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ABSTRACT
“Remov[e] Us From the Bondage of South Africa:” Transnational Resistance Strategies
and Subnational Concessions in Namibia's Police Zone, 1919-1962
Michael R. Hogan
Between 1919 and 1962, the South African government implemented ever more restrictive
segregationist and apartheid policies in South West Africa that attempted to control and monitor
the social, political, and economic development of Namibians living in South West Africa’s
Police Zone. This dissertation examines the transnational resistance campaigns and strategies
developed by Namibians living in the Police Zone and their attempts to dissolve and frustrate the
colonial state’s implementation of these policies. Particular focus is paid to such transnational
institutions/actors as the League of Nations, the Universal Negro Improvement Association, the
African Methodist Episcopal Church, the United Nations, and international student organizations
across Scandinavia, the United States, and South Africa. This work argues that transnational
resistance strategies were the primary tool used by Namibians in the Police Zone during the first
half of the twentieth century and that these strategies were embraced because of the numerous
opportunities created by centuries-old historical linkages connecting Namibians to the
international community. Ideas, actors, resources, and institutions circulated across national
boundaries and proved invaluable in Namibians’ resistance campaigns. These transnational
strategies ultimately helped Namibians secure subnational concessions and reforms from the
colonial regime that improved their standard-of-living and counteracted the South African
government’s flagrant attempts to exploit and underdevelop Namibians living in the Police Zone.
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Chapter 1—South West Africa and Its Changing Colonial Context: Historical Background
and Methodological Considerations
The entrenchment of the South African government’s illegal occupation of South West
Africa, as well as the later development and extension of its apartheid policies, characterized the
colonial experience in the territory between 1915 and 1966. Necessarily, Namibians developed
complex resistance strategies to the colonial state that mobilized people and resources on the
subnational, national, and transnational levels. Resistance by Namibians in the Police Zone
during this period centered on political and social autonomy at both the national and subnational
levels, overturning forced land expropriations, and increasing economic and educational
opportunities.1 This dissertation analyzes how these domestically-marginalized actors developed
transnational networks, through which they organized strategic resistance campaigns to the
extension of segregationist and apartheid policies in South West Africa. The primary focus of
this work is how these actors affected subnational political and socioeconomic change through
the use of transnational churches, student organizations, and supranational political bodies as a
means to temper and alter the behavior and policies of the colonial state. This dissertation argues
that transnational resistance strategies were the primary tool used by Namibians in the Police
Zone during the first half of the twentieth century and that these strategies were embraced
because of the numerous opportunities created by historical linkages connecting Namibians to
the international community. Great attention to detail will be paid in discussing the historical
actors, key events and transformations in the political and socioeconomic sphere, and the

1

The Police Zone constituted the lower two-thirds of the South West Africa territory. In this area, German and
South African colonial police were able to establish police control over the territory constituting the “colonial
heartland” and promise South West Africa’s white population protection from much larger African populations on
the “colonial frontier.” For a more in-depth discussion on the Police Zone and the reasons for limiting this
dissertation’s scope to this area can be found on pages 35-39.

1

convictions that defined these resistance strategies and shaped Namibian history between 1919
and 1962.
Map 1: Reproduction of “Map of the Area to be Placed Under Governmental Police Protection
(1907)”

Source: Giorgio Miescher, Namibia’s Red Line: The History of a Veterinary and Settlement
Border (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 45.

2

This work examines five key transnational institutions that helped facilitate and aid
Namibians’ complex resistance strategies to the extension of South African colonial rule.
Between 1919 and 1945, the League of Nations and the Universal Negro Improvement
Association (UNIA) were the primary transnational bodies that interacted with Namibians in the
Police Zone. The League of Nations mandate granted to the South African government in 1921
provided the Rehoboth Basters with a means to legally challenge the loss of their political
autonomy and the UNIA provided Herero and Nama leaders with access to an international
resource pool and community that lobbied for African independence in the Police Zone.2 During
the apartheid period in South West Africa, and prior to the formation of the nationalist South
West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in 1960, several transnational institutions were
heavily involved in South West Africa’s affairs. The 1940s saw the rise of the African Methodist
Episcopal (AME) Church in the predominantly Nama areas of the Police Zone and Namibians
used its resources and networks of transnational actors to fight for an improved quality of
education for the African population. Likewise, the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945
provided Namibian petition-writers with an outlet to express their grievances over forced land
expropriations. This gave them an avenue to leverage international political pressure against the
South African regime and force it to acquiesce to their demands. Lastly, scholarships provided
by foreign colleges and international student organizations created a framework for an
intelligentsia in exile and placed critical political actors outside of the reach of the South African
government’s recourse. These five institutions form the core of this dissertation and are

The Nama, Herero, and Basters were the three primary ethnic groups in Namibia’s Police Zone. More detail on
Herero and Nama ethnicity is provided on pages 39-46 and the Basters are discussed at length on pages 61-71 of this
dissertation.
2

3

emblematic of the transnational character of Namibians’ resistance strategies in the prenationalist period. Each of these resistance strategies is examined in-depth in the following
chapters, but first historical context on South West Africa’s colonial period under South African
rule is summarized.

South African Rule in South West Africa, 1921-1966
The surrender of the German military to South African forces on 9 July 1915 effectively
ended the German government’s brutal colonial rule over South West Africa and represented a
pivotal moment of hope and potential for political and socioeconomic reform.3 German colonial
rule began in South West Africa in 1884 with the establishment of a government protectorate
over Angra Pequeña and the extension of German jurisdiction into Damaraland and Greater
Namaqualand.4 Merchants and other agents of the German government concluded uneven land
treaties and agreements that, by 1907, effectively granted the German government immense
control over the entire territory south of the Ovambo polities at the Angola border. In the face of
Herero and Nama resistance to the imposition of German rule, the German government
perpetrated the Herero-Nama Genocide between 1904 and 1907. In carrying out the genocide,
the German military effectively de-populated south and central Namibia and severely weakened
Namibians’ ability to successfully rebel against German rule.5

David Stone, The Kaiser’s Army: The German Army in World War One (London: Conway, 2014), 76-77.
Damaraland is the north-central part of South West Africa that stretched from Windhoek in the south to
Ovamboland in the north and was bounded by the Kalahari Desert in the east and the Namib Desert in the west. The
Orange River divides Namaqualand, with Greater Namaqualand resting to the north of the river and Little
Namaqualand to the south.
5
Jeremy Sarkin-Hughes, Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His
Soldiers (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2011), 137-138. Sarkin-Hughes references a number of
studies in his analysis of the demographic impact of the genocide. He references Helmut Bley’s Namibia Under
German Rule, where he argues that between 75 and 80 percent of the Herero population was killed or went into
exile. On those same pages, he points to Horst Drechsler’s Let Us Die Fighting: The Struggle of the Herero and
Nama Against German Imperialism, which states that nearly 81 percent of the Herero population was killed or
3
4

4

The South African military occupation of the territory between 1915 and 1919 occurred
with the use of minimal resources and, as a result, lessened the power of the colonial state to
check Namibians’ movements and activities. Historian Marion Wallace described this period of
minor liberalization, writing “Overall, in the short term the arrival of the South Africans greatly
facilitated African access to land and stock, and the tentative repastoralization that had begun in
the latter years of German rule was tremendously hastened and reinforced.”6 Africans established
new pastoral settlements near Windhoek, 139 Namibian stock owners acquired grazing licenses
to increase the size of their herds, and new Namibian communities and settlements emerged on
crown lands.7 Similarly, pre-genocide leadership structures were reconstituted or reformulated in
the early years of the South African occupation. For example, Edward Frederick returned to
Bethanie, and Isaak Witbooi returned to Gibeon following their imprisonment.8
While Namibians worked to re-establish these previous structures and institutions, South
West Africa was classified as a “Class-C Mandate” following the signing of the Treaty of
Versailles on 28 June 1919 and, despite the initial phase of increased optimism and potential for
a return to precolonial sociopolitical structures, the possibility of subnational, or even national,
independence quickly faded between 1919 and 1921.9 The early years of South African control

displaced. Lastly, Harry Schwirck’s study “Law’s Violence and the Boundary Between Corporal Discipline and
Physical Abuse in German South West Africa,” is also mentioned. The figures in Schwirck’s work suggest that
nearly 85 percent of the Herero population was killed and almost 50 percent of the much smaller Nama population
was also exterminated. The term “successfully rebel” is used here to mean the overthrow of the German colonial
government in the territory.
6
Marion Wallace, A History of Namibia: From the Beginning to 1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013),
212.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid. Edward Frederick survived the concentration camps at Shark Island and returned to lead the community at
Bethanie in 1916. Isaak Witbooi was the son of Hendrik Witbooi. See Casper W. Erichsen, What the Elders Used to
Say: Namibian Perspectives on the Last Decade of German Colonial Rule (Windhoek: Namibian Institute for
Democracy, 2008), 32-42 for a fuller discussion of Frederick’s treatment.
9
The mandate system was set forth in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. In reference to Class C
Mandates, the text reads, “There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands,
which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of
civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best

5

mirrored their wartime rule, in that the government lacked the manpower and resources to fully
control and subdue the Namibian population. Thus, the martial law period in South West Africa
was “in many ways, a time of hope for the African population of the Police Zone, many of whom
seem to have genuinely expected that the new colonial masters would return land confiscated by
the Germans.”10 However, this turning of a “blind eye” to the African re-occupation of fertile
and productive lands was short-lived and the “new regime had…no intention of returning wellwatered land to the Africans of the Police Zone.”11
The South African government ended its military rule over South West Africa on 1
January 1921 and became the mandatory power responsible for overseeing the continued
development of the territory. In its capacity as colonial power between 1921 and 1966, the South
African government instituted a litany of segregationist and apartheid policies that sought to
restrict the mobility of the Namibian population and limit their political, social, and economic
opportunities in the territory.12 As more resources and manpower were poured into South West
Africa in the subsequent decades, the South African government quickly developed a restrictive
and highly effective state apparatus to systematically monitor and control the Namibian
population. The socioeconomic and political situation for Namibians in the territory rapidly
deteriorated as economic and political opportunities disappeared and the standard of living
plummeted.

administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above
mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.” The mandate system is described in greater detail on pages
71 through 81 of this dissertation.
10
Wallace, A History of Namibia, 213.
11
Ibid.
12
Specific examples of segregationist policies implemented during the Inter-War Period can be found on pages 81
through 91 of this dissertation, while chapter 4 provides an in-depth analysis of the apartheid policies established
after 1948.
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The situation in South West Africa was abysmal for its Namibian residents on a number
of levels under the South African occupation. During the Interwar Years, the newly appointed
South African mandatory government focused primarily on controlling the movement of
Namibians and the expropriation of African-inhabited lands. In the early 1920s, the South
African government’s Native Reserve Commission re-established the former German reserves
and created new reserves to displace the Namibian populations from fertile lands, clearing the
way for white settlement in the Police Zone.13 The new reserves further exacerbated the bleak
economic outlook for Namibians during the period, as most of the new reserves were placed on
tracts of land that possessed limited water resources and were unable to support the sizable
displaced populations. Further compounding the poor economic situation for Namibians in the
territory was the drought of the 1920s, the South African government’s unwillingness to aid
Africans in need of financial assistance, and the coming global economic depression. The
drought negatively impacted the agricultural sector of the South West African economy.
Whereas whites in the territory had access to loans and state-sponsored subsidies from the
Union, Namibians were left to deal with the impending recession on their own.14 The result was
an intense state of poverty and hardship for South West Africa’s African population.
The Namibian population fared even worse under South Africa’s apartheid government
between 1949 and 1966. The government continued to economically marginalize Namibians by
ordering a series of forced land removals in the 1950s and introducing the Wage and Industrial

Reinhart Kössler ¨From Reserve to Homeland: Local Identities and South African Policy in Southern Namibia,”
Journal of Southern African Studies 26, No. 3 (September, 2000): 447-452.
14
Wallace, A History of Namibia, 215-232. The term “Union” is used hereafter to refer to the South African
government after 31 May 1910. In 1909, the South Africa Act effectively unified the Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal,
and the Orange Free State into one unitary nation. A constitution was created and an entirely white government was
formed and headed by a prime minister and a bicameral parliament. The parliament consisted of the 40-member
Senate and the 121-member House of Assembly. The senate possessed eight members from each of the former
colonies plus an additional eight members, four of which served as representatives for non-whites in the Union. The
House of Assembly was set to expand to 150 members as the Union’s population continued to grow.
13

7

Conciliation Ordinance of 1952 to bar Namibians from joining trade unions and other
organizations that sought to protect workers’ legal rights.15 Likewise, a pass system was further
entrenched during the post-World War II period and Namibian movement was heavily
monitored. This new system helped facilitate the implementation of an extensive migratory labor
system that sustained South West Africa’s white settler economy and continued to pump its
revenues into the South African economy.
The apartheid government also delved more deeply into the social sphere. In 1949,
whites in South West Africa gained the ability to elect representatives directly to the South
African Parliament, while Namibians were still prevented from participation in the election
process. The South African government successfully segregated the public sphere by introducing
the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act
of 1953 that required Africans to use separate public facilities than their white counterparts. This
enforced segregation carried over into the rural areas as well, with the development of an
ethnically-based reserve policy that created ethnic homelands and attempted to divide the
Namibian population to make it more manageable.16 In all instances, the legal and economic
structure imposed on the African population of South West Africa sought to marginalize and
impoverish, creating stagnant populations that participated in the monetary economy as a cheap
labor pool with few rights and means for recourse.
The deplorable colonial situation that Namibians faced resulted in dynamic resistance
campaigns against the implementation and extension of the South African government’s
restrictive apartheid apparatus. There were undoubtedly a number of domestic resistance

15

Gwyneth Williams and Brian Hackland, The Dictionary of Contemporary Politics of Southern Africa (Abingdonon-Thames: Routledge, 2015), 282.
16
Kössler, “From Reserve to Homeland,” 447-462.
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campaigns that attempted to redress violations by the colonial government. In 1922, the
Bondelswarts rebelled against over-taxation and participated in an armed struggle against the
colonial regime. In 1923 and 1925, respectively, the Witboois managed to successfully resist a
forced removal from Gibeon to Tses, and Hosea Kutako prevented the forced removal of the
Herero to inhospitable land at Epikuro. The 1940s and 1950s were likewise characterized by
local resistance movements against forced removals and, by the 1960s, regional and national
political organizations and workers’ unions formed in South West Africa to provide Namibians
with an outlet through which they could make claims of the colonial government.17
Although Namibians developed domestic resistance campaigns to varying degrees of
success, transnational resistance strategies flourished in the Police Zone between 1919 and 1962.
During this period, Namibians in the Police Zone fought against the extension of South Africa’s
colonial rule by drawing on historical linkages and networks with organizations and institutions
in Europe and the Americas. In the 1920s, the Rehoboth Basters worked through transnational
actors to make claims of both the League of Nations and the South African government to reestablish their political sovereignty at Rehoboth. That same decade, the UNIA sent agents to
Lüderitz to develop relationships with Namibian laborers and political and religious leaders in an
attempt to gain independence for the South West Africa territory. The 1940s and 1950s saw a
continuation of this strategy as well. The AME Church spread to the Nama polities in the mid1940s and quickly became an institution through which Namibians advocated for improved
educational opportunities and made claims of permanent settlement on the land.18 Nearly a
decade later, these same leaders began a petition-writing campaign to the UN that sought aid
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from the international community and requested that they exert pressure on the South African
government to temper and halt the forced land removals in the Police Zone.
This dissertation is concerned primarily with the aforementioned transnational resistance
strategies that developed between the end of World War I and the formation of the national
political parties in the 1960s. At the center of this project are five crucial questions. To what
extent and in what ways did Namibians utilize transnational organizations, institutions, and
networks in their efforts to dissolve or frustrate the colonial apparatus of the South African
regime? Why did Namibians embrace transnationalism as a means of resistance and were these
transnational strategies part of a larger coordinated campaign in the territory? How did
Namibians develop, use, and maintain these transnational networks across time and space and
what were the power dynamics like within these networks? What subnational concessions and
reforms did Namibians demand from the colonial state and international community and did
these campaigns succeed or fail to achieve the stated goals of the movements’ leaders? Lastly,
how did subnational geopolitical structures and considerations factor into these resistance
strategies and were these strategies inclusive of, or exclusive to, the different groups living in the
Police Zone? In answering these questions, this work provides a thorough examination of the
transnational resistance strategies employed by Namibian actors and analyzes their varying
degrees of success in altering the behavior and policies of the colonial state.

The African Resistance Historiography and the Changing Conception of Resistance
The historiography surrounding African resistance to colonial rule has evolved
significantly as the field of African History has grown over the past 60 years. As the field
emerged in the late-1950s and early-1960s, the scholarly conceptualization of resistance centered
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on a dichotomy that labeled African actors as either resistors or collaborators. The publication of
Independent African in 1958, an examination of the resistance campaign waged by John
Chilembwe against colonial authorities in Nyasaland, set the stage for numerous subsequent
works that portrayed African resistors as reactionaries to colonial activity and collaborators as
prudent operators that possessed a stronger grasp of the situation at hand.19 Ronald Robinson and
John Gallagher further cemented the two antipoles of resistor and collaborator, the former
viewed as romantic and unsuccessful proto-nationalists and the latter as practical and far-sighted
actors.20
By the late-1960s, after most African nations achieved independence and began the
process of nation-building, scholars viewed the aforementioned dichotomy as a gross oversimplification of a nuanced and complex subject. Scholars during this period argued for a
middle-path between resistance and collaboration, termed “accommodation.” Terrance Ranger’s
1969 contribution to The History and Politics of Colonialism in Africa outlined this concept,
arguing that the choice to resist or collaborate was often a calculated decision given one’s
circumstances and that societies could fluctuate between the two positions in quick succession.
Ranger contended, “Some resisting societies desperately attempted to avoid the necessity of
resistance. Some cooperating societies made it plain that they were ready to resist if their
cherished privileges were attacked.”21 Thus, accommodation provided a dynamic, rather than
static, analytical tool that could effectively account for African actors’ changing agency.
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Africans could fluctuate between resistance and collaboration, depending on the given historical
context at a particular time.
A common criticism of the resistance scholarship that emerged in the 1970s argued that
the historiography centered too much on the political sphere and conceptions of resistance were
too closely linked to the nationalist movements. Jonathon Glassman argued in Feasts and Riots
that “the historical resistance literature was marred by a teleology that constructed all African
protest as leading inexorably to modern nationalism and decolonization.”22 Furthermore, the
resistance studies of the 1950s and 1960s focused too intently on armed resistance and rebellion,
ignoring various types of resistance that emerged outside of the political sphere. During the
1970s and 1980s, that focus shifted, and the concept of resistance grew and expanded. In these
decades, scholars diverted their attention from uncovering the roots of nationalism and instead
analyzed the concept of systemic underdevelopment that had occurred in African society. As a
result, analysis shifted away from the intelligentsia and heroic nationalist leaders and scholars
delved more deeply into the mass movements of the period and the activities of the peasantry.
James C. Scott’s Weapons of the Weak, despite its focus on Malaysian peasant resistance,
provided one of the most influential theoretical and conceptual shifts in the ways that historians
understood and analyzed resistance. Scott’s work centered on the dynamics of peasant resistance
and moved away from academia’s focus on the acts of resistance themselves and, instead, on the
intention of the action. In Scott’s conception of resistance, everyday activities like arson,
sabotage, individual boycotts, and foot-dragging also became acts of resistance. These acts were
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part of a long struggle against the wealthier classes in society that took place “backstage” to
avoid outright conflict and win peasants concessions and reform within the existent
socioeconomic system.23 Weapons of the Weak, and other works published on peasant resistance
in Africa during the mid-to-late 1980s, expanded the definition of resistance from rebellion and
protest against colonial authority to “include everything from foot-dragging and dissimulation to
social banditry, arson, poaching, theft, avoidance of conscription, desertion, migration, and
riot.”24
Despite Scott’s focus on class relations, the 1990s and 2000s saw an increase in scholarly
works that used the now-expanded definition of resistance to analyze its impact on the various
spheres of colonial life. Jean and John Comaroff’s work on the relationship between symbology,
religion, and resistance perhaps best represent this shift in the studies of colonial South Africa.
The publication of Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance encapsulated the spirit of Scott’s
“everyday resistance,” but expanded its scope beyond class relations to include issues of
symbology, cosmology, and healing. Jean Comaroff contended that the Tshidi construction of an
Africanized Christian symbology gave them the ability to confront their lived colonial
experiences through the creation of a conscious system of signs and practices, resulting in the
ability to manipulate and address their position in the physical world.25 Similarly, Of Revelation
and Revolution looked at the everyday negotiations that occurred between African social
practices and colonial demands of modernity as acts of resistance and accommodation.26 In both
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cases, these works represented the coming shifts in historians’ definitions of resistance to
colonialism in Africa.
Resistance studies of the past decade have picked up this mantle and continue to explore
the diverse and nuanced nature of African resistance to colonial rule. For example, Gwen
Ansell’s Soweto Blues examined the role that jazz played in the South African liberation struggle
of the twentieth century and the link it created between South African and African American
political activists.27 Likewise, Sue Williamson’s Resistance Art in South Africa and Glenn
Reynold’s Colonial Cinema in Africa provide excellent examples of artistic expression as a
means through which to challenge the social hegemony that colonial regimes attempted to
create.28 Further works, like Fassil Demissie’s Colonial Architecture and Urbanism in Africa,
even analyze the politics of resistance that manifested themselves in city-planning and the
aesthetics of colonial architecture.29
The gendered dynamics of resistance have also come to the historiographical fore during
the past two decades. The publication of Judith Abwunza’s Women’s Voices, Women’s Power
and the edited work African Women Writing Resistance are exemplary works that examine
women’s resistance strategies to not only the colonial society, but the post-colonial world too.
Abwunza’s work focuses on re-imaging women as “innovative actors, creative and visionary,
surviving their oppressive circumstances rather than simply being oppressed,” while the edited
work examines contemporary issues, like polygamy, environmental degradation, and Sharia law,
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that women face on a daily basis.30 Later works, like Nwando Achebe’s The Female King of
Colonial Nigeria, continued this multi-dimensional representation of women as crucial resistance
figures to colonial rule and examined the way that the Igbo woman Ahebi Ugbabe vacillated
between aiding the colonial regime and resisting it for personal gain.31 These works, and others
like them, added complexity and nuance to historians’ use of resistance as an analytical tool, and
played varied parts in shaping the Namibian resistance historiography.

The Development of the Namibian Resistance Historiography
and this Dissertation’s Contribution
Since Namibia and South Africa experienced late decolonization as a result of the
pervasive entrenchment of white minority rule, it follows that its resistance historiography went
through many of the aforementioned developments at a later time.32 As Namibia emerged as an
independent nation in the 1990s, the resistance historiography served a dual purpose as both a
field of academic inquiry and a key element in the nation-building process. The former British
and French colonies in Africa underwent a similar process in the 1950s and 1960s, when the
historiography centered on armed resistance and independence struggles to create a new national
identity that focused on African agency and triumph over the colonial oppressors. The early postcolonial resistance historiography in Namibia underwent a similar process as the nation emerged
in the 1990s and early-2000s as national political heroes and their activities were re-integrated
into the Namibian national consciousness.
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The central thematic pursuits of the historiography followed suit and historians focused
their inquiries heavily around two subjects: the armed resistance campaigns against the extension
of German rule and the armed national liberation struggle undertaken by SWAPO between 1966
and 1991. In 1996, Brigitte Lau translated and published the papers and diary of Hendrik
Witbooi in an attempt to bring the writings and ideology of an important resistance figure to the
masses.33 The 1990s saw numerous publications of works that examined the activities of the
Maharero and Witbooi against German colonial rule as a means to re-integrate the armed
resistance activities of these figures into the Namibian independence narrative.34 The HereroNama Genocide of 1904-1907 also occupied a prominent space in the post-colonial resistance
historiography. Jan-Bart Gewald’s Herero Heroes is one of the preeminent works on the
genocide and provides an in-depth look at both the internal and external sociopolitical disputes
that the Herero faced as the German government strengthened its rule.35 The intense academic
focus on the German period has been maintained into recent decades with the publication of
Jeremy Sarkin-Hughes’ Germany’s Genocide of the Herero and David Olusoga and Casper W.
Erichsen’s The Kaiser’s Holocaust in 2011.36 Although these two studies are far more nuanced
in their definition of resistance than the resistance studies of the 1950s and 1960s, they still
maintain a clear focus on the armed resistance struggles as the foremost form of resistance to
colonial rule.
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Likewise, the scholarship created in the post-colonial period is inundated with studies on
the activities of SWAPO between 1966 and 1991 and the armed liberation struggle that saw
Namibia gain its national independence. Much like the scholarship that examines the armed
resistance campaigns against German colonial rule, the scholarship that focuses on SWAPO’s
war for independence also serves in the building of Namibia’s post-colonial national identity.
The subject matter examined in studies of SWAPO’s activities are diverse, but in most cases the
narrative utilizes the colonizer-colonized paradigm and places SWAPO’s forces and leadership
in a reactionary battle against the activities of the South African government. Only recently have
works utilized a more complex analysis of SWAPO’s activities. For example, Lauren Dobell’s
SWAPO’s Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991 examined SWAPO’s activities during the liberation
struggle primarily through a diplomatic lens. Similarly, Richard Dale’s publication of The
Namibian War of Independence, 1966-1989 moved beyond the military campaign and looked at
the role that economic warfare and diplomatic maneuvering played in Namibia’s decolonization
process.37
The armed struggles against colonial rule provide for a strong nationalistic interpretation
that serves the important role of nation-building and creates a useful narrative that celebrates
African agency. However, in Jeremy Silvester’s recent publication Re-Viewing Resistance in
Namibian History, the usefulness of the “nationalistic” interpretation of resistance is critiqued. In
the introduction to his work, Silvester takes issues with Peter Katjavivi’s belief that
independence was the result of a 300-year-long resistance campaign against the German and
South African governments and that all acts of resistance against these two governments were
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“nationalistic” in nature.38 Instead, Silvester warned that such an approach “reduces the
dynamics of struggle to a simple dichotomy….The danger is that agency is reduced and the
complex political dynamics around issues such as generational conflict, ethnicity, traditional
authorities, and gender are ignored.”39 Silvester recognized one of the more problematic
elements of the Namibian resistance historiography: its intense focus on armed resistance and
conflict and the potential risk of relying on conventional colonizer-colonized, oppressoroppressed dichotomies.
While Silvester’s work identified a key shortcoming in the structure of these early
resistance narratives, it serves to highlight a second problem: Namibian resistance to South
Africa’s colonial rule between 1921 and 1962 is under-researched in comparison to the
aforementioned topics. Re-Viewing Resistance, a collection of seventeen chapters presented at
the Archives of Anti-Colonial Resistance and the Liberation Struggle’s (AACRLS) Moments,
Memories and Monuments conference provided nuanced studies of SWAPO’s activities through
the utilization of new audio-visual sources, interviews with ex-combatants, and music. However,
despite developing new directions in the scholarship by using African-created source material, a
clear void still persisted with regard to scholarship on resistance to the extension of South
Africa’s segregationist policies in the pre-SWAPO period.
Few academics have produced comprehensive works of scholarship focusing on
resistance campaigns waged by Namibians against the South African state prior to the initiation
of the armed national liberation struggle. Tony Emmett was one of the earliest scholars to
comprehensively explore the period spanning 1915 to 1966 with the publication of Popular
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Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia in 1999. Emmett’s work included an
examination of some instances of armed conflict, such as the Bondelswart’s Rebellion and the
Rehoboth Rebellion, but also included a lengthy analysis of the contract labor system that
developed to the north of the Police Zone and the impact that migratory workers had on the
independence movement.40 Although an important early pioneer in the study of this period,
Emmett’s work does present some weaknesses. For instance, his work is frequently criticized for
its focus of issues that occurred in Windhoek and his complete exclusion of the Black separatist
church movements of the 1940s. Emmett’s work also falls firmly within the category of works
whose main concern is to uncover the roots of the later-nationalist struggle that emerged in the
1960s.
Other academics have also attempted to address the various developments in Namibia
that occurred during the South African colonial period. Between 1958 and 1973, Katesa
Schlosser’s Native Churches in South and Southwest Africa and Theo Sundermeier’s But We
Were Looking for Fellowship provided in-depth studies of the separatist church movements as
they pertain to both theological and practical concerns in the Rhenish Mission Church in the
1940s and 1950s.41 Others focused on the legal apparatus surrounding the extension of apartheid
in South West Africa in the late-1940s and 1950s. John Dugard’s Confronting Apartheid
examined the “entrenchment” of discriminatory policies in southern Africa from the viewpoint of
UN officials, and international bodies have produced countless reports on the problematic nature
of apartheid policies.42 Many of the scholars who focused on apartheid polices during this
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period have turned their attention and effort toward understanding apartheid’s ability to define
space, limit access to said space, and the sociocultural and political consequences of such
restrictions.
While many of these studies are comprehensive in their stated scope and address
important developments in the pre-SWAPO colonial period under South African rule, they are
singular in their subject matter and provide little in the way of understanding the complex, wideranging resistance strategies and networks that developed nearly simultaneously across the
Police Zone. Against this backdrop, this study seeks to engage with the resistance strategies of
Namibians in the Police Zone between 1921 and 1962 by examining these strategies and efforts
as part of a larger transnational process that enveloped the territory. Like most of the studies in
the past two decades, this dissertation conceives of resistance as an act and process that extends
far beyond armed conflict and the tired colonizer-colonized dichotomies that place all resistance
within a nationalistic paradigm. In this work, in agreement with Walraven and Abbink, resistance
is defined “not so much by various forms of concrete acts, as by the intent of those performing
these acts, aimed usually at the defense of pre-existing and cherished socio-political
arrangements, upholding other civilizational ideals, or just defending existing power structures,
elite or otherwise.”43 The resistance of this period need not be conceived merely as an act or
action to achieve national independence, but rather as conscious and sustained efforts to carve
out spheres of influence and agency within the overarching colonial structure in hopes of
improving everyday life.
Whereas most studies of Namibian resistance have focused on political ends, this
dissertation examines resistance within its wider spectrum as both a political and socioeconomic
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process that centers not on national independence, but on local and subnational goals and
ambitions. Ultimately, this work still addresses political processes much like Emmett’s work,
and discusses the Rehoboth Rebellion of 1925. However, a large portion of this dissertation
focuses on the social sphere. Among the various social processes discussed are: the growth and
eventual dissolution of the UNIA in South West Africa between 1919 and 1924, the rise of the
AME Church and its role in both land disputes and advocating for improved education, the
socioeconomic-centric petition-writing campaigns to the UN in the 1950s and 1960s, and
Namibians’ utilization of foreign colleges and student organizations as a means of resistance to
the colonial regime.
This work fundamentally differs from previous studies of the time period in that it does
not seek to evaluate the resistance campaigns of the era as a predecessor or root cause of the later
nationalist movements. Rather, this dissertation examines these various resistance campaigns as
part of a larger transnational process that relies on historic linkages and relationships to combat
the increasingly aggressive colonial state. These resistance campaigns are, thusly, analyzed as a
mechanism to achieve subnational, rather than national, sociopolitical and economic
concessions. As is apparent throughout the subsequent chapters, in most cases where
transnational institutions were used, the goal of the analyzed political actors was to achieve some
type of reform, concession, or improvement for the population in one’s specific locale or polity.
It was not until the 1950s and early 1960s that true claims of national independence became the
focal point of the resistance campaigns in South West Africa.
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Transnational History as a Conceptual Framework for
Namibian Resistance Studies
South West Africa’s history under South African colonial rule is defined by the plethora
of transnational institutions and organizations that Namibians interacted with between 1919 and
1962. As early as 1919, Namibians accessed historical maritime networks and union connections
to spread the Pan-African message of the UNIA and develop local branches tasked with
providing social and economic welfare programs to guard Namibians against the harsh realities
under the South African colonial regime. Simultaneously, in the Rehoboth Gebiet, the Baster
community utilized the legal framework provided by the League of Nations Charter and mandate
system to call on the international community to pressure the South African government for
restoring local political autonomy at Rehoboth.44 The petition-writing campaign legacy would
continue into the apartheid period, when new political actors would undertake a similar
resistance campaign by writing petitions to the UN to call for local political autonomy, the
protection of land rights, and even national liberation. Some of the same actors that participated
in the petition-writing campaign to the UN were also involved with other transnational
organizations as a means of resistance to the colonial regime. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s,
many Namibians joined the separatist church movements that sought to improve education for
Africans and provide Namibians with more authority over their social and religious lives.45
In recent decades, transnational history and the examination of transnational institutions
as a means of resistance has emerged as an important conceptual framework through which one
can analyze developments in African history. Although the term “transnational history” dates
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back to the 1840s, it has only coalesced into a clearly structured field in the past 20 to 30 years.
In 2013, to adequately define the field, Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier published books that
presented the theoretical considerations, terminology, and methodology of the field.46 That same
year, Andrew Zimmerman published his article “Africa in Imperial and Transnational History,”
where he argued that African historians produced transnational histories for decades.
Zimmerman viewed these transnational African histories as effective in dismantling previous
“borders” between the “colonized” and “colonizer,” removing unnecessary dichotomies and
problematic paradigms through multi-sited research.47 This multi-sited research theoretically
diversified the African histories produced by scholars and incorporated multiple perspectives on
a historical moment to broaden one’s understanding of said event.
Zimmerman believed that Namibia provided fertile ground for transnational African
histories because of its rapidly changing colonial context and its peculiar legal standing as both a
mandate territory and potential UN trust territory. The historiography provides some support to
Zimmerman’s assertions, with numerous recent works on southern Africa embracing a
transnational perspective.48 Robert Vinson’s The Americans Are Coming! utilized the
transnational and multi-sited approach in its analysis of the movement and development of
Garveyist ideas in the United States and South Africa.49 Similarly, the work of Robert Houle and
James T. Campbell on African Christianity and the Ethiopian movement in southern Africa have
incorporated effectively-used transnational frameworks as an explanatory paradigm for the
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transfer of peoples and ideas across borders.50 This dissertation is largely influenced by these
scholars’ theoretical frameworks and analyzes the developments of resistance campaigns in
Namibia between 1921 and 1962 within their transnational context.
Transnational history emerged in part as a response to the historiographical problem of
methodological nationalism, an approach to history “whereby historians explicitly or implicitly
produce a tune in which the country, aka the national state, appears as the natural form or
organization of societies and the basic unit of historiography.”51 Saunier acknowledged,
however, that a transnational perspective does not eliminate the state as a unit of analysis,
writing, “[T]ransnational history is not written against or without nations but simultaneously
pays attention to what lives against, between, and through them.”52 In transnational history, the
primary focus of analysis is not the state, but rather the multitude of entanglements that exist
between nations, communities, economies, and individuals. Thus, those that drive, create, and
shape the historical narrative are non-state actors in their variety of forms. In this particular
transnational history, those non-state actors include Namibian actors, supranational political
organizations, transnational Black separatist churches, and global student organizations that
participated in the resistance campaigns against the colonial state.
Through these non-state actors, Namibians created and maintained complex networks
that spanned numerous countries. A key unit of analysis for an examination of the transnational
resistance strategies developed by these non-state actors is the circuit. Circuits, as defined by
Saunier, are “an arrangement of linkages that is consciously installed and maintained in order to
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gain access to resources and possibilities located in different places across national borders.”53
Between 1919 and 1962, several different circuits developed across the Atlantic that provided
Namibians with access to resources, information, and people that could amplify the effectiveness
of their resistance strategies. For example, a circuit developed between North America, the
Caribbean, and Namibia as a result of the nineteenth-century commercial maritime trade between
the regions. Namibians and Americans maintained this circuit well into the twentieth century,
when it served as the foundation for the movement and flow of the UNIA and AME Church.
Likewise, circuits that developed in the 1920s as a result of the Rehoboth Basters petitionwriting were maintained and provided pathways for Namibians to undertake a petition-writing
campaign to the UN and seek out the aid of international student organizations in North America,
Europe, and South Africa during the 1950s.
Undoubtedly, transplantation and migration played an important role in developing these
networks.54 As chapter 3 will show, the migration of Black Americans to South Africa and
Namibia as dockworkers resulted in the development of tightly-knit communities that allowed
the UNIA and trade unions to spread and flourish during the 1920s. The travel and migration of
missionaries from the United States also made it possible to establish AME Church branches in
South Africa that eventually spread to Namibia in the 1940s. Although these actors were
frequently required to obtain permission from the colonial state before traveling in the territory,
their ambiguous status as non-state actors often provided them with the anonymity and
malleability to move on the periphery of the colonial state’s gaze. As such, they frequently were
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the primary developers of the communication infrastructure necessary to maintain the circuits
between transnational organizations and Namibian actors.
As the previous two paragraphs suggest, transnational history necessarily deals with the
“trends, patterns, organizations, and individuals that have been living between and through [the
nation].”55 The movement of these ideas, resources, and people along these various circuits had a
profound impact on the success and shape of the resistance strategies developed by Namibian
actors. In this dissertation the term “circulation,” rather than “flow,” is frequently used to address
the movement of the aforementioned elements. This is an important distinction because within
the transnational networks discussed in this work, the exchange of ideas, people, and resources is
multi-directional. Saunier noted that this multi-directional circulation is a key part of any
transnational history because of the profound impact this has on the shape of one’s resistance
strategies. He argued that “transnational perspective acknowledges and assesses foreign
contributions to the design, discussion, and implementation of domestic features within the
communities, polities and societies; and, vice versa, the projection of the domestic features into
the foreign.”56 Such multi-directional exchanges and influences are most apparent in the chapters
on the UNIA and the AME Church.
The heavy usage of transnational organizations and institutions in Namibians’ resistance
strategies in the pre-SWAPO period occurred for a number of practical reasons. Chief among
these was the fact that as the South African state strengthened its grip on the African populations
of South West Africa, fewer avenues of legitimate recourse existed within the state
infrastructure. The legal mechanisms instituted by the South African state so profoundly
marginalized Namibians’ abilities to work through the state to seek reform that they turned to
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transnational organizations that functioned in the territory but existed outside of the recursive
purview of the colonial state. While the South African government attempted to regulate and
restrict the ability of organizations to maneuver in the territory, the colonial government’s
obligations to the larger international community allowed transnational organizations to leverage
the weight of action by supranational political bodies and the South African government’s most
important political allies.
Through these transnational networks, Namibians found willing and ready allies that
provided the necessary resources to wage resistance campaigns that allowed local leaders to
carve out new subnational spheres of political, social, and economic influence within a
repressive colonial context. The UNIA provided structural and economic support to create a
welfare organization in South West Africa that covered funeral costs, created a socialized
medical fund, and advocated for political autonomy. Namibians used the international standing
of the League of Nations and the UN and their immense pool of resources to wage a campaign
for political autonomy and economic freedom that frustrated the highest echelons of the colonial
state. Similarly, Namibians coordinated with the AME Church and used its position as a widelyaccepted global religious institution as a means to advocate for increased education and assert
claims to fertile lands in the Police Zone. The development, use, and maintenance of these
transnational networks to affect change is the central thrust of this study.

Sources and Methodology
A sweeping transnational historical study like the one undertaken in this dissertation was
time and resource intensive and presented a number of research challenges. First among these
many challenges was the disparate nature of the sources and the distribution of relevant materials
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across the globe. As Andrew Zimmerman suggested, one of the keys to overcoming the pitfalls
of methodological nationalism and constructing an effective transnational study is the utilization
of a multi-sited research approach.57 The pursuit of historical records across three continents in a
variety of archival repositories introduced a number of diverse perspectives that strengthened this
work and filled the documentary voids inherent in the collections of a single institution. The
multi-sited research approach allowed for the examination of Namibian resistance strategies
through interconnected sites which, as a consequence, helped dismantle some of the inherent
problems that emerge from focusing solely on records and documents produced by colonial
sources. The removal of traditional hierarchies that value European- and white-produced archival
materials over those produced by Africans or other non-state international actors was easier to
implement by using archival repositories.
A logical starting point for the research in this work was the National Archives of
Namibia and its extensive holdings. The National Archives was created through the Archives Act
(Act No. 12 of 1992) and the archives assumed responsibility for regulating and supervising all
records management activities related to the government and public services. Over the next three
decades, the archives accepted numerous documents and collections from the former South
African colonial government and international institutions that created records through their
interactions with Namibians. The National Archives contains a significant number of historical
records spanning from the nineteenth century to the present, with a vast array of collections from
both the German and South African colonial periods. One of the primary concerns of this
dissertation was to produce a transnational study but still use African voices as the driving force
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in the construction of a historical narrative. Thus, the South West Africa Administration
(SWAA) record group was highly important in extracting the African voices of the period.
The SWAA records span from roughly the 1920s to the 1980s with new adoptions and
records being added to the collection periodically. Government officials and administrators
created this collection over this period. They compiled extensive collections of minutes,
memoranda, official and unofficial communications, petitions, and government directives.58 It is
important to recognize that since these record groups were largely collected and compiled by
officials and administrators under the supervision of the colonial government, these actors
possessed a significant amount of influence over the types of records collected and, conversely,
omitted from the official record. The inclusion and omission of records has a meaningful impact
on the historical narrative that emerges from the documentary analysis conducted by scholars
and, at times, requires analyzing these silences and glaring absences as clues themselves.
The documents that proved most useful in this collection were, however, those records
created by Namibians in their own words and voice. Frequently, the Namibian voice came
through most clearly in documents challenging the repressive policies and activities of the
colonial state. Letters, petitions, and communications between Namibians and the colonial
government were prevalent throughout the SWAA records and, when not in Namibians’ own
handwriting, were often included as typewritten attachments to official government minutes and
communications. These records proved invaluable in the pursuit of extracting the Namibian
voice and more deeply understanding their agency, desires, motivations, and the thought process
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behind many of their resistance activities and strategies. These types of documents were
instrumental in constructing the arguments for chapters 4 through 6. Namibians’ discussions and
letters with government officials over the issue of incorporation in 1946, correspondence about
the construction of AME schools and the attainment of state recognition, and the petitions of
Hosea Kutako and Markus Kooper protesting against forced land removals in the 1950s were all
found in these archives and helped emphasize the Namibian voice and their agency.
While Namibian-created sources were analyzed carefully, even more discernment was
needed when SWAA officials attempted to relay the thoughts and motivations of Namibians that
were gleaned from the officials’ own understanding of their conversations with Namibian leaders
and activists. This was most apparent in chapter 3 and this work’s examination of the UNIA in
South West Africa. Although the Marcus Garvey papers were published in a multi-volume set in
1983, most of the documents pertaining to South West Africa are amassed in volumes 9 and 10.59
In the SWAA records, roughly two boxes contained records produced by Namibians that
pertained to the UNIA’s activities in the territory. In these boxes, most of the records consisted
of SWAA officials’ correspondence relating to the monitoring of UNIA agents in the territory
and the white response to the association’s Pan-African message. There were some documents
written by Namibian UNIA members requesting the establishment of branches, handwritten
notes in Nama, and correspondence from non-indigenous UNIA members to Namibians and
potential recruits. Where only SWAA officials’ documents were available, corroborating
evidence was sought from other archival institutions and record groups to highlight areas of
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agreement or incongruity to account for the immense influence that these officials had in
compiling the documents and creating an evidentiary record.
In some instances, agreement was easy to find between Namibian sources and SWAA
officials. For example, in chapter 5 it was clear that SWAA officials agreed with AME church
officials that the RMS embellished accounts of communist infiltration in the AME church
movement and were doing so to stem the loss of their congregants and revenues. However, other
events examined by this dissertation presented different and often conflicting narratives. In the
case of the AME congregations’ resistance to the forced removals at Hoachanas in the late
1950s, congregants provided vastly different accounts of the violent encounter with SWAA
officials than those records generated by SWAA official Colonel Dorfling. To address these
contradictory accounts, and without corroborating evidence elsewhere in the historical record,
this work recognized the accounts of the congregants and Colonel Dorfling as differing
perspectives on the same event. This also occurred, in part, in this work’s examination of the
implementation of the vote on incorporation in 1946 and in the correspondence between Hosea
Kutako and government officials over the Kuridora Affair in the Aminuis Reserve. In each
example, the varying perspectives on the issue were highlighted and then supported by concrete
evidence from the archival record.
Aiding in this difficult navigation of archival collections and records produced by the
colonial regime were the diverse origins of many of these documents. While government
correspondence, minutes, and memoranda made up a significant portion of these collections,
there were also record groups present in the SWAA created by Namibians, international actors,
and other non-governmental entities. These record groups provided diverse perspectives on
overlapping issues and presented adequate source material to either corroborate or contradict the
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official records of the colonial regime. Collections like those detailing the AME church’s pursuit
of state recognition consisted of a significant number of documents produced by AME actors that
provided an important counterbalance to the claims made by the RMS and government officials
about the nature of the church movement and the “imaginary” karakul sheep pelt thefts described
by the territory’s police force. These resources were instrumental in the creation of a more
complete historical narrative and allowed for the inclusion of diverse perspectives on the
resistance activities of Namibians. Through these varying perspectives, it was easier to see how
Namibians viewed the SWAA, how the SWAA viewed Namibian activities, and how Namibians
viewed and understood each other’s motivations and agency during the period.
Much like this dissertation tracks the flow and circulation of ideas and actors across
borders, it was also necessary to track down documents and materials at archival repositories
outside of Namibia. South West Africa experienced a series of dramatic political changes
throughout its colonial history, moving from German colony to South African mandate territory,
and finally to potential UN trust territory. Throughout these changes, and because of South West
Africa’s changing international legal standing, different national, transnational, and nongovernmental organizations collected and compiled records on the territory and its people.
Therefore, many of the records required to construct a more complete historical narrative
surrounding Namibian’s transnational resistance strategies lay outside of Namibia’s present
borders.
The clearest examples of the scattered nature of archival records appears in the chapter on
the Baster’s pursuit of subnational political autonomy and the resistance campaigns waged by
Hosea Kutako and Markus Kooper against the SWAA’s forced land removals. The Baster’s were
required to submit their petitions to the League of Nations through the South African mandatory
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government. As a result, there are limited records associated with these petitions in the National
Archives of Namibia. Instead, these documents are partially stored in South Africa’s National
Archives in Pretoria.60 Many of the petitions, or copies of the petitions, eventually made their
way to the League of Nations Archives in Geneva, Switzerland where they are presently housed
as part of the Mandates Section record groups. The petitions were accessed through this archival
institution in July 2019 and were influential in drawing out the Baster’s own voices and words to
highlight their agency and the claims they made to the SWAA.
Similar problems arose with access to the original petitions submitted by Kutako and
Kooper to the UN during the 1950s. However, unlike the Baster’s petitions to the League of
Nations, the National Archives of Namibia secured copies of many of the documents held at the
UN and accessioned them as part of the AACRLS in Windhoek. It was necessary to travel to
New York City to access the original documents as it was unclear at the time if the copies housed
at the National Archives of Namibia were complete in nature. Once again, the petitions sent to
the UN were written or dictated directly by influential Namibian political actors and played an
important role in using Namibian voices as the driving force in this dissertation.
Despite the primary focus of this work resting on the agency and voices of marginalized
Namibian actors, Namibians’ transnational resistance strategies involved actors and institutions
that moved across borders and resided around the world. These actors played an important role in
facilitating the resources, networks, and communicative infrastructure necessary to wage these
wide-ranging transnational resistance campaigns. As such, it was important to seek out the
voices of these actors to better understand their role in these campaigns and create a more
complete picture surrounding the complexity of these transnational resistance strategies. Since
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some of these actors were highly influential in global or regional politics, many of their records
and writings were published. Several of Reverend Michael Scott’s books on his political activism
with regard to South Africa are published, as are the records of the UNIA, Marcus Garvey’s
personal writings, and American Allard Lowenstein’s account of his trip to South West Africa.61
Yet, other records remained unpublished and provided important insights into the
motivations of transnational actors to involve themselves in South West African affairs. Allard
Lowenstein’s personal records are housed at the University of North Carolina’s Wilson Library
and unpublished copies of his manuscript for Brutal Mandate provided details of his clandestine
trip to the territory that remained out of the public eye for the safety and security of those who
helped him. Likewise, the physical copies of audiotapes that contained the spoken testimony of
Namibians on their treatment at the hands of the SWAA reside at the library. While edited
versions of these accounts were published in UN documents in the late 1950s, the tapes help one
understand the tone and exact wording used by Namibian actors. Similarly, one can also hear
Lowenstein and his companions on the tapes and hear the various side conversations that did not
make it into the written record at the UN.
Other repositories, like Basler Africa Bibliographien in Basel, Switzerland, possessed
important copies of records that were compiled by scholars over the course of their research in
Namibia and at other relevant archives across the globe.62 Here, Theo Sundermeier’s collection
was most useful in the completion of this dissertation. During his research on German
missionary activity in Namibia, Sundermeier successfully compiled immense records on the
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activities of the RMS in South West Africa and several documents pertaining to Herero cultural
practices. His tireless work consolidated archival materials from the National Archives of
Namibia, the Bundesarchiv, and the records of the Rhenish Mission Society in Wuppertal.63 The
compilation was essential to the development of the chapter on the activities of the AME church
and revealed important archival materials that gave voice and perspective to the RMS
missionaries’ activities in South West Africa.
These sources located abroad were instrumental in filling important gaps in the historical
narrative that could not have happened simply relying on the collections at the National Archives
of Namibia. The published records of the UNIA and Reverend Michael Scott, as well as Allard
Lowenstein’s archival records at the University of North Carolina highlighted the complexity of
the networks, connections, and machinations afoot outside of South West Africa’s boundaries
that Namibians accessed and used to their benefit. Other archival repositories, like the UN
Archives and the League of Nations Archives, provided further insight into the inner workings
and motivations of transnational organizations and actors to become involved in the South West
Africa case and drew attention to the influence that these foreign institutions had over the
opportunities, barriers, and restrictions Namibians faced in their engagement with transnational
institutions as a means of resistance.
Consequently, this multi-sited approach to transnational history and the use of varied
sources created by a vast array of historical actors prevented the writing of an overly nationalistic
interpretation of Namibian resistance strategies during the colonial period and avoided many of
the pitfalls of methodological nationalism. Through the use of many archival repositories and
record types, diverse perspectives are included in the work that highlighted the number of ways
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resistance strategies were understood and interpreted by the various parties involved. Embracing
contradictory accounts of an event or seeking out corroborating historical evidence from more
than one source illuminated many of the complexities of the colonial situation in South West
Africa between 1919 and 1962 and created a historical narrative that was not merely a long,
heroic, linear march to national independence. Rather, it shows that Namibians and international
actors involved themselves in these transnational resistance strategies for a number of different,
and at times competing, reasons. In some instances, they outright resisted the colonial regime
and its repressive policies and at other times sought a path of accommodation in an effort to
carve out small spheres of influence in the colonial superstructure and improve their everyday
standard-of-living.

Temporal and Spatial Limitations of the Study
This dissertation begins its examination of transnational resistance in 1919 and covers
Namibians’ resistance strategies up to 1962. This time frame roughly covers the South African
colonial period prior to the emergence of SWAPO as the preeminent national political party and
voice of Namibians seeking national independence. The resistance that occurred during this
period was characterized by the desire to seek local or subnational sociopolitical changes within
the colonial framework. Resistance strategies during this period primarily sought to reform the
colonial system and carve out political autonomy or improve socioeconomic conditions on the
local or subnational level rather than seek outright national independence for the entire South
West African territory. This dissertation focuses on the period up to 1962 because that year
represented the emergence of SWAPO as the people’s political party and signified a profound
shift in Namibians’ resistance strategies. No longer were Namibians concerned with merely
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affecting local sociopolitical and economic changes, but instead viewed themselves as
inextricably linked in the fight to remove the South African colonial regime from the entirety of
the territory. This process, which began in 1962, ultimately culminated in the commencement of
an armed liberation struggle in 1966 that sought to remove the South African colonial state by
force.
This study is not only temporally restricted to the period spanning 1919 to 1962, but it is
also geographically restricted to those people and communities south of “Namibia’s Red Line”
that inhabited the “Namibian Police Zone.” As a result, this work focuses almost exclusively on
the actions and resistance activities of those belonging to the Nama, Herero, and Baster polities.
The Red Line began as a veterinary cordon fence (VCF) imposed by the German colonial
government in 1896 as a means to control rinderpest outbreaks in South West Africa. However,
by the 1910s, the VCF served the dual purpose of preventing the spread of cattle-borne disease,
while also physically separating the “colonial heartland [that] had been cartographically defined
in 1907” from the Ovambo polities in the north.64 The concept of the VCF/Red Line evolved
over time and became more politically significant. The German government guaranteed police
protection for the European populations inhabiting the lands south of the Red Line and
established the basis for the creation of the later Police Zone. Giorgio Miescher’s article “Facing
Barbarians” best described the dual nature of the Red Line and Police Zone, stating that “The
Red Line separated the settler society’s heartland, including its African population in central and
southern Namibia, from the areas in the far north with their exclusively African population. Seen
from a South African perspective the Red Line marked the physical limit of the subcontinent
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claimed to be ‘white’ settler South Africa, and drew the line against ‘dark’ or inner Africa.”65 In
Berlin, the Red Line was simultaneously reconceptualized as a “Blue Line,” south of which the
German government could guarantee police protection.
The establishment of a Police Zone in 1916 and the restriction of movement across this
border effectively separated the Ovambo populations in the north, which constituted the majority
of the African population in the territory, from the Nama, Herero, and Baster populations of the
south. The Nama and Herero Genocide between 1904 and 1907 made the implementation of
colonial rule particularly effective in the south and central parts of the territory. The significantly
reduced African populations in the Police Zone allowed for the effective expropriation of land
and the transformation of many Africans to the role of farm laborer. Although the boundaries of
the Police Zone changed over time, the restrictions on Africans within its boundaries remained
similar throughout the transition to South African rule and into the post-World War II period.66
Miescher again describes this consistent position of Africans inside the Police Zone, writing:
For the areas inside the Police Zone the South African colonial power now came very
close to achieving their goal of ordered segregation of space. In the colonial heartland of
the Police Zone, Africans, if not in a reserve, were only tolerated in the form of
dependent labor on farms, in mines or in the domestic sphere, keeping out economically
independent African entrepreneurs and farmers….By the late 1950s, the territorial
segregation of colonial Namibia was successfully completed. Its settler society was now
reassured and convinced of its ability to control ‘South West Africa proper.’67
The extensive reach of the South African colonial government in the Police Zone differed greatly
from the colonial approach to governing the Ovambo populations that were needed for migrant
labor in the mines.68
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The distinct difference between the administration of the “frontier” in the north and the
“colonial heartland” in the south of the territory is the primary reason for the spatial
demarcations of this study. While a study of transnational resistance strategies in the north would
be valuable in its own right, it is the aim of this study to focus on those people and areas that
experienced the most intrusive and oppressive effects of the South African colonial regime.
Nearly all of the centers of Nama, Herero, and Baster power, including Gibeon, Hoachanas,
Bethanie, Warmbad, Okahandja, Gobabis, Omaruru, and Rehoboth, fell south of the Police Zone
boundary. These African communities experienced intense restrictions on their religious
practices, mobility, economic production, autonomy, and ability to survive in an unforgiving
environment. Direct confrontation with segregationist and apartheid policies in these areas, and
the ability of the South African government to quickly and effectively enforce those policies in
the Police Zone, resulted in the development of specific transnational resistance strategies by the
Nama, Herero, and Baster leadership that differed markedly from the more labor-centric
movements that emerged in the Ovambo polities to the north.69 For these reasons, this
dissertation focused on the transnational resistance strategies developed by those communities in
the Police Zone between 1919 and 1962.
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Ethnicity and Geopolitics in Namibia’s Police Zone
Now that the spatial and temporal limits of the study are established, it is important to
discuss the nature of ethnicity in the Police Zone and its role in the subnational geopolitical
dimensions of the transnational resistance strategies developed by the Nama, Herero, and Basters
during this period. In the Police Zone, the Nama, Herero, and Basters were the three primary
ethnic groups with significant sociopolitical and economic power. This section deals exclusively
with Herero and Nama ethnicity, as Baster ethnicity is dealt with in great detail in chapter 2. The
structuralist interpretation of ethnicity is embraced in this study and the primordial definition of
the term is rejected. Thus, ethnicity is conceived as a constructed identity whereby a group of
people share cultural traits and historical experiences that are commonly accepted by said group
as exclusive or definitive of said ethnicity. Ethnicity is not a biological trait or state of being that
is passed from one generation to another.70 As such, the following pages look at the shared
historical experiences and cultural practices that have come to define an often fluid and changing
Herero and Nama ethnic identity.
The Herero are primarily a Bantu subgroup descended from Otjiherero-speakers that
arrived in modern-day Namibia from the north and northeast between the sixteenth and
eighteenth centuries and settled throughout much of north-central Namibia. While pastoralism
was central to the Herero identity, prior to the 1860s, the Herero were not exclusively cattleherders and frequently supplemented this socioeconomic activity with mercenary work in
Angola and less-common hunting and gathering.71 As Dag Henrichsen emphasized, before the
1860s stock-owning was not guaranteed in central Namibia and the issue of economic
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impoverishment significantly impacted the Herero.72 The 1840s in central Namibia were
characterized by Herero subjugation to Oorlam hegemony, and the 1850s were defined by
widespread impoverishment among the Herero. However, in the late-1850s and 1860s, strong
Herero leaders emerged in the region and began the process of rebuilding herds, establishing new
bases of political power, and creating a new “cattle-based pastoral society which, as such, did not
exist before.”73
Following the death of Tjamuaha and Jonker Afrikaner in 1861 and the emergence of his
son Maharero as a successful political leader, the 1870s saw the emergence of new ethnic
indicators that came to define the Herero identity.74 Cattle, guns, the control of land through a
network of wells, and the embrace of mission Christianity became characteristic of the Herero.
The accumulation of livestock was part of a larger “flexible effort to claim resources and
construct an economic, social, and political differentiation in central Namibia.”75 The okuruuo,
or Holy Fire, was the “ceremonial center of Herero life” and became a defining part of the
Herero identity as well.76 Kirsten Alnaes, in describing the ceremonial and symbolic importance
of the okuruuo to Herero identity, wrote “[I]t is through the Holy Fire that the intricate web of
relationships between cattle, forefathers, men, women, children, and extended family is mapped
out…[it is the] center around which, and through which, basic factors of Herero life meet, where
transformations take place, where misfortune is undone, and where life begins and death is
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completed.”77 This series of historical, cultural, and structural forces formed the very foundations
of a quickly solidifying and exclusive Herero identity in central Namibia.
By the mid 1880s, the Herero had politically restructured themselves, with most of them
falling under the political authority of four key leaders with specific geopolitical bases of power.
Maharero was based in Okahandja, while Kambazembi, Manasse Tjiseseta, and Kahimemua
Nguvauva resided at Waterberg, Omaruru, and Otjihaenena, respectively.78 The paramount
chieftaincy was frequently contested among the Herero and, with the arrival of the Germans in
1884 and the death of Maharero in 1890, the struggle for this power increased. Maharero’s son,
Samuel Maharero, underwent a succession dispute and allied with the Germans who named him
chief of the Herero and helped him subdue his political rivals. By 1894, Samuel Maharero
became the paramount chief of the Herero, agreed to new territorial boundaries with the
Germans, and asserted claims over Herero lands not traditionally controlled by the chiefs of
Okahandja. In this process, Samuel Maharero expelled many of his rivals, patronized his allies,
and consolidated Herero political power in South West Africa.79
Samuel Maharero’s power was short-lived, however, and the perpetration of genocide
against the Nama and Herero by the German government in 1904 was a period of political and
socioeconomic devastation for the Herero. Samuel Maharero and many of his followers were
forced to flee to the Bechuanaland Protectorate as refugees in 1904 after the Battle of
Waterberg.80 Many Herero remained in exile until the South African occupation of the territory
in 1915, at which most returned to South West Africa and re-established their herds in the north
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and east-central part of the territory. The crushing loss by the Herero at the hands of the Germans
caused many to look for reasons for their failure, with most contending that the abandonment of
Herero traditional practices and the embrace of European socioeconomic structures led to their
defeat and current state. The death of Samuel Maharero in exile in 1923 served as the spark that
led to attempts to return to Herero traditionalism and solidified the twentieth-century Herero
identity.81
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Herero society undertook several actions to return to a
more traditional conception of Herero identity. Many actions, like the re-igniting of the okuruuo,
the return to male circumcision, and the re-introduction of polygyny were direct responses to
mission Christianity which the Herero saw as directly contributing to their downfall in the early
twentieth century.82 Similarly, some Herero restarted the process of knocking out their lower
incisors and filing their upper incisors into an inverted “v” shape.83 This process of recreating a
“true” Herero identity was only accelerated by the South African government’s attempt to reinstitute ethnically-based German reserves in the territory. This process of ethnicization was seen
by many Herero as an opportunity to create ethnic spaces and “escape [the dominant colonial
order] without leaving it.”84
The term Herero is used frequently in this dissertation and it is necessary to discuss its
use with regard to its historicization above. As the previous paragraphs suggest, between the
1920s and 1960s Herero identity became increasingly exclusive and salient and based on a
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commonly accepted set of characteristics and cultural structures deemed as being “Herero.” In
the colonial sphere, the South African government had ultimate control over creation and
implementation of policy in the territory. However, the Herero chiefs and leaders during this
period still maintained a significant amount of power and sway over the political lives of the
Herero in South West Africa. While different ethnicities lived in close proximity to one another
throughout the territory, the Herero still maintained population centers and traditional nodes of
power like Okahandja in central South West Africa. At these nodes of geopolitical power, the
Herero leaders played an important role in organizing and structuring the resistance strategies of
those who still participated in and followed traditional authority that functioned simultaneously
with the colonial political superstructure. Chief Hosea Kutako, who was appointed Herero chief
in 1917 by the South African government and later affirmed by Samuel Maharero from exile in
1920, served as one of these important power brokers.85 Although he held sway in the larger
resistance process of the territory, his primary influence was over the Herero in central South
West Africa. Less potent influence was held by other Herero leaders, but the largest
concentration of Herero power and control over the resistance decision-making process rested
with Kutako. These Herero power brokers frequently coordinated with one another to achieve
their subnational goals.
Nama ethnicity, much like Herero ethnicity, centered around common cultural practices,
traditional nodes of geopolitical power, and a culturally-accepted lineage that contended the
Nama groups descended from a common set of ancestors. The Nama initially lived a nomadic
lifestyle with the protection of women and cattle being central to their worldview. The Nama
were Khoe-speakers who originated around the Orange River where hunting prowess was valued
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and wealth was measured in head of cattle.86 The Nama tended to live in small lineage-based
groups that consisted of anywhere between five and 30 dwellings, with seniority determining the
position of one’s home. Common features of Nama society included polygyny, virilocal
residence, patrilineal sociopolitical organization, and communal land ownership.87
The Nama emerged in South West Africa in two separate waves in the nineteenth
century, resulting in a split between two groups called the “Great Nama” or “Pure Nama,” and
the Oorlam. According to Nama traditional narratives, the “Great Nama” consisted of eight
subgroups that descended from a set of five brothers.88 The Topnaars settled from Walvis Bay to
Okahandja while the Bondelswarts settled in Warmbad. The other six branches of the pure Nama
formed an alliance together in south-central Namibia. The Khaiǁkhaun under Oasib established
itself at Hoachanas while the Franzmännschen under Simon Kooper emerged at Gochas. The
!Kara-!oan of the Chamob River, the Swartboois at Fransfontein, the Groot Doden near the Fish
River, and the Feldschuhträgers made up the remaining branches of the Great Nama.89
The Nama south of the Orange River ultimately migrated to Namibia later in the 1800s
and were referred to as the Oorlam. These groups mixed with the other Nama groups in the area
during this migration and adopted many aspects of their clothing, language, and names, making
any distinction between the two groups negligible by the twentieth century.90 The Oorlam
consisted primarily of five branches with the Afrikaners being the most dominant during this
early period.91 The Witbooi settled at Gibeon, while the Gei-/Khauan under Amraal Lamberts
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established themselves at Naosannabis and Gobabis. The /Kari-Khauan made their home at
Berseba and the !Aman at Bethanie. Although there was, at times, conflict between the Great
Nama and the Oorlam, ethnic boundaries during this period were porous and frequently
traversed.92 The Oorlam also found themselves in conflict frequently with the Herero in the area
and this led to a period of political instability that spanned from the 1840s through the 1890s.
Following these initial migrations, the Nama settled down and established permanent
settlements and hereditary chieftaincies at the aforementioned locations. These settlements and
towns became nodes of geopolitical control and power for the ruling families. A kaptein was
chosen from the ruling family of a given branch and then his power was limited by a council of
elders, from whom the kaptein needed unanimous consent before undertaking a decision.93 Thus,
the chief was considered a “primus inter pares” whose primary function was to follow and rule
by the will of the people.94 Some of the most powerful leaders to emerge out of this political
system included Hendrik Witbooi, Jonker Afrikaner, Jan Jonker Afrikaner, and Simon Kooper.
Likewise, powerful settlements such as Gibeon, Bethanie, Berseba, and Warmbad became
influential nodes in the Nama geopolitical system.95
Prior to the arrival of the Germans and the perpetration of the genocide in 1904, the
various Nama branches undoubtedly came into conflict with one another. However, the genocide
proved instrumental in disrupting the sociopolitical organization of the Nama.96 Although similar
structures would re-emerge during the South African occupation of South West Africa, this
period, especially the 1940s and 1950s, saw the emergence of more cohesion between the
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various Nama polities in their attempts to resist the extension of segregationist and apartheid
policies by the South African regime. Certain families, like the Witbooi, continued to exert
significant influence over Nama social and political life within the confines of the South African
colonial system. Much like the Herero, these families and leaders were key power brokers in the
development of Nama resistance strategies and although the strategies employed at Hoachanas
and Gibeon might be different with regard to the AME Church in the 1940s and 1950s, the
strategies across the Nama polities maintained a remarkable cohesiveness and similarity.
When utilizing the terms Herero and Nama in this study, it should not be assumed that
the particular resistance strategies were used by all Herero or Nama in the territory in the same
way. However, as this section notes, the adoption of particular strategies by powerful families
and leaders within a particular ethnic group frequently resulted in the widespread adoption by
those who still followed or were beholden to figures and structures of traditional authority within
the Police Zone. Although the Nama in Gibeon or Hoachanas, or conversely the Herero in
Windhoek or Okahandja, might follow the authority of different chiefs or kaptiens, there was a
significant amount of coordination between these leaders that helped create and facilitate
coordinated resistance strategies and campaigns with great success. In most cases deviation from
these larger subnational strategies was the exception, as in the case of the Swartboois with the
UNIA, and not the rule.97 Thus, while ethnicity and subnationalism did not exclusively define
one’s approach to resistance, the geopolitics of ethnicity in the Police Zone did influence
Namibians’ acceptance and implementation of various resistance strategies.
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Subnationalism and Nationalism in Namibia’s Police Zone, 1919-1962
As the previous pages suggest, ethnicity became more salient and reified under the South
African colonial regime as the state actively segregated Namibians from whites and one another.
This ethnic structure was highly influential in the way that Namibians resisted between 1919 and
1960, impacting the strategies and goals of these transnational campaigns against South African
rule. The resistance strategies developed during this period tended to be highly subnational in
nature, with campaigns developing largely along existing ethnic, social, and geopolitical lines.
This trend toward seeking subnational concessions through transnational resistance strategies
continued through the 1950s until the more nationalistic resistance movement emerged under the
control of SWAPO in the 1960s. Thus, it is crucial to identify the way that the terms
“subnationalism” and “nationalism” are used in this dissertation and their role in describing the
nature of a particular resistance strategy.
Subnational movements, as defined by Joshua B. Forrest, are “movements by regional
actors to pursue greater autonomy within the existing [state], a relatively loose degree of political
separatism, or outright secession.”98 Within subnational movements, the process of political
mobilization is often started and controlled by “regionally-based forces” and geared toward the
achievement of regionalized territorial autonomy or the redress of specific socioeconomic
complaints that center on the achievement of regional political goals.99 The regional component
of subnationalism often revolves around the rule of traditional authorities that are frequently
affixed to a specific geopolitical unit. These traditional authorities and political structures desired
the return of political self-autonomy that was usurped by the colonial state. For the masses, the
common connective tissue that holds a subnational movement together is ascriptive in nature,
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meaning that a group within a subnational unit perceive themselves as bounded together by
common descent, territorial affiliation, or shared historical experiences. Through this group
boundedness between the masses and traditional political authorities, subnationalism occurs
when this group becomes politically-mobilized with the aim of promoting their collective
economic, political, or social interests.100
In South West Africa, these subnational movements frequently developed along
ethnopolitical and geopolitical lines within the colonial state. Namibians’ resistance strategies in
the pre-SWAPO period rarely demanded national independence for the entire South West Africa
territory. Instead, their transnational resistance strategies and approaches often fought for
subnational political autonomy or the achievement of subnational concessions from the colonial
state that returned power in the decision-making process to traditional authority figures in a
given community or area. For example, during the Rehoboth Basters petition-writing campaign
to the League of Nations, the primary concern of the petitioners was the return of the Basters’
political autonomy that was enjoyed during the German colonial period. The Basters mobilized
politically based on regional factors and their desire to promote their collective interests in the
pursuit of subnational political autonomy. Similar processes played out elsewhere in the Police
Zone during this period, with the Herero pursuing their own socioeconomic interests through the
UNIA and UN and the Nama seeking to re-establish their sociopolitical autonomy through the
AME Church and UN.
In these resistance campaigns, the issue of complete territorial independence for the
entire South West Africa colony was limited and, at times, not addressed by Namibians’ claims.
Subnationalism prevailed during this period in part because of the South African state’s focus on
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promoting the salience of ethnic identity in the creation of reserves in the territory. Another
contributing factor was the recent history of conflicts between the Nama, Herero, Damara, and
Basters in central Namibia as recently as the 1890s.101 Over time, the historical weight of these
conflicts lessened as political power brokers turned their attention almost solely to the oppressive
behavior of the colonial state. However, during this period subnationalism was one of the
defining characteristics of resistance campaigns in the Police Zone that sought to win regional
concessions from the colonial government.
In the final chapter of this work, the nature of resistance campaigns waged by Namibians
against the South African regime shifted from subnational concerns to those of a more
nationalistic nature. African nationalism is different from the subnationalism discussed
previously in its territoriality, its social composition, and in its ultimate political and
socioeconomic goals. Definitions for African nationalism, or nationalism more broadly, are often
elusive and heavily contested in the historiography. The role of colonialism and the lack of true
nation-states in colonial Africa are a point of contention among scholars in finding both the
antecedents and basis for national movements in Africa. Likewise, academics have deliberated
the precise definitions and descriptions of the terms nationality, nationalist, national sentiment,
cultural nationalism, and psychological nationalism.102 Each of these debates has added nuance
to the definition and scope of African nationalism, but the term still remains difficult to concisely
conceptualize.
Perhaps it is best to first set forth the territorial dimension of the definition of African
nationalism before discussing the movement’s composition and goals. The term nationalism, as it
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is used in this dissertation, differs significantly from subnationalism in its spatial and territorial
components. Whereas subnationalism centered on more regional and local political units that
often existed in the pre-colonial period, the territorial aspect of African nationalism is
inextricably linked to the colonial process and the artificial boundaries that were created and
solidified during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.103 Historian Assa Okoth highlighted the
role that colonialism played in shaping African nationalist movements, writing “The colonial
powers alone created the present bases of [the] nations of independent Africa by arbitrarily
dividing the continent into administrative entities and imposing thereupon legal, linguistic, and
cultural concepts.”104 These arbitrary colonial borders played an influential role in structuring the
legal apparatus, social conditions, economies, and political infrastructure in a given territory
during the period. African nationalists, seeking to seize these mechanisms and pry them from
European hands, necessarily embraced old colonial boundaries as the territorial limits for the
creation of newly independent states.105
In the South West Africa example, the nationalist movements of the 1960s represented a
marked shift in the territorial conceptualization of resistance movements and resistance
strategies. Earlier protest movements and resistance campaigns frequently referenced regional
and local ethnopolitical boundaries in seeking concessions from the colonial government. For
example, the Basters’ petitions in the 1920s pertained exclusively to the lands surrounding
Rehoboth while the resistance of the Herero and Nama to forced land removals in the 1940s and
1950s focused almost exclusively on the political and socioeconomic concerns at Aminuis and
Hoachanas, respectively. However, in the 1960s the language used in petitions and other forms
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of protest changed. The student organizations and intellectual elites discussed in the final chapter
of this dissertation began to advocate for the independence of the whole South West Africa
territory and all of its people from South African control.
In addition to the spatial differences between subnational and nationalist movements,
there are also key differences in their composition and stated goals. In historian Arif Hussain’s
attempt to historicize and explain the general characteristics of African nationalism, he provides
a concise definition of nationalism. He contends that nationalism is “a movement for the
attainment and maintenance of self-government on behalf of a group of people in a given
territory.” Thomas Hodgkin espoused a similar understanding of African nationalism, stating the
term nationalist referred to “any organization or group that explicitly assert[ed] the rights,
claims, and aspirations of a given African society…in opposition to European authority,
whatever the institutional form or objective.”106 While Hussain and Hodgkin clearly focused on
political dimensions, other historians have expanded upon the scope of African nationalism and
its characteristics. Okoth further argued that nationalism included “opposition to alien control;
the consciousness of belonging to a particular African nation…; pride in the nation’s culture,
traditions, institutions and achievements; awareness of common political rights and
responsibilities; an articulate demand for a self-governing nation-state; and especially all forms
of persuasion, agitation and concerted action through which such sentiments are expressed and
encouraged.”107 In each of these definitions, it is clear that one of the defining characteristics of
the nationalist movements in Africa was the desire of Africans to seize control of the social,
political, economic, and legal mechanisms of the state and utilize them for the benefit of
Africans, rather than Europeans.
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Several factors contributed to the rise in African nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. The
destructive nature of World War II significantly weakened the global position and capabilities of
European powers to maintain their colonial empires.108 African veterans’ war experiences
eliminated the aura of white invincibility that colonial troops and militaries once held and their
exposure to concepts of Western nationalism through wartime propaganda only further affirmed
their desire for similar rights and opportunities when they returned home.109 During the World
Wars, hundreds of thousands of African soldiers served in the military and even more laborers
were drawn into wartime production.110 At the conclusion of World War II a second colonial
occupation began, whereby the European colonial powers extended social services, built
infrastructure, and encouraged secondary industry to create a small urban-based working class.
The European powers hoped to stabilize their colonial possessions through this process and
repay their war debts with the profits secured through exploitation of the colonies.111 Post-war
expectations by Africans for an increased standard of living forced colonial officials to respond
to African demands in the hope of avoiding further protest or conflict. Education, in particular,
saw a vast expansion during the 1940s and 1950s as new schools were constructed and the level
and quality of education increased. Many Africans took advantage of these new opportunities,
with a small number of Africans traveling overseas or to other parts of Africa to receive collegelevel educations.112 While overseas, African intellectuals were further introduced to Western
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concepts of nationalism, exposed to political mass mobilization campaigns, and created networks
that would provide material and ideological support as their nationalist campaigns in Africa
developed.113 The early successful decolonization of Ghana, the long-standing independence of
Ethiopia, and the emergence of independent nations in formerly colonized Southeast Asia only
further increased the demand among Africans for complete independence from colonial and neocolonial forces.114
Whereas subnational resistance strategies were often ethnically or linguistically exclusive
and led by traditional authority figures or institutions, the nationalist campaigns of the 1950s and
1960s were frequently led by newly-educated political elites who effectively connected with the
masses to create inclusive and popular movements.115 Okoth’s work is again useful at
highlighting how the nationalist movements were different from earlier forms of protest. He
argued that there were three key characteristics of nationalist movements. First, the movement
needed to “aim at the exercise or sharing of power at the colony’s political center.”116 Next, the
movement is “led by a political elite which is conscious of the aspirations of the masses [and]
willing to articulate them.”117 Finally, the movement must possess a popular following. While
earlier forms of protest contained some of these characteristics, Okoth contends that only
nationalist movements possessed all three at the same time.118 The subnational strategies
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discussed in this dissertation were frequently led by political elites who were conscious of the
aspirations of the masses but frequently lacked the mass popular appeal and sharing of power
necessary to classify a movement as nationalistic in nature. The student-led movements of the
1960s and subsequent creation of mass political parties in South West Africa helped solve these
glaring weaknesses of the earlier protest movements.
The nationalist movements that emerged across the continent in the 1950s and 1960s
were highly effective because of their inclusivity and their ability, for however brief of a time, to
overcome internal sociopolitical divisions in pursuit of common goals. The exploitative and
oppressive behavior of the colonial regimes in Africa undoubtedly played a role in providing for
common cause among the masses. Despite ethnic, linguistic, or subnational political differences,
Africans within a particular colonial boundary were often subject to the same types of laws,
administrative mechanisms, and sociopolitical controls that frequently advantaged Europeans
and the colonial state, while disadvantaging Africans of all different socioeconomic classes.119
These experiences, over time, created a sense of common grievances among the different
elements of African society and the eradication of the colonial regime was desired, albeit for
different reasons, by most. The creation of national political parties became a natural nexus
between the political elites and the masses to state these common grievances, give voice to their
future aspirations and present them on the national and international stage, and focus the
mobilization of resources and energy in a common direction.120
The creation of national political parties proved effective messaging tools for this purpose
and, through the displacement of traditional authority figures with new Western-educated elites,
many of these divisions were overcome in the name of achieving national independence. In
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South West Africa, SWAPO most effectively overcame internal divisions and crafted a popular
message that advocated political independence. Unlike in some parts of Africa where traditional
authorities were completely displaced, SWAPO actively incorporated more traditional authorities
into their power structure to appeal to the masses. 121 As a result, many of the people bound to
these leaders through subnational affiliation also joined the nationalist movement. This brought
Baster, Nama, Herero, and Ovambo together for the mutually shared goal of achieving
independence from the South African colonial state and eradicating South African rule from the
entire territory. Like most entrenched white settler colonies, Namibia’s independence ultimately
was won by waging a protracted armed liberation campaign that began in 1966.122
In this dissertation, particularly in chapter seven, the term “nationalist” is used to describe
the resistance campaigns of Namibian students who were educated in European and American
universities during the 1950s and 1960s. What is meant by a nationalist resistance strategy in that
instance is twofold. First, the resistance strategy was geared toward the complete territorial
independence of South West Africa, as defined by the recognized colonial boundaries of the
territory. In a national resistance strategy, the desire was the establishment of an independent
Namibian state that encompassed the entirety of the South West Africa territory and all of its
people. Second, the resistance strategy sought the collective improvement of the economic,
social, and political lives of all Namibians, regardless of their ethnic or geopolitical affiliations,
through the complete seizure of the political, economic, social, and legal mechanisms of the state
that were previously controlled and dominated by South Africans. No longer were political
leaders seeking regionally-based concessions for the improvement of their specific group’s
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standard of living within the colonial system, but instead the movement’s leaders were
concerned about the conditions everywhere in the territory and the complete overthrow of the
colonial regime.123 In this regard, nationalist movements were socially, politically, and
territorially inclusive and used this inclusivity as an instrument of resistance against the colonial
state. Although the transnational resistance campaigns involving student organizations and
universities initially sought the improvement of individual socioeconomic situations and
resistance to the extension of Bantu Education in South West Africa, these campaigns quickly
shifted and created an intelligentsia in exile that were motivated by the nationalist concerns of
territorial independence, overcoming subnational divisions, and the eradication of South African
hegemony in the territory.
Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into two parts consisting of four chapters each. The first part
of this study focuses on the period spanning from the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919
to the implementation of the apartheid government in South West Africa in the late-1940s.
Chapter 2 examines the petition-writing campaign of the Baster community to the League of
Nations and their attempt to retain some semblance of political autonomy in the Gebiet in
Rehoboth. Chapter 3 traces the growth of the pan-Africanist UNIA, its role as a protest and
social welfare organization, and the disunity that befell the organization following the Herero
assumption of leadership in 1922. Finally, chapter 4 analyzes the political climate in South
Africa in the late-1930s and 1940s. The development of the apartheid legal apparatus is
examined, as are the specific policies that socially, politically, and economically marginalized
the Namibian populations of South West Africa until independence.
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The second half of this dissertation covers a period that begins with the founding of the
AME Church branches in 1946 and ends with the emergence of SWAPO and the South West
African National Union (SWANU) in the early-1960s. Chapter 5 explores the Nama use of the
AME Church to achieve spiritual autonomy from white missionary control and how Namibians
utilized the church to call for vast improvements to the African education system in the territory.
Chapter 6 draws upon the legacy of the Rehoboth Basters’ petition-writing campaign and
analyzes how Nama and Herero leaders undertook a similar campaign to the UN to prevent
forced land removals in the 1940s and 1950s. The attempted removal of the Nama from
Hoachanas and the Kuridora Affair are of crucial importance. The subsequent chapter focuses on
the role that foreign universities and international student organizations played in providing
scholarships for Namibians, resulting in a vocal political opposition in exile. Finally, the
dissertation ends with a conclusion examining the successes and failures of these transnational
resistance campaigns, and the larger lessons that can be learned from such efforts.
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Chapter 2—A New Type of Resistance: The Rehoboth Basters’ Petition-Writing Campaign
to the League of Nations, 1915-1935
The South African government received the mandate to rule over South West Africa in
1921 as a result of the negotiations at Versailles and the subsequent establishment of the League
of Nations and Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC). In the early 1920s, the South African
government established its control over South West Africa through the extension of
segregationist laws and policies to the territory that limited Namibian mobility, eliminated viable
economic opportunities, and institutionalized political oppression. In 1923, the impacts of this
process reached the Rehoboth Baster community in southern Namibia when the government
passed Proclamation No. 28 of 1923 and curtailed the limited autonomy and political selfdetermination the Basters secured from the German government in 1885. Devoid of legitimate
means of legal recourse within the South African colonial system, the Basters focused their
efforts on the utilization of post-World War I transnational organizations, like the newly-created
League of Nations, to resist the colonial state’s attempt to politically repress their community.
In 1923 the Basters responded to the South African encroachment of their limited
political autonomy by creating a 13-year-long petition-writing campaign that employed the
language of self-determination and socioeconomic development present in the Covenant of the
League of Nations to influence the policy- and decision-making processes of the South African
government and express Baster political agency. The Basters sought the aid of the League of
Nations in resolving the question of their political autonomy, as well as the resolution of more
practical everyday concerns like the uneven issuance of hunting licenses, arbitrary fines, and
predatory financial institutions. Although this particular resistance strategy was exclusive to the
Basters, the petition-writing campaign opened a period of resistance in South West Africa
characterized by the utilization of transnational institutions and organizations as a means of
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resistance against an increasingly aggressive and oppressive colonial state. The campaign proved
effective in forcing the South African government to respond to their demands for clarity on
policy issues and effectively moderated their abusive behavior toward the Baster community
during a period of regional strife and challenges to South African rule.
Whereas previous scholars like Tilman Dedering focused on the Basters’ use of
Wilsonian language as a tool to place pressure on the South African government, this chapter
focuses specifically on the substance of the claims made by the Basters in their petitions and
their changing understanding of the League of Nations’ role and usefulness in their quest for the
return of limited political autonomy in the Gebiet.1 The chapter begins with an examination of
the development of the Baster community in Namibia and the emergence of a particular AfroEuropean cultural identity defined by its embrace of political autonomy and Christianity. The
Baster community’s development is traced from its migration from Gordonia in the 1860s and
details the formation of their distinct and exclusive cultural identity. The chapter proceeds to
analyze the position of the Basters in Namibian society under German rule and how that position
changed throughout the course of World War I and during the South African government’s
extension of segregationist policies to the territory in the early 1920s. The impact of the
Bondelswarts Rebellion on moderating the South African government’s behavior in South West
Africa is also briefly discussed.
Finally, the chapter concludes with an examination of the petition-writing campaign that
began with the early petitions against Proclamation No. 28 of 1923 and ended with petitions

Tilman Dedering, “Petitioning Geneva: Transnational Aspects of Protest and Resistance in South West
Africa/Namibia After the First World War,” Journal of Southern African Studies 35, No. 4 (November, 2009): 785801.
1

60

acknowledging the re-unification of the Raads in the 1930s.2 Here, the chapter argues that
despite the general unwillingness of the League of Nations to intervene in the territory, the
petition-writing campaign moderated South African behavior in the territory and brought
international attention to the South African government’s violations of its position as mandatory
power. Perhaps most importantly, it is argued that the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations to
restore political autonomy to the Gebiet ultimately led the Baster leadership to develop
alternative political strategies that included resolving subnational political disputes in order to
make new unified claims of the South African government and League.
The strategies that the Basters developed were subnational in nature and intended to win
concessions within the colonial order on issues that pertained exclusively to the Basters at
Rehoboth. The express intention of this transnational resistance strategy was to leverage the
international political power of transnational organizations to increase the pressure on the South
African government to return subnational political autonomy to the Gebiet. During the interwar
years, petition-writing became a strategy that was exclusive to the Basters but was adopted after
World War II by the different ethnopolitical groups in the Police Zone. This strategy, in part, can
be traced back to the historical processes that the Rehoboth Basters underwent during the
German colonial period in South West Africa.

Establishment of the Rehoboth Baster Community in Namibia, 1870-1915
In order to understand the origins of the Baster’s petition-writing campaign and the
source of their political grievances against the colonial state, one must begin with an examination
of the establishment of the Baster community in South West Africa and its distinct political

2

The term Raad refers to the Baster Council, the political body that dealt with internal affairs in the Gebiet in
Rehoboth.

61

standing under German colonial rule. The Rehoboth Baster community originated on the
northwestern frontier of the Cape Colony. As Dutch settlers began to trek inland from the Cape
Colony in the eighteenth century, many of these settlers married indigenous Khoe women and
started mixed-race families, the offspring of which were referred to as “Basters.”3 Baster
communities formed in the territory south of the Orange River and north of the Cape Colony.
The Basters developed an identity that was rooted in a strong Christian identity and the Afrikaner
language, but their African heritage made them distinct from the white and Boer populations of
the Cape.4
The Basters of the northwestern frontier embraced this distinct identity and wore the
name “Baster” as a “badge of honor.”5 The whites and Boers of the Cape rejected the Basters
because of their Khoe ancestry and identity. However, the indigenous African populations of the
region also rejected the Basters for their European-Christian identity and their use of Afrikaans
and Dutch. In this ethnically-fluid space, the Baster community developed an independent
cultural identity that leaned on its mixed-race heritage. At this cultural intersection between their
European and African heritage, a strong inclination toward political sovereignty and cultural
distinctness became a central part of the Baster identity.
Baster families assembled near Amandelboom and Schietfontein in the early nineteenth
century and established autonomous settlements thereafter. Missionaries from the London
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Missionary Society (LMS) and Rhenish Mission Society (RMS) began work among these
communities in the early-to-mid-nineteenth century and further solidified the group’s strong
Christian identity. The settlements at Amandelboom and Schietfontein continued to grow into
the 1850s when, in 1855, the expanding Boer populations of the Cape encroached on the Baster
settlements and forced a Baster exodus. The Basters trekked northward and established new
settlements at De Tuin and Pella.6
Following the establishment of settlements at De Tuin and Pella, the Cape parliament
passed a series of controversial laws in the mid-1860s that required landowners to provide
documentary proof that they owned the land on which they resided. The Basters at De Tuin
petitioned the Cape parliament in 1865 for the government-sanctioned acquisition of land in the
northwestern frontier. However, racial barriers and white complaints over the Basters’ request
led the Cape parliament to reject the request and this decision forced the Basters to consider a
second northward migration. The Basters held a People’s Assembly on 24 February 1868 at De
Tuin where they elected Hermanus van Wyk as Kaptein and tasked him with leading a migration
northward across the Orange River into southern South West Africa.7 The Basters left De Tuin in
forty ox-pulled wagons on 12 July 1868, proceeded to Pella, and finally crossed the Orange
River on 16 November 1868.
The migration into southern Namibia occurred in three separate groups under the
guidance of van Wyk and Klaas Zwarts. Zwarts and his followers established a short-lived
settlement at Grootfontein, while van Wyk and his followers continued on to Warmbad near the
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Nama polities. The environmental destruction caused by the party’s livestock was immense and
van Wyk and his followers were ultimately forced to leave Grootfontein in December 1868.
Nama leadership granted van Wyk sustainable grazing land at Chamis in 1869 after failed
settlement attempts at Ganigobis and Keetmanshoop.8

Map 2: The Baster Migration from Amandelboom in 1861 to Rehoboth in 1870

Source: Jeron Zandberg. Rehoboth Griqua Atlas (Morrisville: Lulu Publishers, 2013), 35.
8
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More fertile pastures and reliable water sources lay roughly 230 miles north in the
largely-vacant lands surrounding Rehoboth. Oasib of the Khaiǁkhaun granted the Swartboois the
land at Rehoboth in the 1840s, but conflicts with Jan Jonker Afrikaner forced the Swartboois to
abandon Rehoboth in 1864.9 Further conflicts erupted between the Nama and Herero in southern
and central Namibia during the 1860s. It was in the peace negotiations between Afrikaner and
Maharero that van Wyk and the Basters seized on the opportunity to establish a permanent and
sustainable settlement.
Negotiations between the aforementioned parties occurred at Okahandja on 23 September
1870. Carl Hugo Hahn and other missionaries served as intermediaries in the construction of the
peace.10 Through this agreement, van Wyk and the Basters secured permanent residence at
Rehoboth to serve as a “buffer” between the Nama and Herero to reduce future conflicts. 11 The
Basters quickly drafted a new constitution for the governance of the settlement at the start of
1872. On 31 January 1872, the Basters ratified a 30-article constitution that outlined political,
socioeconomic, and legal guidelines for the community.12 Over the next two decades, disparate
Baster populations throughout southern Namibia moved to Rehoboth and facilitated the growth
of the settlement.13 The Basters faced a number of attacks from the Herero and Nama throughout
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the 1870s, and especially intense conflicts developed between 1880 and 1882. However, superior
firepower helped the Basters maintain their foothold at Rehoboth.
European contacts with Namibians intensified in 1883 when German businessman Adolf
Lüderitz secured treaties with local Namibian leaders that procured large swaths of land in the
hope of creating a German sphere of influence in southern Africa. On 1 May 1883, with the help
of Rhenish missionaries, Lüderitz purchased Angra Pequeña from Joseph Fredericks and the
people of Bethanie.14 Fear of British annexations in the area ultimately led Lüderitz to request
German protection for Angra Pequeña. On 24 April 1884, Otto Von Bismarck placed Angra
Pequeña under German protection and began an intensive process of securing more land and
treaties with Namibian leaders. The land secured in the Kunene region, Kaoko, and near the
Angola border provided the territorial basis for a German colony.15
As the Germans extended their colonial rule over their newly procured territory, they
faced a shortage of manpower and made use of indigenous populations to strengthen their grip in
the colony. Maximillian Bayer and Peter Carstens argued that the German government viewed
the Basters as a useful tool in the extension of their colonial rule. The Germans categorized the
Basters as an indigenous population, but also acknowledged the distinct position of the Basters in
Namibian society. They believed that the Basters’ mixed racial heritage indicated a higher level
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of civilizational attainment than their Nama or Herero counterparts. Their perceived intellectual
superiority and advanced social development appealed to the German colonial administration
and led to overtures for cooperation and collaboration between the two parties. Additionally, the
geographical position of the Rehoboth Basters as a buffer between the Herero and Nama polities
made the Basters politically useful to the German administration.16 The German government
agreed that the Basters would retain certain political and legal privileges in exchange for their
cooperation.
On 15 September 1885 Hermanus van Wyk agreed to the “Treaty of Protection and
Friendship Between the German Empire and the Bastards at Rehoboth” and requested German
protection for the Baster community. The treaty explicitly detailed the social, political, and legal
privileges granted to the Basters in the Gebiet. And it established the Basters political autonomy,
proclaiming “His Majesty the German Emperor acknowledges the rights and the liberty which
the [Basters] have acquired for themselves and binds himself to leave undisturbed any treaties
which other Nations or subjects thereof have previously entered into with them, and not to
prejudice the Chief in the collection of the revenues to which he is entitled according to the laws
and usage of his country.”17 The fifth clause of the treaty expounded upon the Basters political
autonomy by permitting them to litigate and try civil and criminal cases in Rehoboth.18 The
treaty concluded with two clauses that required van Wyk to “[promise] protection, as regards life
and property, to all subjects of the German Empire and those under its protection…” and
“…assist as much as possible towards the preservation of peace in Great Namaqualand and
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neighboring countries.”19 The Basters honored this treaty and fulfilled their obligations from
1885 through the commencement of World War I.
At the beginning of World War I, the German government raised a Baster Corps in
Rehoboth to support German forces in Namibia. The German government provided 46 members
of the Rehoboth community with uniforms and weapons and sent them to Uitdraai to guard
roughly 120 British prisoners of war. The German colonial administration made further attempts
to send more members of the Baster Corps north to guard prisoners of war, but this decision
provoked protests in Rehoboth.20 When the Baster leadership voiced their complaints to Colonel
Victor Francke, he presented them with an ultimatum: continue to guard prisoners of war or
forfeit their weapons and disarm.21
The colonial administration gave the Basters a three-day grace period to respond, but
during this time the Basters evacuated unarmed men, women, and children from Rehoboth.
When the colonial administration became aware of these actions, disarmament of Baster men at
various outposts commenced. The German military proceeded to attack unarmed men, women,
and children at Heuras during the Basters’ flight from danger.22 Perhaps the most significant
action taken by the colonial administration was the capture and execution of Cornelius van
Wyk’s sons.23 This act led to increased efforts by the Basters to fight against the German
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military. On 22 April 1915, these small skirmishes resulted in the German government’s
issuance of a declaration of war.24
The declaration of war detailed the German government’s efforts to disarm the Basters
after they refused to fulfill German demands. The German government pointed to the evacuation
of families during the three-day grace period, the unwillingness to forfeit their arms, and the
alleged “plunder and murder against the whites” as the primary reasons for the conflict.25 The
government vowed to “…take such measures as it may deem necessary, for the serious
consequences of which the [Baster] community of Rehoboth will be answerable” and the “Treaty
of Protection and Friendship” was rendered void.26 The German Schutztruppe attacked the
Basters on 7 and 8 May 1915 at Tsamkhubis and defeat appeared imminent for the Basters.27
However, Union forces under the command of General Mackenzie arrived on 9 May 1915 and
forced the Schutztruppe to abandon their attack on the Basters.28
Prior to General Mackenzie’s victory, the Baster community made overtures to Union
officials with the aim of preserving their lands and political autonomy in the event of a German
defeat in the First World War. On 1 April 1915, Cornelius van Wyk claimed to have met with
South African Prime Minister Louis Botha at Swakopmund to assure the general of the Basters
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neutrality.29 The Basters believed that this gesture assured them of the retention of their lands
and continued self-determination at the conclusion of the war.30 The Basters and other
Namibians were largely relegated to non-combat roles after the victory at Tsamkhubis, and
Botha declared the conflict in South West Africa a “white man’s war.”31
The South African army quickly dispatched German forces in South West Africa. The
German military surrendered to Union forces on 9 July 1915 at Khorab, merely two months after
the Rehoboth Basters’ stand at Tsamkhubis.32 The South African government quickly instituted
martial law in South West Africa, which lasted until 1921. The lack of resources available to the
South African government during this period allowed Namibians a brief period of reconstituted
political power.33 The Otruppa movement thrived among the Herero, while Mandume built up
his armed support in the north. Fears of rebellion among the white population soared as a result
of the perceived military threat that these movements and groups posed, but the South African
government did little to alleviate these concerns at the time.34 In Rehoboth, there was renewed
hope that, at the conclusion of the war, the Baster community would return to its state of political
autonomy and regain complete sovereignty. Yet, by 1918 it became clear that the immediate fate
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of the Rehoboth Basters and the rest of South West Africa was directly linked to the activities of
transnational actors and the development of a new global post-war political order.

The Creation of the League of Nations and Mandate System in
South West Africa, 1916-1920
The Basters’ attempt to regain their political independence began in earnest following the
German military’s defeat in July 1915. On 2 November 1915 Cornelius van Wyk and four
members of the Baster Raad met with the administrator of South West Africa Sir Edmond
Howard Lacam Gorges to request the establishment of a new treaty that was similar to the Treaty
of Protection and Friendship that the Basters had with the Germans. This overture was rejected
and in early 1916 the Basters sent a petition to the British government requesting that Rehoboth
be granted its independence. The Basters received no response from the British government and
submitted a second petition that would make Rehoboth a British Protectorate. This, too, was
rejected by the British in February 1918 because the British government claimed it would not
make a decision on the matter while the country was still at war.35 One final attempt was made
before South West Africa’s fate was placed in the hands of the League of Nations and the
negotiations at Versailles. In November 1919, the Basters proposed a plan that would place a
British representative in Rehoboth and bestow him with immense political power in the town.
The British government, once again, rejected the Basters’ request.36
The political fate of the Basters was ultimately linked directly to the affairs of post-war
South Africa and both the domestic and international political maneuvering of Jan Smuts
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between 1917 and 1924.37 In The Failure of South African Expansion, Ronald Hyam posited that
South African Prime Minister Louis Botha and General Jan Smuts entered the First World War
with an eye toward domestic affairs. The British government requested that Union forces invade
South West Africa on 7 August 1914 and the Committee on Imperial Defense set forth a strategic
campaign whereby Union forces would capture the harbors at Lüderitz and Swakopmund and the
wireless telegraph centers at Windhoek to disrupt German communications.38 As the previous
pages suggest, South African forces succeeded in their invasion of South West Africa and
claimed victory by July 1915. After the Union victory in South West Africa, Jan Smuts led a
Union army into German East Africa in 1916 to defeat Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and his forces.
Smuts’ offensive proved successful and, by 1917, he confined Lettow-Vorbeck and his German
forces to the southern parts of German East Africa. Although German forces continued to
operate in the territory until formally surrendering on 25 November 1918, Smuts and the Union
military effectively occupied the German colonies in southern and eastern Africa.39
Following Smuts’ military victories in southern Africa, he was called to London in
January 1917 to join the Imperial War Cabinet. Smuts arrived in London in March 1917 and
quickly cultivated a close relationship with the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George.
Lloyd George relied heavily upon Smuts’ military advice during this period and Smuts toured the
Western Front, where he supported Field Marshal Douglas Haig’s Third Ypres Offensive. An
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indication of his reputation as a successful general, Smuts was later offered the command over
British forces in Egypt, but he rejected the offer.40
In addition to Smuts’ military acumen and history of success on the battlefield, his
abilities as a statesman positioned him to play a prominent role in the creation of the new postwar international political order and provided him with the means to pursue his expansionist
domestic political agenda after the war. Smuts’ background as an administrator and diplomat,
combined with his natural flare for public speaking captured the attention of Lloyd George and
his inner circle, of which there were many proponents for the establishment of an international
political organization that could facilitate peaceable reconciliation with the German government.
Lloyd George, in his role as Prime Minister, created the Phillimore Committee in January 1917
in an attempt to give concrete form to the League of Nations concept that Lord Robert Cecil
called for in his 1916 publication Memorandum on Proposals for Diminishing the Occasion of
Future Wars.41 However, it was Smuts’ advocacy and writings between 1917 and 1918 that
provided a practical framework for such an organization.
On 14 May 1917, Smuts spoke to the London League of Nations Society and advocated
for the creation of an international institution that would secure international rights and general
peace at the conclusion of the war. Historian George Curry contended that Smuts’ ability to
eloquently discuss the future of the British people and the high stakes of the upcoming peace
negotiations further ingratiated him to Lloyd George’s government. By 1918, the British
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government viewed Smuts as a prime candidate to help develop a concrete and structured plan
for the League of Nations that could be presented at later, more formal, peace negotiations.42 At
the behest of the prime minister, Smuts set forth a practical plan for the League of Nations in
1918 with the publication of The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion. Smuts’ work
provided structure and a workable solution to what had previously been a “nebulous” idea.43
In the opening pages of his work, Smuts clearly outlined the practical concerns of this
endeavor, writing “[T]he discussion of the League of Nations has proceeded far too much on
general or academic lines; and this, combined with the inherent difficulties of the subject, has
helped to create the impression which is unhappily prevalent, that the League is not really a
matter of practical politics. To combat this impression, I have drawn in a rough outline what
appears to me a practical, workable scheme.”44 Smuts also addressed the concerns of most at the
time that the League of Nations was merely a cautious mechanism created out of fear of future
wars. Smuts acknowledged this fact, stating that “a great deal of attention has been given to the
idea of the League of Nations as a means of preventing future wars. The discussion of the subject
proceeded almost entirely from that one point of view, and as most people are rather skeptical of
the possibility of preventing wars altogether, the League has only too often been looked upon as
Utopian, as an impracticable ideal not likely to be realized….”45 Smuts attempted to introduce a
new “point-of-view” that, at its core, centered on the belief that the League of Nations could act
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as a stabilizing and guiding force in the creation of a new world order. Smuts’ League of Nations
was more hopeful than previous iterations. He believed that the League could play a constructive
role in the post-war period rather than act as an interventionist monitor of global relations.46
One of Smuts’ primary concerns about the League was his fear that the post-war political
arena would resemble a “scramble among the victors” that equated the territories of the defeated
powers to “loot.”47 Smuts argued that if such a situation were to occur, “Europe must indeed be
despaired.”48 The League of Nations would serve as a mechanism to prevent this problematic
post-war reconciliation. He considered the League to be a “reversionary in the most general
sense…clothed with the right of ultimate disposal in accordance with certain fundamental
principles” and this reversion to the League would function as a substitute for any attempts at
national annexation of territory as plunder.49
The annexation of territory in the post-war period, in particular the potential annexations
of South West Africa and German East Africa, troubled Smuts as it would limit his ability to
fulfill his imperial vision of creating a politically and economically strong white dominion in
southern Africa. Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw argued that Smuts’ calls for South African
expansion and the creation of Greater South Africa dated back to the mid-1890s and his
advocacy for the founding of a South African state that encompassed all territories south of the
Zambezi River.50 The process of realizing this dream began in 1909 with the passage of the
South Africa Act, which created the Union of South Africa from the British colonies of the Cape
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of Good Hope, Natal, Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony. These four colonies were
officially unified on 31 May 1910 and provisions from the South Africa Act of 1909 allowed for
the future admittance of Southern Rhodesia into the Union as a fifth province.51 Smuts’
conception of Greater South Africa also included the incorporation of the British High
Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. German East Africa
would be used as a bargaining tool with the Portuguese, ceding parts of southeastern Tanganyika
to the Portuguese in exchange for the southern part of Mozambique and, most importantly,
possession of the port of Lourenco Marques in Delagoa Bay.52
In order for Greater South Africa to come into existence and stretch from coast-to-coast
in southern Africa, the incorporation of South West Africa following the First World War was
also necessary. The incorporation of South West Africa would give the Union access to the
Atlantic ports at Lüderitz, Swakopmund, and Walvis Bay and provide new opportunities for this
potential dominion to gain access to gold and diamond mines in the territory. The acquisition of
South West Africa by the Union government would also prevent the territory from reverting to
German control, an outcome that posed a significant security threat to the Union. Union
leadership believed that harsh treatment by the German colonial government would result in
significant upheaval in South West Africa and posed the potential to spill over into South
African post-war affairs.53 The acquisition of South West Africa and proposed exchange for
southern Mozambique would theoretically provide South Africa with “a natural frontier and
round it off as a compact block of subtropical territory” under white minority rule.54 This
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outward expansion of the Union would fulfill Smuts’ imperial vision of creating “one of the
greatest future Dominions of the [British] Empire” and ensure the political viability and
economic health of whites in southern Africa during the post-war recession and political unrest.55
Smuts’ desire to utilize the post-war moment as an opportunity to incorporate South West
Africa into the Union emerged in The League of Nations in 1918 and became a focal point of his
demands during the negotiations at Versailles. In his work Smuts classified the territories of the
former Central Powers into three categories, each corresponding to a peoples’ perceived
modernity and closeness to the Western ideal of “civilization.” While the Eastern European
nations, the Transcaucasian territories, and the Transcaspian territories fell within the first two
categories, the “backward” areas consisting of Germany’s former Pacific and African colonies
fell into a third category.56 He believed that these territories and people required extensive
tutelage, writing:
[T]he German colonies in the Pacific and Africa are inhabited by barbarians, who not
only cannot possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be impracticable to apply
any ideas of political self-determination in the European sense. They might be consulted
as to whether they want their German masters back, but the result would be so much a
foregone conclusion that the consultation would be quite superfluous. The disposal of
these Colonies should be decided on the principles which President Wilson has laid down
in the fifth of his celebrated Fourteen Points.57
Despite Wilson’s insistence that the Central Powers’ former territories not be annexed as
a result of the war, it is clear from Smuts’ negotiations at Versailles that he did not conceive of
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Germany’s former African and Asian colonies as exempt from annexation. While the territories
of the first and second kind mentioned above were to be exempt from annexation, Smuts argued
that the populations in South West Africa should be guided toward “self-determination,
autonomy, or self-government” by a “mandatory” power with close historical ties to the territory
in question.58 He believed that “the only successful administration of undeveloped or subject
people [would be] carried on by States with long experience, for the purpose and staffs whose
training and singleness of mind fit them for so difficult and special a task.”59 Although still
subject to the ultimate control of the League of Nations, these mandatory powers, acting on the
consent or approval of the governed, lent legitimacy to the League of Nations by avoiding the
use of unfamiliar and foreign agents. Furthermore, Smuts suggested that this position was a
“sacred trust” bestowed upon the mandatory power and that any violation of this trust could
result in the removal of the mandatory power and the appointment of a new mandatory state.60
Smuts’ publication and delineation of the different types of territories to be administered served
as the basis for the “mandate system” created during the negotiations at Versailles.
South West Africa was the prized political and economic asset for Smuts and the South
African government at Versailles and represented the next logical step in the creation of Greater
South Africa. As discussions surrounding the peace negotiations grew, it became clear that the
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fate of the former German colonies in Africa was uncertain. Woodrow Wilson believed that the
annexation of these former German colonies could result in the same abuses and exploitation that
the League of Nations was supposed to safeguard against.61 In November 1918, Smuts began his
campaign to impress upon British government officials the imperativeness of the “unconditional
annexation of the German colonies” under the Treaty of Versailles.62 His arguments found the
sympathetic ear of Lloyd George who argued Smuts position to the Council of Ten on 24
January 1919.63 Through a series of tense negotiations, the various sides settled on a
compromise. South Africa was granted the position of mandatory power over South West Africa,
but these mandate territories had to be administered as “integral portions” of the mandatory
power and not outright annexed.64 Such a compromise appeased Wilson and the British radicals
and socialists, while also providing a viable path for Smuts and the other Dominion governments
to secure economic and political control over their desired territories.65
Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles formalized this compromise and echoed the
language of Smuts’ League of Nations. Article 22 began:
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be
under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are
inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous condition of
the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the
[formation] of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.66
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The Treaty proceeded to argue that the tutelage of these populations should fall to “advanced
nations who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position can best
undertake this responsibility….”67 It was further recognized that the mandate “must differ
according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the
territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.”68 In order to account for the
different stages of perceived development in these territories, and in an attempt to appease Smuts
and his compatriots, a three-tiered mandate system was developed that mirrored Smuts’ earlier
classifications of territories by their perceived modernity.
South West Africa, like the other former German colonies that were adjacent to, or
integral parts of British Dominions, received the classification of a “Class C” mandate. “Class C”
mandates were territories with small, heterogeneous, and remote populations that “[could] be
best administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject
to…the interests of the indigenous population.”69 S.D. Meyers contended that, although not
outright annexation, Smuts obtained the political and economic access he desired to South West
Africa. The PMC was subsequently established in order to provide international oversight on the
administration of the mandate territories.70 The Commission served as a “consultative body”
with the ability to conduct investigations into violations of the mandates and “bring facts to light
to influence public opinion.”71 In each mandate territory, indigenous populations could submit
petitions against the mandatory government to the League of Nations and have their complaints
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debated during the meetings of the PMC. As the South African government extended its rule into
South West Africa in the early 1920s and encroached on African lands and communities, the
Rehoboth Baster community took full advantage of the ability to submit petitions to the League
of Nations as a means to exert international pressure on the South African government and
moderate and change repressive colonial policies.
The use of petition-writing as a campaign of transnational resistance against the South
African regime was a strategy exclusive to the Basters. For them, petition-writing served as a
mechanism through which they could express their sociopolitical and economic agency to great
effect. The Basters’ resistance efforts represented the early vestiges of an emergent pattern of
Namibian actors in the Police Zone accessing transnational networks to circumnavigate the
recursive gaze and reach of the colonial state. This began a pattern of transnational resistance in
the territory that would continue into the early 1960s, at which time resistance strategies shifted
to focus on more inclusive national claims for complete territorial independence.

The Extension of South African Rule and Conflicts in the Police Zone, 1920-1923
The Rehoboth Baster community, like the rest of South West Africa, fell under the “Class
C” categorization and found themselves governed by the mandatory’s laws; laws which became
highly repressive of the Basters’ political autonomy and challenged their very socioeconomic
and political survival. South West Africa formally became a mandate territory under the South
African government on 1 January 1921, the result of a nearly two-and-a-half-year process. The
terms of the Treaty of Versailles were dictated to the German government by the Allied Powers
on 7 May 1919. The treaty was subsequently signed on 28 June 1919, and the former German
colonies in Africa and Asia fell under the mandate system of the League of Nations. Soon after,
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the South African government worked rapidly to consolidate its power and authority over South
West Africa.72
The first piece of legislation that facilitated this transfer of power under the mandate
system was the Treaty of Peace and South West Africa Mandate Act (Act No. 49 of 1919) that
passed the South African Parliament in September of 1919. The South African Parliament
bestowed the Governor-General with the power to “make such appointments, establish such
offices, issue such proclamations and regulations, and do such things as appear to him to be
necessary for giving effect, so far as concerns the Union, to any of the provision of the said
Treaty or to any Mandate issued in pursuance of the Treaty of the Union with reference to the
territory of South West Africa….”73 Additionally, Act No. 49 made it possible for the GovernorGeneral to “repeal, alter, amend, or modify any laws in force within the [South West Africa]
territory…make new laws applicable to the territory…[and] delegate his authority….”74 South
African laws, particularly those that pertained to Crown Lands were retroactively applied to the
territory as well.75
Following the establishment of its authority to make and repeal laws in South West
Africa, the South African government created its civil administration in the territory in January
of 1920. Many former South African civil servants manned posts within this new SWAA and
enforced the implementation of laws and decisions that emanated both from the South African
Parliament and the SWAA. Civil courts, magistrates, native commissioners, and native affairs
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commissioner posts were all created and vested with power in a relatively short period of time.
The SWAA attempted to extend bureaucratic controls over the indigenous populations of the
territory and create social, political, and economic order like that which existed in South
Africa.76
The Council of the League of Nations confirmed the mandate established by the Treaty of
Versailles on 17 December 1920 and provided specific terms for the administration of the South
West Africa mandate. The official terms of the mandate provided the South African government
with the “full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to the present
mandate as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa….”77 Despite this seemingly
unlimited authority to administer the territory, subsequent article of the mandate did provide
some checks on the South African government’s power. The slave trade was to be prohibited in
the mandate territory, Africans were not to be trained in the military except for internal policing
purposes, and the freedom of conscience and worship was to be protected at all times. Finally,
Article 7 explicitly stated that the Council of the League of Nations must approve and consent to
any modifications in terms of mandate. Thereafter, military rule was withdrawn from the
territory on 1 January 1921 and the period of South African rule in South West Africa officially
began.78
Prime Minister Jan Smuts and the South African Parliament viewed the addition of South
West Africa as a de facto fifth province as a possible solution to the political and socioeconomic
unrest occurring in early-1920s South Africa. In May 1921, Smuts’ government was forced to
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respond to Enoch Mgijima’s growing socio-religious movement in Ntabelanga and the social
unrest and economic disruption the movement created. By May 1921, Mgijima and roughly 3000
“Israelites” had amassed at Ntabelanga, occupying white settlers grazing lands and refusing to
work on the white farms at Oxkraal.79 Facing political pressure, Smuts sent a detachment of 800
armed policemen and gave Mgijima an ultimatum to have his followers leave the area by 23 May
1921. Mgijima and his followers refused and in the subsequent Ntabelanga Massacre, 163
Israelites were killed and another 129 wounded.80
Smuts’ government faced further unrest as the Rand Rebellion broke out on 28 December
1921. As a result of the post-war recession, gold prices dropped by nearly 27 percent in
December 1921. The mining companies, in an effort to remain profitable during the recession,
significantly decreased the wages of their white miners. Additionally, the Chamber of Mines
proposed a limit to the colour bar that would allow mining companies to hire lower-paid African
laborers and displace nearly 2,000 semi-skilled white miners. A workers’ strike ensued, and
Afrikaner nationalists quickly formed armed para-military commandos. This led to an open
insurrection against the South African state in which the strikers took control over most the Rand
and some suburbs in Johannesburg.81 The formation of the Communist Party of South Africa
(CPSA) that same year further complicated matters for the South African government, as the
CPSA urged on the strikers’ activities.82
In response to the Rand Rebellion, Smuts sent 7,000 troops to quell the unrest. These
troops were accompanied by bombing planes and tanks. Over the four days of the conflict
“Israelite” was the term used to refer to Mgijima’s followers.
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between 150 and 220 people were killed, while another 500 to 600 people were wounded.
Eighteen of the strike’s leaders were sentenced to death and four were executed. In the
immediate aftermath of the strike, the mining companies proceeded to enforce lower wages, hire
cheaper African laborers, and lay off a substantial number of white miners. George Frederickson
argued that the extreme use of force against white South Africans and the resultant economic
burden faced by white miners soured many South Africans on Smuts’ government and the South
African Party.83
To combat unrest in the Union caused by the post-war recession, the South African
government developed plans to encourage white migration to South West Africa for new
economic opportunities. The South African government opened up former German crown lands
to poor whites in South Africa with the express hope that they would leave South Africa and
become prosperous, hard-working farmers in the new territory. Likewise, lands were
expropriated from former Nama and Herero reserves and made available for white settlement.
The provision of land for white settlement was central to this resettlement scheme, but these new
farmers also needed easy access to an immobile and cheap labor source.84 Throughout the 1920s
a number of segregationist polices were implemented by the SWAA in the territory and these
new laws were used as a means to control the labor of the African populations of the territory
and move Namibians into reserves.
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On 1 July 1920, for example, the administrator of South West Africa passed into force
the Vagrancy Proclamation and prohibited Africans from entering or travelling through the
Police Zone without employment. If one was found to be “wandering abroad and having no
visible lawful means, or insufficient lawful means of support,” government officials could deem
a person “idle and disorderly” and subject that person to punishment ranging from hard labor to
solitary confinement for a period of twelve months.85 The restrictions on movement and attempts
at the forcible employment of indigenous laborers were aided by the introduction of the Masters
and Servants Proclamation, which replaced former German legislation of the same name. This
Proclamation focused on civil contracts between an employer (master) and worker (servant) that
functioned to bind the indigenous populations to white-owned farms. Namibian workers faced
monetary fines, corporal punishment, and incarceration for any offenses that ranged from
“withholding full effort” to “unauthorized absences from work.”86 This legislation functioned as
a “form of indentured servitude enforced by criminal sanctions” and was only compounded by
the implementation of the Vagrancy Proclamation of 1920.87 Combined, these two pieces of
legislation forced Namibians into the labor force with the threat of extreme criminal punishments
for minor infractions and offenses.
In 1922, the movement of Namibians within the Police Zone was further restricted with
the introduction of pass laws. The Native Administration Proclamation of 1922 required
Namibians to produce a pass when confronted by the police and prohibited them from entering
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or leaving reserves and farms.88 If one could not produce a pass accounting for their presence in
a given area, arrest and imprisonment were the most likely penalties. A curfew was introduced
for Namibians in the Police Zone through Proclamation 33 of 1922 that limited not only the
spaces Africans could enter, but the times at which they could travel.89 The implementation of
the Native (Urban Areas) Proclamation in 1924 provided for residential segregation in South
West Africa and limited the ability of Namibians to own and operate businesses or shops,
restricting them to locations and reserves. The Native Reserves Regulations of 1924 increasingly
entrenched segregation in the territory and gave magistrates and government officials complete
control over life on the reserves. Magistrates and government officials had exclusive control over
the allotment of land on the reserves and could determine how said land was utilized when given
to African laborers.90 In combination, these pieces of legislation simultaneously cleared space for
white settlers to establish farms and provided them with a stagnant pool of Black labor with
limited economic opportunities and little recourse against their employers.
The implementation and enforcement of such policies initially proved difficult in South
West Africa. Marion Wallace detailed the limited nature of South African control in 1923,
writing that only 503 policemen patrolled the Police Zone at the time. This number only
modestly increased over the next sixteen years, rising to 520 policemen in 1939.91 The lack of a
viable enforcement apparatus provided Namibians with multiple channels through which they
could resist the extension of South African rule and the implementation of segregationist
policies. Beginning in 1922, the lack of policemen in the Police Zone and the increasingly
oppressive nature of South African legislation for the territory resulted in a series of violent
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confrontations between Namibian communities and the SWAA. Chief among these occurrences
was the Bondelswarts Affair of 1922, which profoundly impacted the South African
government’s approach to dealing with later confrontations against Namibians when they
received unexpected criticism from the international community at the League of Nations.
Although several instances of violent resistance occurred in South West Africa in the
early 1920s, few had the international impact of the Bondelswarts Affair. The Bondelswarts, a
Nama group located near Warmbad in southern Namibia, experienced the brunt of the extension
of South Africa’s segregationist policies. The implementation of the aforementioned legislation
expropriated the Bondelswarts’ lands and subjected them to repeated humiliations, like carrying
metal passes to travel within the Police Zone and repeated beatings from employers under the
authority of the Masters and Servants Proclamation.92 Relations were further strained with the
continued implementation of increasingly high taxes during a period when most communities
were slowly recovering from the post-war economic recession.
The spark that ignited the Bondelswarts Affair came in April of 1921 when the SWAA
implemented a uniform dog tax in South West Africa. The tax specifically targeted “natives and
a certain class of European squatter” who the administrator believed used the animals as a
dishonest way to obtain a livelihood.93 The tax ranged from one pound for a license for the first
dog to nearly ten pounds for the fifth dog, an amount that was nearly equivalent to the monthly
salary of a herder in the territory. The tax was difficult to enforce throughout the territory and the
administrator distributed circulars that lambasted magistrates for uncollected dog taxes.
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However, the one place that the SWAA enforced the dog tax heavily from its inception was the
Bondels Reserve.94
Robert J. Gordon’s “Fido: Dog Tales of Colonialism in Namibia” provides one of the
more detailed analysis of the causes of the Bondelswarts Affair. Between September 1921 and
January 1922, the SWAA leveled nearly 140 prosecutions against the members of the
Bondelswarts community for violations of the dog tax. Roughly 100 of these proceedings
resulted in fines and imprisonment of the perpetrators. In the first half of 1922, nearly 70 percent
of all charges brought against the Bondelswarts community directly related to the 1922 dog tax.
The seemingly arbitrary enforcement of the dog tax created a volatile environment and increased
tensions on the Bondels Reserve.95 Gordon argued, “This, coupled with a long legacy of
systematic impoverishment, was the final factor which precipitated the Bondelswarts Rebellion
in May 1922.”96
In May 1922 the Bondelswarts refused to pay the dog tax and failed to hand over five
men with arrest warrants, including an armed Abraham Morris, to the SWAA.97 Jan Smuts and
Gysbert Hofmeyr feared that the rebellion might spill over into South Africa and, as a result,
mounted a quick and heavily-armed response to this resistance.98 Hofmeyr raised a force of 400
men armed with rifles and machine guns to quell the rebellion. Hofmeyr’s forces were also aided

Robert J. Gordon, “Fido: Dog Tales of Colonialism in Namibia” in Social History & African Environments, eds.
William Beinart and Joann McGregor (Oxford: James Currey Publishers, 2003), 245.
95
Ibid., 246
96
Ibid.
97
Ibid. Abraham Morris was Jakob Marengo’s co-commander during the Herero and Nama campaigns against the
Germans between 1904-1907. Morris had re-entered South West Africa illegally during this period and was said to
be armed. Concerns of armed rebellion pervaded white society when reports surfaced that Morris attempted to rally
Bondelswarts support to rise against the SWAA. In conjunction with the South African government, the SWAA
recognized that immediate action was needed.
98
Gysbert Reitz Hofmeyr was the administrator of South West Africa from 1920 to 1926 and oversaw the
government’s repression of the Bondelswarts Rebellion. There was a fear that the Bondelswarts Rebellion could
lead to further unrest in South Africa and South West Africa. The Union government only recently dealt with the
Rand Rebellion and the Ntabelanga Massacre and there was concern that a lackluster response to the Bondelswarts
could lead other groups to follow suit.
94

89

by South African aircraft that proceeded to indiscriminately bomb the Bondelswarts community.
Although short-lived, the conflict resulted in the deaths of 100 Bondelswarts and the wounding
or imprisonment of an additional 468 people. When Hofmeyr’s forces entered the community,
they recovered only 40 weapons, highlighting the fact that the force used against the
Bondelswarts was disproportional and violated the mandate bestowed upon the South African
government.99
The international outcry, especially at the League of Nations, was swift. In May 1922
Haitian delegate Dantes Bellegarde condemned the assault and destruction perpetrated by the
South African government against the Bondelswarts and made the international community more
fully aware of the atrocity. He appealed to the altruistic and humanitarian covenant of the League
of Nations by arguing that “Although there was no act of rebellion and no attempts against life,
an expedition was undertaken with all the materials of modern warfare—machine-guns, artillery,
and aeroplanes….The natives who were practically unarmed were massacred.…That women and
children should have been massacred in the name of the League of Nations and under its
protection is an abominable outrage which we cannot suffer.”100 Marcus Garvey was another
prominent global figure that railed against the South African government’s disproportionate
violence against the Bondelswarts and disseminated information about the atrocity to the larger
pan-African community through The Negro World in June 1922.101
The efforts by these figures and numerous others placed an immense amount of
international pressure on Jan Smuts and the South African government. This pressure forced
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Smuts and the SWAA to adopt a much more cautious approach to dealing with Namibians in the
reserves and locations. More violence would only further sway public opinion in Britain, at the
League of Nations, and among white liberal opinion in South Africa against the government’s
mandatory rule. Thus, when similar problems arose in the Rehoboth Baster community between
1923 and 1925, the South African government and SWAA proceeded with a mind toward the
impact their actions might have on their position as mandatory power. This was particularly
useful for the Basters, who understood that their ability to disseminate information through
transnational networks could be leveraged against the state as a means to achieve their
subnational goal of local political autonomy.

The Transnational Resistance Strategies of the Rehoboth Basters, 1923-1935
In the wake of the Bondelswarts Affair, concerns of a general African uprising pervaded
southern Africa during the 1920s. South Africa experienced several instances of socioeconomic
unrest that made whites fearful of an African uprising, with the Ntabelanga Massacre, the arrest
of the prophetess Nontetha, and the introduction of lower-paid African laborers into the mining
industry as the most prominent examples.102 In South West Africa, the UNIA emerged between
1919 and 1921 in Lüderitz and actively disseminated Pan-Africanist and Black liberation
ideologies throughout the Police Zone, finding particular success among the Herero. The active
patrolling of quasi-military Otruppa Commandos during the 1920s only added to whites’ fears of
a rebellion.103 Many of the Herero and Nama pastoralists involved in these movements settled
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near Rehoboth in the early 1920s due to the more suitable grazing lands around the settlement
and, at the time, to benefit from the Basters’ political control of the area. The growing number of
“militant” Black Africans in an area where the SWAA’s reach was weakened did little to ease
the concerns of whites in the territory.
The SWAA, in part, blamed the Basters’ practice of leasing land to Nama and Herero
herders as one of the primary factors fueling reports from whites that Namibians were arming
and preparing for a rebellion. The intense droughts of the early 1920s and the increasingly
burdensome post-war economic recession severely impacted the livelihoods of Namibians in the
Police Zone. The Baster community, which still possessed the political autonomy to dispense
land in the Gebiet without the SWAA’s approval, increasingly leased land to Nama and Herero
herders as a means to generate additional revenue from the rent and offset the impact of the
socioeconomic hardships enveloping the territory. Patrick Pearson stated that this practice led to
an influx of Black Namibians into the Gebiet and, to a degree, shielded them from the SWAA’s
reach in the territory.104 At the same time, the SWAA believed that this practice could provide a
safe haven for emergent resistance groups in the Police Zone and discouraged Namibians from
working on the surrounding white farms.
In an attempt to halt the growing population of Black Namibians in the Gebiet and
prevent the possibility of a rebellion, the SWAA attempted to construct an agreement with the
Baster Raad that reshaped lease-holding practices and clearly defined the parameters of both
criminal and civil jurisdiction in the Gebiet. The SWAA found a willing partner in Kaptein
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Cornelius van Wyk who desired to create a closer and more favorable working relationship with
the SWAA. On 17 August 1923, the Executive Council of the Basters and seven members of the
Raad came to an agreement with the SWAA. The framework for this agreement was published in
the Official Gazette of South West Africa as Proclamation No. 28 of 1923.105
The agreement first established the boundaries of the Gebiet and acknowledged the “right
and title” of the Basters to that territory.106 The agreement recognized Cornelius van Wyk as the
Kaptein of the Rehoboth community and conceded the right of local self-government within the
Gebiet in accordance with the laws found in the Law Book of the Raad of Rehoboth.107 In order
to maintain control over the Gebiet and its populations, the agreement included language in its
provision that any laws passed in the Gebiet were to be presented to the administrator for his
“assent,” and that the laws of the rest of the territory would extend to the Gebiet from that date
forward.108 Further limits were placed on the Basters’ autonomy and sovereignty, when the
SWAA prevented the Baster courts from ruling on any cases, civil or criminal, that involved a
white party and prevented Basters from selling any land in the Gebiet without the express
approval of the new magistrate.109
Proclamation No. 28 proved to be one of the key factors that initiated the Basters’ 13year-long petition-writing campaign to the League of Nations. A majority of the Basters in the
Gebiet believed that van Wyk’s agreement with the SWAA effectively forfeited the Basters’
sovereignty and vested the SWAA with ultimate decision-making power over the affairs in the
Gebiet. In response to the conclusion of this “illegitimate” agreement, the Basters established a
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Provisional Raad under the leadership of the Provisional Kaptein, Nicolas van Wyk. The reasons
for the establishment of a Provisional Raad are detailed in Nicolas van Wyk’s petition to the
League of Nations on 27 June 1924. Van Wyk wrote:
The present situation in our territory is due to the fact that the former Raad of the
Rehoboth Burgher Community concluded a Treaty with Mr. Hofmeyr, the
Administrator…without the consent of the Community. The Burgher Community
consider[s] this Treaty unacceptable, but in spite of protracted negotiations with the
Administrator all of our efforts have hitherto been in vain. In view of these
circumstances, the [Community] rightly repudiated the former Raad, and a new
Provisional Kaptein and Raad were elected by the Burgher Community. The newlyelected Raad has been established to govern the people under the laws of 1870.110
Van Wyk continued to argue that the SWAA forced the Basters “against [their] will to conform
to the Treaty concluded by the former Raad with the Administrator” and that “[The Baster were]
compelled to bring the situation, which is fraught with such dangerous possibilities, to the notice
of the League of Nations.”111
The SWAA’s unwillingness to respond to the Basters’ claims that the agreement in
Proclamation No. 28 was illegitimate forced the Basters to seek other means of external legal
recourse, since few such avenues existed for Namibians in South West Africa. While it is
uncertain exactly how the Basters learned of the League of Nations and why they embraced the
process of petition-writing as a means to counter the SWAA’s overreach in the Gebiet, historian
Tilman Dedering suggested that South African parliamentarian Dewdney Drew played a crucial
role in explaining the mandate system and the role of the PMC to the Basters.112 The SWAA
viewed Drew as an agitator in the Gebiet and argued that he had “no locus standi, and he is [not]
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a resident of the Gebiet….”113 In correspondence between South African Prime Minister J.B.M.
Hertzog and the PMC, Drew’s activities in the territory were further explained:
This gentleman has already been the cause of a vast amount of trouble in the Gebiet.
From 1917 when he took up the cudgels on behalf of the Rehobothers he has always been
ready to impute the basest of motives to the officials responsible for the government of
the country, both under the German and Union regimes. Charges of bad faith are made
with utter recklessness… Mr. Dewdney Drew’s interference in this matter can, I think,
only be characterized as mischievous. He has been led away by what he is pleased to
regard as the romance attaching to the history of this people and has, I understand,
embarked on a series of newspaper articles in the Union papers in which the Bastards’
aspirations to remain a separate state under the direct aegis of the Imperial
Government…114
As Prime Minister Hertzog noted, Drew visited the Basters at Rehoboth in 1917. The
Minutes from the PMC’s Fourteenth Session elaborate on Drew’s visit, stating that he went to
Rehoboth to “[speak to the Basters] about the freedom and self-determination of small
nations….” that would be guaranteed at the conclusion of the war.115 Drew’s activities in
Rehoboth likely had an impact on the Basters’ approach to making claims of the mandatory
power, as is evidenced by their specific use of the phrases “self-determination” and “freedom of
small nations” in the subsequent petition-writing campaign that developed in the mid-to-late
1920s. Drew’s apparent influence over the language and origins of the petition-writing campaign
concerned the SWAA that other transnational actors might similarly influence the Rehoboth
Basters to take their complaints to a more critical international audience. In 1923, administrator
Hofmeyr wrote to then-Prime Minister Jan Smuts that he was concerned that the political activist
Dr. Abdullah Abdurahman wanted to visit the Rehoboth Basters and suggested that such a visit
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could lead to increased tensions and added international scrutiny over the SWAA’s treatment of
the Basters.116
The relationships that emerged between the Basters and the aforementioned actors
created a circuit through which the Basters developed their later petition-writing resistance
strategy. Dewdney Drew’s visit to the Basters in 1917 and his subsequent discussions with them
surrounding the role of the League of Nations and PMC as it pertained to the territory made the
community aware of the potential international influence that could be wielded against the South
African government. Likewise, Drew’s sympathetic stance toward the Basters required a
response from Hertzog to the PMC and brought the government’s treatment of the Basters under
increased scrutiny. The Basters, aware that the mandate granted to South Africa required the
government to submit their petitions to the PMC for review, could levy their accusations against
the South African government to the international community and demand that justifiable legal
action be taken against the mandatory power. This created a circuit that connected the PMC and
League of Nations in Geneva with the mandatory government in South Africa and the petitioners
in Rehoboth. Through this circuit, the Basters waged their intensive resistance campaign
throughout the Interwar Years.
The Basters’ interactions with these transnational actors and their newfound familiarity
with the Covenant of the League of Nations and the mission of the PMC served as a foundational
moment in the development of the Basters’ transnational interwar resistance strategies. Issues of
autonomy and self-determination became focal points of the early petitions in 1924 and 1925 as
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the Basters sought the League’s intervention to enforce its proclaimed mission and settle the
dispute between the Basters and the SWAA over Proclamation No. 28. The petitions submitted
by the Basters utilized the language of the League’s Covenant and South Africa’s mandate to
make claims of the supranational organization tasked with protecting the development and wellbeing of colonial peoples across the globe. In allusion to the mandate system’s proposed goals of
guiding colonial peoples toward modernity, the Basters’ petitions clearly delineated their social
and political position in the territory from that of Black Namibians.117 Nicolas Van Wyk
historicized the Basters’ political autonomy, writing “We, the Burgher Community of the Gebiet
of Rehoboth, obtained this territory as our lawful property in the year 1870…bequeathed to us by
our forefathers, with its own administration and Government.”118 Subsequent petitions
highlighted that the Basters were not “a conquered people” like the other Black Namibians in the
Police Zone, and that the German government afforded their Community and Kaptein Hermanus
van Wyk “all the rights appertaining to an independent Chief” and “confirmed [the Basters’]
right to live independently under [their] own laws and administration.”119
The Rehoboth Basters’ willingness to “…[stand] shoulder to shoulder with the Allies…”
during World War I also became a central thrust in the Basters’ petitions to the League and their
claims of political autonomy as a reward for their service in the war. The Provisional Raad wrote
to the League in 1924 that “During the Great World War we had to defend our territory,
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independently, by the efforts of our Burghers; since we were compelled to take part in the Great
War and to incur heavy losses, we are therefore entitled to submit to the League of Nations our
claim to possess our own private property, since we understood from the Treaty that we were
included, together with all our rights, in the Treaty which was concluded at Versailles on [28
June 1919].”120
The Basters clearly understood their voluntary participation in World War I as imbuing
their community with the same rights granted to other newly-created independent nations at
Versailles. The decision made by the administrator to take away part of the Raad’s political
autonomy and power through Proclamation No. 28 created confusion among the Basters’
leadership about their position in South West Africa under the mandate system. Van Wyk
continued:
We cannot understand why we should be included by right of conquest or that we should
be classified as a conquered people. It is incomprehensible to us since the troops of the
Union Government marched freely through the territory of our Republic, which had been
fighting independently. All this entitles us to appeal to your Excellencies, for we have
done everything in our power, up to the present, to represent to the Administrator our
feelings on this subject. The rights which we possess, our opposition to the
[Proclamation], and the fact that , as a free and autonomous people, we cannot accept the
above mentioned [Proclamation].121
The Basters’ expectation that participation in the war on the side of the victors would
result in political independence was not unfounded. Namibian wars prior to European
encroachment frequently resulted in the capture and expropriation of lands. As argued earlier in
this chapter, the mandate system was intended to create an amicable resolution between South
African desires to annex Namibia and Wilsonian concepts of self-determination. Likewise, the
Treaty of Versailles partitioned former German territories among Allied Powers and created
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newly-independent states like Czechoslovakia. Thus, the Basters’ belief that their participation
entitled them to political autonomy was in line with the political thinking of the period. The
Basters’ belief that their participation in the war alongside the Allied Powers also likely
contributed to their desire to pursue an exclusive and subnational resistance strategy. They
viewed themselves separately from the Nama and the Herero in the territory and believed that
they had paid the price, through military service, to earn subnational political autonomy in the
Gebiet.
In their continued effort to achieve this subnational political autonomy, the Provisional
Raad requested the opportunity to appear before the PMC to plead their case about the
illegitimacy of Proclamation No. 28; however, the PMC rejected their request. Despite this
setback, the petitions from the Provisional Raad continued and the SWAA became more
frustrated with the increased scrutiny from the international community about their activities in
South West Africa. The recent memory of the Bondelswarts Affair and the intense international
scrutiny that the South African government faced at the League of Nations due to its response
tempered the SWAA’s response to the Rehoboth Basters’ demands. The SWAA’s attempt to
amicably resolve the dispute by establishing a meeting with members of the Traditional Raad
and the Provisional Raad failed. On 1 December 1924, the Provisional Raad sent a petition to the
Magistrate’s Office in Rehoboth effectively ending communication with the SWAA on political
matters in the Gebiet.122 The petition read:
Hitherto we have done all in our power, but in vain. We now abandon any further
attempts and will not apply to you again for counsel or advice; we shall not even make
use of the letter from the Administrator, and henceforth we shall remain entirely
independent of you. It is clear to us that the magistracy and the Administrator himself still
desire to compel the people against their will to submit to the Council which has been
122
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deposed, and to accept the Agreement….As the elected representatives of the State, it is
henceforth our duty to make known the situation in our territory in every newspaper,
even in Europe….It is impossible for the present situation in Rehoboth to continue; this
population is the only one in the world which is not allowed any right to its own property.
We also desire to state that we will not obey any law issued by Nels Klazen; we will only
obey authorities who have been elected by the community to enact laws and keep order,
and we will only obey the laws so enacted.123
The mounting frustrations among the Provisional Raad and its supporters toward the
Traditional Raad and the SWAA threatened to spill out into the open. Albert Mouton, the
Provisional Kaptein of the Traditional Raad wrote to the Rehoboth magistrate in the week
following the break in communication that “the dissensions in Rehoboth have reached a point
where it is beyond our power to deal with them…[and] I can see only too clearly the disasters
which are before us unless these disorders are speedily brought to a close.”124 Mouton proceeded
to detail how the “opposition” continued to sow the seeds of disaffection toward the Union
government among the community and that the possibility existed for members of the
Traditional Raad to be imprisoned or physically harmed. Mouton officially requested the
SWAA’s intervention on his behalf and demanded the “removal of the…leaders and men of the
Opposition from the midst of the Community.”125
The prospect of a mutually-agreeable resolution to the dispute no longer existed. As a
result, the SWAA took a more direct approach to ending the dispute over Proclamation No. 28.
On 10 December 1924, the SWAA issued the Rehoboth Affairs Proclamation No. 31 of 1924
that effectively divested the Kapteins and Raads in the Gebiet of their political powers. Instead,
those decision-making powers were vested in the newly-appointed magistrate at Rehoboth. The
loss of autonomy in the Gebiet, coupled with mounting frustrations among the Black populations
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around Rehoboth over stock branding proclamations, created a volatile situation that threatened
to result in open conflict between Namibians and the SWAA.126
On 5 April 1925, these tensions led to the Rehoboth Affair. In the preceding week, the
SWAA sent policemen to the Gebiet to arrest three men on charges of failing to appear for
summons relating to violations of the stock branding proclamations. The policemen were
prevented from arresting the three men and within the week Colonel de Jager sent a police force
of 621 men to the Gebiet to carry out these arrests. At 7am on the morning of 5 April 1925, de
Jager sent a messenger to the Baster leadership to demand unconditional surrender and to turn
the men over. An hour later, before the Basters had the opportunity to evacuate the women and
children at Rehoboth, the SWAA flew three airplanes with machine guns over the settlement and
the police force charged.127 Although no shots were fired during the operation, policemen
entered the community members’ homes and beat them with sticks and the butts of rifles.128
In total, 632 people were arrested in Rehoboth as a result of the police assault. The
SWAA confiscated and destroyed another 304 firearms.129 Again, the international backlash
from the Bondelswarts Affair played a role in tempering the SWAA’s response to the Basters
perceived disregard for the administration’s laws. Despite the SWAA effectively stripping the
Baster Raads of any decision-making powers and settling the question of the Basters’ selfdetermination, the petition-writing campaign to the League of Nations only intensified. Between
1925 and 1935, the volume of petitions flowing from South West Africa increased. However,
during this period the concerns and appeals of the petitioners changed.
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The increase in petitions from the Basters to the League between 1925 and 1935 likely
came about as a response to the Rehoboth Rebellion. The force used by the SWAA limited the
appetite of those at Rehoboth for another violent clash with government forces and, out of
necessity, the Baster turned to more diplomatic means to achieve their social and political aims.
Due to the government’s response and further limitation of the Basters’ political rights, it became
imperative that Baster leadership seek avenues external to the territory and outside of the
jurisdictional reach of the South African government to regain their political autonomy. Earlier
interactions with Dewdney Drew and their knowledge of the international outcry over the
Bondelswarts Affair made a petition-writing campaign to the League of Nations a logical
resistance strategy. The Basters utilized the language of both the League of Nations Covenant
and the mandate granted to the South African government as a way to call upon the League to
fulfill its mission and force its members to place pressure on the colonial regime.
The claims in the Basters’ petitions shifted after the Rehoboth Affair from focusing on
political autonomy and self-determination to arguments that centered on practical, everyday
claims of underdevelopment and harmful land expropriation practices. In two petitions submitted
in November 1926, Nicolas van Wyk and the Rehoboth Basters detailed the SWAA’s oppressive
treatment toward the community as it pertained to issues of taxation, imprisonment, cattle
seizures, and European encroachment. Van Wyk wrote to the League as a result of the Basters’
defiance of the SWAA’s orders on 5 April 1925, only for administrator Hofmeyr to provide an
ultimatum that imposed heavy fines on the community on threat of imprisonment. This action,
the petition stated, “heavily taxed [the Basters’] resources” and “forced [them] to sell the little
which remained for the subsistence of [their] wives and children.”130 And this only compounded
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the “great set-back[s]” that the Basters experienced since the issuance of Proclamation No. 28
stripped away their political and economic independence.131
The Basters’ continued to detail their socioeconomic underdevelopment at the hands of
the mandatory power, with a particular focus on the laws surrounding cattle in the Gebiet and the
predatory practices of white business owners in the area. Cattle and small livestock served as a
vital part of the pastoralist existence in Rehoboth and the Police Zone. Following the Rebellion
of 1925, the SWAA began to implement legislation known to van Wyk and the community as
the “Stock Disease Act.” The Basters argued that the new law made the Basters’ cattle “subject
to strict medical inspection, and if they are found diseased, the owner is summoned or fined and
imprisoned, even if he is unaware of the condition of the cattle.”132 The loss of cattle
economically devastated both the Basters and the remaining Black pastoralists in the Gebiet and
contributed to their deteriorating circumstances. Subsistence and socioeconomic development
became even more difficult in the years following the Rebellion, as the SWAA reduced and
limited the number of hunting licenses provided to Basters and Black Namibians. Van Wyk’s
petitions make it clear that the SWAA significantly increased the number of hunting licenses
granted to whites and that they hunted so effectively that it threatened to “exterminate” the game
in the Gebiet.133 The confiscation and destruction of the Basters’ firearms following the
Rebellion increased the difficulties faced by hunters in the Gebiet and the inequity in hunting
opportunities led van Wyk to comment to the League that “The white man shoots in a month
what we could not kill in a year…..”134
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Finally, van Wyk addressed the increased white encroachment occurring in the Gebiet in
1926 and how the predatory practices of white business owners severely disadvantaged the
Basters. Of key concern in these arguments was the fact that the SWAA allowed white
shopkeepers and traders to buy land and set up businesses in the Gebiet.135 Van Wyk contended
that these business owners sold goods to Basters and other Black Namibians on credit, but then
quickly brought the Basters to court to settle this debt. Unable to repay the debt in this short time,
Basters faced the possibility of steep fines and imprisonment.136 This further contributed to the
inequity and underdevelopment faced by those the mandatory power was supposed to usher
toward development and “civilization.”
The focus of these early petitions centered on utilizing the language of the League’s
Covenant and the mandate to highlight the legal violation committed by the SWA. The mandate
granted to the South African government clearly stated that “The mandatory shall promote to the
utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants subject to the
mandate” and League’s Covenant reaffirmed this, stating “the well-being and development of
such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization….”137 In order to bring the League’s attention
more fully to their demands of local self-determination, the Basters routinely highlighted the lack
of social or economic progress that the mandatory’s policies created. Thus, van Wyk’s petitions
pointed to the unscrupulous business practices of whites in the Gebiet that went unpunished by
the SWAA and detailed the great difficulty that the Basters faced to obtain hunting licenses that
were paramount to their ability to feed themselves. By directly invoking the text of the
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aforementioned documents, the Basters forced the League of Nations to open inquiries into the
abuses of the SWAA and place pressure on the South African government.
Although few laws changed as a result of these November petitions to the League, the
petitions forced the SWAA to respond to inquiries by the League of Nations regarding the claims
made by the Basters in 1926. In a memorandum addressing the issues raised by the Basters, the
SWAA argued that the Basters were subject to the laws of the entire territory and that they no
longer possessed rights of limited self-determination in the Gebiet. Furthermore, the SWAA
rejected claims that predatory creditors and traders took advantage of the Basters in Rehoboth.
The memorandum stated that “Trading licenses [were] restricted to traders who were formerly
and continuously carrying on business in the Gebiet,” while the issue of credit was to be dealt
with in South African judge Justice de Villiers report on Rehoboth.138 The issue of whites
overhunting in the Gebiet was also addressed briefly in the memorandum and the SWAA made
the concession that Basters could “hunt small game without payment of the license fees
prescribed by the Game Law, or other restriction, at any time,” even as the game laws that
related to “royal and big game” remained in effect.139
Despite indirect diplomatic pressure from the League’s members curtailing the SWAA’s
willingness to respond violently to colonial resistance, it continued to impact the Basters’
development and desire for self-determination through arbitrary arrests and land expropriation.
Petitions submitted by the Basters between 1928 and 1929 detailed the increasingly arbitrary
nature of arrests in the Gebiet and the use of the police and courts as a means to strip Basters of
their property. In January 1928, Jacobus Beukes described the dangerous police state developing
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in Rehoboth, writing to the Secretariat of the League of Nations that “The Rehoboth District is
continually held down by force. It is constantly infested with police who travel about in the
district making arrests, thereby causing unrest.”140 The petitioner openly wondered why “there
should be police wandering about in an entirely disarmed country” and detailed the
establishment of a “prison camp” in Rehoboth.141 These aggressive police tactics and activities
convinced Beukes that the goal of the SWAA was “to drive [the Basters], the owners of the land,
out of [their] own country.”142 The land could then be dispensed to white farmers and shop
owners and encourage both white settlement and economic development in the territory to
combat the emergent global depression of the late 1920s.143
Imprisonment and the elimination of due process rights proved an effective method for
the SWAA to expropriate land from the Basters and redistribute it to white farmers. The Basters’
petitions made repeated reference to one particular case in March and May of 1929 that resulted
in the expropriation of Hendrik Beukes lands and property. Jacobus Beukes described the
pending legal case to the League and argued that the claim made on Hendrik’s lands by David
Venter was illegitimate. The petition stated that “[the Basters did] not know in what manner Mr.
Venter issue[d] summons against Hendrik Beukes,” or by what means Venter made claims of
possessing Hendrik’s lands.144 The Basters wrote to the magistrate at Rehoboth and to the
SWAA, only turning to the League when they received no reply from either party. While the
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League failed to act on the petition, Beukes was arrested and removed from his land and his wife
and children were forced from the property as well.145
The focus on the issue of land is unsurprising as it served as the chief means of survival
in the arid parts of the Police Zone. The Basters linked the preservation of their claims to the
land as necessary for economic survival and their social and political development under the
mandate. Jacobus Beukes questioned the League on the matter in October 1929, positing “How
can we keep pace with [development,] seeing that we are completely deprived of our rights?
How can we accept offers which have been made to us politically?” He believed that the ease
with which the SWAA dispatched Baster lands meant that the Basters were “not property
owners” and thus “had no future.”146 Since property rights were linked to “foreign laws” and
controlled by the SWAA, Beukes contended that, according to the law, “[the Basters were]
regarded as belonging to the Union of South Africa,” a direct contradiction to the text of the
mandate over South West Africa.147
It is clear that the continued expropriation of land in the late 1920s created a belief among
the Baster community that the SWAA’s intention was not the development of the Basters and
other indigenous groups in South West Africa, but instead their destruction. The Basters initially
made the League aware of their fears that they would be “utterly destroyed and scattered” in
January 1928.148 They received no response from the League regarding their concerns
surrounding arbitrary detentions and land expropriation, but reaffirmed their concerns about their
destruction in March 1930, when they again wrote to the League, “We have still received no
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answer to our previous petition and report submitted through the proper channels, and we are
highly apprehensive that if the League hands us over to the present Mandatory Government, we
shall quickly be destroyed. We therefore beg you to take pity on us.”149 The failure of the League
to directly respond to the Basters’ petitions made the probability of an intervention on the
Basters’ behalf highly unlikely. Therefore, beginning in 1931 and 1932, the Baster community
began the process of resolving their internal disputes and making stronger, unified claims to the
SWAA.
Initial attempts were made through Proclamation No. 9 of 1928 to restore some form of
local government and self-determination to the Gebiet. This proclamation created an Advisory
Council that consisted of three elected officials from the Baster community and three members
that the SWAA appointed to the Council. The SWAA’s role in appointing three of the Advisory
Council’s members remained a point of contention among the Basters. Likewise, Proclamation
No. 28 of 1923 had yet to be repealed and continued to cause internal tensions and division
among the community into the early 1930s and negatively impacted negotiations within the
community to end the dispute. On 15 January 1931, Albert Mouton wrote to the League detailing
the problematic nature of Proclamation No. 28 in ongoing negotiations:
We do not know how we are to preserve the peace, since the Magistrate of Rehoboth
assures us that peace must be concluded under Proclamation 28 of 1923. But
Proclamation 28 of 1923 is just the cause of the dissension, and all our petitions to the
League of Nations are concerned with Proclamation 28. Honorable Gentlemen, we are
anxious to have peace and are actually negotiating for peace, but we [do] not want it
under Proclamation 28 of 1923. In case the League of Nations should have approved of
Proclamation 28 of 1923, we beg to request you, Honorable Gentlemen, to write us this
definitely.150
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Over the course of the next year, Lord Lugard and the PMC implored the Basters to
conduct their elections within the guidelines established by Proclamation No. 9 of 1928.151
However, Nicolas van Wyk’s letter to the administrator at Rehoboth on 5 June 1932 rejected this
suggestion. Van Wyk contended that “We, the Burghers who did not adopt the Agreement of
1923, have after long consideration of the letter of the League of Nations of [19] February 1932,
decided to hold an election in accordance with the law of our Fathers of 1871-1872.”152 The
resultant election, according to van Wyk, would allow the elected members to consult with the
administrator on the matter of cooperation with the complete backing of the community.
Concerned about the nature of the administrator’s response to this proposed election and the
disregard for Proclamation No. 9, van Wyk also demanded that the Basters be “place[d] under
the protection of the League of Nations.”153 Later petitions in 1932 also alluded to potential
reprisals against Baster lands in response to proposed elections and the demand for protection by
the League was reaffirmed.154
By April 1933 opposition to conducting Advisory Board elections under Proclamation
No. 9 of 1928 waned. Following the submission of a petition from T. Beukes on 17 June 1932,
Nicolas van Wyk and his supporters joined the Minderheids, thus placing them in the majority.155
The Minderheids agreed to hold elections under the Proclamation and the members of the
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Advisory Council established by Proclamation No. 9 resigned their position, which allowed the
administrator to call for elections under Section 2 of the Proclamation.156 On 11 April 1933
Nicolas van Wyk and two others were elected to the Advisory Board to serve alongside the three
appointed members. While the Meederheids refused to participate in the election, the majority of
voters agreed to the appointment of the new Advisory Council and the election, which was
largely engineered and made possible by the tri-lateral negotiations of the Baster community
represented a restorative step toward the reimplementation of limited self-determination in the
Gebiet. 157 Through Proclamation No. 5 of 1935, the three government-appointed members of the
Advisory Council were eventually replaced by elected members. Limited political autonomy and
self-determination thus briefly returned to the Gebiet as a result of the Rehoboth Basters’ tireless
petition-writing campaign and utilization of transnational organizations to make claims to the
SWAA and South African government.

Conclusion
The Rehoboth Basters developed and embraced transnational resistance strategies as a
means to combat the aggressive extension of South African rule in South West Africa during the
1920s and 1930s. South West Africa’s transition from a German colony to a South African
mandate territory placed the Basters and other Namibians directly under the legal jurisdiction of
the Union. The legal apparatus created by the South African government and implemented by the
SWAA provided few viable or legitimate avenues of recourse for Namibians trying to
reconstitute political or socioeconomic institutions that existed prior to colonialism. Since only
limited concessions could be obtained by working solely through the apparatus provided by the
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colonial power, the Basters instead turned to transnational actors and institutions that existed
outside of the recursive purview of the South African government and could, as a result, provide
alternative means of support for the Basters’ resistance campaigns. Through a carefully
cultivated circuit of interested and sympathetic international actors, the Basters utilized
mechanisms of international diplomacy to place pressure on the South African government to
acquiesce to their political and socioeconomic demands.
In its earliest phases, the limitations of the Basters’ transnational resistance strategies
were apparent, and they achieved minimal political change. The Basters’ early petitions focused
heavily on subnational issue like the reconstitution of their political autonomy in the Gebiet and
they believed that their demands would receive full consideration during peace negotiations as a
reward for their participation in World War I on the side of the Allies. Despite South African
assurances that they would maintain a political position similar to that which existed under
German colonial rule, however, the transition from colony to mandate territory and General
Smuts’ desires to annex South West Africa as a de facto fifth province made the Basters’
political sovereignty untenable. As a result of this betrayal, the Basters engaged with the League
through a petition-writing campaign intended to apply international pressure on the South
African government and moderate its activities against the community.
The focus of these petitions was clearly subnational in nature with limited interest in the
independence of the larger South West Africa territory. Instead, the Basters concerned
themselves almost entirely with restoring political autonomy in the Gebiet to the Baster Raad.
This exclusive approach to resistance to the colonial regime allowed the Basters to focus on a
small set of localized problems and avoid embroiling themselves in larger controversies in the
territory. Their steadfast concentration on political autonomy and sovereignty during the early
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petition-writing phase had great success in amplifying the Baster voice and expressing Baster
agency to the larger international political community. However, that early focus on political
autonomy also complicated the League of Nations willingness to intervene in the matter as it
tried to restructure the international political order after the war.
The concentration on political autonomy by the petition writers limited the ability of the
League to directly intervene. The negotiations at Versailles and the subsequent mandate granted
to the South African government clearly placed South West Africa under the legal control of the
Union. At the time, the League lacked any type of coercive mechanism or enforcement arm that
could have forced South Africa to grant the Basters autonomy. Likewise, the League lacked the
appetite to force such a concession from a state that readily participated on behalf of the Allies in
World War I. These limitations provided little resolution for the Basters’ political demands and
forced the Basters to table these complaints and focus on working directly within the legal
language of the mandate.
Despite the early limitations of their transnational resistance campaign, the Basters’ later
resistance efforts proved more successful. As the possibility of obtaining political autonomy in
the Gebiet appeared unlikely, the Basters altered their demands and focused more on
socioeconomic development than on political sovereignty. The petitions of the mid-to-late-1920s
called for reform within the colonial government rather than outright independence. Relying on
the language of the League’s Covenant and the Treaty of Versailles, the Basters’ railed against
the lack of progressive development achieved under the colonial regime. Their petitions
highlighted the uneven distribution of hunting licenses that adversely affected their ability to
feed their families, decried the predatory lending practices of white business owners in the
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Gebiet, and lamented the lack of economic opportunities in the drought- and poverty-stricken
territory.
This marked shift in approach by the Basters and their demands for accommodation
within the mandate structure allowed the League to more effectively pressure the colonial
government. The Basters’ demands could be directly linked to the legal language present in the
mandate granted to South Africa and recursive measures could be taken. By following the
guidelines set forth by the PMC and submitting their petitions to the League, the League
compelled responses from the South African government and SWAA regarding the Basters’
claims. In order to maintain their mandate over the territory the South African government was
forced to respond to the League, further legitimating the Basters’ resistance campaign and
claims.
The pressure that the Basters were able to leverage against the colonial state by proxy of
the League resulted in a number of concessions exclusively for the Basters as the South African
government wanted to avoid increased international scrutiny over their actions. The South
African government already faced immense backlash as a result of the Bondelswarts Affair and
the Rehoboth Rebellion and wanted to avoid similar situations that would require testimony in
front of the League. That concern ultimately led to concessions from the colonial regime that
improved the socioeconomic situation for the Basters in the Gebiet. For example, the
expropriation of lands around the Gebiet temporarily slowed and the Basters were more easily
able to obtain hunting licenses to supplement their food production. The petitions effectively
forced the South African government to temper its behavior and find more amicable, less violent
resolutions to disputes raised by the Basters.
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Despite these victories on socioeconomic issues, the issue of political autonomy
simmered well into the early 1930s. The South African government proved unwilling to repeal
Proclamation No. 28 of 1923 and the disputes between the Traditional Raad and Provisional
Raad continued over this issue. The continued unwillingness of the League to intervene
ultimately resulted in the two Raads working internally to resolve their domestic disputes and
then, in a unified attempt, made claims of the SWAA to hold elections and restore limited
political autonomy in the Gebiet. The approach proved effective and, in 1935, the Basters’
Advisory Board consisted entirely of members from the Gebiet.
The success of the Basters in their transnational resistance efforts was part of an emergent
pattern in South West Africa that permeated the territory between 1921 and 1962. During the
Interwar Years, while the Basters developed and executed their petition-writing campaign, the
Herero and Nama simultaneously embraced a transnational resistance strategy that sought to
reconstitute their precolonial sociopolitical institutions and traditional authority. Relying on
historical maritime linkages that created a circuit between North America, South Africa, and
South West Africa, the Herero and Nama readily embraced the Black liberation messages of the
UNIA as it spread throughout the territory in the 1920s. The next chapter will examine how the
Herero and Nama cultivated and maintained a working relationship with the transnational UNIA
and utilized it not for national liberation but, instead, to reconstitute traditional Herero political
power and improve the socioeconomic conditions for Namibians living in the Police Zone.
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Chapter 3--“The Herero Claim it for Themselves Alone:” Subnationalism and the
Rise and Fall of the UNIA in South West Africa, 1921-1924
Whereas the Rehoboth Basters turned to the League of Nations to wage their
transnational interwar resistance campaign, the Herero and Nama in the Police Zone embraced
the UNIA as their primary means of resistance to the South African government’s repressive
segregationist policies. The UNIA was a transnational organization that originated in the
Caribbean and, through Black American diasporic channels, traversed the Atlantic and found
fertile grounds in North America and South Africa. The UNIA fostered close relationships with
other Black nationalist labor movements in the Union, like the Industrial Commercial Workers’
Union (ICU), and shared both leadership and members with these organizations. Unsurprisingly,
because of these close relationships, the UNIA came to South West Africa in 1920 by way of the
territory’s ICU branches and enjoyed popularity among the West Indian and West African
dockworkers in the territory.1 These West Indians and West Africans spread the UNIA’s PanAfricanist message and held positions of immense power within the association for nearly two
years, at which time the power dynamics in the territory’s UNIA branches shifted.
In late 1922, Herero political leaders wrested power away from the West Indian and West
African leadership of the Windhoek branch of the UNIA. This change in power was the result of
nearly two years of unkept promises that failed to produce a successful American intervention
force and a desire by Namibians to create both old and new structures of power.2 As the Herero
in Windhoek and Nama in Rehoboth swept into power, the agenda of the UNIA in South West
Africa shifted significantly from a focus on racial unity, Pan-Africanism, and complete territorial
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independence to a message of subnationalism and the achievement of specific subnational
ethnopolitical and economic goals. Under its new Herero and Nama leadership, the UNIA
became a vehicle for Namibian leaders to redress the political and economic traumas of
colonialism and utilize a transnational institution to resist South African colonialism and improve
their local socioeconomic circumstances.
This chapter seeks to add further complexity to the historical narrative surrounding the
UNIA’s activities in South West Africa during the 1920s. Historians have traditionally focused
on the role that millenarianism, Black nationalism, and American intervention played in the rise
of the UNIA among non-indigenous Blacks in South West Africa’s industrial centers.3 This
chapter instead examines the transnational nature of the UNIA, why the association took root
among indigenous Namibians in the early 1920s and what factors, outside of American
intervention, facilitated the UNIA’s growth as a resistance institution in the Police Zone. In
particular, this chapter analyzes how existent cultural frames in Namibian society mirrored the
organizational structure of the UNIA and enabled the UNIA’s growth as a means to reconstitute
Namibians’ subnational sociopolitical institutions and challenge the power of the colonial state.
In the wake of the Herero’s seizure of power, and absent non-indigenous leadership’s influence,
the focus of the Windhoek branch’s activities turned to subnational concerns, with the leadership
of other more rural UNIA branches following suit. Lastly, whereas Tony Emmett’s work on this
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topic argues that Garvey’s arrest, the preponderant power of the colonial state, and the
emergence of the South West Africa National Congress (SWANC) contributed to the collapse of
the UNIA in the territory, this chapter instead examines two important aspects of the rise and fall
of the association in South West Africa. First, the chapter examines how indigenous Namibians
created, accessed, and used the transnational networks provided by the UNIA in order to
influence the behavior of the colonial state. Second, unlike Emmett’s work, this chapter contends
that ethnopolitical rivalry and competing subnational goals played an essential role in the
collapse of the UNIA in South West Africa, not external factors overseas. Such an analysis adds
further detail and nuance to Emmett’s limited discussion on how the “composition and nature of
political organizations during this period” contributed to the failure of the UNIA in the 1920s.4
The historiography surrounding the UNIA in Africa concentrates on the organization’s
activities in West Africa and South Africa. Within the South African context, scholars focused
on the millenarian aspects of Garveyism, how this coincided with similar resistance movements
in Southern Africa, and the role that concepts like Black nationalism and providential design
played in the association’s popularity. Robert Vinson’s The Americans Are Coming! is perhaps
one of the most thorough examinations of the transnational nature of Garveyism and explored
why the UNIA found success in South African industrial centers. Likewise, Robert A. Hill’s and
Gregory Pirio’s chapter “Africa for the Africans” examined the development of Garvey’s
movement in South Africa between 1920 and 1940.5 Other works, less extensive in scope,
analyzed smaller episodes of Garveyism’s role as an ideology suited to colonial resistance. For
instance, Robert Edgar’s “Garveyism in Africa” examined Wellington Buthelezi’s activities in
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the Transkei in interwar South Africa, and Vinson’s “Sea Kaffirs” focused on the role of Black
Americans in the spread of Garveyism in Cape Town.6
The historiography of the UNIA’s activities in South West Africa, unlike its South
African counterpart, is more limited. In 1982, Pirio produced one of the early in-depth studies of
the UNIA in South West Africa, where he highlighted the connection between the UNIA and the
ICU and argued that these two organizations played an instrumental role in the development of a
Black working-class nationalism in the territory.7 In June 1984, Emmett added to Pirio’s work
with the presentation of his seminar paper “Popular Resistance in Namibia, 1920-1925.”
Emmett’s paper argued that the UNIA represented the emergence of a new, nationalistic period
of resistance in South West Africa’s history. His work analyzed the growth of the UNIA as a
result of millenarianism and pointed to the association’s predominantly non-indigenous
leadership, the rise of SWANC, and the preponderant power of the colonial state as major factors
in the association’s collapse in the territory.8 In 1990, Emmett further refined his work on the
UNIA in South West Africa and published a shorter version of his seminar paper as part of his
larger book Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915-1966.9 Other
historians, like Jan-Bart Gewald, have briefly analyzed the role of the UNIA in postwar Herero
society, but in a more limited manner and within the context of more sweeping historical
examinations.10
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The analysis of the UNIA in South West Africa has focused on two key issues. First,
scholars argue that the UNIA’s espousal of a Black liberation ideology cultivated an improbable
belief among Namibians that American intervention would bring about a millenarian general
uprising in the territory.11 Second, the UNIA’s close links to the ICU created the basis for a
Black working-class nationalism that provided the foundation for the national liberation
movement of the 1960s.12 This approach, although valuable, creates a historiographical issue,
whereby there is an overemphasis on the promise of American intervention as the leading cause
for the rise and collapse of the UNIA in 1920s South West Africa.
While the possibility of American intervention and territorial liberation undoubtedly
aided the spread of the association, it is clear that among indigenous Namibians, particularly the
Herero, the success of the UNIA rested on the similarities between Namibian and UNIA
sociopolitical structures and their ability to address subnational socioeconomic needs. In the case
of the Herero and Nama in the Police Zone, the social welfare programs provided by the UNIA
and the opportunity to re-establish earlier sociopolitical structures proved equally enticing and
led to the association’s growth among Namibians.13 Although questions still remained for
Namibians around the viability of an American intervention force, the UNIA’s new agenda
centered on subnational and local problems under indigenous leadership.
This chapter begins its exploration of the UNIA’s role in Namibian resistance politics by
first detailing Marcus Garvey’s early life in the Caribbean and his development of the UNIA in
New York. The chapter proceeds with a discussion on the transnational nature of the UNIA and
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the particular circumstances in South Africa that allowed it to flourish and spread in the early
twentieth century. Here, the close relationship that developed between the ICU and UNIA
leadership is discussed with a particular focus on the ICU’s role in spreading the UNIA to South
West Africa. Next, the chapter examines why the UNIA experienced success in South West
Africa. The UNIA’s similarities with existing Namibian social structures, its popular social
welfare message, and spread from urban to rural areas are analyzed. Finally, the chapter
concludes with an analysis of the transfer of power that occurred in the UNIA in 1922 and the
subsequent collapse that transpired as a result of internal sociopolitical fissures among the
UNIA’s Namibian leadership and members.

Marcus Garvey: The Development of His Pan-African Thought
Marcus Garvey was born on 17 August 1887 in St. Ann’s Bay, Jamaica to Sarah Jane
Richards and Malchus Garvey, Sr.14 Richards served as a housekeeper in middle-class
households and Garvey, Sr. was a prominent land-owning Black man in St. Ann’s Bay who held
important positions in the parish and possessed a large private library that provided his son with
access to education and inspiration at an early age.15 Garvey described the significance of his
father’s library in his early intellectual development, writing “And in my tender years I went
to…[my father’s] books and I gathered inspiration, and what inspiration I gathered, changed my
outlook from the ambition of wanting to be a wharf-man or a cow-boy, and made me look
forward to being a personality in the world. Nobody helped me toward that objective except my
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own mind and God’s good will.”16 Garvey began his formal education at a local elementary
school and later enrolled in the Church of England Grammar School in St. Ann’s Bay until he
completed the sixth standard in 1903.17
After leaving the Church of England Grammar School, Garvey became an apprentice in
the printing shop of his godfather Alfred Burrowes. During this period, Garvey quickly learned
the technical side of the printing process and the importance of the written word. While working
in Burrowes’ shop, Garvey immersed himself in the printing business and learned of Black
Jamaican struggles by listening to Burrowes and his acquaintances discuss historical slave
rebellions and the contemporary political happenings on the island.18 Upon completion of his
apprenticeship with Burrowes, Garvey left St. Ann’s Bay in 1904 and travelled to Kingston,
Jamaica to obtain work as a printer. In Kingston, Garvey found employment with Jamaica’s
largest printing firm, P.A. Benjamin Company, and by the age of 20 he became a master-printer
and foreman.19
During his time at the company, Garvey became deeply involved in the political and
economic life in Kingston. The Compositor’s Branch of the Printer’s Union elected Garvey as its
Vice President in 1907, and that same year he led a printers’ strike that demanded higher wages
and better working conditions for the Union’s members.20 The strike was broken in 1907 and
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because Garvey did not succumb to the pressure from his employers to defect from his fellow
strikers, he was blacklisted from the printing industry in Jamaica. Upon the advice of his mentor
and elocution teacher, Dr. Joseph Robert Love, Garvey founded his own publication, Garvey’s
Watchman, which was based, in part, on Dr. Love’s The Advocate.21 Love’s impact on Garvey’s
conception and definition of Black consciousness cannot be understated. Garvey was an avid
reader of Dr. Love’s publication and, through his relationship with Love, he was introduced to
the writings of the period’s most prominent Pan-African thinkers like Edward Wilmont Blyden,
Booker T. Washington, Alexander Crummell, W.E.B. Du Bois, and John Edward Bruce. In
response to a letter written by the anonymous “St. Ann” in the 10 February 1930 issue of the
Daily Gleaner that described Garvey and Dr. Love’s conceptions of race as at odds, Garvey
further highlighted the impact of Dr. Love and The Advocate on his conceptions of race. Garvey
wrote, “[I]sn’t it rather amusing to those who knew Dr. Love for you to refer to him as
[someone] to the opposite of Marcus Garvey? Why, much of my early education in race
consciousness is from Dr. Love. One cannot read his ‘Jamaica Advocate’ without getting race
consciousness.”22
Unable to find suitable work in Jamaica and desirous of exploring the Black condition in
the rest of the world, Garvey travelled to South and Central America from 1910 to 1912. He
travelled extensively, making stops in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Panama
where he performed manual labor jobs that provided him with an intimate knowledge of the
similar working conditions faced by Black workers in the Americas.23 He attempted to bring this
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condition of exploitation and oppression to the forefront by publishing La Nacion, a newspaper
in which Garvey lamented the burdensome and deadly working conditions faced by Black
laborers in Costa Rica. However, the claims and information presented in his paper proved to
have little effect on white policy-makers. After two years of seeing the plight of the Black
worker, Garvey returned to Jamaica in 1912.24
Upon his return, Garvey quickly realized that the lack of employment opportunities still
remained and that, in order to find better economic prospects and discern for himself if the
treatment of Blacks was better in Europe, he again needed to leave the island. Through the help
of his sister Indiana Peart, who was living in London at the time, Garvey secured a passage to
England.25 In London, Garvey enrolled in Birkbeck College and took courses in philosophy and
law while also working at various docks in London. Garvey continued to involve himself in the
printing industry and contributed a number of articles to English-language publications,
including the African Times and Orient Review.26 In this journal, Garvey published his
influential article “The British West Indies in the Mirror of Civilization: History Making by
Colonial Negroes,” which called for a federation in the British West Indies and prophesized that
such a federation would make “[West Indians] the instruments of uniting a scattered race who,
before the close of many centuries, will found an Empire on which the sun shall shine as
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ceaselessly as it shines on the Empire of the North to-day.”27 Garvey used this concept of
“uniting a scattered race,” which he developed as a result of his experiences in the Americas and
Europe, as the intellectual forerunner to the creation of the United Negro Improvement
Association and African Communities League.

The UNIA: Its Structure and Growth in North America
Garvey returned to Jamaica in 1914 and on 1 August 1914, the anniversary of the
emancipation of Jamaican slaves, he founded the UNIA. In its early stages, the UNIA began as a
“universal confraternity” with the goal to “promote the spirit of race pride and love,…reclaim the
fallen race,…administer to and assist the needy,… [and] establish universities, colleges and
secondary schools for the further education and culture of the boys and girls of the [Black]
race.”28 Chapters of the UNIA could be created, with the approval of Marcus Garvey, if the
members showed “a commitment to contribute to the UNIA program” and “at least seven Black,
dues paying individuals” were present.29 The rates of these dues were not to exceed 25 cents per
person and included an additional 10 cents that served as a type of insurance that alleviated
funeral costs for a deceased UNIA member’s family.
Fairly moderate in its early conception, improvement and the provision of education for
Black Jamaicans became the early focus of the UNIA. On his return trip from London to
Kingston, Garvey read Booker T. Washington’s Up From Slavery and firmly embraced
Washington’s Tuskegee Model and its focus on industrialization and vocational skills as a model
to be followed in Jamaica. Garvey initially attempted to create a school for delinquent children in
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Jamaica, but the government rejected his request for Crown lands to build the school after
several complaints from “Coloured” intellectuals and civil servants in Jamaica.30 However, it is
clear that by September of 1914 Garvey planned to travel to the United States and raise funds for
the creation of a school in Jamaica based on the Tuskegee model. He wrote to Booker T.
Washington that month, detailing his plan to partake in a lecture tour around the United States to
raise awareness about the work of the UNIA in the United States, and he asked Washington to
make a donation to their cause.31 Although Washington was unable to make a donation to the
UNIA or its proposed school, he did reply “I have read what you say with reference to the
advance being made in educational facilities for the Negroes of [Jamaica]. I hope that when you
come to America you will come to Tuskegee and see for yourself what we are striving to do for
the colored young man and woman of the South.”32 Approximately two years later, and a year
after Washington’s death, Garvey made the voyage to the United States and arrived in Harlem,
New York on 23 March 1916. While Garvey struggled in the early years in New York, late1910s and early-1920s Harlem proved a fertile ground for the Pan-African message and platform
of the UNIA.
Two factors that contributed to the eventual popularity of the UNIA in Harlem, and later
the United States, were the post-war disillusionment experienced by African Americans and the
cultural flourishing of the African American community in Harlem. African Americans that
fought in World War I sacrificed their lives for the war effort. Yet, when they returned to the
United States they experienced the same humiliation, dehumanization, and violence that thrived
under Jim Crowism in the United States South. The production of Birth of a Nation in 1915 led
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to a revival in the recruitment efforts of the Klu Klux Klan (KKK) and increased violence against
Blacks in the American South. Garvey recognized the peculiar position of African American
servicemen and the affected communities and captured the prevailing attitudes of African
Americans, writing:
When our interests clash with those of the ruling faction, then we find that we have
absolutely no rights. In times of peace, when everything is all right, Negroes have a hard
time, wherever we go, wheresoever we find ourselves…but in the time of trouble they
make us all partners in the cause, as happened in the last war, when we were partners,
whether British, French or American Negroes. And we were told that we must forget
everything in an effort to save the nation. We have saved many nations in this manner,
and we have lost our lives doing that before. Hundreds of thousands—nay, millions of
Black men…we saved this glorious country more than once; and all that we have
received for our sacrifices, all that we have received for what we have done, even in
giving up our lives, is just what you are receiving now, just what I am receiving.33
African American journalist and writer Roi Ottley later wrote of Garvey’s ability to
connect with the African American sentiment of the time: “Garvey [leapt] into the ocean of
Black unhappiness at a most timely moment for a savior. He had witnessed the Negro’s
disillusionment mount with the progress of the World War. Negro soldiers had suffered all forms
of Jim-Crow, humiliation, discrimination, slander, and even violence at the hands of a white
civilian population…. Meantime, administration leaders were quite pointed in trying to persuade
Negroes that in spite of their full participation in the war effort they could expect no changes in
their traditional status in America.”34 The unkept promises of the postwar period created an
environment where African Americans were particularly receptive to the messages of Garvey
and the UNIA.
Despite the broken promises of the period, the Black community in Harlem flourished.
The New Negro Movement, which spanned from the 1890s to 1940, provided an intellectual and
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philosophical foundation for Black political awareness, citizenship, and power in the postReconstruction Era. Led by Booker T. Washington’s “Tuskegee Machine” and W.E.B. Du Bois’
“Talented 10th,” the movement represented a political and social re-awakening for African
Americans in the United States. While the New Negro Movement would continue until 1940, in
the late 1910s and early 1920s a more radical wing developed in Harlem that centered not on
social and political discourse, but instead on Black expression through the arts. This more
radical, artistic branch of the New Negro Movement that developed in New York was known as
the Harlem Renaissance.35
Unapologetically Black and proud, the Harlem Renaissance sought to reclaim the lost
identity of Black people from the depths of white oppression. The driving force behind the
Harlem Renaissance was the expression of Black identity through the creation of artwork,
literature, poetry, and plays that challenged stereotypes and misrepresentations of the Black
experience in the United States. For many artists and writers that shaped the Harlem
Renaissance, art served as a form of activism. Whereas negative images of African Americans
inspired racism, these artists believed that positive representations of Blacks could uplift the
race.
Works like Claude McKay’s poem “If We Must Die,” Zora Neal Hurston’s Their Eyes
Were Watching God, and Alaine Locke’s The New Negro attempted to capture the feelings of
disillusionment that had set in during the post-war years and replace them with feelings of racial
pride and optimism.36 Such works decried the act of lynching and violence against African
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American, questioned the socioeconomic and political marginalization of Blacks, and challenged
African Americans to reconceptualize their position in American society. Other works, like
Langston Hughes’ The Negro Speaks of Rivers, attempted to connect African Americans with a
lost past that included important contributions to the development of Western culture and
society.37 The radical, more militant pro-Black artists of the Harlem Renaissance were critical of
the “more conservative bourgeoisie [element] of the New Negro Movement” and, coupled with
the disillusionment that many African Americans experienced during this period, their strategies
cultivated a receptive audience in New York that was willing to embrace the message that
Marcus Garvey prepared to unleash in the United States.
In an attempt to give his idea a lasting organizational foothold in the United States,
Marcus Garvey incorporated the New York Branch of the UNIA in June of 1918. Membership in
the UNIA began with as few as 13 members. However, by 1920 there were an estimated 300,000
to 2,000,000 members in the UNIA in the Americas and Africa. Likewise, the UNIA established
nearly 300 branches across the globe by the mid-1920s.38 Garvey’s dream of “uniting a scattered
race,” that he had so eloquently described in “The British West Indies in the Mirror of
Civilization” in October of 1913, manifested itself in concrete ways in the 1920s.39
As Garvey’s movement took root and spread in the United States, the platform and
purposes of the UNIA expanded and took shape. At the heart of the UNIA’s mission in the
United States was the restoration of Black political autonomy and the rescuing of Black
humanity and dignity. Unlike other movements which “[sought] to make the Negro a secondary
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part of the existing government” and “subordinate the Negro as a secondary consideration in a
great civilization,” Garvey and the UNIA advocated for the creation of an African state that
African Americans and West Indians could repatriate to and develop.40 Garvey acknowledged
this desire as a key distinction from other organizations of the period and wrote, “The difference
between the [UNIA] and the other movements of this country, and probably the world, is that the
[UNIA] seeks independence of government.”41 From this desire for an independent and blackcontrolled state, albeit controlled by Western blacks, the [UNIA] and Garvey developed their
“Back-to-Africa” slogan which became a rallying cry of the Garveyite movement in the United
States.42
The concept of a “Back-to-Africa” movement was not new in the United States. The
American Colonization Society (ACS) supported the repatriation of African Americans to Africa
and, in 1822, helped establish the Liberia colony. Garvey was clear that the UNIA was not
“seeking to build up another government within the bounds or borders of the United States of
America” or “disrupt an organized system of government.”43 Instead the UNIA was “determined
to bring Negroes together for the building up of a nation of their own…because [they] have been
forced to it.”44 In this pursuit, Liberia served as a perfect conduit through which the UNIA could
carry out its program of re-establishing Black political sovereignty in a world that oppressed,
abused, and enslaved its Black populations. Garvey further underlined this point, writing “Yet it
is realized that all human beings have a limit to their humanity. The humanity of white America,
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we realize, will seek self-protection and self-preservation, and that is why the thoughtful and
reasonable Negro sees no hope in America for satisfying the aggressive program of the [National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)], but advances the reasonable
plan of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, that of creating in Africa a nation and
government for the Negro race.”45
Closely related to Garvey’s conception of a politically and socially independent Black
society was the desire for Black economic self-sufficiency. Garvey believed that “it is only a
question of time when the Negro, economically dependent as he is on the white man, [will] be
forced to the wall, and that the solution of the problem in the future would not be so much by
wholesale killing or wiping out of Negro populations…but by a well-organized plan of economic
starvation.”46 He would further write, “The time is coming…when the Negro will have a hard
time finding a place in the economic arrangements of the other races of the world, when not only
in Europe, but in America, it will become difficult for him to find even the opportunity to work
in the most menial occupations.”47 In order to prepare for and counteract this perceived threat to
the viability and stability of the Black race, Milfred Fierce argued that Garvey and the UNIA
adopted a platform based on “Black capitalism” and turned its attention toward the creation and
support of Black businesses across the United States.48
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The Black Star Line, one of Garvey’s early business ventures, was founded in New York
in 1919 and became central to his concept of economic self-sufficiency. The Black Star Line was
conceptually a mechanism through which the UNIA could support its “Back-to-Africa”
movement and provide African Americans with the opportunity to invest in a Black-run and
Black-owned businesses. The Black Star Line was capitalized at $500,000 and African
Americans bought shares of stock in the publicly traded company at $5 a share. In addition to the
repatriation of African Americans to Liberia, the Black Star Line also served to transport goods,
like alcohol, vegetables, and coconuts, to Central and South America, as well as the Caribbean
and Africa. This company, the epitome of a Black capitalist venture, provided the UNIA with a
means through which to facilitate its followers’ dreams of economic opportunity and stability
through Black-owned businesses.49
In 1920, Garvey and the UNIA also organized and capitalized the Negro Factories
Corporation and the Black Cross Navigation and Trading Company. The Negro Factories
Corporation’s purpose was to “construct and manage factories in the urban or industrial centers
of North America, Central America, the West Indies, and Africa” and produce commodities that
would guarantee “steady and profitable” employment for black workers. The Negro Factories
Corporation served as a way for black producers and manufacturers to sell desired commodities
to Black communities, creating a system that increased Black economic power. Similarly, the
Black Cross Navigation and Trading Company, a successor of the Black Star Line, chartered
trade between Black communities around the Atlantic and facilitated the repatriation of African
Americans to Africa.50 Garvey intended The Black Cross Navigation and Trading Company to
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“contribute to the transportation of pilgrims to West Africa,” which would create the foundation
for the development of a Black capitalist society in Liberia devoid of the socioeconomic and
political pressures of white society.
In order to develop this Black capitalist society and link it to the larger Pan-African
diasporic community, Garvey relied on his background as a publisher, printer, and journalist to
disseminate the core concepts of the UNIA across the globe. These core concepts included
political sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency, racial pride, and general improvement and
upliftment of the Black race. In 1918, with the help of his future wife Amy Euphemia Jacques,
Marcus Garvey established The Negro World in New York. The Negro World, a newspaper
resembling Hubert Harrison’s The Voice, served as the primary propaganda and dissemination
organ of the association. The purpose of the Negro World was to connect the African diaspora in
North America, South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and Africa with one another and
facilitate the exchange of ideas and information. Similarly, Garvey also hoped that The Negro
World would encourage other newspapers in the United States to take up international issues that
affected the Black community and do so in an honest manner. He argued, “[The Negro World]
has rendered a wonderful service to Negro journalism in the United States. It has gradually
changed the tone and make-up of some of the papers…today several of the papers are publishing
international news and writing intelligent editorials on pertinent subjects. It has been a long and
costly fight to bring this about…. I fully realize that very little can be achieved by way of
improvement of the race when its press is controlled by crafty and unscrupulous persons who
have no pride or love of race.”51
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Travelling primarily along shipping routes, some estimates place the total global
circulation of The Negro World at around 200,000 copies in 1921.52 The publication served as a
sociopolitical analysis and critique of the Black experience across the globe. And it consequently
served as the primary link and line of communication between the UNIA’s headquarters in the
United States and the separate branches across the world. In many cases, The Negro World not
only informed the global Black community about political events, but also distributed
information and propaganda about the association that cultivated fertile ground in places where
branches of the organization did not already exist. In this way, The Negro World was not only
the connective tissue that held the organization together, but also a tool for its growth and
expansion in places like West Africa and South Africa.

The UNIA in South Africa
The historical links that developed a circuit between the United States and South Africa
date to the eighteenth century and created a natural channel through which the Garveyist
ideology and the UNIA circulated. Garvey’s UNIA found a favorable environment in 1920s
South Africa as Black South Africans experienced the misfortunes of a poor global economy and
the aggressive expansion of segregationist policies by the South African state in the post-war
period. The South African government “retained an essentially regressive approach” toward
African workers in the 1920s and limited both their political and socioeconomic opportunities.53
The 1913 Land Act, which forced Africans into reserves and prevented them from either buying
or renting land that sat outside of these economically unviable reserves, was rigorously enforced
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and expanded. The 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act further restricted the movement of Africans
outside of the reserves and practically “provided for the registration and control of employment
contracts, and regulated migration into and residence in towns on the basis of the ‘pass’.”54
Africans that violated their labor contracts while in the urban areas were persecuted through the
earlier Masters and Servants law and the 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act.55 The South
African government was, thus, creating an immobile and stagnant labor pool that could be easily
controlled and monitored by the state.
For those Africans in the urban areas and cities in South Africa, their economic
opportunities were also tightly controlled. As Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seekings suggest,
“Trade Unions representing African workers were not recognized, and were not allowed to
participate in centralized bargaining,” severely limiting Africans' abilities to negotiate better
working conditions or higher wages.56 Although the welfare state in South Africa grew
dramatically during the 1920s, African workers were largely excluded from such programs.
Many of these programs were meant to promote industrial growth and modernize agricultural
practices; however, they were geared largely toward benefiting unskilled poor white laborers as a
means to avoid situations similar to the Rand Rebellion of 1922.57 In addition to these
unfavorable economic conditions, Africans also faced a continuous assault from the South
African government on their political rights. Beginning in 1924, J.B.M. Hertzog actively worked
to remove Blacks from the South African voting rolls and effectively eliminate their franchise.
These efforts culminated in the establishment of the Representation of Natives Act of 1936 that
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placed Black Cape elites with qualified franchise on separate voter rolls and forced them to
accept indirect parliamentary representation.58
Black South Africans, oppressed by the implementation of the aforementioned
segregationist legislation, acutely experienced the dehumanizing effects of the establishment of
an early “Color Line.”59 The nature of these experiences and the disillusionment it caused South
Africans during the previously hopeful post-war period created an environment that craved the
Black liberation message at the core of the Garvey Movement. The spread of Garveyism to
South Africa, although complex and multi-faceted in nature, can be linked to three specific
groups with origins in, and ties to, North America. Crucial to the spread of Garvey’s ideology to
South Africa were the American Jubilee Singers, West Indian laborers and mariners, and the
AME Church.
While American Blacks were historically linked to South Africa through commercial
maritime ventures as early as the eighteenth century, one of South Africa’s first significant
experiences with African Americans occurred in 1862 when the Confederate ship Alabama
arrived in Cape Town with a cargo of Black slaves. In The American’s Are Coming! historian
Robert Vinson wrote of this experience: “The slaves performed minstrel shows for white South
Africans sympathetic to the Confederate cause and bitter about Britain’s ending of slavery in the
Cape Colony; such shows began in the United States in the late 1820s, and they featured white
performers in Blackface caricaturing enslaved and free Blacks….Blackface minstrelsy continued
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to circulate negative images of Black Americans in South Africa.”60 Such shows in South Africa
used common American characters and tropes, like Jim Crow and Zip Coon, to re-affirm
negative stereotypes about both Africans and American Blacks. These performances were
successful in spreading these negative caricatures of Blacks throughout South Africa. However,
the relationship between African Americans and black South Africans underwent a fundamental
shift in the 1890s with the arrival of the Virginia Jubilee Singers in Cape Town.61
Orpheus McAdoo, a former Fisk Jubilee Singer, founded the Virginia Jubilee Singers in
1889 at Hampton Institute in Virginia. The Virginia Jubilee Singers modeled themselves after
their Fisk University forerunners and employed biblical imagery, dance, and spiritual songs as a
way to critique the racism and horrors of the American South in coded language understood
primarily by oppressed Blacks.62 The Virginia Jubilee Singers partook in two separate tours of
South Africa from 1890 to 1892 and 1895 to 1898. Counter to the negative anti-Black imagery
circulated by the minstrel shows of the previous three decades, the Virginia Jubilee Singers
represented the epitome of Booker T. Washington’s Up From Slavery.63 Rather than displaying
the lazy, lustful, and menacing characteristics popularized by caricatures like Jim Crow, the
Virginia Jubilee Singers instead represented the possibilities for Black South Africans if they
were to follow a program of education similar to that which was provided at the Hampton
Institute. Whites understood the achievements of the Virginia Jubilee Singers as a sign of hope
that, with time and education, Black South Africans could become civilized like their American
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counterparts. Black South Africans viewed the successes of the Singers and the “honorary white”
status that they received from the South African government quite differently.64
In 1896, in the middle of the Virginia Jubilee Singers second tour of South Africa, the
AME Church accepted the Ethiopian Independent Church of South Africa as its fourteenth
district.65 The AME Church was founded in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1816 and preached a
Black liberation theology that advocated for the political, social, economic, and spiritual
liberation of African Americans.66 The interaction between the American members of the church
and their new South African counterparts centered on the concept of “Providential Design.”
“Providential Design” emphasized the idea that diasporic Blacks, who through their enslavement
came into contact with Western education and Christianity, would return to Africa and play a key
role in civilizing and redeeming the continent. Henry McNeal Turner, a key figure in the
founding of the AME Church in South Africa, supported this idea wholeheartedly.67 In 1883 he
wrote, “I do not believe that American slavery was a divine institution, but I do believe it was a
providential institution and that God intends to make it the primal factor in the civilization and
Christianization of that dark continent.”68 Pastors and Bishops preached this concept in the AME
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Churches of South Africa and Black South Africans projected the Virginia Jubilee Singers, and
African Americans more broadly, into this role of liberator and civilizer.
This ideology of Black excellence, racial pride, and liberation from white oppression
cultivated an environment primed for the arrival of Garveyism and the UNIA in the 1920s.
Garvey and the Black Americans that espoused and transmitted his message, much like the
Virginia Jubilee Singers, represented the “American liberators” that had been prophetically
foretold in the teachings of the AME Church. UNIA writings and publications used this Biblical
and African imagery as a way to convey the message that their organization and members
intended to return to Africa and liberate the continent. In 1920, the UNIA adopted “The
Universal Ethiopian Anthem” as “the anthem of the negro race” because of its use of this
imagery. An excerpt from this poem reads:
Ethiopia, though land of our fathers, Thou land where the gods loved to be, As storm
cloud at night suddenly gathers Our armies come rushing to thee. We must in the fight be
victorious When words are thrust outward to gleam; For us will the vict’ry be glorious
When led by the red, black and green. Advance, Advance to victory, Let Africa be
free….O Jehovah, thou God of the ages Grant unto our sons that lead The wisdom Thou
gave to Thy sages When Israel was sore in need. Thy voice thro’ the dim past has spoken,
Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hand, By Thee shall all fetters be broken, and Heav’n
bless our dear fatherland….69
Garvey would likewise use this language in his speeches and publications. On 14 August 1923,
during discussions about sending a representative to the League of Nations, he wrote “Let us
work and pray for the hastening of the day when ‘Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hand unto God’
and our race be lifted from the mire of prejudice and injustice to the realm of freedom and true
liberty.”70
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In addition to the contributions of African Americans and their organizations in the
United States, the migration of West Indians to South Africa in the early twentieth century also
contributed significantly to the rapid spread of Garveyism in Cape Town. American Blacks, and
West Indians in particular, had a lengthy history of association with the commercial maritime
industry and some estimates suggest that by 1850 nearly 50 percent of all American seamen were
Black. The poverty and limited opportunities that accompanied the post-emancipation period in
the Caribbean, as well as the economic depression in the sugar industry, forced many West
Indians to use migration as a “mechanism of adaptation” and “a symbolic expression of new
freedom.”71 Already proficient in maritime skills, many of these West Indians used the Atlantic
trade routes to travel to South America, Africa, and Europe in search of new employment
opportunities. These West Indians were often more educated and in possession of more
commercial skills than Blacks in other parts of the world. This helped them secure jobs more
easily in port towns and cities.72
A strong West Indian/Afro-Caribbean community formed in Cape Town as a result of the
aforementioned migrations. Alan G. Cobley argued in his article “Far From Home” that
“Although a West Indian presence was established in all major ports in southern Africa from
Windhoek to Durban, and in the interior as far afield as Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, Kimberley,
and Basutoland, the vast majority of West Indians were always to be found in the Cape Colony,
and particularly in the great maritime crossroads of Cape Town.”73 In agreement with Cobley,
Robert Vinson contended that most of the West Indians in the Cape “came to the region as
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sailors who used their maritime skills and their kinship ties to link up with the Trinidadian dock
labor recruiter James Wilson to secure readily available, higher paying stevedoring jobs on Cape
Town’s docks.”74 The further discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1868 and the discovery of
Gold near Johannesburg in 1886 provided a significant financial incentive for West Indians to
flock to South Africa.
One of the more attractive features of Cape Town for these West Indian sailors and
laborers was that it offered new political possibilities that did not exist in the Caribbean or
United States. “Cape Liberalism” was the defining political ideology in Cape Town from the
early 1850s to the early 1890s. At the core of this ideology were concepts like the non-racial
system of Cape Qualified Franchise and the extension of a policy of non-racialism in the social
sphere. During this period the Cape’s attorney general William Porter, and others like
parliamentarian Saul Solomon, embraced an approach to racial relations that was distinct from
the other South African provinces.75 Such opportunities, coupled with economic opportunities
that did not exist in the Caribbean, made Cape Town a hub of diasporic West Indian life.
These newfound opportunities and optimism were short-lived for the West Indian
community in Cape Town, however. In 1892, voting restrictions were increased and nonracial
franchise was severely limited. Similarly, at the conclusion of World War I, white sailors and
maritime workers returned to their jobs and West Indians were subsequently forced to seek other
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forms of employment.76 Although many were able to find work on the Cape Town docks, the
hopes and aspirations that characterized West Indians post-migration experiences soon
evaporated. Instead, restricted franchise rights, more limited economic opportunities, and a
general decline in the health of the economy in the 1920s led to a sense of disillusionment akin to
that which was experienced by African Americans in the United States during the same period.
Whereas African Americans in the United States turned toward the artistic expression that
defined the Harlem Renaissance, West Indians in South Africa embraced political and labor
activism as a means to cope with their new reality.
Aiding the growth of effective labor organization and Black political consciousness was
the arrival of many West Indian and Black veterans to Cape Town. The negative experiences of
Black soldiers during World War I is well-documented. Conversely, the interaction of diasporic
blacks and the destruction of the myth of white invincibility proved crucial in developing an
organized and radical-nationalist sentiment among West Indian troops.77 Events like the Taranto
Mutiny of December 1918 and the resultant formation of the Caribbean League only further
solidified the burgeoning relationship between Black South Africans and Black West Indians that
faced similarly oppressive white regimes. The interaction between these two communities led to
the creation of a Black nationalist ideology steeped in working-class consciousness.78 In 1920,
South African professor and political activist D.D.T Jabavu noted:
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[T]he Native Labor Contingent that did work in France during the Great War has
imported into the country a new sense of racial unity and amity quite unknown heretofore
among our Bantu races. Common hardships in a common camp have brought them into
close relation…some of their white officers, including two chaplains…made themselves
notorious by their harsh treatment and slanderous repression of them….All this was
carefully noted and published in [South Africa] when they returned. The result is that
there is among the diversified Bantu tribes of this land a tendency towards complete
mutual respect and love founded upon the unhealthy basis of an anti-white sentiment.
They thus provide plastic material for all sorts of leaders and agitators who may use it for
good or ill.79
The post-war disillusionment experienced by these returning veterans and forcibly
unemployed West Indian sailors, combined with the Black nationalist working-class
consciousness that they imported, facilitated an unprecedented organizing effort among Cape
Town’s Afro-Caribbean community. Clements Kadalie, a Malawian schoolteacher, founded the
ICU in Cape Town in 1919. The following year a massive strike of 70,000 Black miners and a
subsequent strike of Black dockworkers occurred. The ICU proved instrumental in negotiating
the wage dispute with Cape Town’s dock employers and this success led to a rise in the
popularity of the ICU. An article in the Times (London) claimed that “The genuine grievances of
the South African Natives provided the hotbed in which the ICU flourished. Rack-rented Natives
in the urban locations, underpaid Natives in Government employ, badly treated Natives on
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European farms, flocked to join the movement.”80 The ICU spread rapidly in South Africa,
establishing branches in East London, Port Elizabeth, Orange Free State, Natal, and the eastern
Transvaal. By 1927, membership in the ICU had reached a peak of 100,000.81
The lack of consistent leadership and organization within the ICU led to a constant state
of ideological change and reformulation. In the 1920s, the ICU focused on traditional trade union
activities like workers strikes and union organizing. For a time, the ICU flirted with a
Communist ideology and became involved with rural South African workers and their grievances
against white employers. Owing to its ethnically and racially diverse base, the ICU proved
ideologically fluid during its most influential years. Although the Port Elizabeth Massacre of
1920 is most directly linked with the radical shift in the ICU ideology, the ICU served as an
organization focused on Black political, economic, and social justice from its inception. 82
The state response to the activities of the ICU were fluid over time. In some cases,
politicians like J.B.M. Hertzog sought to cultivate friendly relations with the ICU and negotiate
with their leadership because of their political influence in the Cape until the late 1930s.83
However, as ICU membership crested 100,000 in the late 1920s, the South African government
passed legislation to limit the influence of the ICU and hinder its ability to function. The Native
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Administration Act of 1927 effectively made it “an offense to disseminate ‘certain doctrines
among natives, to say or write anything intended to promote hostility between the races.’”84
Likewise, the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1930 targeted organizations like the ICU, the African
National Congress (ANC), and CPSA, that the government feared would inflame hostilities
between the races. Such “government antagonism” led to the eventual “disintegration” of the
ICU in the late 1920s.85
While the ICU thrived in 1920s South Africa, the UNIA also flourished in this
environment of newly-emergent Black nationalism and working-class consciousness that the
ICU’s activities created in Cape Town. Garveyism and the UNIA followed the same transAtlantic shipping routes that carried the Virginia Jubilee Singers and politically active West
Indians to South Africa in the 1920s. The UNIA’s Black Star Line helped forge these links and
facilitated the exchange of people, culture, commercial goods, and knowledge from the Americas
to South Africa. Black American sailors carried with them copies of The Negro World, the
official information and propaganda organ of the UNIA, and freely disseminated Garveyite ideas
to the South African masses without fear of government reprisal.86 James Ghazu, a sailor and
leader of the UNIA in Cape Town, highlighted the importance of Garveyism in South Africa
when he wrote: “Garveyism is a self-protecting system among the blacks to promote the race
socially, economically and in the true form which God the creator of all races on this earth
meant. The Negro desires to share in every possible thing that other races enjoy and…is just as
fit to shape its own destiny as other races are.”87
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The UNIA grew rapidly in Cape Town and the rest of South Africa despite the South
African government’s fears of a transnational organization contributing to the “Black peril.” By
1921, the UNIA founded four separate branches in Cape Town alone. In the following five years,
the UNIA reached its peak in South Africa and established at least seven separate UNIA
branches by 1926. In 1922 the UNIA established a branch in Claremont, Cape Town. In 1923,
five more branches were established in South Africa and in 1924 branches were also established
in East London, Pretoria, and Johannesburg.88 The South African branches of the UNIA drew its
membership across diverse ethnicities and among the various workers in South Africa. However,
despite its mass appeal, the UNIA had its largest impact among the trade unionists and manual
laborers.
As the UNIA spread across South Africa and among the working-class Black nationalists
of the Cape, a close relationship developed between the UNIA and the ICU. The nature of this
close relationship is best illuminated through a brief examination of the previously discussed
negotiations between the ICU leadership and the dock employers of Cape Town. In August 1920,
representatives of the ICU met with the Cape dock employers in an effort to negotiate a wage
dispute. Among the ICU leadership that brokered the meeting were Clements Kadalie, J.G.
Gumbs, and S.M. Bennet Ncwana.89 This represented the first face-to-face meeting between the
ICU and Cape Town employers, leading to an increase in membership in the ICU and a rise in its
popularity among Black workers.90 Membership peaked at over 100,000 members in 1927,
drawn mostly from union workers, clergy, traders, and emerging Black political activists. Of the
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three ICU leaders that met with the Cape dock employers, all three were either members of the
UNIA or active supporters of the Garveyist agenda in Cape Town.
Clements Kadalie, in particular, had much in common with Marcus Garvey and modeled
his union activities on the UNIA. Kadalie admired Garvey’s personal charisma and message of
Black liberation so much that in a letter to Ncwana, he wrote “My essential object is to be the
great African Marcus Garvey and I don’t mind of how much I shall pay for the education.”91 He
founded the ICU as a mechanism through which Black laborers filed grievances against their
employers and organized to effect change in wages and working conditions. Furthermore, he
founded The Blackman in Cape Town, a newspaper that simultaneously functioned as the official
organ of the ICU and as a conduit for Garvey’s propaganda. The Blackman so frequently
reprinted stories from The Negro World, Crisis, and The Messenger that Marcus Garvey once
described The Blackman as “The Negro World of South Africa.”92 The Blackman circulated
among the dock workers and laborers of Cape Town and especially among the members of the
ICU. Through Kadalie’s leadership and publishing efforts the Garveyite ideology was
disseminated through the ranks and became a key feature of the labor movement in 1920s South
Africa.
S.M. Bennet Ncwana, the other ICU negotiator present at the August 1920 meeting, was
also heavily involved in the UNIA in the 1920s. Ncwana’s involvement in the ICU saw him rise
to the position of “Chairman of Propaganda” and tasked with spreading the message of solidarity
and activism to the Black worker.93 In 1920 Ncwana became more directly involved in the UNIA
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and Garveyist movement. That same year he helped Kadalie create and publish The Blackman.
Ncwana often penned articles for the paper that clearly had a Garveyist influence and also began
to travel outside of Cape Town and meet with receptive Blacks in other parts of southern Africa
to spread the work of the UNIA and ICU.94
The activities of the UNIA and ICU became intertwined in South Africa. Historian
Gregory Pirio argued that the ICU essentially became the “labor wing of the UNIA/Garveyite
Movement in South Africa.”95 The leadership of the ICU in South Africa, as evidenced above,
was clearly influenced by Garveyite publications and ideology. In most cases, the language and
message of the two organizations overlapped, making them almost indistinguishable from one
another. Thus, in 1920s South Africa, the UNIA effectively infiltrated and permeated the ranks
of the ICU and its members, leading to the formation of a distinctly Black nationalist and
working-class consciousness among the masses. This ideology did not remain confined to Cape
Town and South Africa. In the 1920s the UNIA radiated outward from South Africa and
established branches in numerous states in southern Africa. One of the UNIA’s early successes
occurred in South West Africa in the early 1920s.

The UNIA Arrives in South West Africa: Racial Unity and Subnationalism
in the Police Zone
The ICU, which flourished first among the West Indian dockworkers in South Africa and
then spread to the other parts of society, ultimately served as the primary vehicle through which
Garveyism and the UNIA took root in South West Africa. West Indian and West African
seamen, similar to the West Indians that established vibrant and politically-active communities in
Cape Town, worked in South West African port cities like Lüderitz, Swakopmund, and Walvis
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Bay. These West Indians and West Africans were well aware of Garveyism, with many having
read copies of The Negro World or encountered UNIA members and propaganda in North
America or West Africa.96 These dockworkers experienced post-war disillusionment and
unfavorable working conditions similar to those that arose in the South African ports. Thus, it is
unsurprising that agents of the Cape Town ICU, who were also heavily involved in Garvey’s
movement, spread the UNIA’s ideology in the South West African port cities.
The ICU established one of its first branches in South West Africa in December 1920
through the efforts of James La Guma and John de Clue, a member of the UNIA.97 Fritz
Headley, a West Indian member of the Lüderitz ICU, proceeded the following April to submit an
application to the Magistrate of Lüderitz to establish a Lüderitz branch of the UNIA. Headley
wrote that the main purpose of creating Branch 294 in Lüderitz was “to establish confraternity
among the race, to promote pride and love, to reclaim the fallen and administer and assist the
need[y] in the development of the NEGRO RACE.”98 Headley claimed to have a membership
roll consisting of 125 people at the time of application and within a month he secured a letter
from Marcus Garvey that certified that “Mr. Davis Adams of Lüderitz SWA Division #294 has
been given authority to solicit Convention Funds for the Parent Body of the Universal Negro
Improvement Association.”99 Ncwana, the president of the Cape Town division of the UNIA
travelled to Lüderitz in June of 1921 and helped facilitate the establishment of this branch.100
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Although South Africans facilitated and aided in the establishment of the first UNIA
branches in South West Africa, Fritz Headley became the driving force behind the spread of the
UNIA and ICU in the territory between 1921 and 1922. He was a West Indian born in Barbados
in 1870 and came to Cape Town in 1900. He served as a cook at the Arthur Seat Hotel and the
Kimberley Hospital before becoming a general laborer at Cape Town’s docks. In 1909, Headley
travelled to Lüderitz as a contract laborer with Metje, Siegler, and Bause until the outbreak of the
First World War, at which point he was captured by German forces as a prisoner of war and sent
to Namutoni. Upon his release by Union troops, Headley returned to Lüderitz where he found
employment with the South African Railway and Harbours Union until 1922. Administrators
noted that Headley possessed “sober habits” and that he “[was] much thought of [amongst the
Natives]…[and] he demands respect from his fellow Natives.”101 Despite statements from his
former employer that “he could not say anything detrimental about Headley,” administrators still
referred to him as an “agitator,” especially “amongst the local fishermen.”102
Non-indigenous Blacks, like Headley, possessed a significant amount of influence and
control in the UNIA during its first year in the territory. The Officer-in-Charge of Native Affairs
R.S. Cope recognized the influence of non-Namibian actors in the UNIA as early as September
1921 when he noted that “[The UNIA] does not appear to confine its activities to any particular
tribe or sect, but it seems that Kroo Boys are amongst its most active members…”103 Cope
reaffirmed this point in the coming months when he wrote, “The most active workers here are
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natives from Monrovia, Liberia, and Togoland and although they are not in confidence of the
local natives, the latter are freely joining the society…”104 The initial positions of leadership held
by West Indians and West Africans in these formative years is unsurprising given the earlier
extensive discussion of the UNIA’s historical links to West Africa, migratory West Indian
communities, and mobile dockworkers.
The labor union experience of West Indians and West Africans lent itself to effective
organizing within the UNIA and allowed for the rapid spread of the organization to urban areas
in South West Africa with sizable non-indigenous Black populations. Headley established the
Lüderitz branch in June 1921. In October 1921 the UNIA began operations in Windhoek and
boasted a “local membership of 311 persons, comprising all native and coloured nationalities,
found here, both male and female” by December of that year.105 J.D. Abraham, a Cameroonian
businessman, also applied to establish a UNIA branch in Swakopmund in April 1922.106 Within a
year, the UNIA established branches in three of the major population centers in the Police Zone.
Copies of the Negro World, which were brought to the territory by West Indian maritime
workers, circulated throughout the territory. The Negro World facilitated the spread of Garveyist
ideas in the Locations and brought the ideology of the movement to the urban masses.107 Other
UNIA documents and circulars made their way more slowly to the rural areas by means of
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sympathetic actors. For example, W. Scotland, the manager of Liebig’s Extract Meat Company
in Windhoek, reported to the Secretary of South West Africa that a “Togo boy in the Location
office in Windhoek” was the “principal active agent” in spreading these circulars in the city and
nearby rural areas.108 These ideas spread quickly in the Police Zone and found an audience that
was receptive to the UNIA’s message.
Tony Emmett argued that the early West Indian and West African leadership of the
territory’s UNIA branches found it difficult to understand the conditions faced by Namibians
throughout South West Africa and focused heavily on the concerns of urban bourgeoisie Black
traders, consequently limiting the appeal and spread of the UNIA to the Namibian population.109
However, documentary evidence suggests that Namibians embraced the UNIA’s message, at
least in part, because UNIA leadership and local political leaders were able to connect the
organization’s ideological underpinnings effectively with the dire political and socioeconomic
situation faced by Namibians under two separate colonial regimes. The message that the UNIA
disseminated to Namibians and colonial officials alike was that the UNIA was a “humanitarian,
charitable, education[al], social, friendly, instructive, and expansive society…founded by
[people] desiring to work for the general uplift of the Negro people the world over.”110 In its
early stages, the social welfare message resounded most significantly with Namibians in the
Police Zone. These Namibians experienced years of insufficient pay, poor healthcare, a
burdensome labor system, and expropriation from ancestral and fertile lands. The eventual
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embrace of a transnational organization like the UNIA was a calculated response to the limited
social and economic opportunities presented to Namibians under colonial rule.
In particular, the UNIA’s willingness to provide its members with life insurance, or a
“[sick fund],” proved highly popular among Namibians in the Police Zone. The harsh and
unforgiving nature of life under German and South African rule provided little assurance that
one’s family could continue to survive if the primary income earner proved unable to work. R.S.
Cope highlighted the importance of the sick fund in recruiting UNIA members, arguing that
“The main inducement for natives to become members, is the promise of assistance in time of
sickness, funeral expenses in case of death, and an assistance to relatives of deceased
members.”111 Where the state and private industry failed to provide any type of social safety net
in the event of injury or illness, the UNIA provided a viable alternative and tangible benefits for
marginalized Namibians.
The UNIA also drew on Namibian experiences with land expropriation and over-taxation
under both the German and South African government as a means to attract followers. Headley’s
letter to the Negro World in January 1922 referenced the inequitable treatment of Namibians
under the segregationist policies of its mandatory power. High taxes on livestock served as a
rallying cry for the UNIA in South West Africa and criticism of the transfer of arable land into
the hands of white farmers further stoked support for the UNIA in the Police Zone.112 In each
case that Headley made to the international community and those Namibians reading the
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circulating copies of the Negro World in the territory, he positioned the UNIA as the primary
vehicle for the “salvation” of the Namibian people.113
Over time, the scope of the UNIA’s message broadened to include more general claims
of complete territorial independence and freedom for South West Africa and its residents.
Namibian leaders were well aware of Garvey and the UNIA’s earlier attempts to lay claim to
South West Africa at Versailles in 1919. Headley actively worked to promote this message and
its spread within the territory. In the aforementioned letter to the Negro World, Headley wrote
that “our fatherland must be freed from the white man’s rule, for his reign is simply stifling the
talents and progressiveness of our people.”114 Later that year, in his correspondence with Joseph
Hailand on the establishment of a UNIA branch in Usakos, Headley again positioned the UNIA
as an organization “working for [South West Africans’] entire freedom and emancipation…for
the better conditioning of [South West Africans] as human beings and not as beasts of the fields
as we are classed by the other races of mankind.”115
The concept of the UNIA as an organization fighting for the freedom and independence
of Namibians reached its pinnacle in July 1922 when Garvey and the UNIA petitioned the
League of Nations to assume control over the former German colonies in East and South Africa.
Garvey and the UNIA stated that they were “prepared to assume the responsibility of developing
[Africa],” and “[desired] to achieve a sympathetic, spiritual, educational, and industrial
evangelization of our race in Africa.”116 The Negro World published news of this petition and it
circulated throughout the urban locations in Windhoek. News of the petition was well-received
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in South West Africa and there was an increase in reports of concerning activities coming from
whites throughout the Police Zone.

The Rise of Herero Leadership in the UNIA and the Problem
of Subnationalism, 1922-1924
While Garvey’s activities on the international political stage increased the association’s
popularity in the Police Zone, other domestic factors also contributed to the UNIA’s rise in South
West Africa. Scholars have attributed the successes of the UNIA in South West Africa to the
mood of millenarianism enveloping the territory in the 1920s. As Emmett suggested in his paper
“Popular Resistance,” popular stories of the future arrival of an African American military
liberation force appealed to Namibians’ desire to see the removal of oppressive colonial rule and
the introduction of a new, more liberal political order. The UNIA represented, for many, a new
opportunity for African rule in a territory that was economically, politically, and socially
damaged by decades of colonial rule.117 Likewise, as Pirio suggests in his paper “The Role of
Garveysim,” an emergent Black working-class nationalism appeared among the West Indian and
West African communities in the territory and began, in earnest, to spread to some parts of the
Namibian population.118 While new possibilities undoubtedly contributed to the UNIA’s growth
in the territory, the UNIA also served the important function of providing Namibians with an
opportunity to reconstitute and re-establish previous sociopolitical and economic institutions. As
the allocation of power in the South West African UNIA shifted from the control of nonindigenous Blacks to Namibians, this process of the reconstitution of precolonial sociopolitical
institutions played out within the structure and power dynamics of the territory’s UNIA
branches. When the Herero seized control of the Windhoek branch of the UNIA in late 1922, the
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racial unity and Black nationalism discussed in Pirio’s “The Role of Garveyism” faded and gave
way to subnational resistance strategies that broke, largely, along pre-existing ethnopolitical
lines. The leadership of each of these groups understood the role of the UNIA as a transnational
resistance institution differently and developed distinct resistance strategies that appropriated the
UNIA’s organizational infrastructure to further subnational sociopolitical and economic goals.
Undoubtedly, the UNIA experienced its greatest success in South West Africa among the
Herero. Robert Edgar argued that the success of the UNIA among the Herero could be attributed
to the fact that “it brought together many strands of African thought in the mid 1920s: the linking
of European Christianity and mission education with European rule, the attempt to construct
alternative institutions for Africans, the desire to overthrow European rule and to control
European wealth…and the search for new inspirational leaders who could offer innovative
answers and solutions for the traumatic changes which were taking place within African
society.”119 Also facilitating the rise of the UNIA among the Herero was the fact that they
already possessed cultural institutions that were comparable in structure and function to those of
the UNIA. In particular, the Otruppa movement’s quasi-military structure and social welfare
program were similar to that of the UNIA. These similarities eliminated some cultural obstacles
that could have stunted the growth of the organization in the Police Zone and allowed it to
flourish in the early 1920s.
Participation in the UNIA became a logical conduit through which the Herero continued
the re-establishment of their important sociopolitical institutions. The Otruppa movement’s
origins can be traced back to at least the early 1890s and reports of Herero “playing soldier” or
mimicking German military practices. The trauma and cultural destruction exacted by the
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German military during the genocide in 1904 necessitated the restructuring and reconstitution of
Herero identity and cultural practices.120 The Otruppa movement provided young Herero with a
mechanism to cope with the “emasculating experiences of German colonialism” and an
opportunity to “reclaim and renovate Herero manhood in its wake.”121
Performative masculinity, order, and mutual assistance were central to the Otruppa
movement and its structure. Molly McCullers, when discussing the rise of the movement in the
late 1910s and early 1920s, argued “[The Otruppa movement] recreated the security of military
orderliness in a chaotic time through uniforms, ranks, and drilling.”122 The use of military
parades, uniforms, insignias, and ranks helped re-affirm the orderliness of the organization and
solidified the masculine identity of the movement and newly-reimagined Herero cultural identity.
Within this structure, Herero youths created “an alternative masculinity that blended German
military aesthetics with aspects of pre-German Herero manhood.”123 The Otruppa movement
thrived and became highly active during the period of martial law and throughout the early
1920s.
The UNIA possessed many similar characteristics in its organizational structure. Much
like the Otruppa movement, the various UNIA branches across the globe held parades,
developed insignias, and bestowed its members with ranks that resembled a military structure.124
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The sale of the UNIA’s red, green, and black pins became popular in South West Africa’s urban
locations, mirroring Otruppa receptions where ox-skin belts were given to soldiers.125 The
UNIA, in its recruitment efforts, used the pageantry and masculinity of the association and
adapted it to its South West African context to appeal to the Herero.
One of the best examples of the UNIA’s appeals to masculinity as a recruiting tool
appears in F.H. Headley’s letter to Herero Headman Barnabas in 1922.126 Headley wrote to
Barnabas that “in [the UNIA], and [the UNIA] alone, can we as men regain our National
Manhood which we have been deprived of for generations before us.”127 Headley continued to
describe the oppressive and “vile” nature of white rule and advocated for “freedom and liberty
before it is too late.”128 Clearly drawing on the destructive historical process of genocide and the
subsequent emasculation of Herero men under German rule, Headley portrayed the UNIA as a
vehicle through which the Herero could continue their process of performative masculinity.
Furthermore, Headley closely linked the “[regaining] of National Manhood” with political and
social liberation from white colonial rule, a concept that was already popular among the
Herero.129
Clear connections also existed between the UNIA and the Otruppa’s social welfare
programs. In its role as a “benefit society,” the Otruppa collected subscriptions from members
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for the purposes of “burying paupers, procuring cattle for slaughter on occasion of feasts….to
support soldiers’ widows, pay court fines, pay for funerals and generally support people in
need.”130 McCullers elaborated on the social aspects of the movement, arguing that “The
organization provided Herero youths with a social network and mutual aid, essential qualities of
military masculinity.”131 Members claimed the troops were “designed to foster good fellowship
and amusement” and to assist members financially.132 This assistance was critical for Herero
youths who became detached from families during the genocide and faced social and financial
uncertainty during the transition to a new colonial regime.133 Similarly, the UNIA’s initial
popularity in the territory was linked to the sick fund and monthly death tax. The UNIA funded
these through the collection of subscriptions among members and claimed to ensure financial
security for UNIA members’ families in the wake of unforeseen tragedy or difficulty.134 As the
Negro World and other UNIA circulars spread information about these programs, the movement
grew, and more Herero members joined it.
A strong belief grew, among the Herero in particular, that not only could they gain access
to these social welfare programs by joining the UNIA, but that Black Americans would
inevitably assist in the liberation of Namibians from South African rule. Early graffiti appeared
near Okahandja in April of 1922 that read, “This country is not yours, it is that of the Blacks of
America and that is the Herero.”135 The Herero prophets subsequently foretold of the American
arrival after World War I and discussed the liberation of the Herero at the hands of the
Americans and English.136 The prominent prophetic tradition within Herero culture increased
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expectations of an American liberation force providing the Herero and other Namibians with
guns, ammunition, boats, and airplanes.137 In some cases, the Herero and members of the
Otruppa began the process of procuring guns, ammunition, and horses, while also attending
UNIA meetings at night in the “veld.”138
The growth of the UNIA among the Herero soon expanded outside of urban Windhoek as
Garveyite agents Aaron (John) Mungunda, the brother of local Herero leader Hosea Kutako, and
Theodor Hanbanue held meetings to enroll members into the UNIA at Karibib, Usakos, and
Okahandja in October 1922.139 Mungunda met with Namibians in Karibib on 19 October 1922
and told them that he was “working in conjunction with America, and that they wanted to do
away with white teachers, missionaries, and that they want[ed] their own Administration.”140
Five new members enrolled at Karibib immediately following the conclusion of the meeting and
others asked for the opportunity to consult with their chiefs before making a decision. Over 150
people attended the meeting in Okahandja on 1 November 1922, where an undetermined number
of people enrolled in the organization. At the meeting Eduard Maharero was elected chairman of
the proposed branch.141
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Map 3: Hotbeds of UNIA Activity in South West Africa, 1922-1924

Source: Prepared by Author.
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The burgeoning success of the UNIA in the Police Zone and the spread of rumors about
unrest and armed rebellion among the African populations led to numerous complaints from
whites in South West Africa.142 The South African government took a vested interest the
development and movement of the UNIA in the territory and actively monitored the spread of
the UNIA branches. On numerous occasions, South West African police intercepted letters
between UNIA members, searched members’ mail, and surveilled their physical movements.143
In some instances, like the UNIA meetings in Karibib, Usakos, and Okahandja, the government
used Namibians to infiltrate the meetings. Here, the government’s operators pretended to be
members of the UNIA and reported back to government officials on the agenda of the
association and any future plans for rebellion or unrest in the territory.144
Despite the anxieties of white South West Africans, SWAA officials believed that there
was little cause for concern. Officials found little evidence to suggest that there was an organized
effort among Namibians to execute an armed resistance struggle. Rather, their concern and
attention almost exclusively focused on the activities of West Indians and West Africans.
Reports included descriptions of the unrest as “engineered by American negroes” and that it was
causing “confusion and disorder…in the heads of the natives, especially the Herero minds.”145
However, most official reports concluded that “no trouble [was] anticipated” and that the “matter
[was] not serious.”146
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In part, the lack of concern by the SWAA toward the UNIA centered on the fact that,
despite the UNIA’s growth in South West Africa between 1921 and 1922, signs of disunity
among the UNIA’s American and Namibian leaders also grew. Although Ncwana formed the
SWANC in September 1922 to counteract the West Indian and West African influence over the
leadership of the UNIA and ICU, within the UNIA itself signs of a growing fracture among the
territory’s UNIA leadership emerged during that same month. The Officer-in-Charge of Native
Affairs in Lüderitz remarked that there was
[D]issatisfaction on the part of [South African] and [South West African] natives with the
[ICU] (chiefly dominated by Capeboys) and the [UNIA] (introduced and directed by
West Indian and West Coast Natives) which is continually calling for funds for American
propaganda purposes. The collection of subscriptions (or dues) for UNIA memberships
were intended to provide life insurance and coverage during times of illness. Yet, the
funds collected were sent to America and few Namibians ever received payment from the
‘sick fund’.147
Combined with the lack of action by Americans in the liberation of their Namibian counterparts,
the tensions and disappointment in the organization were palpable among the Namibian
leadership.
These tensions came to the fore during a meeting between the Herero leadership and
UNIA agents at Okahandja on 1 November 1922. During this meeting, a group of young Herero
men and women asked Mungunda “when the Americans were coming to release them.”148
Mungunda, surprisingly, openly acknowledged the lack of action by the American branches of
the UNIA at a meeting the next day, stating “If I told you that the American negroes were
coming to release you, I think you would be satisfied, but it would be a lie. I know nothing about
America. The society has been formed through American ideas, but Americans only explained it

147

Annual Report of the Nama Parish, South West Africa, by Rev. Gustav Becker, 9 January 1923, MGP, Vol. X:
Africa for the Africans, 1923-1945, ed. Robert A. Hill (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 8.
148
Enclosure: Report of Native Corporal Jacob, 6 November 1922, NAN: SWAA/A50/32.

162

but will not do the work—we must do that. It is no use holding out false hopes about America,
because I do not believe that they will ever be able to come here to help you.”149 While 30 new
members joined the organization following this statement and meeting, Mungunda’s willingness
to criticize the parent organization during a recruitment drive signaled the eroding patience of not
only prospective members, but also the very leadership tasked with spreading and supporting the
UNIA’s message.150 This change in approach heralded the power struggle that occurred within
the leadership of the South West African UNIA in the coming months. This struggle ultimately
resulted in the Herero taking control of the association in most of the Police Zone.
Colonial officials believed that Hosea Kutako played a crucial role in advocating a
change in leadership within South West Africa’s UNIA branches.151 R.S. Cope wrote to the
Secretary for South West Africa that,
[Hosea Kutako] has also got a [program] of the aims and objects of Marcus Garvey,
President of the Universal Negro Improvement Association…but I suppose his object is
to [show] his Honour that he is at any rate trying to do something, but he is a very
plausible individual.…He hankers after power similar to that of a great native chief. [I]f
he is drawn out it will be observed that this is almost his one aim. [H]e is always
deploring his lack of power and finds it so difficult to carry out his duties.152
Kutako’s campaign for power within the organization, and more broadly control over the
UNIA’s approach to fighting South African segregationist policies in the territory, succeeded. On
22 November 1922, the Officer-in-Charge of Native Affairs, Windhoek wrote to the Secretary
for South West Africa that “the control of the Windhoek Society [had] passed from the hands of
the Kroo-Boys and is now vested in the following natives—(John) Aaron Simon Mungunda,
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Herero, President.”153 Mungunda was the brother of Hosea Kutako and colonial officials seemed
certain that it was Kutako who was the “controlling spirit” of the change in leadership. Xhosa
railway employee Solomon Hosiah Monguya became the Chairman of the Windhoek branch and
Clemens Kapuuo served as Secretary following the change.154
Whereas the UNIA’s ambitions centered on Black liberation, emancipation, and the
general uplift of the Black race under West Indian and West African leadership, under
indigenous Namibian leadership this Black nationalist creed and racial unity gave way to a more
subnational approach. Reverend Gustav Becker noted that the “initial enthusiasm and unity
among the [ethnic groups] has disappeared. They gradually [sobered] up. Differences with
respect to leadership have arisen….The other [ethnic groups] are dissatisfied with that.”155 The
Herero, as previously mentioned, continued to essentially use the UNIA as an extension of their
Otruppa movement. The Windhoek branch focused primarily on Herero concerns, including
making claims on expropriated lands and pushing back on excessive livestock taxes.156 The shift
to Herero leadership in Windhoek also signaled to the Nama leadership further south that they
would need to utilize and appropriate the transnational organizational infrastructure of the UNIA
in their own way to realize their local political and socioeconomic agenda.
Even prior to the arrival of the UNIA in the territory, many of the Nama leaders felt
politically marginalized under the new South African regime and believed that they had not
received any “justice” since the South African government took control of the territory.
Complicating the matter, it is clear that many Nama believed that members of the other
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Namibian ethnic groups received concessions during this period. One of the Nama headmen at
Rehoboth, Vaaluin Lawren, captured the mood among the Nama when he said:
The Bast[ers] got a certain amount of justice, the Germans got justice, the Herero got a
little justice but they, the [Nama], got no justice from the Administration, the Europeans
and Bast[ers] have farms, the Herero have Reserves but the [Nama] are chased from
place to place and have no fixed place to abode. He further stated that the Bastard
Government made them pay poll tax in the Gebie[t] and the Administration made them
pay Dog Tax in Gebie[t] if they reside on European farms and wished to know why they
should pay taxes to two Governments at the same time and be ruled by two Governments
at the same time.157
The shift to Herero leadership in the UNIA branches at Windhoek and the surrounding areas in
November 1922 did little to ease concerns that their voice was fading. Again, pointing to Rev.
Becker’s statements, they believed that “The Herero claimed the [UNIA] for themselves
alone.”158
The Nama at Rehoboth acted quickly and appointed new leadership over their UNIA
branch. They elected Vaaluin Lawren and Franz Afrikaner to the positions of Kaptein and Vice
Kaptein of the UNIA’s Rehoboth branch.159 Under their leadership, the UNIA served as a
conduit to advocate for Nama independence and as a means to reassert Nama claims to
expropriated lands. Lawren and Afrikaner rode around the district collecting subscriptions from
members of the UNIA and began telling members that their dues would be used by the UNIA to
purchase land and freedom for the Nama members of the district. The magistrate for Rehoboth
recalled that Lawren and Afrikaner told members that “this money…would be used to purchase
their freedom and the land, at present occupied by the Bastards and Europeans, would be
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returned to them.”160 Upon receiving this news, many Nama at Rehoboth abandoned laboring on
white owned farms and began to “congregate” their herds on the Naos and Gurumanas farms.161
The activities of Lawren and Afrikaner illustrate how the UNIA leadership near
Rehoboth successfully crafted a Nama-specific message by wedding the desire for the return of
ancestral lands to the UNIA’s message of Black liberty and emancipation. The magistrate at
Rehoboth noted this intense desire for land, contending “The [Nama] appear to be dissatisfied
because they have been allocated no reserve, and they say they are chased from place to place,
but its only lately that they have come together in a mob; previously they used to work on the
[Baster] and European farms, and there was then no necessity to put them in a reserve.”162 The
message’s specificity to the circumstances at Rehoboth differed greatly from the previous
approaches of the UNIA that advocated for the emancipation of the entire South West Africa
territory. Instead, subnational concerns about Nama independence, and the procurement of the
land necessary to make this a reality, took precedent. While there is evidence that
communication still existed between the Rehoboth and Windhoek branches and that cooperation
was achieved on some territorial matters like the Bondelswarts Rebellion in 1922, the notes of
colonial officials make it clear that the leadership of these two branches worked separately
toward distinct goals associated with their own ethnopolitical group.163
While most branches worked effectively through the UNIA apparatus in the territory,
there are some examples that Namibians outright rejected the UNIA and its messaging specific
localities. Some preferred instead to pursue other methods to assert their agency and turned

160

J.C. Hofmeyr, Acting Magistrate of Rehoboth, to Secretary for South West Africa, 6 January 1923, NAN:
SWAA/A396/6.
161
Ibid. The Nama chose these farms because they possessed “plentiful water and rand grass” that allowed them to
sustain herds of 4,000 small stock and 250 large stock.
162
Ibid.
163
Emmett, “Popular Resistance,” 26-27.

166

toward the South African colonial state to make claims for aid. For example, even among the
Nama the acceptance of the UNIA was not universal. The Swartbooi wrote to the SWAA on 20
November 1922 and dissociated themselves from the movement. David Swartbooi was
concerned that the movement was aimed against the SWAA and asked the government to
intervene. Members of the UNIA branches in Windhoek and Rehoboth allegedly threatened the
Swartbooi for writing to the government and claimed that, for their treachery, the Swartbooi
would “lose the blessing which the advent of the [UNIA] government will pour out on
Africa.”164
The Rehoboth Basters similarly did not pursue great involvement in the spread or
utilization of the UNIA as a method to resist the South African government and its policies. Even
in the Rehoboth district, where some colonial officials claimed that the Baster Raad was
protecting Herero and Nama populations from government policies, it was noted that the Basters
desired the removal of Lawren and Afrikaner and were waiting to “see first where [the Garvey
movement led].”165 As chapter 2 explained, the Basters instead worked through the South
African government and the League of Nations to reaffirm the conditions of the Treaty of
Friendship with the Germans that granted them specific legal and political rights in 1895. Even
as the SWAA betrayed the treaty and issued Proclamation No. 28 of 1923, the Basters did not
turn to the UNIA to assert their claims to self-determination and land. Rather, they embraced
another international institution, the League of Nations, and carried out an ethnically exclusive
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petition-writing campaign that began in 1925 and used international law as a means to stake
these claims.
By the middle of 1923, moreover, it became apparent that the UNIA and its resultant
Garveyite movement were in decline in South West Africa. The investment failures of Marcus
Garvey and his subsequent arrest in 1922 on charges of mail fraud significantly weakened the
organization. In the case of South West Africa, the lack of an American liberation force,
questions over the use of collected membership dues, and internal fissures led to the collapse of
the UNIA in the territory. The UNIA collected over £2,000 in membership dues, but, by the end
of 1922, only £80 of this reserve remained.166 The failure to administer funeral funds, the sick
fund, or establish African-led schools from these dues caused many to become “discontented”
and they “dissociated” themselves from the UNIA. The issue of continuing feuds between
American and Namibian leadership raged on into early 1924 and the earlier unity that had
existed continued to fade, making the UNIA a marginal force in Namibian efforts to assert their
agency under South Africa’s segregationist system and make claims of subnational independence
after 1924.

Conclusion
The transnational UNIA came to southern Africa by way of historical maritime channels
and flourished among union members and dockworkers in South Africa, creating a circuit
through which sympathetic anticolonial actors, ideas of Black nationalism, and substantial
resources flowed. South Africans believed that the American leadership of the UNIA intended to
educate and economically develop Coloureds and Blacks in the Union. The circulation of the
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Negro World disseminated the UNIA’s message in South Africa and created a communicative
and intellectual link that connected Black trans-Atlantic communities in their efforts against
white sociopolitical and economic domination. The UNIA, through its growth and spread,
formed valuable relationships with ideologically-similar organizations, like the AME Church and
the upstart ICU, that gave way to a larger pan-African resistance strategy in southern Africa.
Beginning in 1919, Garveyist propaganda made its way to South West Africa and
circulated in the port city of Lüderitz, establishing another linkage in this transnational resistance
circuit. The ICU leadership simultaneously held positions in the UNIA and worked in tandem
with West Indian and West African dockworkers in the territory to establish the first branch of
the South West African UNIA at Lüderitz between 1920 and 1921. These West Indians and West
Africans worked tirelessly to promote the UNIA’s message of racial unity and uplift and
established subsequent branches at Swakopmund and Windhoek to lobby for their economic and
political interests. UNIA agents proceeded to distribute Garveyite propaganda in the rural areas
within the Police Zone and establish more branches at Rehoboth, Karibib, Usakos, and
Okahandja.
Between 1919 and late 1922, the non-indigenous Black leadership of the South West
African UNIA promoted a message of racial unity among Namibians for the purposes of racial
development and territorial independence. UNIA agents collected subscriptions throughout the
territory and many Namibians joined the UNIA for access to its social welfare program and the
guarantees of assistance in their liberation struggle. Unfortunately, few received the benefits
from these programs and questions arose over the lack of a promised American liberation force
and the limited payouts from the sick fund. In November 1922, these tensions came to a head
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and the Herero members of the UNIA in Windhoek seized control of the branch from its West
Indian and West African leadership.
This shift in the power dynamics of the organization weakened the perceived racial unity
and inclusivity that existed during the first two years of the organization’s existence in South
West Africa. Instead, the Nama and Herero appropriated the UNIA as a transnational vehicle to
achieve their exclusive subnational and local sociopolitical agendas. The Herero used the
UNIA’s organizational infrastructure to make claims for lost lands and push back against the
SWAA’s imposition of dog and livestock taxes. The Nama, unenthused by the shift to Herero
leadership, subsequently appropriated the UNIA branch in Rehoboth as a conduit to make claims
of subnational independence and establish themselves on land within the Rehoboth district.
Meanwhile, other groups like the Swartbooi and the Rehoboth Basters refused to participate in
the UNIA’s activities and embraced different pathways to challenge the segregationist policies of
the South African government in the interwar period.
Although the UNIA essentially collapsed as an organization in South West Africa by
1924, its impact on Namibian resistance during the period was substantial. First and foremost, as
Pirio argued in “The Role of Garveyism,” the UNIA created the earliest foundations for a Black
working-class nationalism in Namibia that contributed to and shaped the approach of the
liberation movement in the 1960s.167 Perhaps more importantly, the UNIA reified the subnational
character of resistance campaigns prior to the 1960s that often broke along ethnic and
geopolitical lines in South West Africa. The evidence makes clear that after the Herero seized
control of the UNIA in South West Africa, Namibians turned toward their local and traditional
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ethnic leadership to make claims to the South African government that were specific to their
local situation.
Namibian leadership in the UNIA quickly made use of the resources and transnational
infrastructure provided by the UNIA in the territory. Access to the UNIA’s network of
sympathetic transnational actors, both inside and outside of the territory, proved crucial in
Namibians’ resistance efforts in the 1920s and allowed them to amplify their voices to a wider
audience, thus placing increased pressure on the SWAA to resolve their demands. In concert
with agitation from the non-indigenous UNIA leadership for South West Africa’s territorial
independence, the continued demand by the Namibian UNIA leadership for improved local
socioeconomic and political conditions increased tensions with whites in South West Africa.
Fears of a larger general uprising and reports that the UNIA’s message had encouraged
Namibians in the Police Zone to accumulate weapons and ammunition in anticipation of the
arrival of an American liberation force permeated the territory only further encouraged the
SWAA to interact with the UNIA as a means to peaceably de-escalate post-war tensions in South
West Africa. Finally, due to the SWAA’s perception of the UNIA’s non-indigenous Black
leadership as more highly educated agitators than their Namibian counterparts, the SWAA
intentionally supported a policy of non-interventionism when Ncwana and his allies established
SWANC in September 1922 and siphoned off a significant portion of Namibian support for the
UNIA. While this profoundly altered the long-term viability of the UNIA in the 1920s, it also
presented disaffected Namibians with a new avenue to pursue the SWAA’s unjust policies and
provided them with the distinct organizational control missing in the UNIA’s leadership structure
prior to the Herero seizure of power.
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While the UNIA failed to drastically alter the SWAA’s segregationist policies of the
early 1920s, the UNIA did have some important successes in its resistance campaign. It provided
Namibians with non-state avenues to make claims of the South African government within a
system where limited legitimate legal means existed to fundamentally alter the oppressive
government apparatus thrust on Namibians. Likewise, the UNIA provided Namibians with an
organizational infrastructure that could be used and appropriated to support social welfare
programs, encourage mutual aid among Namibians and diasporic Blacks, and actively engage
with transnational institutions that could put pressure on the South African government on behalf
of Namibian leaders. For example, the use of the UNIA to engage with international actors at the
League of Nations and in the Americas slowed the South African government’s implementation
of harsher segregationist policies prior to World War II.
Perhaps just as significant, Namibian involvement in the UNIA significantly impacted
resistance strategies and campaigns in the post-World War II period. The subnational organizing
that occurred after November 1922 provided some basis for the lines along which later political
parties formed in the early 1960s. The Ovamboland Peoples’ Organization (OPO), the South
West Africa United National Independence Organization (SWAUNIO), and SWANU developed
their early political bases along ethnic lines with some of these parties continuing to give
subnational groups a political voice even after SWAPO emerged as the dominant political party
in 1962. Yet, underneath the clear distinctness in political demands during the early political
party years existed the concept of cooperation and Black nationalist consciousness that the UNIA
helped develop in the territory under non-indigenous leadership.
Similarly, the experience of interacting with a transnational organization like the UNIA
shaped Namibians’ resistance strategies in the post-World War II era. The AME Church became
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a central institution among the Nama resistance efforts in the Police Zone and had close
organizational and ideological linkages to the UNIA. The Nama leadership used the AME
Church to make claims of spiritual and political autonomy, as well as promote socioeconomic
development and educational improvements. The UN also served as a transnational means of
resistance and Namibian leadership used a petition-writing campaign, a method the UNIA and
Rehoboth Basters helped popularize in the Police Zone in the 1920s, to place pressure on the
South African government when few other legitimate means existed. Later involvement with
student organizations and sympathetic international actors also had its foundation in these early
interactions with these transnational organizations. In essence, perhaps the UNIA’s greatest
impact in Namibia was that it helped form the basis for future resistance strategies that would
have a much larger impact on facilitating concrete changes to South African colonialism in the
territory.
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Chapter 4—Comparative White Politics and Apartheid in Southern Africa, 1919-1964
The interwar transnational resistance campaigns of the Basters and the South West
African UNIA proved moderately successful in achieving their political and socioeconomic ends.
The Basters advocated to the League of Nations for the re-establishment of their political
sovereignty and autonomy and achieved a fairly small concession of limited self-government
from the SWAA in the 1930s. Meanwhile, the UNIA provided the necessary transnational
resources to develop a basic social welfare program among the Herero and Nama in the 1920s.
However, as they resisted colonial expansion and the implementation of segregationist policies,
white politics in South Africa and South West Africa rapidly changed. The battle for the heart of
Afrikanerdom came to represent the core struggle of the interwar period and, by 1948, D.F.
Malan’s National Party (NP) emerged victorious over Jan Smuts’ United Party (UP) and began
to construct and implement the more rigid and harshly enforced apartheid in South Africa and
South West Africa. The emergence of apartheid as the primary governing ideology in postWorld War II South Africa and South West Africa placed increasingly more difficult barriers and
obstacles in front of Africans seeking to regain political and socioeconomic independence.
With this background in mind, the purpose of this chapter is not to examine a particular
transnational resistance institution, but instead to trace the evolution of apartheid in southern
African politics in the 1930s and 1940s. This chapter contends that apartheid grew and
developed simultaneously in South West Africa and South Africa, albeit at different rates and
with different intensity, as a result of the changing dynamics in white politics and interracial
relations in post-World War II southern Africa. The chapter begins with an examination of the
evolution of twentieth-century Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa and South West Africa, and
the process of political samsmelting that led to fissures in Afrikanerdom and the radicalization of
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some elements of the volk. Both global and domestic South African politics are examined within
the political and socioeconomic context of the interwar period, with a particular emphasis on
Smuts’ international political focus and D.F. Malan’s internal political warfare with his
Afrikaner rivals. Malan’s and the NP’s rise to political prominence in 1940s southern Africa is
central to the chapter and the dueling Fagan and Sauer Commission reports are discussed within
their apartheid context. Finally, the chapter concludes with an examination of the entrenchment
and extension of apartheid in South Africa beginning in 1948 and how apartheid was installed in
South West Africa by the SWAA through a series of legislation that sought to politically,
socially, and economically segregate Namibians. In its totality, this chapter serves to provide a
contextual foundation for the remainder of the dissertation, which examines Namibians’
transnational resistance strategies in the late-1940s and 1950s in the face of an ever expansive
and rigid apartheid apparatus.

Samsmelting and Changes in Late-Nineteenth- and
Twentieth-Century Afrikaner Politics
The transformations that occurred to Afrikaner identity during the 1930s and 1940s
facilitated the creation of an apartheid apparatus that severely limited Namibians’ prospects for
subnational or national independence after World War II. Historian Hermann Giliomee traced
the development of late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century Afrikaner identity to the economic
crisis in 1870s South Africa. There, Giliomee contended, fears of “cultural degeneration” took
priority among the Afrikaner upper classes. Dutch-Afrikaner farmers were forced from their
farms into a state of squalor, illiteracy, and into close proximity with Africans.1 The
“Anglicization” of Dutch-Afrikaner intellectuals led to a cultural crisis that resulted in the
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creation of two contradictory Afrikaner nationalist organizations: the Genootskap van Regte
Afrikaners (GRA) and Zuid-Afrikaanse Boeren Beschermings Vereniging (BBV). The GRA and
BBV worked simultaneously to construct a true “Afrikanerdom,” with the GRA working among
the “true Afrikaners” and the BBV working almost exclusively with the wealthier elements of
Dutch-Afrikaner society.2
This early movement to re-invent Afrikaner traditions and an imagined Afrikaner
community focused on three crucial elements: language, race/ethnicity, and religion. The issue
of language was of chief importance to the GRA and S.J. du Toit wrote in 1874 that he wanted to
make Afrikaans “the cardinal ethnic symbol which encapsulated the history and the singularity
of the Afrikaner people.”3 The language not only served as a political tool with particular
importance to “Afrikaner ethnic self-awareness,” but also served the important purpose of
educational uplift for poor white Dutch-Afrikaners and became a symbol of resistance to the
perceived threat of British imperialism in South Africa.4 The First Language Movement and
Second Language Movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created an
ethnonational identity that repurposed words to convey a certain political and cultural belief
system that provided Dutch-Afrikaners with a way to resist the Anglicization of South Africa
during this period.5
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While one’s whiteness played a role in the definition of Afrikaner identity, the concept of
whiteness in South Africa was complex and multi-layered. Afrikaners viewed themselves as
white in the sense that they were a clearly distinct racial group from the Black Africans who
lived in close proximity. However, both Dutch-Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans
viewed themselves as racially and ethnically separate. English-speakers viewed the Afrikaners as
culturally backward and did not view them as civilized whites like themselves. Likewise, the
Dutch-Afrikaners did not view themselves as racially, ethnically, or culturally similar to Englishspeaking South Africans. This concept of distinctness is best described by Giliomee when he
detailed the GRA’s conception of Afrikaner identity: “[The GRA] divided the Afrikaner people
into three groups—those with English hearts, those with Dutch hearts and those with Afrikaner
hearts, and only the latter were considered the true Afrikaners.”6
Lastly, nineteenth- and twentieth-century Afrikaner nationalism rested on Christianity
and, in particular, the teachings of the Dutch Reformed churches in South Africa. As Joha LouwPotgieter crudely wrote in 1988, “[A] typical Afrikaner…[is] supposed to be white, an
Afrikaans-speaker of West European descent, who votes for the NP, belongs to one of the three
Dutch Reformed churches and shares distinctive history with the rest of the Afrikaner group.”7
Mission leaders in the Dutch Reformed churches espoused, over time, a neo-Calvinist message
that “consort[ed] naturally with conceptions of racial superiority and of national separateness”
and found a place in “the spiritual home of the vast majority of Afrikaners.”8 Pastors in the

Giliomee, “Afrikaner Ethnic Consciousness,” 34.
Joha Louw-Potgieter, Afrikaner Dissidents: A Social Psychological Study of Identity and Dissent (Cleverdon:
Multilingual Matters, 1988), 50. While scholars have criticized Louw-Potgieter for simplifying Afrikaner identity as
a static monolith, his argument that the Dutch Reformed churches played a crucial role in defining and shaping
Afrikaner identity from the 1870s-1950s proves important in understanding the religious influence on Afrikaner
culture.
8
Richard Elphick, The Equality of Believers: Protestant Missionaries and the Racial Politics of South Africa
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012), 222. Neo-Calvinism provided Afrikaner Trekboers with the
theological underpinnings to legitimate white supremacy and racial inequality in South Africa’s interior. The
6
7

177

Dutch Reformed Church were involved with the “color question” as early as the 1920s and
espoused a missiology that focused on the civilization, but separateness of, Black churches and
congregations.9 The vast majority of self-identified Afrikaners embraced the missiology and neoCalvinist teachings of the Dutch Reformed Church and, especially in the 1930s and 1940s, this
particular conceptualization of Christianity was central to Afrikaner identity and political
policies.
Aiding the constructive process of the reformulation of twentieth-century Afrikaner
identity, Afrikaner intellectuals returned to South Africa from doctoral programs in Europe
where they were exposed to German Romantic Philosophy and concepts of organic nationalism
rooted in natural law. Neo-Fichtean ideas and Kuyperian theology combined to provide a new
type of nationalism that further solidified Afrikaners as a volk (people) that was socially separate
and distinct from other elements of South African society.10 Exposure to other philosophers, like
Johann Herder and August Wilhelm von Schegel, only further integrated the concepts of shared
culture, language, and history into the evolution of the Afrikaner identity.11 While language,
ethnicity, and religion still remained crucial to Afrikaner identity, the shared history of the Great
Trek of the 1830s took prominence in the creation of an imagined community with a distinct
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anti-British imperialist identity.12 As World War II approached in the mid-to-late 1930s,
Afrikaner identity was ever more contested among the volk, most prominently in the political
sphere.
The contestation of Afrikaner political identity and policy reached a climax in 1933 and
1934 over the issues of political samsmelting (fusion). Beginning in 1933, heated debates
occurred over the issue of Afrikaner political and economic cooperation with Britain and
English-speaking South Africans as a result of the Great Depression. The proposed plan called
for a samsmelting between the South Africa Party (SAP), first led by Boer generals Louis Botha
and Jan Smuts, and the Afrikaner-led NP under Prime Minister J.B.M. Hertzog. The SAP was
more sympathetic toward cooperation with the British government and English-speaking South
Africans and found that, as a result of the NP’s increasingly unpopular position among
Afrikaners in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, Hertzog and the party’s moderates were
willing to consider samsmelting out of economic and political necessity. 13
The Great Depression and its resultant economic impact played an influential role in the
fusion process between the SAP and the NP. Prior to the depression, however, deep fractures
existed within Afrikaner politics based on class conflicts and geographic rivalries. The Afrikaner
members of the NP in the Cape consisted of skilled professionals and “prosperous farmers who
were relatively unaffected by the Depression” that controlled Afrikaner capital and financial
ventures of the period.14 Conversely, the Afrikaners in the Transvaal and Orange Free State
consisted primarily of farmers and manual laborers who “constituted the lowest socioeconomic
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strata of South Africa’s white population.”15 These differences resulted in “considerable interregional resentment” that fueled socioeconomic rivalries between northern and Cape Afrikaners
that characterized their political relationship into the 1930s and 1940s.16
As the Great Depression persisted and expanded, it only further exacerbated these
tensions and fissures, which disproportionately affected Afrikaners in the Transvaal and Orange
Free State. As global trade slowed, the demand for agricultural goods and mineral exports, the
heart of northern Afrikaner economic production, dropped drastically. This dramatic decrease in
demand for South African agricultural exports caused the prices for these goods to similarly fall
and deprived Afrikaner farmers of their main source of income. As a result of these changes to
the global and domestic economy, numerous Afrikaner farmers defaulted on the loan payments
for their farms and lost their livelihood.17
Likewise, the Gold Standard Crisis of 1931 adversely impacted the South African
economy during the Great Depression. Speculative attacks on sterling led the British government
to abandon the Gold Standard in September 1931 and New Zealand and Australia soon followed.
The South African government under Hertzog, however, remained on the Gold Standard until
1932.18 Hertzog faced immense pressure from the Gold Producer’s Committee and the leaders of
the mining companies to remain on the Gold Standard, as they viewed sterling as “unstable.”19
Additionally, these interest groups feared that abandoning the Gold Standard would threaten the
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viability of the mining industry in Witwatersrand and that maintaining this standard was
“economically and psychologically imperative.”20 In November 1931, only after closely studying
the positive impact that the abandonment of the Gold Standard had on the Australian mining
industry, the Gold Producer’s Committee lobbied the South African government to abandon the
Gold Standard. They believed that the devaluation of the South African currency offered the
opportunity to increase profits and undermine the costs of labor, leading them to officially
demand the linking of South African currency to sterling on 13 November 1931.21
Hertzog initially refused to succumb to this pressure and, much like the consequences of
the United States government’s refusal to abandon the Gold Standard until 1933, the impact of
the depression continued to grow. Hertzog intended to stay on the Gold Standard as a way to
show his supporters that the Union was independent of British influence, but this move was
viewed as “widely unpopular,” even among his political base.22 Northern Afrikaner farmers were
disproportionately affected by the deepening depression and held the NP, and the manufactureroriented Cape NP in particular, responsible for their plight. The 1930 and 1932 by-elections
emphasized their growing political discontent as the election results showed a clear shift away
from the NP toward the SAP.23
In the face of the negative economic impact discussed above and its potential political
consequences, Hertzog abandoned the Gold Standard in 1932. Upon doing so, the South African
economy recovered, albeit slowly, and the country saw an improvement in its economic

20

Ibid.
Ibid., 297-299. In addition to the reasons listed above, the South African government embraced the abandonment
of the Gold Standard more broadly because they believed it would make their exports, particularly agricultural
exports, more competitive on the world market. They believed that this move would eliminate some of the political
tensions that had emerged with agriculturalists, an important base of support for the party.
22
Newell Maynard Stultz, Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 1934-1948 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1974), 25.
23
Ibid.
21

181

situation. The South African gold mining industry was highly advanced for the time period and,
when global gold prices began to rise in 1932-33, the health of the South African economy
improved. As Keith Breckenridge observed, revenue from the sale of gold jumped by nearly £20
million after 1932 and the mining companies’ gold revenues approached £50 million for the first
time. The increase in the demand and price of gold also increased mining companies’ dividends
to more than £13.5 million. The positive shift in the gold mining industry doubled the workforce
and led to rapid expansion for the mining industry in West Rand and the Orange Free State.24
While the mining sector experienced positive growth in 1932, the South African
government continued to face pressure from Afrikaner farmers who still experienced the
negative effects of the Great Depression. After the British government left the Gold Standard,
South African farmers continued to see their incomes drop because the sterling price of their
exports had not risen to a level that compensated them for the devaluation of sterling. Concerns
mounted that Afrikaner farmers, and to a degree mine laborers and manufacturers, would seek
economic reprieve by challenging the government that failed to resolve these issues. These
disillusioned Afrikaner farmers found an ally in Jan Smuts and the SAP, who took up the
farmers’ complaints in 1933 and tried to find a way to make the South African economy more
profitable for this important political constituency.25
In 1933, Smuts and his party crafted a plan that advocated for the devaluation of the
South African pound that would bring it into closer parity with the British sterling. This plan
posited that such a devaluation and entrance into the sterling area would benefit both the mining
and agricultural sectors in South Africa. Such a devaluation would, in theory, directly benefit the
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mining sector by raising the domestic price of gold.26 A rise in the domestic price of gold would
consequently increase the mines’ profitability and lead to expansion in the industry. A more
stable currency would also consequently increase British interest in supplying new capital and
investment for said expansion and growth.27
For Afrikaner farmers, devaluation and entrance into the sterling area was necessary
because Britain remained the dominant customer of South African agricultural goods. Entering
into the sterling area essentially “concluded a wide-ranging bargain” that drastically benefited
Afrikaner farmers.28 For example, under this plan and “bargain,” South African farmers received
higher prices for their exports. The British, as a result, received a beneficial “ruling price” on
much needed agricultural goods. British encouragement of this deal ultimately also made the
pound sterling more stable, increased the prestige of sterling in the global market, and provided
British capitalists with a new area for investment.29
Hertzog and Smuts both believed that one of the primary ways to maintain the positive
economic growth experienced by the South African economy was the development and
maintenance of cooperative trade agreements with the British government. Unfortunately, a
significant portion of the Cape members of the NP maintained their long-held skepticism that
cooperation between the South African and British governments would prove beneficial to their
interests. Farmers and manufacturers in the Cape NP ardently opposed British imperialism, as
they despised the ability of a foreign government to influence the prices paid for their exports.30
The general unwillingness of the Cape NP to support cooperation with the British government
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posed a clear threat to the economic interests of Afrikaners in the Transvaal and Orange Free
State who benefitted from Hertzog’s earlier political maneuvering with regard to the Gold
Standard. As such, the appeal and popularity of the NP weakened in the early 1930s and created
an opening for negotiations surrounding the formation of a coalition government and fusing part
of the NP with the SAP.31
As Hertzog and Smuts developed the structure and platform of the proposed UP in 1933
and 1934, it was clear that one of the major hurdles the new party faced was Afrikaner suspicions
that the English-speaking whites in South Africa held a deep-seated loyalty to the British
government and would never truly place the interests of the Union first. Unlike those suspicious
Afrikaners, Hertzog embraced the concept of a “two-stream policy.” Hertzog based the twostream policy on “an absolute equality between Afrikaners and English-speaking whites [that
resulted] in an emphasis on white unity and the protection of white civilization in the face of a
‘Black peril’.”32 The UP supported this position and adamantly believed that English-speakers in
South African society would put the interests of South Africa first, even if these interests came
into conflict with the interests of the British government. Belief in this policy portended a belief
that Afrikaners and English-speakers could come together in support of the best economic and
political interests of the white race.33 Additionally, the two-stream policy allowed for separate
development and for the retention of some key elements of the Afrikaner identity, most
significantly Afrikaans. The UP’s willingness to adopt and support this policy ultimately led to
Hertzog throwing his support behind the samsmelting of the SAP and NP.
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While Hertzog sought compromise, the more right-leaning anti-imperial elements of the
Cape NP saw Hertzog’s negotiations as a betrayal. D.F. Malan, a political opponent of Hertzog,
believed that the very premise of the two-stream policy was flawed and unrealistic. Newell Stultz
described Malan’s position as “[seeing] no evidence of a change in nature of the Englishspeaking population, and, moreover, [Malan] was deeply suspicious of the willingness of Smuts
to unite with Hertzog, vaguely seeing some treacherous motive beneath Smuts’ sanguine
pronouncements on national unity.”34 Furthermore, Malan argued that “the English[-speaking]
South African would never voluntarily relinquish his un-Afrikaner associations with Great
Britain; he would remain, until persuaded or compelled to change, an ‘unassimilated’ element in
the white population of the Union.”35 There were only two viable solutions to the two-stream
policy issue. He argued that the connection to Britain must be severed through the creation of a
republic, and that this would force English-speaking South Africans to embrace Afrikaans as
their primary language. In essence, Malan advocated that “South Africa [would] have two equal
languages, but [they] shall be one People!”36
Malan’s position, following the initial successes of Smuts’ and Hertzog’s economic plan
to cooperate with the British on trade deals, proved unpopular and placed Afrikaners, who still
strongly supported the NP’s protection of Afrikaner culture, in a challenging electoral position.
In 1934, Afrikaners faced the difficult decision of following Hertzog into the UP or voting to
remain a separate political party. The vote split nearly 60-40 and clear divisions emerged along
regional lines. The Cape served as an NP stronghold for those in support of rejecting
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samsmelting, while the Orange Free State and Transvaal, Afrikaner regions that benefitted
significantly from Smuts’ and Hertzog’s political maneuvers, voted heavily in favor of fusion.37
When Hertzog left for the UP, he took many of the northern Afrikaners and Afrikaner moderates
with him. The more right-wing elements of Afrikaner society instead joined D.F. Malan’s newlycreated Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party (GNP). Multiple factions within the GNP vied for political
power in a battle for the heart of Afrikanerdom. This struggle resulted in a concentration of
power around Malan, clear ideological shifts in Afrikaner nationalism, and the eventual
emergence of competing Afrikaner political parties.
The relationship between Malan and Hertzog was contentious in the years immediately
following the split. However, the centenary celebrations in 1938 to commemorate the Great Trek
served as an important moment that led to a heightened cultural self-awareness among
Afrikaners and led to demands for a political reunion between the two figures.38 While Hertzog
was initially receptive to the idea, Malan outright rejected it and squandered an important
opportunity that had important political implications in the coming years. World War II
commenced in 1939 and the UP-led South African government declared war on Germany.
Hertzog, a strong opponent of South Africa joining the war, ultimately left the UP on this point
and created the Volksparty (VP), which drew support from Afrikaners to Malan’s political left.
That same year, Malan faced an internal ideological challenge from his political right with the
formation of the radical right-wing Ossewabrandwag (OB) on 4 February 1939.39 Thus, Malan
faced challenges from both sides of the political spectrum during World War II.
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While the GNP vocally supported the concept of republicanism and tacitly supported
anti-Semitic immigration policies, the OB came out in full support of the German government
during the war. Although the South African Parliament voted to support the war effort on the
side of Britain, the OB took explicit steps to sabotage the war effort and even created
paramilitary units called Stormjaers.40 The OB’s ambiguous appeal to volkseenheid (national
unity) allowed the party to develop into a mass movement, as it intentionally failed to elaborate
on specific policy distinctions that weakened broad popular support for earlier Afrikaner political
movements. The OB embraced radical right-wing politics of the time and “articulate[d] the
disgust which many people felt in view of the delicacies of party politics. It proudly showed
itself as a movement of ‘doers’ rather than ‘talkers’….For everyone hoped to find his or her
‘salvation’ there, rather than in politics.”41 Within its first year, the OB effectively peeled away
300,000 supporters from Malan’s political right and forced him to contend with their popular
policy agenda.42
In the 1940s, another shift occurred that challenged Malan’s control over Afrikaner
politics. In 1941, a split within Hertzog’s VP led H.C. Havenga to create the Afrikaner Party
(AP), a party consisting of those opposed to following Hertzog into the Herenigde Nasionale
Party (HNP) under Malan’s control.43 Thus, prior to the 1943 General Elections, three primary
political parties battled for control over political Afrikanerdom. The UP under Smuts drew its
support from Afrikaner moderates and maintained its support of the two-stream policy and its
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intentions to cooperate with English-speakers in the Union. Malan’s HNP formulated its political
agenda based on the promotion of Afrikaans, its rejection of South African participation in
World War II, and its strong desire for a republic. Finally, the OB continued to pull its support
from the far-right and those that, in many cases, supported the German government and
embraced much of the National Socialist sociopolitical agenda.44
The division created in Afrikaner politics between 1939 and 1942 made Smuts’ and the
UP’s victory in the 1943 elections a certainty. In 1942, Afrikaner political leaders made last-gasp
efforts to unite Afrikanerdom and challenge the UP’s political dominance. In March, L.J. du
Plessis wrote a piece in Die Vaderland that proposed a new Unity Movement to facilitate
cooperation between Afrikaner leaders with disparate interests.45 Johannes Van Rensburg also
tabled a proposal that sought to mitigate the disagreements between the OB and HNP by
agreeing to “put up mutually acceptable volk candidates” in the 1943 General Election.46 Malan
viewed the political maneuvering by the OB leadership as a sign of weakness and concluded that
such an arrangement benefited members of the OB far more than it helped the HNP.
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Instead of coming together in the interest of defeating Smuts and the UP, Malan devised a
political campaign that guaranteed short-term losses in Afrikaner political power but laid the
foundation for the consolidation of Afrikaner politics under his control. Rather than attack the
UP, Malan instead waged a campaign against his Afrikaner political rivals. Malan’s internal
crusade focused on portraying the OB as extremists with an unworkable political agenda and
abandoning republicanism for a more widely-accepted parliamentarianism grounded in populism
and authoritarianism.47 The strategy proved successful as the OB became defunct and the AP
offered little in terms of a true political rival. The HNP gained 16 seats during the election and
received roughly 36.7 percent of the vote, but Smuts and the UP retained 89 seats in Parliament
and captured 49.68 percent of the vote .48 Smuts’ victory and Malan’s consolidation of Afrikaner
political power proved significant developments for the post-war trajectory of South African
politics.

Interwar White Politics in South West Africa, 1919-1939
While nineteenth- and twentieth-century Afrikaner identity was re-invented in the Union,
white politics in South West Africa underwent a similarly contentious and volatile reformulation
during the Interwar Years. White politics in South West Africa generally broke along lines
pertaining to language and culture and consisted of three separate spheres: English-speakers,
German-speakers, and Afrikaans-speakers. The English-speaking element of society was
relatively small and consisted primarily of civil servants and government administrators who
came from the Union to serve in the SWAA. The Germans, as described by historian Christo
Botha, “tended to be generally enterprising, inquisitive and already possessed a self-image that
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depicted them[selves] as being a distinctly localized German entity.”49 Lastly, the Afrikaners
“comprised the predominantly rural element amongst the white population…. Religion played a
vital role everywhere for Boer rural communities…. [And] religion was closely associated with
education and imparting moral values required to cope with what was perceived as at best a
foreign world encroaching upon them.”50 Although there were conflicts between Englishspeakers and the other two groups, the main tensions arose between the German-speakers and
Afrikaans-speakers, as they were the largest two non-indigenous groups in South West Africa.
Prior to 1915, tensions between the Germans and Afrikaners in the territory centered on a
rural-urban divide that created negative stereotypes of each group among their counterpart.
Christo Botha described this rural-urban dichotomy:
Contact between these rural Afrikaners and Germans in the pre-1915 era was therefore
between representatives of a rapidly industrializing country in the grip of a profoundlydislocating modernization process and representatives of a rural lifestyle whose way of
thinking was essentially shaped by generations of volatile engagement with African
communities and the British in South Africa, as well as the German-speakers in the
former German South West Africa.51
The German’s self-fashioned identity as urban, industrial, and modernizing was supported by the
fact that they dominated the business and finance sectors in the territory. Conversely, Afrikaners
were largely rural-based and availed themselves to the agricultural sector. Germans, and even
English-speakers, in the territory viewed the Afrikaners as culturally-backward and slow to
accept the modernization process underway in the colonial world.52
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Despite the existence of tensions between the territory’s Germans and Afrikaners prior to
World War I, this conflict inevitably exacerbated the enmity between the two groups. As the
conclusion of the war approached, the South African government, keen to assert its power and
control over South West Africa, used the Blue Book as a mechanism to collect damning
information on the German treatment of the territory’s African populations and discredit German
colonial rule in the process.53 The Blue Book ultimately allowed the South African government
to portray the German government as “unfit to exercise control over [its] colonies.”54 Coupled
with Germany’s impending defeat and the internment of large numbers of German males in the
territory during the war, Germans in the territory viewed the Blue Book as “add[ing] injury to the
humiliation of defeat.”55 The territory’s Germans, still loyal to the German government and their
deeply embedded cultural identity, continued to rail against the administration of the Blue Book
well into the mid-1920s.
A second factor that contributed significantly to the tensions between Germans and
Afrikaners in post-war South West Africa was the issue of citizenship and immigration.
Germany’s defeat in the war, and its subsequent loss of its colonial possessions, left South West
Africa’s German population in a peculiar position with regard to their legal status in the territory.
During a trip to London in 1923, Prime Minister Smuts unsuccessfully attempted to persuade
German government officials to assent to a plan that would see the nearly 8,000 Germans in
South West Africa apply for citizenship in the Union. In an attempt to resolve the Germans’ legal
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status, Smuts ratified the London Agreement of 1923 and provided citizenship to all Germans in
the territory within a specified time. This agreement was upheld by the League of Nations in
April 1923 and “as a result of the London Agreement [Germans in South West Africa were]
made [Union] citizens unless they refuse[d]: but, in accordance with the German nationalization
law, they still remain[ed] German citizens since they…made no application to change their
status.”56 Thus, Germans in the territory “[had] rights and duties within the Union” but were
exempt from military service for a period of 30 years.57
It is clear that, through the London Agreement, the Union government wanted to cultivate
a positive working relationship with the German-speakers as a means to solidify and expand their
control in the territory. In order to achieve this positive relationship, the Union government
agreed to a number of concessions that allowed German-speakers to maintain their cultural and
political identity. Per the agreement, Germans in the territory were permitted to retain the “free
use of the German Language,” an important concession given the role language played in
creating tensions between the German-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking elements of white South
West African society.58 Likewise, the Union government also agreed to provide support to
German schools in the territory and maintain a friendly relationship with German churches and
missionaries. Finally, former German officials were granted access to their retirement pensions.59
There were initial attempts to work closely with the territory’s German-speaking
population, however, German-speakers were uneasy about the Union government’s land
settlement schemes and immigration policies that directly impacted the composition of the white
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population in South West Africa. As chapter 2 argued, Smuts and the South African government
offered whites in the Union favorable loan deals and easy access to relatively fertile lands in
South West Africa as a way to deal with the poor white problem in the Union and avoid
recurrences of revolts like the Rand Rebellion of 1922.60 German-speakers believed that these
government policies constituted an active attempt by the Union government to increase the size
of the Afrikaner population in the territory and, ultimately, further dilute the political power of
German-speakers in South West Africa. These suspicions were only further confirmed when, in
1929, “it was decreed that German immigrants would henceforth need to reside for five years in
[South West Africa] before they could claim citizenship, in contrast to British (i.e., South
African residents) who required only two.”61 That same year plans were made to resettle nearly
1,200 Boers from Angola, a move that would have further politically marginalized Germanspeakers in the territory.62
As a result of the tensions that emerged among South West Africa’s whites, a flurry of
ethnically- and linguistically-based political parties formed throughout 1924 in an attempt to
safeguard the interests of the various sectors of the territory’s white population. Frikke Jooste
founded The National Party of South West Africa (NPSWA) in Mariental on 26 July 1924 and
the party aligned its platform with Hertzog’s aforementioned NP in the Union. In September
1924, Andries de Wet, A.P. Olivier and F. van Der Heever founded the Union Party, another
predominately Afrikaner political party that aligned itself ideologically with Smuts’ SAP.63
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Outside of counteracting German political influence in the territory, a key point of ideological
agreement between these two parties was their desire to seek the incorporation of South West
Africa into the Union as a fifth province.64 In contrast, Dr. Fritz Brenner founded the primarily
German-speaking Deutscher Bund on 3 September 1924 to advocate for the 11,000 Germans in
the territory and fight against the other two parties’ demands for incorporation.65
Beginning in 1925, these political parties became the electoral mechanism through which
white South West African society influenced policy and territorial decision-makers. That year,
the South African Parliament passed the South West African Constitution Act which helped
tighten their control on the territory. This act allowed for limited rights of political participation
for the white population and created a representative Legislative Assembly that crafted
legislation for the territory. Executive powers in South West Africa were shared jointly by the
SWAA and the Executive Committee. Meanwhile, the South African Parliament and the
territory’s Governor-General maintained the ability to overrule any piece of legislation or
executive decision that it deemed not in accordance with the Union’s political agenda.66
Although they were not provided direct representation in the South African Parliament, whites in
South West Africa possessed the necessary political infrastructure to pursue their ambitions and
agenda in the territory.
The first elections in 1926 proved a success for the Deutscher Bund, as Afrikaners and
English-speakers in the territory remained divided between the NPSWA and the South West
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Party (formerly the United Party).67 The Deutscher Bund secured seven of the 18 Legislative
Assembly seats, while the NPSWA and the South West Party won a combined three seats.68 The
Deutscher Bund’s victory, however, was somewhat blunted when Administrator Werth
appointed four Afrikaans-speakers and two German-speakers to fill the six appointed seats on the
assembly.69 This essentially meant that Afrikaners controlled seven seats, German-speakers
controlled nine seats, and two seats were held by independent candidates, preventing any one
party from dominating the territory’s first Legislative Assembly.
The NPSWA and South West Party recognized that swift action must be taken to find
common cause among the territory’s Afrikaners and prevent successive Deutscher Bund
electoral victories. Therefore, on 31 January 1927 the NPSWA and South West Party merged to
form the United National South West Party (UNSWP) and pursue their joint goal of securing the
incorporation of South West Africa into the Union. The newly-merged party experienced almost
immediate success. In the 1929 Legislative Assembly elections, the UNSWP procured eight of
the 12 elected seats by campaigning on a pro-incorporation platform. The Deutscher Bund won
the other four seats while supporting an agenda focused on German cultural rights and upholding
the terms of the mandate.70 Werth again limited the impact of the election by appointing more
German-speaking members to the Legislative Assembly to provide balance.71 However, the 1929
election signified an important shift in the territory’s white politics that saw a rise in influence of
South West Africa’s Afrikaans-speaking whites.
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Following the 1929 elections, sectional divisions were further enflamed as Germanspeakers continued to lose political influence in South West Africa. As was previously
mentioned, in 1929 barriers were put in place that required German immigrants to reside in the
territory twice as long as their South African counterparts in order to receive citizenship and
political representation. Similarly, plans were devised to repatriate nearly 1,200 Angola-Boers, a
move viewed by German-speakers as a ploy to solidify the Afrikaners population advantage.72 If
successful, the UNSWP would be further entrenched as the dominant political party in the
territory and the likelihood of incorporation, something vehemently opposed by the Deutscher
Bund, increased. This led the Deutscher Bund to fight for German language rights and, more
importantly, against automatic naturalization during the late 1920s and early 1930s.73
Further compounding the dire sociopolitical position for German-speakers, internal
fractures appeared in the early-1930s. The Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
(NSDAP) was founded by Ernst Wilhelm Bohle in South West Africa in 1932, a year prior to
Hitler and the National Socialist Party’s rise to power in Germany.74 The NSDAP was heavilysupported by the younger elements of German-speaking society and, in light of Hitler’s rise in
1933 and his strong denunciation of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, they demanded
the return of South West Africa to German control. This inevitably led to conflict with the
Deutscher Bund, which maintained popularity among the older German-speakers in the territory
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and supported a more moderate political agenda.75 The founding of the Deutsche Afrikanische
Partei (DAP) under Martin Mauer in February 1939, an anti-Nazi party that emerged from the
Deutscher Sudwest Bund (DSWB), only further added to the multitude of internal fissures that
enveloped German political life in the territory and increasingly weakened their influence in
South West African politics.76
The rise of Nazism also led to increased cooperation between the Union government and
SWAA, resulting in the UNSWP actively working to limit the spread and influence of Nazism in
the territory. In 1933 and 1934, the UNSWP, through the Legislative Assembly, banned the
NSDAP and Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth) in the territory.77 The NSDAP held three
demonstrations in South West Africa in 1934 to demand the reinstatement of the party in South
West Africa and the return of their expelled leader Major Weigel. However, the demonstrations
proved unsuccessful and subsequently resulted in UNSWP raids on the NSDAP’s offices and the
headquarters of the Hitler Youth. The volatile and problematic activities of the Nazi
organizations in South West Africa proved beneficial for the UNSWP, as the 1934 elections
showed a significant shift away from the Deutscher Bund and toward the Afrikaner-dominated
political parties.78
The UNSWP continued its political dominance in South West Africa well into the early
1940s. However, in 1939 the NPSWA re-emerged as a separate political party in the territory.
Although the UNSWP and NPSWA shared a desire for incorporation of South West Africa into
the Union, their primary point of differentiation centered on South African participation in World
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War II. The UNSWP, much like Smuts and the UP in South Africa, supported joining the war
effort on the side of the Allied Powers. This decision created tensions between the UNSWP and
German-speakers in South West Africa, as they were steadfastly against participation in the war.
The NPSWA, despite its support for incorporation into the Union, was against South African or
South West African participation in World War II.79 The NPSWA sought electoral support from
the likeminded members of the DAP in their challenge of UNSWP hegemony in the 1939
Legislative Assembly elections. Nonetheless, given the anti-German sentiment among the
territory’s Afrikaans- and English-speakers, this move caused the NPSWA to lose each of its
contested seats and the party only received two seats through administerial appointment
following the election.80 The NPSWA remained a minor political party during the course of
World War II and it only rose to prominence in South West Africa after the NP gained popularity
under D.F. Malan in the Union as a result of his pro-apartheid agenda.

The Incorporation of South West Africa and the
Failed Referendum of 1946
The UP’s victory in the 1943 election and Malan’s subsequent consolidation of Afrikaner
political power proved significant developments for the post-war trajectory of South African
politics. One issue of political importance for South West Africa in the post-World War II period
was Smuts’ renewed attention on incorporating South West Africa into the Union and
determining the fate of the other High Commission Territories in southern and eastern Africa.
Conversely, Malan and the HNP focused on reformulating their political agenda and message in
an attempt to appeal to the more moderate elements of Afrikanerdom. The post-war years were
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significant in paving the way for the development of apartheid policies in South Africa and
providing a legal justification for their extension and entrenchment in the 1940s and 1950s.
The European conclusion of World War II in May 1945 presented Smuts and the South
African government with renewed opportunities for the incorporation of South West Africa as a
de facto fifth province. Smuts believed that joining the war effort on the side of Britain provided
a clear path to the incorporation of the three High Commission Territories in southern Africa,
allowed for the annexation of South West Africa, and brought his concept of a Greater South
Africa to fruition.81 W.K. Hancock suggested that “not a dog would have barked during the
Second World War if [Smuts] had simply annexed South West Africa,” but Smuts’ “oldfashioned respect for the legal fabric of the society of nations restrained him.”82 Smuts, instead,
intended to secure “full sovereignty” over South West Africa through the newly-formed UN.83
Delegates of the Allied Powers met in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on
International Organization (UNCIO) between April and June 1945 to charter a new international
organization with a more robust enforcement arm than the League of Nations.84 The delegates
opened the UN Charter for signatures, and they ratified the document on 26 June 1945. After a
minor delay, the UN began its operation on 24 October 1945 and existed simultaneously with the
League of Nations until April 1946. It was clear that, with an effective enforcement arm, the UN
would soon replace the League of Nations.85 The transfer of powers from the League of Nations
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to the UN was complex, but no issue created a lengthier and more intense debate than the
proposed status of the mandate territories that existed under the League’s purview.
Chapter 12 of the UN’s Charter attempted to resolve this issue. Article 75 of the Charter
“establish[ed] under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and
supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual
agreements.”86 The “territories now held under mandate” were included under the purview of the
trusteeship system.87 The trusteeship system laid out a program designed to “encourage respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms,” as well as “promote the political, economic,
social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their
progressive development toward self-government.” 88 The mandatory powers continued to
administer these territories under the guidelines laid out in the Covenant of the League of
Nations until such time as an agreement could be reached to place these territories under the
trusteeship system.89
Smuts believed that, based on the wording of the proposed trusteeship system,
Namibians’ consent to incorporation would facilitate the process and ease any potential concerns
or objections that might be brought against the South African government at the General
Assembly. The need for Namibians’ consent was emphasized at a confidential conference of
Native Commissioners in Windhoek on 19 January 1946. Smuts tasked the attendees of the
conference with carrying out a referendum to determine whether Namibians living in the
territory “wish any other Government or people to rule [them]” and if they “would like [their]
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country to become part of the Union of South Africa.”90 Smuts instructed the Native
Commissioners that “incorporation will depend on whether the United Nations is satisfied that
the Natives want it.”91 The South African government needed consent because they believed that
“the mandate was originally set up for the protection of the Natives and therefore the Natives’
willingness to stand under the Union government [would] contribute to the inclusion of South
West Africa with the Union.”92 Thus, an affirmative response from Namibians toward
incorporation was essential to Smuts’ larger plans for southern Africa.
To ensure that the referendum result was favorable, the Native Commissioners received
detailed instructions at the aforementioned confidential meeting on how to carry out the
referendum. Native Commissioners in Ovamboland had already made initial contacts with
Ovambo leaders on the referendum and ascertained that there was “unanimous” support for the
referendum.93 In the Police Zone, the fate of the referendum was much less clear. While some
believed that if “the Ovambos [are] affiliated with incorporation, the Herero and the Basters will
also agree,” others questioned whether the Herero would consent to incorporation.94 The Native
Commissioners from central Namibia recounted throughout the meeting that the Herero political
process necessitated discussion and debate, often requiring additional time to come to a decision.
Concerns existed that the Herero would question why a document must be signed and approach
the referendum with suspicion.95
The Native Commissioners agreed to carry out the referendum in a confidential manner
to avoid any potential outside influence on the process. The Native Commissioner at Karasburg,
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J.S.J. Grobler, feared that if the administration of the referendum took too long and lengthy
deliberations ensued, the “Natives [could] run to the German Fathers and Priests and…be
wrongly influenced” against the Union government on the issue of incorporation.96 The
commissioners thought that some of the missionaries in South West Africa might still be bitter
about the South African government supporting Britain in the war and that they might stoke
negative sentiments among Africans. Chief Native Commissioner for South West Africa P.R.
Botha concurred with this assessment and reiterated that “it was not the idea to advertise the
[referendum] because priests and missionaries would advise the natives to vote against the
incorporation of South West Africa with the Union.”97 Uniform statements about the purpose of
the referendum were created to avoid potential contradictions among Native Commissioners that
could be exposed during meetings between the various groups in the Police Zone.
The Native Commissioners travelled to the locations in February 1946, prior to putting
the referendum to a vote, to consult with Namibian leaders and ensure that an affirmative vote
could be obtained. Commissioners visited each reserve and consulted with leaders, explaining
the nature of the referendum and its consequences. It was clear during these consultations that a
“Yes” vote on the referendum was a certainty. A total of 168,491 Namibians, consisting mostly
of Ovambos, informed the Commissioners that they intended to vote for incorporation. Another
7,176 Namibians indicated that they would vote against incorporation, while 11,246 remained
uncertain of their stance on the issue. The table on the next page highlights how these
consultations determined how each reserve intended to vote after the meetings.
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Table 4.1
Results of Consultations with Non-Europeans in South West Africa RE: Incorporation in
the Union

Native Territory or Reserve
Bondels
Western Caprivi Zipfel
Franzfontein
Hoachanas
Kaokoveld
Kranzplatz
Okavango
Ovamboland
Okombahe
Otjimbingwe
Otjituo
Rehoboth

In Favor Of.
[Ethnic Group]
[Nama]
Okavangos
[Nama]
[Nama]
[Nama and Herero]
[Nama]
Okavangos
Ovambos
[Damara]
[Damara] (excluding Herero)
Herero
Coloured

Population
700
2,797
433
280
6,294
422
17,682
129,763
1,744
400
1,976
6,000
168,491

Against.
Aukeigas
Berseba
Otjimbingwe
Otjohorongo
Ovitoto
Soromas

[Damara]
[Nama]
[Nama]
[Nama]
Herero
[Nama]

519
2,472
530
2,204
1,020
431
7,176
Doubtful.

Aminius
Epukiro
Waterberg East
Tses

In Favor of
Against
Doubtful

Herero
Herero
Herero
Herero

2,287
3,087
4,493
1,379
11,246
168,491
7,176
11,246

Source: Results of Consultations with Non-Europeans in South West Africa, RE: Incorporation
in[to] the Union, 1946, NAN: Native Commissioner Ovamboland (Hereafter, NAO)/47/1/1.

In April 1946 the Native Commissioners travelled to the locations, read the statements on
the referendum, allowed for deliberations, and then put the issue of incorporation into the Union
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to an official vote. The results of the referendum returned overwhelmingly in favor of the
incorporation of South West Africa into the Union. Namibians allegedly voted in favor of the
referendum, with 208,850 voting in the affirmative and 33,520 voting against incorporation.
These results provided Smuts with the statistical evidence he believed was necessary to convince
the UN that South West Africa should become the fifth province of the Union.98
Smuts formally submitted his request for the incorporation of South West Africa into the
Union at the first meeting of the UN General Assembly in October 1946. The request was poorly
received and the Indian delegate Mrs. Pandit used the request as an opportunity to attack Smuts
and the South African government for the institution of the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian
Representation Act earlier that year.99 Smuts later wrote that Pandit’s attacks were a “bitter
experience” that exposed the author of the preamble of the UN Charter as a “hypocrite and
double-faced time server!”100 Smuts and his government never recovered from this humiliation
with regard to the South West Africa question. After a few months of debate, the UN General
Assembly rejected Smuts’ proposal for incorporation in December 1946. UN Resolution 65-1 of
14 December 1946 acknowledged that the General Assembly was “unable to accede to
incorporation” because the “African inhabitants of South West Africa [had] not yet secured
political autonomy or reached a stage of political development enabling them to express a
considered opinion which the assembly could recognize on such an important question as
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incorporation of their territory.”101 Instead, the General Assembly recommended that the
mandate territory be placed under the trusteeship system and allowed for the South African
government to “continue to administer the territory…in the spirit of the principles laid down in
the [m]andate.”102
Numerous factors contributed to the failure of Smuts’ proposed plan for the incorporation
of South West Africa, the most prominent of which was the perceived illegitimacy of the
referendum of 1946. Three key factors contributed to the perception of the referendum’s
illegitimacy. First, delegates at the General Assembly believed that the wording and language of
the proposed referendum was ambiguous and misleading. Second, the Native Commissioners’
conversations with Namibian leaders on the Union’s plans to remain a part of the British
Commonwealth were believed to be misleading at best and were thought to have influenced their
votes during the referendum. Finally, the delegates of the General Assembly believed that the
South African government manipulated the process of the referendum and utilized questionable
tactics to achieve their desired result.
The phrase “that we do not wish any other Government or people to rule us” was a
central focus of the referendum’s critics. The wording of this phrase and the manner in which it
was presented to Namibian leaders led them to believe the choice presented in the referendum
was binary in nature, an exclusive choice between remaining under Union governance or
returning to German rule. 103 Many leaders feared the possibility of being placed under an
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unknown government and the nature of the trusteeship system and its focus on guiding
populations to political self-determination went unexplained. Benjamin Kido and Ovahimba
Headman Youyouruka’s conversations with the Officer-in-Charge of Native Affairs in
Kaokoveld in January 1946 highlight this issue. The Officer-in-Charge asked “whether they
would prefer any other Government to the present Administration” and Kido responded, “I have
heard what you have told us, and I understand. I cannot wish for a Government that I know
nothing about or that I have never seen. The Government I have now I know. With it I am
satisfied, and I would like to remain under this Government to the last.”104 Headman
Youyouruka concurred: “I do not want to talk a lot. All the Governments you told me about, I do
not know. I know the Government we have at present. It is our Government. We have been under
it for a long time. We are satisfied with it and do not want any other.”105
Further confusion surrounded the position of the Union of South Africa within the British
Commonwealth and the South African government’s intention to remain in the Commonwealth.
Major Hahn’s recollection of conversations with the Witboois at Krantzplatz in 1946 highlight
the unclear nature of this issue. Kaptein David Witbooi was hesitant about the prospect of
incorporation, stating “I do not know about joining the Union; we are under the English and we
always [said] this.”106 He further pointed to Hendrik Witbooi’s words from the late-nineteenth
century, relaying that “If [the gentleman] is the administrator of the English Government I would
like to say that old Hendrik Witbooi, who died, told us that we also joined the English
Government. It was before the German government came here. I now understand that there are
other nations who want to rule [South West Africa]. Our Kaptein said he was under the English
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Government. The Union Government is also under the English Government and if we say we are
under the English Government, we reckon we are under it.”107 Similar questions arose in the
Otjohorongo Native Reserve and at Grootfontein about the nature of the Union’s relationship
with the British Commonwealth.108
The assurances provided to Namibian leaders at the time, that the Union would remain
part of the British Commonwealth, proved disingenuous. An excerpt from an administrator in the
Omaruru district read, “After about an hour had elapsed they sent for me and told me that they
wanted to ‘remain’ under the English flag. I explained to them that they were being administered
by the Union Government, through the South West African Administration, and not by the
British Government. I also explained to them that the Union of South Africa was a member of
the British Commonwealth of Nations, and that as far as could be foreseen it would continue to
remain a member.”109 The impending rise of Malan’s NP in the immediate post-war years was a
primary concern of Namibian leaders in the territory and there were well-founded fears that
incorporation entailed potential oppression under a hostile Afrikaner-led government. The
aforementioned administrator in Omaruru recalled that “there seemed to be a fear amongst a
section [of Namibians] that the extreme element amongst the Afrikaners in the Union would
come into power and would then break away from the British Commonwealth.”110 Assurances
were given to Namibian leaders, but long-standing debates about the “two-stream policy” made
it impossible to provide such assurances with any certainty and, given the rise of Malan’s antiBritish HNP after the war, such assurances proved untenable.
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Coupled with disingenuous information and limited explanations of the true nature of the
trusteeship system, delegates were rightly concerned about the South African government’s
manipulation of the referendum process through nefarious means. While largely speculation at
the time, documentary evidence suggests that the General Assembly’s delegates’ skepticism
about the veracity of the referendum was well-founded. A transcript of the confidential
Conference of Native Commissioners on 19 January 1946 details how Smuts, the South African
government, and the SWAA initially planned to avoid “Natives…unless it was certain that a
favorable response would be obtained from them.”111 Furthermore, concrete efforts were made to
monitor potential dissidents and limit their influence within the Police Zone. For example, Fritz
Kasuto’s activities in Windhoek were closely observed and the SWAA used “native detectives”
to track his movements and secretly read his mail. They believed that he was a member of the
“red bands” and involved in “…making adverse propaganda amongst the Herero regarding
incorporation of the territory.”112 Despite claims of holding a vote of “free will” among Africans
in South West Africa, the South African government actively manipulated the results of the vote
and created the most favorable conditions for a “Yes” vote.
These acts of manipulation occurred most frequently in the Police Zone among the
populations with the closest ties to sympathetic international actors who could amplify their case
for self-determination on the global stage. It should not, however, be assumed that all Namibians
who voted “Yes” on the referendum were manipulated or misled by the SWAA. For example, a
history of conflict and famine in the Ovambo areas north of the Police Zone led many to believe
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that incorporation into the Union was socioeconomically beneficial. They believed that
becoming the fifth province of the Union ensured protection against cattle raids from populations
across the Angola border and that, additionally, there was a real opportunity for legal rights and
protections to be extended to Namibians in South West Africa.113 This geographical divide in
terms of the referendum likely occurred because Ovamboland’s colonial experience centered on
indirect rule, while the experiences of the Nama, Herero, Damara, and Basters were directly
influenced by daily experiences of government/police brutality in the Police Zone.114

The Rise of D.F. Malan and the Implementation of Apartheid
in South Africa, 1945-1955
Concerns over the legitimacy of the referendum caused the South African government’s
attempts at incorporation to fail and, as a consequence, the political position of Jan Smuts and the
UP weakened. His opponents seized on this momentum and attacked Smuts’ “temporizing
equivocation and perceived weakness on the Colour Question.”115 This tactic was successfully
utilized in the 1924 elections when Hertzog used the threat of a “Black peril” to defeat Smuts.
The NP repurposed this approach as efforts ramped up for the 1948 General Election. This
strategy made it clear that the issue of racial segregation, apartheid, and safeguarding
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Afrikanerdom from this perceived threat played a crucial role in the outcome of the 1948
election and South Africa’s plan to manage race relations in the future.116
Malan’s approach to South African politics changed markedly after the 1943 General
Elections, and he shifted his attention toward a political agenda that the larger white South
African electorate embraced. In November 1943, Malan gave a conciliatory speech at
Stellenbosch where he recognized the importance of changing the NP’s stance on the question of
the “two-stream policy” to appeal to more moderate Afrikaners. Whereas in the past Malan and
the NP fully-embraced the “Afrikaans-heart” definition of Afrikaner nationalism, Malan’s new
approach argued that the Afrikaner and English-speaking South African were socially,
politically, and economically equal.117 While such a stance alienated some of the extremist
elements of Afrikanerdom, Malan believed that this position attracted far more Afrikaners from
his political left.
Malan’s post-election political maneuvering was on full display in May 1944 during the
Wakkerstroom by-election. In previous elections, most notably the 1943 General Election, Malan
and the NP reached out to their political rivals in an attempt to cooperate and defeat the UP’s
candidates. A coalition formed between the Greyshirt Movement, the New Order Movement, the
AP, and the OB. The coordination between these Afrikaner organizations resulted in the victory
of NP candidates over the UP with a majority of 221 votes.118 The unity displayed during this
election and the fruitful results of the election opened a new chapter in Afrikaner politics and
provided a clear blueprint for defeating the UP in future post-war elections.
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The achievement of volkseenheid became the central thrust of Malan’s policy formulation
in the post-war era.119 Afrikaners believed that the only way to achieve volkseenheid was to
establish a republic and rid themselves of British influence that was rife in the Union. However,
since more moderate Afrikaners still desired a close relationship with Britain for its beneficial
trade agreements, Malan, a republican at heart, embraced a more pro-parliamentary approach in
the post-war period to attract those moderate Afrikaners that left for the UP in the 1930s and
1940s. The Union functioned essentially as a republic regardless of its label, and Malan’s more
conciliatory approach to this issue served as an olive branch to the more moderate elements of
Afrikanerdom in the hopes of finally unseating Smuts and the UP in the 1948 General
Election.120
The policy to promote volkseenheid heading into the 1948 General Election consisted of
three particular elements meant to appeal to Afrikaners across the political spectrum. First and
foremost, the NP’s political platform advocated the establishment of schools taught solely in
Afrikaans. The goal of these Afrikaans-language schools was clearly the promotion,
development, and entrenchment of Afrikaner cultural identity in South Africa. It served to
redress many of the ills that plagued Afrikanerdom throughout its history. They believed that
“Mother-tongue schools” would reduce illiteracy rates among the poorer elements of Afrikaner
society and protect against feared cultural degeneration in the face of a perceived “Black
peril.”121
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In the aftermath of World War II, concerns over the spread of communism were
pervasive in South Africa and Malan used fears of both a Red and Black peril to his political
advantage to attract support from moderates. The NP included a strong anti-communist platform
in their political agenda in order to appeal to the English-speaking whites in South Africa who
believed communist infiltration in schools, labor unions, and Black nationalist groups could lead
to violence or rebellion.122 Similarly, the rise of the Youth League in the ANC was monitored by
the South African government as their more militant approach to fighting white oppression
increased fears of a Black or Red peril.123 The Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), a
Trotskyist organization based on non-racialism and non-collaboration with the South African
government emerged most prominently in Cape Town among Coloured activists.124 Although the
NEUM was highly critical of the ANC and CPSA, their stance of non-collaboration made them a
perceived threat to white hegemony in the Union as well.125 Malan understood this fear well and
manipulated the situation to his political benefit.
Lastly, the NP embraced the concept of apartheid as a key component of its political
campaign and efforts to reunite the disparate elements of Afrikaner society. During World War
II, factories in South Africa expanded to meet the production demands of the Union government
for the war effort. The increase in factory jobs ultimately drew Africans from rural areas to the
cities and brought them into close contact with whites. This close proximity increased
competition for jobs and impacted the wages whites could obtain. The labor strikes and clashes
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that ensued following increased African urbanization in the 1940s only added to these fears, as
nearly half of the population lived in urban areas. The government was fearful that the races
living in such close proximity could result in the collapse of white hegemony over the economy
and industrial labor in particular.126
The increased urbanization of Africans in the 1940s brought Blacks and whites into ever
closer proximity, re-igniting fears of cultural degeneration that permeated the Afrikaner
discourse between the 1870s and 1940s.127 Apartheid, the Afrikaans word for “separateness,”
sought to segregate the white, Coloured, Asian, and Black parts of society and allow them to
develop separately along different lines. In its practical implementation, the implications were
clear. Apartheid provided a perceived safeguard for white society and Afrikaner culture against a
Black peril represented by the influx of Black Africans into the urban areas of South Africa.128
The centrality of apartheid to the political landscape was reinforced in 1946 and 1947
when the dueling Fagan and Sauer Commissions were appointed to tackle the problems of
African urbanization. The UP-led government created the Fagan Commission in 1946 and sought
to resolve the problem of African urbanization through liberal means. The Fagan Report
recommended an approach of limited state intervention through the creation of advisory labor
bureaus that made recommendations to facilitate the regulation of African urbanization. The
report found the concept of “total territorial segregation” to be impractical and instead sought to
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implement less rigid pass laws that allowed for the creation of a reliable and stable African labor
source in the urban areas.129
Unsurprisingly, the NP created the Sauer Commission in 1947 to counteract the claims of
the UP and the Fagan Commission Report. The Sauer Commission Report argued for the
eventual implementation of “total apartheid” and for a complete separation of whites and
Africans. This approach also employed labor bureaus but relied on heavy state intervention and
control of these institutions as a means to reverse African urbanization completely. Such a
process called for the creation of ethnically-based governments in the reserves and the complete
removal of African laborers from white industries.130 These two approaches to racial relations
came to define the UP and NP platforms heading into the 1948 General Election and provided
voters with a distinct choice on the future of the Union.
The 1948 General Election pitted Malan’s Afrikaner-dominated NP against a weakened
Smuts and his UP. The NP’s cooperation with its former adversaries, namely the AP, the OB,
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and now-sympathetic Afrikaner moderates, proved successful in the General Election. The NP
won 70 seats in the election and the allied AP won another nine seats. Conversely, the UP lost 24
seats during the election and ended up with only 65 seats. Likewise, the Labor Party managed to
win six seats.131 The results of the election provided the NP with a mandate to further implement
the recommendations of the Sauer Report and install the necessary government infrastructure to
create the “total apartheid” the Report envisioned.
The NP implemented apartheid beginning in the late 1940s, crafting new legislation to
deal with the fluid issue of race relations in the Union and amending or adding to current
segregationist legislation. These apartheid policies simultaneously attempted to create total
separation between whites and Africans in three spheres: territorially, socially, and politically.
Attempts to institutionalize the physical and territorial separation began with the implementation
of the Population Registration Act in 1950. This act classified the South African population into
four separate racial categories based on their physical appearance. The South African
government issued identity cards that listed a person’s race, as well as their physical description,
an identity number, and “the tribe to which he belongs.”132 The Group Areas Act was
implemented later that year and combined with the identity cards created by the Population
Registration Act, worked to territorially segregate the South African population. This act limited
transactions in land between whites and Blacks and separated Blacks and Coloureds into their
own separate reserves to allow for separate development.133 Furthermore, in 1951 the NP-led
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government passed the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act. The NP sought to fulfill its promise
of eliminating African urbanization by allowing for the forcible removal of squatter communities
and the demolition of Black shanty towns in urban and rural areas. 134
The apartheid legislation for the social sphere sought to safeguard Afrikaner cultural
purity by protecting against the pervasive Black peril and the accompanying “cultural
degeneration” that came with close proximity between the races. The South African government
passed the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act in 1949 and made it illegal for any white person
to enter into a marriage with a Black or Coloured person. Additionally, the Immorality Act of
1927 was amended in 1950. The new amendment to the act extended the prohibition on
interracial intercourse between whites and Africans to encompass all “non-Europeans,” including
Coloureds and Asians.135 These policies sought to prevent not only biological “degeneration,”
but also the perceived implications that interracial marriages and offspring would have on South
Africa’s cultural fabric.
Finally, the South African government sought to further disenfranchise Coloureds and
Indians in an attempt to create a white monopoly on South African politics. In 1950, the
government passed the Suppression of Communism Act and outlawed the CPSA and any other
organizations that aimed to “[encourage feelings] of hostility between the European and nonEuropean races of the Union.”136 This act gave the government the ability to
“[declare]…organizations promoting communistic activities to be unlawful and [prohibit] certain
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periodical or other publications [and] to prohibit certain communistic activities.”137 The specter
of communism played an important role in winning moderate Afrikaners to the side of Malan’s
NP. However, in its South African context, the act was aimed at the numerous Black
revolutionary groups that embraced aspects of a communist or socialist ideology. The
aforementioned Youth League of the ANC and the NEUM proved particularly worrisome to the
South African government and this act provided them with the opportunity to label people
engaged in political activism as communists. African calls for political participation and for
changes in the political, economic, or social spheres would be dismissed as attempts to cause
disharmony between the races.
Coloureds were further disenfranchised by the NP-led government. Malan introduced the
Separate Representation of Voters Bill in 1951. The act effectively removed all non-whites from
the voter roll and revoked the Cape Qualified Franchise system.138 Although ruled
unconstitutional in 1952, the South Africa Act Amendment Act was passed in March 1956 and
overturned the Supreme Court’s ruling.139 Under this system, Coloured voters in the Cape
Province participated in segregated elections and were only allowed to elect four members to
Parliament. Blacks were still barred from participation in elections at this time, and there were
numerous debates surrounding the participation of South Africa’s sizable Indian population
during this period. Through all of these separate pieces of legislation, the South African
government was able to create a highly-sophisticated and all-encompassing system of apartheid
that physically, socially, and politically isolated the various races of South Africa.
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De Facto Incorporation and the Introduction of Apartheid
in South West Africa, 1949-1964
While apartheid was entrenched in South Africa during the late 1940s and 1950s, it
developed and emerged more slowly in South West Africa. Due to the close political links
between South Africa and South West Africa, the NPSWA saw an increase in popularity and
power following the Malan-led NP’s victory in the 1948 General Election and, as a result, the
issue of the implementation of apartheid in South West Africa came to the fore. Since its reemergence in 1939, the NPSWA actively courted the territory’s sizable German-speaking
population to increase its political influence. The NPSWA initially fared much better than the
UNSWP among South West Africa’s German-speakers because, much like its counterpart in the
Union, the NPSWA vehemently opposed participation in World War II on the side of the British
government. Also, in a move similar to the Union NP, the NPSWA opposed the expulsion of the
territory’s Germans in 1948 and, instead, advocated that these Germans be granted South African
citizenship. The NPSWA also proved markedly more sympathetic to German-speakers’ demands
for German Language rights than the UNSWP, thus contributing to the NPSWA’s improved
political standing among the territory’s white population.140
Germans in South West Africa viewed Malan and the Union NP as accommodating to the
needs and demands of German-speakers in both the Union and South West Africa. Since the
NPSWA was, for all intents and purposes a branch of the Union NP, Germans viewed the
NPSWA as a mechanism through which they could safeguard Germans’ racial privileges in the
territory and simultaneously preserve their cultural-linguistic profile.141 Smuts’ failure to
successfully incorporate South West Africa as a fifth province in 1946 and the UNSWP’s
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subsequent opposition to incorporation only further weakened the position of the UNSWP
among Afrikaners who whole-heartedly supported, and even demanded, incorporation into the
Union. In 1949, Malan moved to solidify the standing of the NP in South West Africa by
granting the territory’s whites direct representation in the South African Parliament and de facto
incorporating the territory into the Union.
De facto incorporation was finally achieved in 1949 with the passage of the South West
Africa Affairs Amendment Act. Under this Act, the Advisory Council was abolished, and South
West Africa’s white electorate was granted the right of direct representation to the South African
Parliament. The Union granted the territory’s whites six seats in the South African House of
Representatives and another four seats in the Senate. Only Europeans over the age of eighteen
could participate in the elections and, furthermore, issues pertaining to Native Affairs were
reserved for the Union government.142 The move further repudiated the UN’s demands for the
territory to be placed under the trusteeship system and facilitated the implementation and
entrenchment of the apartheid apparatus in South West Africa. The introduction of the
aforementioned act also proved a successful political maneuver for Malan because he provided
the territory’s whites with the close political linkage to the Union that they desired and, as a
result, essentially gained 10 reliable NP seats across the Senate and House of Representatives.143
The immediate impact of the passage of the South West Africa Affairs Act on domestic
South West African politics was readily apparent in the 1950 Legislative Election. In 1945, the
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NPSWA failed to win a single seat in the election and only secured two seats by administerial
appointment. However, with its newfound popularity and close links to the Union’s NP, the
NPSWA won 55% of the vote and secured 15 of the 18 seats in the Legislative Assembly.
Conversely, the UNSWP received 45% of the vote and only procured three seats in the
Assembly.144 This significant majority would continue until the 1978 Legislative Election, with
the NPSWA never losing more than three seats in any election during that period.
The success of the NPSWA in the territory allowed for Afrikaners and German-speakers
to work cooperatively on their most significant point of agreeance: apartheid. As the previous
section detailed, the Union government passed a robust amount of apartheid legislation in South
Africa to combat the perceived threats of rapid African urbanization, popular resistance, and
white cultural degeneration. However, in South West Africa, apartheid developed much more
slowly as a result of a different socioeconomic context. As Marion Wallace argued in A History
of Namibia, African urbanization occurred to a lesser degree in South West Africa than in South
Africa. Likewise, there were less robust challenges to the state in South West Africa during the
interwar years.145 The segregationist policies discussed at length in chapter 2 mostly remained in
place into the 1940s. This meant that “de facto control was already applied through informal
segregation,” and that allowed for formal apartheid to develop more slowly in South West
Africa since effective mechanisms were already in place to limit and control interaction between
the races.146
Although the South African government reserved the right to extend any piece of
apartheid legislation to South West Africa, the existence of informal segregation meant that not
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all legislation created in the Union needed to transfer to South West Africa to maintain control
over the Black population. The Population Registration Act of 1950 is perhaps the best example
of South African apartheid legislation not extending to the territory. In the Union, the act
required people to be registered under one of the four races from birth based on their appearance.
Such a system already existed in South West Africa and, as a result, such legislation was not
extended as part of the formal apartheid apparatus.147 However, such informal practices still
played a significant role in promoting and maintaining the racial separateness demanded of the
apartheid system.
Instead of direct transference, apartheid in the territory was implemented through three
types of legislation: constitutional laws, security legislation, and ordinances imposing racial
segregation.148 One of the key pieces of apartheid legislation passed in South West Africa during
the 1950s was the Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation of 1951, which effectively limited
African mobility through the creation of segregated towns and attempted to create reliable and
controllable labor pools for whites.149 The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Ordinance of 1953
was similar to the Mixed Marriages Act passed in the Union in 1949 and prevented marriage
between whites and non-whites in the territory. The Education Ordinance of 1962 essentially
institutionalized Bantu education in South West Africa and was quite similar to the Bantu
Education Act of 1953 that was passed in the Union.150 This type of education intended to
provide Namibians with just enough knowledge to successfully participate in low-level skilled
labor, while simultaneously excluding them from enough education to significantly improve their
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socioeconomic standing.151 These pieces of legislation worked to socially segregate South West
Africa’s Black population from whites and preserve the cultural identity that was so valued by
both the Germans and Afrikaners.
Legislation focused on territorial and spatial segregation also proved essential to the
extension of apartheid in South West Africa. Town planning ordinances played a crucial role in
the segregation of urban spaces. Wallace, again, highlighted this process, writing, “The urban
areas legislation and subsequent town planning ordinances also set up new means of enforcing
spatial apartheid in the towns, using the title deeds of individual properties to prevent land in
‘white’ and ‘Coloured’ areas being sold to Africans.”152 In effect, this type of legislation “created
a very small African urban elite with rights to remain in the towns, while the majority of the
Black population were conceived as a transient proletariat.”153 Further limiting Namibians’
physical and economic mobility, the SWAA passed the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1952 and
prevented Namibians from joining labor and trade unions. This move limited Namibians’
abilities to resist unfair and exploitative working conditions imposed by the territory’s white
business class and worsened the socioeconomic condition of most Namibians in South West
Africa.154
The rural parts of South West Africa also experienced the heavy hand of apartheid in the
1950s. In 1954, the Union government passed the South West Africa Native Affairs
Administration Act which vested the Minister of Native Affairs with decision-making power
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over issues concerning South West Africa’s Namibian population.155 The Act was placed into
effect in the territory through the South West Africa Native Affairs Administration Ordinance of
1955.156 The Native Affairs Department (NAD) under H.F. Verwoerd quickly implemented a
plan that re-established reserves in South West Africa and used forced removals to clear fertile
land and urban spaces for new white settlement. Whereas reserves in South West Africa initially
consisted of various ethnic groups to prevent the re-constitution of precolonial political
structures, the NAD constructed new reserves based on ethnic identity to more closely mirror the
“homeland” policy in the Union.157 In their totality, these efforts funneled South West Africa’s
sizable rural population onto small arid pieces of land that were agriculturally poor, thus forcing
them into the migrant labor system to work on white-owned farms and in mines.
The extension of apartheid in South West Africa became more salient in 1963-64 with
the issuing of the Odendaal Commission’s Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South-West
Africa Affairs, 1962-1963. The Commission’s goal was to find the most effective way to promote
the separate development of Namibians in the territory and to extend its “homeland” policy to
South West Africa.158 The Odendaal Commission recommended in 1964 that a homeland “must
be created for each population group, in which it alone had residential, political, and language
rights to the exclusion of other population groups.”159 Such a policy necessitated the use of
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forced removals of Namibian populations from fertile and desired lands and led to the
development of eleven separate ethnic homelands in South West Africa. Although apartheid was
de facto extended to South West Africa through the aforementioned policies and legislation, the
Odendaal report officially extended the strict legal apparatus of apartheid to the territory and
entrenched socioeconomic and spatial segregation. This set the stage for a series of
confrontations between the South African government, Namibians, and transnational actors in
the post-World War II era.

Conclusion
Malan’s political maneuvering during the 1940s led to the NP’s dominance in post-war
South Africa and South West Africa. While Smuts looked outward in an attempt to fulfill his
vision of Greater South Africa, Malan turned inward and exerted all of his effort to unite the
disparate and ideologically-opposed parts of Afrikanerdom under the ideology of apartheid.
Following the recommendations of the Sauer Commission report, Malan and the NP established
and implemented an apartheid legal apparatus. The NP blunted the rapid African urbanization
occurring in the Union by developing legislation to separate whites, Africans, Coloureds, and
Asians in the political, social, and economic spheres. Legislation like the Bantu Education Act of
1953 and the Immorality Act of 1950 severely disadvantaged South Africa’s Black population
and entrenched the apartheid system at all levels of life.
Malan’s victory in the 1948 General Election and his accommodationist stance toward
German-speakers in South West Africa led to a rise in popularity for the NPSWA as well. The
NPSWA’s success in the 1950 Legislative Elections and the ratification of the South West Africa
Affairs Amendment Act of 1949 de facto incorporated the territory into the Union and cleared
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the way for the entrenchment of apartheid in South West Africa. Apartheid developed more
slowly in South West Africa than in the Union and it relied heavily on the segregationist policies
implemented during the interwar years under the League of Nations mandate. Yet, it proved
highly effective at separating the races and limiting the political, educational, economic, and
social opportunities for Namibians in the territory.
Conversely, the South African government’s repudiation of the UN’s demand that South
West Africa be placed under the trusteeship system only increased international interest and
scrutiny in the treatment of Namibians at the hands of the SWAA and Union government.
Whereas apartheid legislation closed off official and legitimate channels for Namibians to make
claims of the Union government, Namibians found new opportunities in the relationships they
cultivated with sympathetic transnational actors. Namibian leaders called upon historical
linkages and networks to use transnational institutions and actors to pressure the colonial regime
and seek recourse for the state’s abuses of the Namibian population. The following chapters
examine the role of three particular transnational organizations in the development of
Namibians’ resistance strategies in the post-war period: the African Methodist Episcopal Church,
the United Nations, and international student organizations. These organizations, much like those
engaged with the Basters and Herero during the interwar years, functioned on the margins of
South African governmental recourse and provided Namibians with alternative strategies for
moderating and changing oppressive policies implemented between 1946 and 1960.
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Chapter 5—“They Do Not Want to be Dominated and Suppressed by Europeans in Church
Affairs:” The Nama Secession of 1946 and the Rise of the AME Church in South West
Africa
The victory of the South African NP in the 1948 General Election allowed the
government to implement and expand its apartheid policies throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The
extension of some South African apartheid policies to South West Africa began in the late 1940s
as the NP government in both South Africa and the territory sought to protect white society from
the perceived threat of cultural degeneration and African urbanization. This protection was
achieved through the strict enforcement of territorial, social, political, and economic segregation.
The NP’s apartheid government espoused the development of different racial groups along
separate lines and entrenched a system of homelands and reserves in both South Africa and
South West Africa. This policy often meant inadequate facilities and services for Africans and it
severely limited their socioeconomic and political opportunities in the post-war years.
Throughout the 1950s, for example, the NP government attempted to create a minimallyskilled and immobile Black labor force that would provide cheap wage labor for white-owned
farms, mines, and businesses.1 As a result, Namibians faced chronic and systemic educational
underdevelopment. This educational underdevelopment entailed limited class schedules devoid
of courses related to non-labor occupations, a restriction on classes above Standard II, a lack of
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African teachers, and minimal government investment to improve the educational environment.
This systemic underdevelopment of the education system and infrastructure in South West Africa
first occurred at the hands of the RMS, which had a longstanding reputation as oppressors and
state collaborators in the territory. As apartheid became more entrenched, educational
underdevelopment happened through the introduction and standardization of Bantu Education in
South West Africa by the SWAA. To resist this social underdevelopment, an extension of
apartheid, Namibian leaders in the Police Zone turned to the AME Church in 1946, a
transnational institution grounded in an Ethiopianist Black liberation theology and emancipatory
ethos.
The AME Church’s determination to achieve racial uplift and economic self-sufficiency
through Black-led education matched the needs and demands of Namibians in the territory at the
time. Through the AME Church, its Black liberation theology, and transnational resource pool,
Namibians recognized the opportunity to improve their own socioeconomic position and gain
back some of the control in their daily lives that was wrested from them by the RMS and the
SWAA. Mission educated Namibians, who often served as communities’ political leaders,
continued to face mission- and state-sanctioned limitations to their upward mobility within the
church and, more broadly, limits to their larger socioeconomic and political mobility under the
SWAA and RMS. These Namibians were barred from being ordained within the RMS, unable to
tend to the financial and spiritual needs of their Namibian congregations and restricted in their
opportunities to teach at the mission-run schools. The AME Church’s arrival in the territory
provided new avenues, outside of the colonial state and RMS, to seek some level of personal and
community autonomy in both worldly and spiritual matters to resist the crushingly dehumanizing
effects of the apartheid apparatus.
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This chapter argues that due to the state’s persistence in its policies of educational
underdevelopment and its lack of responsiveness to Namibians’ claims for increased educational
standards, Namibians turned to transnational actors and institutions to leverage international
resources and political pressure to alter the colonial state’s behavior. In the Police Zone the
primary transnational institution with the international reputation, resources, and familiarity with
the South African government to effect change was the AME Church. The AME Church,
renowned for its establishment of Black-led schools and its espousal of a message of racial uplift,
was known to the Nama in the early nineteenth century. It is argued that these early relationships,
established by Hendrik Witbooi, created the necessary channels and circuits through which
transnational actors and resources circulated from the United States to South Africa, and finally
into South West Africa to give the Nama the ability to resist the colonial state’s attempts at
educational and economic underdevelopment. Although the AME Church’s activities in the
territory were inclusive of all Namibians, by the 1950s the resistance strategy surrounding the
AME Church became an almost exclusively Nama undertaking. Thus, the transnational
resistance strategies involving the AME Church in South West Africa took on a fundamentally
subnational character during this decade and presented the Nama with new avenues to make
claims to the colonial state for the improvement of their everyday material and spiritual lives.
These resistance strategies, although subnational and largely exclusive to the Nama
congregations, sought inclusion in the colonial sphere. Despite seeking independence in church
and spiritual affairs, the Nama congregations and their leaders pursued improvements to colonial
education standards within the existent framework. Likewise, in order to more effectively create,
staff, and maintain schools, AME leaders pursued state recognition for the AME schools so that
funds could be secured for the “feeding schemes” and permits obtained to legally construct
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schools and churches. Although a long and trying process, by the 1950s the AME congregations
in the Police Zone received a number of permits to construct schools and experienced some
success in their efforts to secure state recognition for their schools and mitigated the educational
underdevelopment caused by nearly 70 years of colonial rule.

The Problematic Relationship Between the RMS
and the Colonial Government, 1828-1921
The origins of the Nama Secession of 1946 are found in the problematic and often tense
relationship that developed between Namibians and missionaries in South West Africa from
1828 to 1946. Tracking the development of missionary activity in South West Africa during this
period highlights the complex nature of the relationships created between the RMS and the Nama
and illuminates the weaknesses in the missionaries’ approach that led to a rise in internal
dissatisfaction among the Nama congregations. The RMS was founded in Germany in 1828
when three missionary societies merged. John Philip, the superintendent of the LMS in South
Africa, submitted a request for missionaries to come to South Africa shortly after the RMS’s
inception in Germany. The RMS responded to this request and established its first mission in
South Africa in 1832. 2
The RMS received a boost in its missionary efforts when Jonker Afrikaner requested a
missionary from the RMS and Wesleyan Missionary Society in 1840-41.3 Heinrich Vedder
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recounted this important moment, writing, “[O]n the [4 March 1841], the Society passed a
unanimous resolution to send the missionary, Hugo Hahn…with instructions that he should settle
in Bethanie…with Heinrich Kleinschmidt.”4 The missionaries arrived in Windhoek on 9
December 1842 and involved themselves immediately in local Namibian politics. One of the
missionaries’ earliest political entanglements involved the provision of aid to Afrikaner in order
to secure a peace treaty in 1842.5 Despite this help, Afrikaner initially refused to allow the RMS
and its missionaries to penetrate into Nama and Herero lands. However, in 1844 Afrikaner chose
to retain the Wesleyan missionaries at Windhoek and allow the RMS missionaries to continue
onward to work among the Nama populations.6 RMS mission stations proliferated in Great
Namaqualand in the aftermath of this decision.7
RMS missionaries focused on the religious sphere during these early years despite some
inevitable involvement in political affairs. For example, Johann Krolein studied the Nama
language extensively at Berseba in the 1850s and successfully generated religious texts,
textbooks, and dictionaries in Khoekhoe. Another missionary, Johannes Olpp, built a church at
Gibeon and worked to convert the Nama to Christianity with success among the Witbooi.8
Regardless of the particular missionary or mission station, the missionary enterprise in South
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West Africa possessed a common goal: to “civilize” the African populations of South West
Africa.
Map 4: Locations of Proposed AME Schools in 1950s South West Africa

Source: Prepared by Author.
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Historian Marion Wallace laid out the ideological foundations of this “civilizing mission”
as follows: “[T]he new RMS and Wesleyan stations made active attempts to reshape the societies
in which they lived…according to a specific Christian and European model of
godliness.…[M]issionaries promoted a salvation that lay not only in faith, a rigid sexual morality
and the abandonment of…‘heathen’ practices, but also in the adoption of the features of an
idealized, orderly, European peasant society.9” Missionaries espoused Western-style dress,
literacy to read the scriptures, and strict adherence to patriarchal gender roles. They also
introduced important economic innovations, like the plough in 1848, to promote a more
Western-style agriculture among the converts. The objective was clear: to restructure African
society in the image of a Western agricultural settler culture and eliminate the mobile pastoralist
lifestyle that thrived in south and central Namibia.10
The services that missionaries and mission stations provided in times of warfare and food
insecurity allowed for increased, albeit slow, rates of conversion among the Nama and Herero.
Increases in followers created mission stations that “constituted alternative nodes of power” for
disenchanted Africans and created new possibilities for challenging traditional political
authority. 11 Missionaries also developed large mission colonies that participated in regional and
international trade to increase the appeal of the RMS among the Nama and Herero. Carl Hugo
Hahn described the process of constructing a mission colony in 1858:
I recommended that an industrial and farming colony be established…. There must be no
lack of iron for the smith, or of wood for the wagon-maker, and they must be provided
with the proper tools. The stock-farming operations ought to begin with 100 and 150
head of cattle; between 500 and 1,000 sheep will be required.…If the Missionary Society
should see its way clear to establish a mission colony of this kind, it can have some
expectation of the Herero mission becoming a success.12
9
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Although Hahn’s statement pertained to the creation of an RMS mission among the Herero, it
was illustrative of the structure subsequently used among the Nama.
The new missions functioned, to a degree, as outposts in a southern African trade
network. Traders like Sidney Dixon and James Morris successfully traversed routes that
connected the Cape with South West Africa in the 1840s, with Windhoek being the central hub
of this trade. The discovery of guano at Ichabo Island and concessions for mining rights further
sparked trade.13 RMS missionaries were active in this trade and, ultimately, participated in the
firearms trade as well. The firearms trade not only served to protect mission stations from
potential cattle raids but also provided the means for some missionaries to curry favor with
Nama and Herero leaders in search of firearms and ammunition for local political conflicts.14
Trade initially allowed mission stations to remain viable. However, the influx of firearms from
these routes exacerbated long-standing tensions between the Nama and Herero and made for a
volatile political situation in the region.
Missionaries also significantly contributed to the unstable political environment in 1880s
and 1890s south and central South West Africa through the provision of firearms and the
sociopolitical upheaval caused by the growth of Christianity.15 The missionaries did play a role
in the peacemaking process to end these conflicts, but it is clear from subsequent events that they
failed to craft equitable treaties that satisfied all parties. For example, in 1870 missionary Hugo
Hahn helped create and secure the Peace Treaty of Okahandja to put an end to the Nama-Herero
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War of 1863-1870. However, the treaty further dispossessed Jan Jonker Afrikaner of his lands
and increased his distrust in the RMS missionaries.16 Jan Jonker Afrikaner accused missionaries
and traders of contributing to the growing power of his rival Chief Maharero and threatened
punishment against the missionaries by means of expulsion or through the price-fixing of firearm
sales. The failures of the treaty and the missionaries’ inability to create an equitable resolution to
this conflict led to resumed hostilities within the decade.17
The missionaries’ most profound failures, in terms of the deteriorating MissionaryNamibian relationship, occurred in 1868 and 1884. Inspector Fabri of the RMS submitted a letter
to the British Parliament on 9 November 1868 in which he “[prayed] that British protection
might be afforded to the German Missionaries in Namaqualand…who are grievously oppressed
by the natives.”18 Fabri’s attempts to secure British protection resulted in a subsequent race to
establish a colonial presence in the territory. As a result, Adolf Lüderitz sent his request for
German protection in August 1884 and initiated the colonial period in South West Africa. Rather
than strongly rebuke colonial intervention, many RMS missionaries embraced colonialism and
welcomed the presence of the German government.19
Missionaries actively facilitated the spread of colonialism, functioning as translators who
convinced Nama and Herero leaders to sign uneven peace treaties that reduced their power,
dispossessed their lands, and forced people to settle ever closer to RMS mission stations. The
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clearest example of these uneven treaties included the negotiations between Lüderitz and Josef
Frederiks over the land at Angra Pequeña and protection treaties.20 The view of missionaries as
complicit in the dispossession of Namibian lands and power, as well as the perception that
missionaries were responsible for the German annexation of South West Africa, solidified many
Namibians’ negative perceptions of RMS missionaries as colonial collaborators.
In the South West African context, the flag undoubtedly followed the cross. The
relationship between missionaries and the colonial state, and the debate over which preceded the
other, has been contested by historians. Edith Miguda attempted to describe this close
relationship in its Nigerian context, arguing:
When missionaries came to Africa, the close following by and connection with colonial
administrators and colonial occupation led to the phrase ‘the Flag Follows the Cross.’
Once colonial administrators occupied Africa, a number of missionaries relied heavily on
colonial military might for their own survival and continued missionary work. As a
result, the cross followed the sword inland into areas brought under effective colonial
administration and control. At decolonization, churches did not pack and leave with the
outgoing colonialists, as a result of which the cross remained behind the flag.21
The symbiotic, and at times undifferentiable, relationship between the missionaries and colonial
state created lingering perceptions of missionary complicity in the abuses of the colonial regime.
This issue persisted throughout Africa and was not exclusive to the South West African context.
In Joseph Kirsop’s book on the activities of the missionary Robert Moss Ormerod in East Africa,
this troubling relationship is laid bare in its Kenyan context. After quoting Ormerod as
describing the position of missionaries in East Africa “as the friend of both parties, and…in no
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way connected with [the] Government,” Kirsop added “This disclaimer was very prudent and
very necessary. Missionary memoirs… show the evil that results when the missionary is
identified with the civil powers. The case is an example of how the flag follows the missionary,
not the missionary the flag.”22 Although Miguda and Kirsop’s arguments show that this
relationship differed in the various colonial spheres, the late establishment of an official colonial
power in South West Africa created the perception that the brutal German state followed the
missionaries who had arrived decades earlier.
This perception became ever more salient in South West Africa in the early twentieth
century when the Nama and Herero experienced the full weight and destruction of German
colonialism. In 1904, after nearly two decades of mounting tensions, war broke out between the
German colonial government, Samuel Maharero, and Hendrik Witbooi.23 Over the course of
three years, German General Lothar von Trotha committed an act of genocide against the Herero
and Nama.24 It is estimated that 40-to-60 percent of the Nama and Herero populations perished
as a result of the genocide.25 In the aftermath of the physical, social, and political destruction
caused by German colonialism, survivors were pushed toward the RMS mission stations as a
means of survival. The belief that missionaries were partially responsible for the destruction
wrought upon the Namibian population prevailed in subsequent decades and, ultimately, sowed
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the seeds for the later Nama Secession in 1946. Namibians viewed the RMS as an oppressor of
the African populations of South West Africa, not merely bringers of a Christian “civilizing”
mission. Jan Jonker Afrikaner summarized the attitudes cultivated toward the RMS over the
preceding century, stating that “Missionaries were traitors to the country…[I] would rather go to
hell with [my] whole people than ever again receive a missionary amongst [my] people.”26
The relationship between the RMS and Namibians continued to deteriorate, but the
destruction experienced during the genocide limited their ability to resist in a way that truly
threatened German hegemony in the territory. This condition persisted until the outbreak of the
First World War and the declaration of martial law by the South African government on 12
October 1914.27 Between 1914 and 1921, the South African invasion of South West Africa
“greatly facilitated [Namibian] access to land and stock, and [tentative] re-pastoralization….The
South African invasion thus intensified the movements of people and stock and the rebuilding of
herds….On the political level, this movement meant the (re)constitution of leadership that had
been broken or banished by the defeat in 1904.”28 Leaders like Edward Fredericks and Isaak
Witbooi returned to their communities at Bethanie and Gibeon and, in some cases, quasi-military
activities re-emerged among some Nama and Herero groups. 29 The re-emergence of space for
African social and political agency as a result of diminished government and missionary control
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was, however, short-lived because, as explained earlier in the dissertation, the League of Nations
classified the territory as a “Class C” Mandate under South African control in 1921.30

Trans-Atlantic Evangelism and the Rise of the AME Church
in the United States and South Africa, 1735-1908
While missionaries were busy spreading Christianity in South West Africa, Blacks in the
United States grew the AME Church, an Ethiopianist church focused on racial uplift, selfimprovement, and Black ecclesiastical control of the church. The origins of African Methodism
in the United States can be traced to the eighteenth century and the First Great Awakening that
occurred in England and its American colonies. 31 Evangelist John Wesley arrived in the
Georgia colony in 1735 and tried to convert Native Americans to Christianity with little success.
Wesley returned to England two years later and, aware of the failings of his missionary activities
in the colonies, sought a deeper connection and understanding with his Christian faith. At a
service in Aldersgate in May 1738, Wesley underwent a profound and personal experience
relating to God’s salvation. Soon after, Wesley and his companions preached in open fields and
churchyards about crucial Methodist concepts like salvation through faith alone, the fallacy of
the Calvinist belief in pre-destination, spiritual rebirth, and Christian perfection.32
As Methodist communities formed in the 1760s American colonies, the issues of slavery
and abolition were central to the greater Methodist theological debate. Eighteenth-century
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Methodists believed that the institution of slavery represented a great hypocrisy within the
Christian doctrine and was “inconsistent” with the teaching of church founder John Wesley.33
Methodist preachers and clergy displayed a keen interest in the salvation of Black souls and, as
early as 1766, accepted African American converts into their church.34 While the issues of
abolition and slavery were heavily contested and led to a split between northern and southern
Methodists, the anti-slavery message of the church and its participation in institutions like the
Underground Railroad led to a rise in popularity for the church among African American
communities in both the northern and southern United States.35
African Americans flocked to the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States, with
slaves and free Blacks serving as some of the primary propagators of the faith. African
Methodism emerged and developed primarily within the context of American slavery and this
historical experience ultimately shaped the character and nature of the AME Church of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. James H. Cone argued that within this context, Methodism
was “re-interpreted for and adapted to the life-situation of Black people’s struggle for justice in a
nation whose social, political, and economic structures [were] dominated by a white racist
ideology.”36 African Methodism was not merely an identical recreation of white American’s
church theology, but rather a newly created syncretic religion that utilized both African and
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white Christian practices to develop a religious worldview that more closely linked to one’s lived
experiences. As slavery and racial injustice dominated many aspects of the African American
lived experience, it is unsurprising that the issues of equality, racial justice, and spiritual
salvation dominated the newly-emergent theology of African Methodism.37
African American Methodists developed a Black liberation theology that served as the
ideological core of the eventual AME Church, and they utilized the language of freedom and
equality that pervaded the American Revolutionary War discourse enshrined in the Declaration
of Independence. The Black liberation theology that defined Black religious thought during the
period of American slavery rested on five key themes: justice, liberty, hope, love, and
suffering.38 Black liberation theology argued that the “Justice of God” was inescapable, and that
God’s justice ensured that African Americans’ wicked oppressors would be punished and the
oppressed liberated. Although many held onto the belief that this liberation would occur in the
physical world, Black liberation theology generally advocated that Blacks’ liberation from their
oppressors would come in the next life. Thus, the concept of Heaven acted as a beacon of hope
within this theological worldview and served as a way to reaffirm God’s love and one’s
humanity, while also simultaneously ending the suffering experienced by enslaved Africans and
oppressed free Blacks.39 Frequently, to affirm the belief that God would redeem the African race
and free Blacks from their white oppressors, Psalm 68:31 was referenced in sermons: “Princes
shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God.”40
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One of the most important propagators of African Methodism in the United States was
Richard Allen. Allen was born into slavery on 14 February 1760 in Delaware and was introduced
to Methodism during his enslavement. Allen eventually secured enough money to purchase his
manumission from slavery in 1780 when his slave master experienced an “awakening” to the ills
of slavery after listening to the Methodist preacher Freeborn Garrettson.41 Allen proceeded to
qualify as a preacher at the Christmas Conference in Baltimore in 1784 and began his work as a
Methodist clergyman and proponent of the Black liberation theology.42
The Methodist Episcopal Church in America was founded at the Christmas Conference in
Baltimore in 1784 and, within two years, Allen moved to Philadelphia to spread the message of
the Methodist Episcopal Church among one of the largest free Black communities in the United
States.43 The event that sparked the subsequent separation between the Methodist Episcopal
Church and its Black congregants occurred in 1787 at St. George’s Methodist Church in
Philadelphia. Allen served as a preacher at St. George’s and proved particularly popular among
African American congregants during the morning services, when he quickly accumulated
followers at his sermons. The white church leadership at St. George’s segregated their services,
forcing Allen to preach only in the mornings and in separate areas of worship. Furthermore, at
other services the congregation’s seating was segregated, and Black parishioners were barred
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from sitting in the front pews of the church.44 Allen and his colleague Absalom Jones believed
that white Wesleyans no longer possessed the fortitude or desire to support the church’s
egalitarian teachings and, in November of 1787, Allen, Jones, and the Black congregants of St.
George’s walked out of the church service and sought to establish their own Black-led church.45
Allen and Jones initially founded the Free African Society as an “ethical and beneficial
association” that served to “promote orderly and sober living,” as well as advocate for the
education and socioeconomic support of the African American community in Philadelphia.46 The
Free African Church of St. Thomas was established in the summer of 1794 and the Bethel
Methodist Church was also founded that same year. Allen remained affiliated with the Methodist
Episcopal Church for nearly two decades, but continued conflict between white church oversight
and the needs of the Black congregation and clergy created tensions. Therefore in 1816, Allen
and five other African American Methodist congregations founded the AME Church.47
Allen and the AME Church readily embraced Black liberation theology and
institutionalized an emancipatory ethos in Black Methodism. Much like Garvey’s later Negro
World, the AME Church used its publication, the AME Recorder, as an organ for the
dissemination of Black liberation theology and a means to attract followers to the denomination.
Cornelius Bynum argued that the AME Recorder “deliberately worked to refine and forcefully
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articulate a specific liberation theology that challenged the fundamental moral underpinnings of
white supremacy and unequivocally affirmed the equality of all people.”48 The AME Recorder
frequently questioned the moral and legal legitimacy of white supremacy and frequently
highlighted the hypocritical relationship between Christianity and slavery that Wesley’s theology
made so readily apparent decades earlier. The spread of the AME Church’s message proved
successful in terms of recruitment during the early-to-mid nineteenth century and was aided by
the Second Great Awakening.49 At the time of Allen’s death in 1831, the AME church “boasted
congregations in every northern state and several southern ones, with a total membership of more
than ten thousand.”50 Membership had increased to over 50,000 congregants by 1861 and the
AME Church possessed the requisite numbers and resources to send missionaries to the southern
United States after the American Civil War to seek out converts and admit new church
members.51
The core premises of Black liberation theology in the AME Church during the period of
American slavery focused on spiritual liberation and salvation. However, with the issuance of the
Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 and the period of Reconstruction that followed the American
Civil War, the AME Church’s Black liberation theology soon shifted to deal with more practical
issues.52 Intellectuals in the AME leadership subscribed to the belief that “[God helps] those who
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help themselves” and, therefore, advocated the need for “racial self-sufficiency.”53 This new
focus on matters of the material world centered on issues of the socioeconomic realm, with later
thinkers like Henry McNeal Turner shifting their attention to political matters. These
intellectuals developed a doctrine that supported a clear social and political program that
vehemently criticized and challenged the ills of laissez-faire economics where the rich devour
the weak. Instead, the new practical Black liberation theology of the AME Church argued in
support of an economic program that was simultaneously socialist in nature but allowed for
African Americans and former-slaves to pull themselves up in the capitalist classes of society. 54
To achieve the necessary economic advancement to improve one’s material life and
overcome trials that the white supremacist systems in the United States inflicted on African
American communities, AME thinkers considered education to be of paramount importance.
Allen believed that members of his congregation should be provided with a moral and religious
education to fulfill their potential in society. Literacy was essential to aid in the reading of
scriptures, and Allen also believed that it was necessary to teach free Blacks a technical trade so
that they could secure stable employment and pull themselves out of poverty.55 In combination
with a strong moral education that advocated the avoidance of vices like drinking, gambling, and
idleness, Allen believed that education through the AME Church could limit the impact of
structural inequalities faced by free Blacks in Philadelphia and “lift his congregation out of
poverty.”56 In doing so, he hoped that Black-led education would provide more social and
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economic opportunities for his congregation, while simultaneously “gaining respect from white
Philadelphians.”57
While many AME intellectuals focused on the promotion of racial self-sufficiency
through economic opportunities and education, the early “Back to Africa” concept became more
salient among the politically-minded leaders of the church. The “Back to Africa” movement
emerged as early as 1773 when theologian Samuel Hopkins advocated for African Americans to
serve as a civilizing force in Africa.58 The subsequent creation of the Sierra Leone colony in
1787 and the founding of the ACS in 1817 produced further momentum behind the concept of
repatriating freed Blacks from the United States to Africa.59 The concept of emigration to Africa
became a point of contestation between AME intellectuals and the larger African American
community despite the establishment of a permanent AME mission in Africa as early as 1787.
In one camp sat African American leaders that opposed the repatriation of Blacks to the
continent. The intellectuals in this camp believed that the actions of the ACS and the supporters
of a repatriation scheme merely sought to weaken the gains of racial uplift organizations in the
United States like the AME Church. Richard Allen and Absalom Jones were notably against the
emigration schemes proposed by the ACS. They and the congregation of the Bethel Church
asserted their right to remain in America and continued to strive for the goals of egalitarianism
and abolition espoused in the Wesleyan doctrine.60 Later thinkers like Edward Blyden and
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Alexander Crummell, as well as influential AME Bishop Henry McNeal Turner, believed in
Providential Design and the concept that American Blacks were particularly well-suited for
Christian civilizing work in Africa.61 The work of AME missionaries on the continent increased
in the mid-to-late nineteenth century with the continued growth of the movement and the
emergence of an increasingly global Pan-African movement.
The 1890s represented a particularly successful decade for the spread of the AME
Church, specifically within the South African context. The history of the Wesleyan involvement
in South Africa dated back to the arrival of missionary Reverend J. McKenny at Cape Town in
August 1814 and the spread of Wesleyan Methodism to the Highveld by the 1820s.62 The
Wesleyan Church experienced a period of growth in South Africa during the nineteenth century
that saw the establishment of a number of churches in Cape Town. The Wesleyans gained more
popularity among African congregants because of the Church’s willingness to accept Black
ministers “on trial” and their support for egalitarianism and the education of its congregations.
However, by the 1880s the church experienced a series of internal disputes that led to a few
break-away movements. As it pertains to the establishment and spread of the AME Church in
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southern Africa, Mangena Mokone’s withdrawal from the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary
Society in 1892 proved crucial.63
The Wesleyan Methodist Church ordained Mokone in 1887 and he served as both a
minister and educator to his congregations in Pretoria, South Africa. Mokone became
disenchanted with the discriminatory treatment he and other Black ministers suffered at the
hands of Wesleyan Church leadership. He believed that African ministers received far more
limited financial support than their white counterparts and were often arbitrarily deemed unfit to
serve as ministers to their congregations by church elders. He created a list of grievances against
missionaries and, in November 1892, he resigned from the Wesleyan Church ministry and
established the Ethiopian Church in South Africa. In the process, Mokone brought a number of
African ministers and congregants with him into his newly-formed church.64
Mokone’s breakaway from the Wesleyans was merely one of several secession
movements in southern Africa characterized as “Ethiopian.” The people attracted to the
Ethiopian movement were frequently “those who had received a certain amount of education at
the hands of missionary bodies and who felt their newly-created aspirations blocked by the
dominant European ruling class.”65 The leadership of the Ethiopian movement commonly
consisted of these disillusioned Black clergymen who felt socioeconomically and spiritually
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oppressed by the white church hierarchy. Mammo Muchie and Hailemichael Demissie described
the role of these Black clergymen in propelling the movement forward, writing:
The Ethiopian movement was first a reaction to the discrimination in ecclesiastical
administration and the outright marginalization of Black clergymen. Black clergymen
underwent demeaning acts of de-selection for ordination and promotion to the clerical
echelons. They were denied deserved promotion to the higher ranks of the clergy for no
other reason than the color of their skin. The white mission churches had an unwritten bylaw that the ordination of Blacks was to be avoided. Even when a Black clergyman was
ordained, he was stripped of authority and privilege that he was supposed to have by
virtue of his ordination.66
Black clergymen quickly realized that any chance to rectify the church’s shortcomings and
wrong-doings would be impossible under the white-dominated church hierarchy.67 Mokone, like
Nehemiah Tile nearly a decade before him, withdrew from the white churches and created an
independent African church that ultimately “associate[ed]…with kindred bodies amongst [the]
American Negro churches.”68
Mokone first became aware of the AME Church through letters sent by his niece
Charlotte Manye, who was studying at Wilberforce University in Ohio. In the middle of 1895
Mokone began a correspondence with Henry McNeal Turner and the AME leadership in the
United States to discuss the goals and aims of the movement, as well as the possibility of joining
the AME Church.69 At the Third Annual Conference of the Ethiopian Church in 1896, Mokone
and the various branches of the church held a vote to seek affiliation with the AME Church. The
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vote passed in the affirmative and that same year the AME Church formally incorporated
Mokone and the Ethiopian Church of South Africa into the movement.70 Even with the
successful vote, however, the first years of this association provided a number of difficulties for
the growth and structure of the church.
Upon J.M. Dwane’s return from a meeting with the AME leadership in the United States
in 1897, he convened a meeting of 20 former Ethiopian Church ministers and “re-obligated”
them to the AME ministry.71 His stories of AME promises to build a “South African college”
resulted in a “revival” that led to the rapid spread of the AME Church across the eastern Cape
and into Transkei. This “revival” led to the admittance of thousands of new congregants and
spurred on the early growth of the AME Church in South Africa.72
Despite the success of the church in its early years in South Africa, the rapid growth of
the congregations caused Dwane and Mokone concern that this growth could potentially put
strain on an inadequate church infrastructure. Thus, in 1898, Dwane called upon Henry McNeal
Turner to travel to South Africa and aid in structuring the South African AME Church to support
its rapid growth. Turner arrived in South Africa in March 1898 and ordained new ministers and
streamlined the church’s infrastructure. Within the first six weeks of his arrival, Turner
successfully incorporated three more congregations into the South African AME Church and
increased the size of the congregation by more than 11,000 members. To deal with this influx of
new members, he also ordained roughly 60 deacons and church elders. By the time Turner
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returned to the United States in the middle of 1898, he had doubled the size of the AME Church
in South Africa and provided the church with improved means to support its growth.73
In 1900, the AME Church sent Bishop LJ Coppin to South Africa to serve as the church’s
first bishop in the country.74 Within the year, the Cape Government “acknowledged” the AME
Church, one of only three African Independent Churches to receive this recognition at the time.75
Following Coppin’s arrival, the AME Church in South Africa went through another period of
growth. During this time, the AME Church successfully ordained numerous African ministers
and admitted students from South Africa into Wilberforce University in the United States where
they would train to become ministers in South Africa.76 In 1908, the church leadership took their
commitment to the education of a successful ministerial force another step and established the
Wilberforce Institute in Evaton, South Africa. The church’s commitment to education, racial
self-sufficiency, and the general principles of egalitarianism facilitated its entrenchment as a
critical social institution among Black South Africans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.77 In South Africa, the AME Church developed a positive reputation among Blacks for
its focus on ordaining Black pastors and promoting an atmosphere among the congregation of
ecclesiastical and social equality. This reputation travelled along transnational channels and
preceded the arrival of the AME Church in South West Africa in the early twentieth century.
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Background to the Early Interactions Between Namibians
and the AME Church, 1904-1945
Although the earliest interactions between Namibians and the Methodist church can be
traced back to the Moravian missions in Namaqualand in the 1810s, the first prolonged and
meaningful interactions between Namibians and the AME Church are undoubtedly linked to
Hendrik Witbooi, his theology, and his interactions with the Union Ethiopianist prophet
Shepherd Stuurman during the genocide between 1904 and 1907.78 The mission-educated
Witbooi rose to prominence as a leader among the Nama in the 1880s when he claimed to have
received a vision that “instructed him to lead his followers north on a mission from God.”79
Combining Christian elements of an Exodus story with Nama ancestor-worship, Witbooi claimed
the “sole right to tread a path which he saw as having been determined by the ancestors of the
group, which led to a strategically well-situated redoubt in the mountains” and sanctioned armed
raids and conflicts against other Africans to fulfill this vision.80 Witbooi’s komando, the Witkam,
believed that Witbooi was a prophet and followed his commands with an almost “blind
obedience.”81 Witbooi’s belief that his mission was ordained by God lent him religious and
moral authority among his followers.
Witbooi led his followers north in a series of three ill-fated attacks on the Herero living in
the fertile land he believed was promised to his followers by God. In 1888, during a leadership
dispute among the Witbooi at Gibeon, Hendrik and his followers migrated to Hoornkrantz where
they established a fairly successful settlement with an effective central administration and a
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church. He and his followers resided at Hoornkrantz until April 1893 when German Captain Curt
von Francois attacked Witbooi and his followers to secure his signature on a treaty of
protection.82 Von Francois killed 88 of Witbooi’s followers, 78 of whom were women and
children. Von Francois’ heavy-handed tactics resulted in a change in German leadership in South
West Africa and Theodor Leutwein became the Commander of the Schutztruppe.83 Witbooi
signed a treaty of protection on 15 September 1894 and allied with Leutwein in a series of
military campaigns that sought to quell potential rebellions in the territory. Witbooi returned to
Gibeon and, from 1894 to 1904, he helped the German government maintain the “Ten-Year
Peace.”84
Witbooi’s activities in the late nineteenth century embodied the nuanced nature of
resistance and accommodation under German colonial rule. Within the span of a decade, Witbooi
went from vehemently resisting the German government at every turn to working through them
to achieve his subnational sociopolitical and economic goals. However, in 1904 a changing
sociopolitical context and Witbooi’s new relationship with the Ethiopianist prophet Stuurman led
the Nama back into direct conflict with the German colonial military. Administration officials
believed that Stuurman was a Cape Presbyterian functioning as an agent of the Ethiopian Church
in the Union during his time in South West Africa. Stuurman arrived at Rehoboth in February
1904 after his arrest by Cape police in Rietfontein for giving “riotous speeches.”85 While at
Rehoboth, Stuurman preached to Namibians that the time had come to redeem Blacks from the
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oppressive rule of German white supremacy in the territory. He detailed a prophetic vision that
he received from God, telling Rhenish missionary Carl Wandres, “I was a stable groom in
Kimberley. One day I cleaned the horse stable and I saw a fire in front of me. In the fire, there
was a figure that looked at me with piercing eyes. I realized it was Jesus Christ. Next to that
figure I noticed Black people. The Lord in the fire gave me the order to go west in order to
preach to the Black people.”86
During his westward journey, Stuurman encountered Hendrik Witbooi at Gibeon and told
the Witboois that he had been sent by God to “drive all the whites out of Africa.”87 At the time,
Witbooi still maintained a friendly relationship with Leutwein and the German forces in South
West Africa. However, increased German aggression and violent interrogations made Witbooi
sour on German racial and political policies toward the Nama and other Blacks in South West
Africa. Stuurman’s threats to seek out the Herero to participate in this emancipatory campaign
and his prophecy that “a little king” was chosen by God to liberate the Black people of South
West Africa appear to have altered Witbooi’s willingness to engage against the German
military.88
In part, Stuurman’s self-identification as a Christian prophet appealed to Witbooi because
he too experienced prophetic visions and messages that led to his migration northward from
Gibeon in the 1880s. Witbooi saw himself much in the same vein as other historical “Black
Moses” figures and as the person responsible for leading his followers to physical,
socioeconomic, and political liberation from oppressive forces. Initially these oppressive forces
came from within his own family. However, as German colonialism became more entrenched in
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South West Africa, Witbooi’s desire for liberation from his oppressor became inherently
intertwined with a Black liberation theology.
In October of 1904 Witbooi and the other Nama polities rebelled against the German
government. Witbooi and Stuurman led an intense and violent resistance campaign to end
German hegemony over the Nama. Stuurman utilized prophecy and mysticism within a larger
Christian Black liberation narrative to lead a unit of 30 “sacred warriors” and roughly 200 other
men against the German Schutztruppe. As the conflict dragged on and the Nama experienced a
series of desertions and defeats, Stuurman’s personal influence among the Witbooi eroded and he
no longer enjoyed a high status among his followers. Open challenges to Stuurman’s authority
forced him to abandon the Witbooi, whom he accused of losing faith in his prophecy.89
Witbooi’s subsequent death in 1905 effectively removed the Nama from the conflict against the
German government and solidified feelings of racial animosity and distrust against the German
population in Namibia that lasted long after Witbooi’s death.
Despite his waning personal influence, Stuurman’s Black liberation theology maintained
a particular appeal in the collective Nama historical memory. Witbooi, in part, entered the
conflict based on his growing belief and acceptance of the Ethiopian-style message espoused by
Stuurman.90 Witbooi’s martyrdom and resultant position as a lauded anticolonial resistance
figure in twentieth-century South West Africa inextricably tied Ethiopianism, Black liberation
theology, and anticolonial struggle together. The inability of the missionaries to prevent the
genocide of the Nama and Herero and their role in crafting the ineffective Treaty of Protection
that left Namibians vulnerable to German aggression ultimately soured the relationship between
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the Nama and the RMS. This relationship only became further strained as RMS influence in the
Police Zone weakened following World War I and the AME Church, an Ethiopianist institution
associated with Witbooi’s anticolonial and anti-white campaigns of the early twentieth century,
became increasingly active in is proselytization efforts in the territory.
Nama experiences after the genocide and Witbooi’s continued popularity in the Nama
historical memory further weakened the position of the RMS in the Police Zone and cultivated
fertile ground for the emergence of the AME Church in South West Africa. Between 1907 and
1945, some cracks formed in the relationship between the Nama and the RMS missionaries. The
commencement of World War I and World War II during this period severely curtailed the
ability of the RMS to function at full capacity in the territory. A few mission stations closed,
some German missionaries were expelled or arrested, and many of the benefits that drew Nama
practitioners to the mission stations disappeared. Schools closed and economic activity decreased
around a number of mission stations.91
The socioeconomic and political experiences of the Nama after the First World War only
further strained an already tense relationship. The socioeconomic prospects for the Nama failed
to improve and these issues were exacerbated by the global depression of the late 1920s and
1930s. Likewise, fears of potential rebellions and the alleged accumulation of weapons by
Africans weighed heavily on the minds of the newly-instituted South African mandatory
government. Pass laws were implemented to control the movement of Namibians in the territory,
investment in social programs for Namibians was severely limited, and the constant threat of the
expropriation of African lands hung over the 1920s and 1930s.92 Missionaries played a limited
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role in the implementation of these policies and laws, but the perception of missionaries as
colonial agents remained strong among Namibians even as a new colonial regime took control.
As World War II approached and further restraints were put on the capabilities of the RMS as
those with German heritage were viewed with suspicion, Nama church and community
leadership seriously considered the establishment of an independent African church and the
severing of ties with the RMS. The establishment of such a church would serve as the foundation
of the Nama’s subnational resistance campaigns of the 1950s.
A letter from Petrus Jod to Heinrich Vedder in 1939 provided some of the reasons that
Nama leadership desired to sever ties with the RMS. Chief among the reasons for the formation
of a breakaway church was the belief among the Nama that the RMS failed to fulfill a number of
its promises with regard to schooling and education. Jod wrote:
We only want us and our people to get on. All we got, however, was promises and our
own hope, all of those years….I do not do this work because of some white missionary
pushing us but to help our people to advance….Now the school has been closed again,
without us getting to know this. We were not even told a single word about it, but
nevertheless, it will be us whose fault it is that it has been closed. Even with all this I was
committed to the work of the Rhenish Mission….This is why—in the time, which I will
still live, if the Lord will give me this—I am looking for my people and me somewhere
else for the things…you have promised to me, to us, to our people, but which you have
kept until today.93
The lack of commitment by the RMS to schooling and education, combined with their
unwillingness to ordain African pastors and protect their congregations’ economic interests, led
the Nama leadership to leverage the threat of a secession against the RMS.
In contrast, the AME Church’s reputation of ordaining African ministers and its intense
focus on education and schooling, coupled with the historical links between the AME Church,
Hendrik Witbooi, and the Nama polities, ultimately made the AME Church an attractive option
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when a breakaway church movement formed among the Nama congregations. Information about
the AME Church was readily available to the Nama leadership and their congregations. The
AME attempted on numerous occasions to send missionaries to the territory and establish a
presence in South West Africa, resulting in the spread of AME literature and teachings.
Furthermore, South African newspapers and publications frequently discussed the problems and
successes that accompanied the spread and growth of the AME Church in the Cape.94 Nama
leaders had access to a vast transnational network of information because of these earlier
experiences, and that helped shape their approach to dealing with the oppressive nature of their
relationship with the RMS and SWAA leading up to 1945.
The resistance campaign that developed among the Nama during the period was
simultaneously subnational and transnational. Their strategies sought to leverage the resources of
the transnational AME Church to avoid working through the colonial state, which merely wanted
to use Namibians as agricultural laborers in the Police Zone Through the AME Church, the
Nama were able to pursue their subnational goals of obtaining a more advanced Western-style
education to resist the colonial state’s efforts to socioeconomically underdevelop the Nama.
While the movement initially started inclusively and drew some followers among the Herero, the
rise of the Oruuano Church siphoned off most of the AME’s Herero congregants and made the
AME Church in the territory a nearly exclusive vehicle of the expression of Nama agency and
resistance.95
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The Causes and Justification for the Nama Secession of 1946
The Nama’s subnational resistance campaign against educational underdevelopment
began when an article in the South African Afrikaans-language publication Die Burger on 31
October 1945 revealed negotiations between the Superintendent of the RMS, Heinrich Vedder,
and the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa (NGK). Financial trouble in the RMS led
Vedder to negotiate the transfer of 23 RMS churches and congregations to the control of the
NGK, and this sparked the Nama Secession of 1946.96 Nama leaders viewed the NGK as a
segregationist church that embodied the very structures from which the Nama sought to liberate
themselves. In response to the article, Zacheus Thomas, an Evangelist from Keetmanshoop,
convened the Nama Teachers and Evangelists Association on 12 January 1946 to formulate a
plan of action to deal with this perceived betrayal. The summary of the minutes from this
meeting are referred to as the Protokoll uber die bei der Evangelistenzusammenkunft festgelegten
Punkte, or Minutes on the Specified Points of the Evangelist’s Meeting.97
An examination of these notes revealed the motivations for the meeting, the goals of the
association, and provided insight on Nama agency during the period. Thomas began the meeting
with a discussion that covered the article in Die Burger and the prospect of the NGK
incorporating 23 RMS stations. Next, the Protokoll showed that those in attendance agreed to
resist any attempt to hand over control of the churches to the NGK. If the RMS refused to change
their leadership and ordination practice, Black congregants threatened to leave the church
entirely. Several references were made at the meeting to the deteriorating relationship between
RMS missionaries and their African congregants, the lack of consultation between congregations
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and missionaries in the church’s decision-making process, and the contempt missionaries
displayed toward their Black practitioners.98 Finally, the document concluded with references to
the education process and the need for new textbooks for Standard II students.99
As a result of this conference, Zacheus Thomas, Petrus Jod, and Markus Witbooi wrote a
public letter titled the Agitasie teen die Blanke Genootskappe, or Protest Against the White
Societies. The letter opened with a statement that argued non-white congregations in South West
Africa would no longer accept spiritual guidance or ministry from whites in the RMS or NGK.
The letter read, “On behalf of the non-whites and non-white church members from the southern
part of South West Africa, that so far served under the spiritual ministry of the Rhenish Mission
Society, we wish to state that the congregations refuse to further serve under the governance of
any white Society, the Rhenish Mission Society, or the Dutch Reformed Church. Our motivation
will be clear from [what follows].”100 The subsequent paragraphs in the Agitasie laid forth the
historical argument that the leadership of the RMS had failed in its duties to successfully
administer and develop their Nama congregations.
The authors of the letter lamented the slow progress made by the RMS and their failure to
provide adequate spiritual and practical guidance. The authors contended:
[After] one hundred years under the spiritual ministering of the [Rhenish Mission
Society] …we are today described as incompetent, weak, [and] heathens. The question is,
how long will it be so? When will we become proficiently strong and become Christians?
Time has revealed that the spiritual disposition of the white population is not better, but
worse. Clearly, conditions today are anything but desirable…. The spiritual education and
the social conditions are deplorable. This is all due to the policy of the RMS in South
West Africa.101
They continued their lamentation:
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It seems clear that upliftment and development will never happen, because a hundred
years have passed, and we are still where we were at that time. From our own experience,
in some books we learned that it was not the RMS’s endeavor to do constructive and
enduring work among us, compared to the work done by the Finnish Mission under the
Ovambos, but to use us to support constructive things elsewhere. The only intrinsic
interest that has been shown so far is that the members must fulfill their ecclesiastical
duties, especially the financial ones…. Even in the material state such as improvements
and repairs, there is no interest. There are many other clear evidences that seem to prove
that revenue play the main role, not the spiritual well-being of the congregations that are
being targeted.102
The Agitasie also further reaffirmed the belief among Black congregants that whites,
including teachers and pastors, possessed “degrading and humiliating” attitudes toward their
congregations. There appears to be an attempt by the authors of the letter to avoid arguing that
African members of these congregations should be treated as equals to their white counterparts.
However, there was a strong belief that their humanity and human dignity should be recognized
by the RMS leadership. The letter reads “[W]e are nevertheless human beings, people with
eternal souls, human beings who, as far as it concerns the temporal [world], form a definitive
part of society.”103
The final point of contention addressed in the Agitasie clearly laid out that the Nama
leaders and their congregations would no longer accept the spiritual guidance of the RMS if it
continued to refuse the ordination of Black ministers and betrayed the will of its congregants.
The authors demanded that congregations, in the form of a Church Council, possess significant
influence over the decision-making process, especially in terms of church finances. The Nama
leaders advocated:
Finally, [if] we have to remain under [the RMS’s] spiritual governance…current policy
and management [must] change….All church matters must be discussed and dealt with at
semi-annual church council meetings. We may elect a secretary and treasurer who will be
responsible for the control of all institutional activities and income and expenses. No
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income will be accepted, and no expenses paid without the knowledge and approval of
the church council.104
Through these demands, the Nama leaders sought to limit the unilateral power of the white
ministers and restore authority and power over the decision-making process to the congregations.
Within two days of these demands becoming public, the demands were disregarded and RMS
missionary W. Neumeister was appointed pastor at Keetmanshoop instead of ordaining Zacheus
Thomas to fill the position. 105
While letters were exchanged between the RMS and Nama leaders between January and
June of 1946, the Nama leaders officially broke away from the RMS on 3 July 1946. After the
secession, Thomas gathered further information about the AME Church in the Cape from
Keetmanshoop policeman Jonas Katjirungu. Through this network, Thomas contacted Francis H.
Gow in South Africa. Gow, the General Inspector of the AME Church, agreed to provide aid for
the Nama secessionists until they could independently run their church. The AME Church
ordained a number of the secession’s leaders, including Thomas, Jod, and Witbooi, making them
leaders of their churches and communities.106
The Nama secession was wholly Ethiopian in its nature and different from the creation of
more radical African Independent Churches that sought to completely remove the Western
influences from the church. Whereas other breakaway churches in Africa expressed open
hostility toward the colonial administration, the Ethiopian churches, though anticolonial at heart,
instead emphasized “self-improvement and political rights” as a key part of their spiritual and
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worldly ideology moving forward.107 Likewise, while many Ethiopian and breakaway churches
often “incorporate[d] a [large] measure of African beliefs and practices into Christian life than
was permitted in churches under missionary control,” the Nama instead turned to already existent
Ethiopian churches to provide structure and a path forward.108 Tabona Shoko described the
Ethiopian churches in southern Africa as “exhibiting anti-racist and Pan-African tendencies,
while retaining the organization and doctrines of white dominated Protestant Churches they
broke away from.”109 The AME Church in particular provided the necessary structure to be
simultaneously anticolonial and Pan-African, while maintaining the Christian doctrine that many
of the secessionist leaders supported as a result of their mission education. In the AME Church’s
Protestantism and advocacy for racial uplift and equality within the church hierarchy, the Nama
found a “place to feel at home” that provided “spiritual, mental, and material security” from the
“paternalistic attitudes and cultural superiority of [the] mission churches.”110
The secession and the incorporation of the movement into the AME Church represented
an important step in the development of an almost exclusively Nama-led transnational resistance
campaign against the further encroachment of the SWAA into Nama socioeconomic and political
affairs. Through information gathered from a South African Afrikaans-language publication,
Nama leadership undertook a letter writing campaign to demand institutional reform by the RMS
for the rectification of their troubled relationship. When the RMS refused to seriously consider
ordaining Nama ministers or to consult congregations more thoroughly in church matters, Nama
leaders accessed their networks in South Africa. The Nama successfully allied themselves with
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Francis H. Gow and the AME Church, a church with its origins in Philadelphia and a wellestablished presence in South Africa. The relationship that developed between Nama political
leaders and the AME Church proved crucial in Nama leaders’ later resistance campaigns to fight
for subnational concessions like high quality Black-led education in the territory and a halt to
forced land removals in the Police Zone.

The Establishment of AME Church Schools in South West Africa
and the Quest for State Recognition, 1948-1960
Due to the AME Church’s successes in the United States and South Africa, the
foundation of the AME Church in South West Africa presented Namibians with renewed hopes
that this transnational organization would provide the machinery for improved education and
increased socioeconomic opportunities in the territory. News of the relative successes of the
AME schools in the United States and South Africa during the early-to-mid twentieth century
circulated in South West Africa by means of AME publications and sympathetic transnational
actors. Government officials believed that the AME clergy’s success in cultivating the
aforementioned breakaway movement relied primarily on the promises of the organization to
create and staff Black-led schools in South West Africa. In 1953, for example, the Magistrate of
Maltahöhe emphasized the vital relationship between the church and Black education in
government communications and went as far as to argue that he “[did not] think that [Namibians]
will want to establish a church if they cannot have a school.”111
Namibians’ desire for Black-led education in the territory came as a natural by-product of
the poorly-funded and unsatisfactory education provided by the RMS prior to the Nama
Secession of 1946. The Western-styled education offered by white missionaries prior to the
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implementation of apartheid allowed converts to partake in the colonial economy, but in a
limited capacity. The RMS educational system delivered low-quality education to Namibians in
an effort to provide them with enough skills to work for and benefit the white farmers and
businessmen, while simultaneously limiting upward mobility for Blacks and funneling them into
low-wage labor-intensive work.112 This type of education created low-level artisans, domestic
servants, and agricultural laborers who could serve the economic purposes of the missionaries,
white farmers, and the state.113
The RMS curriculum at the mission schools played a critical role in the systematic
educational underdevelopment of South West Africa’s African population. The course schedules
and grade sheets for the RMS school at Hoachanas provide insight into how exactly the
missionaries administered education to Namibians and its inherent shortcomings. Prior to 1960,
the RMS curriculum listed a number of courses including Reading, Recitation, Speaking,
Composition, Arithmetic, Grammar, and Bible Study. Likewise, these course offerings also listed
classes in Geography, History, Natural Studies, and Hygiene; all courses offered to white
students. In some instances, a limited number of schools also offered courses in metalworking
and woodworking. However, an examination of the grade sheets prior to the 1960s revealed that
courses were not provided, nor were grades submitted for any of the social or natural science
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classes listed on the course schedules.114 Instead, missionaries emphasized the cultivation of the
basic skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic, as well as the promotion of the Afrikaans
language.
While the offered courses provided Namibians with the basic education needed to fill
menial labor jobs, they found themselves at a competitive disadvantage in the labor market
because their education was limited. A common complaint that arose among the Namibian
population in the Police Zone in the late 1940s centered on the fact that missionary schools only
offered Blacks education up to the level of Standard II. Standard II provided a minimal primary
school education for Blacks and few opportunities existed in the territory for secondary and postsecondary education. Nama leaders, seeking inclusion in the colonial economy and the equitable
provision of education, pressured the SWAA as early as 1948 with calls for an increase in the
level of education provided to Africans intensified in the early 1950s.115 In 1952 Joseph Kahuika,
an AME-affiliated teacher at Gainachas in the Berseba Reserve, pointed to the limits placed on
Namibians’ education and the desire for education up to the level of Standard VI. In his
communications with the Director of Education in Windhoek he argued:
The Rhenish Mission [has led] our Native schools for more than a century. Still, the
styles of education are laughable and ridiculous compared to today’s modern times. We
have made unsuccessful efforts in the past, to get a better education. So, we trust the
Administration and politely ask the Education Department to take this school at
Gainachas completely [under] its direct supervision [and allow us to teach school to
Standard VI]. There are 70 students here at this school [and] it is undesirable to continue
with Standard II if there are skilled and suitable teachers.116
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Although secondary education developed in the territory as the standardization of Bantu
Education occurred in the 1950s, missionaries failed to meet the growing desires of Namibian
leaders for improved education and social progress.
Namibian leaders were also concerned with the treatment of Black educators at the
mission schools in the Police Zone. A limited number of RMS-affiliated Blacks taught at the
mission schools prior to the secession, but the conditions and opportunities for these teachers
were poor. Opportunities for promotion within the RMS were non-existent and the pay that these
few Black teachers received was not comparable to their white counterparts. Black teachers
repeatedly advocated for increased pay and opportunities for advancement within the RMS’s
existing structure.117 However, as these prospects continued to dim, the Black teachers and
members of the RMS started to look elsewhere for the opportunities they were denied.
As many of the Black congregants and educators in the RMS left to join their local AME
congregations, the RMS exacted retribution on the Black educators and their schools for leaving
the denomination. Gow relayed to government officials that the RMS schools demoted and
removed teachers that left the denomination to join the AME church. Johannes Ludwig served as
the principal at the RMS school in Mariental for a number of years before he was demoted for
joining the AME Church. Similarly, the RMS removed Jeremiah Fleermuis as the principal of
the RMS school at Hoachanas after his nine years of service because he too abandoned the RMS
for the AME Church.118 Gow urged the government to take action to stop these retributions as he
believed the denomination of a teacher should play no role in their employment given that the
state funded most of the mission schools by 1945. The “intimidation and victimization” against
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the AME teachers resulted in increased feelings of dissatisfaction toward the RMS and its
schools and led other teachers to further abandon the RMS altogether.119
The growing number of AME Church schools in predominantly Nama areas provided
these disaffected teachers and congregants with opportunities for socioeconomic mobility
lacking under the RMS. Gow and AME agents in the territory continued the AME’s Cape
tradition of promoting Black pastors and advocating for the use of Black educators in their
proposed schools in the territory. This led to the exodus of influential Black teachers from the
RMS and, as an expression of their anticolonial agency, their participation in the AME schools.
Reverend Daniel Dausab taught at the RMS school in Rehoboth for nearly 20 years before
leaving for the AME Church and its schools in December of 1947.120 Reverend Markus Kooper,
who similarly trained at the Augustinium in Okahandja, left the RMS in Hoachanas and
proceeded to further his education at Wilberforce in the Cape before returning to Hoachanas to
serve as a pastor and a teacher in the AME Church.121 Finally, Markus Witbooi also abandoned
the RMS and its schools after being demoted from his position of principal at Gibeon after 10
years of service for nothing more than the possibility of “a conflict in religious differences that
[arose] between himself and his Manager.”122
The parents of the Nama schoolchildren supported the shift from missionary education
under the RMS to the AME’s new Black-led education system as a means of resistance to
colonial rule. When the AME Church first formed and broke away from the RMS parents pulled
their children out of classes and enrolled them in the AME schools.123 The Director of Education
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in Windhoek described the parents’ strong desire to leave the RMS even if there was not a viable
alternative school. Writing to the Chief Native Commissioner in 1951, he stated: “Although
some parents will be prepared to send their children to Rhenish Mission schools, and some have
already done so, the majority are still far from being in a mood to consider such a step. Many
will probably prefer doing without a school for their children [rather] than make use of facilities
provided by what they have come to consider an enemy Church Mission.”124 The parents’
willingness to rebel against the RMS schools led to a reduction in enrollment in the RMS
schools, particularly among the Nama schoolchildren.125
The school enrollment statistics for the RMS school at Hoachanas between 1947 and
1952 highlight the precipitous drop in Nama enrollment as the AME-minded parents enrolled
their children in the Black-led AME schools. In December of 1947, 71 Nama schoolchildren
enrolled in the school at Hoachanas and constituted roughly 79 percent of the total students. By
1951, only 24 Nama school children were enrolled at Hoachanas, making up barely 30 percent of
the student population.126 A similar trend occurred at Gibeon and Gainachas among Nama
schoolchildren as enrollment numbers continued to drop at the RMS school in favor of an AME
education.127
The decreased enrollment in the Nama areas challenged the viability of the RMS schools
in the 1940s and 1950s. State funding for teachers’ pay and the “feeding scheme” were
contingent upon enrollment numbers and fewer students threatened to decrease RMS revenues in
the territory. In an attempt to stunt the growth of the AME and its schools, RMS missionaries
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filed complaints to the SWAA against the AME Church that sought to influence the
government’s perception of the school’s intentions. Teachers and missionaries argued that the
arrival of the AME Church in South West Africa resulted in an increase in “idleness,
promiscuity, immorality” and social degeneration.128 The missionaries continued to portray the
AME Church as an organization with “political goals that they pursued under the guise of
religion.”129 The RMS described the AME schools’ curriculum as promoting “anti-white
resistance” and causing “struggle and strife among the non-whites.”130 These alleged anti-white
attitudes were subsequently used to paint the church as anticolonial in nature and as an institution
that hindered the general progress of Namibians in South West Africa.
The development of the global Cold War political context in the immediate post-war
years, especially the South African government’s attempts to prevent the spread of communism,
provided new fodder for RMS missionaries and teachers to use against their AME counterparts.
The Magistrate in Keetmanshoop detailed a common RMS complaint in a 1948 letter to the
Chief Native Commissioner, writing “I have been informed that the [AME] movement is
communism under the cloak of religion but have never been able to get any concrete or real
evidence to substantiate this allegation.”131 Other allegations of the distribution of communist
propaganda circulated in the Police Zone during the late 1940s. However, much like the
complaint received by the Magistrate in Keetmanshoop, concrete evidence of communist
influence among the AME congregants never materialized.132
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The skepticism of SWAA officials mounted as unsubstantiated complaints continued to
pile up in administrative offices throughout the Police Zone. Magistrates noted that most of the
accusations against the AME Church originated with members of the RMS and NGK. The
questionable motivations of these two organizations did not go unnoticed by SWAA officials. In
1948, the Magistrate at Keetmanshoop posited that “The loss of revenue to the [RMS and Dutch
Reformed Church] has therefore been considerable.…[I]t is only natural that the Rhenish
Mission, whose membership has been so depleted…should feel antagonistic towards [the AME
Church]. Their pockets have been touched.”133 The magistrate drew upon the South African
government’s experience with the AME Church in the Union and went on to argue, “I do not
think that the AME Church is responsible for the propaganda that is afoot. It is worldwide and
common to all non-European peoples. The RMS is as far as I know the chief complainant but as
stated before they are not disinterested as the AME has deprived them of a large source of
income.”134
In the early 1950s, Gow submitted applications to the SWAA for state recognition of the
AME Church schools in South West Africa to receive government funding and solidify the
survival of the church in the territory. The SWAA’s intervention in South West Africa had
increased over the previous three decades, beginning with the issuance of Proclamation 16 of
1926 that provided for separate classifications of mission schools into “Coloured” and “Native”
schools and placed the burden of “control and management” of all of the schools in the territory
on the SWAA. Proclamation 31 of 1932 vested the SWAA with the power to grant permission
for the construction of church sites for schools and mission purposes.135 Control over funding
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and oversight was further granted to the SWAA through the Native Education Finance Act of
1945 which provided for the “financing of Native Education out of general revenue.”136 This
legislation culminated in the further extension of Bantu Education to South West Africa by way
of the Van Zyl Commission in 1958 and the establishment of a government-sponsored
apartheid-style education system.
To gain state recognition for the AME Church schools, Francis Gow, Bishop I.H. Bonner,
and Rev. Zacheus Thomas met with the Secretary for South West Africa on 3 August 1951 to
discuss the various requirements that had be met in order for the AME schools to be recognized
by the SWAA. The secretary pointed to three specific requirements. First, the conditions of
Proclamation 16 of 1926 must be observed. Second, each school must operate under a European
manager or supervisor during a probationary period of unspecified length.137 Finally, the AME
Church needed to restore faith and confidence in the church by “allaying” white suspicions that
the church aimed for non-ecclesiastical goals.138 The Secretary detailed how reports of “certain
statements made by irresponsible members of the [AME] Church caused [the church] to be
regarded with very grave suspicion by Europeans in the Territory” and how this had led the
SWAA to refuse to provide the same level of assistance to the AME church as was provided to
other schools.139
Bonner and Gow assured the Secretary and the Director of Education that the accusations
were unfounded. Over the course of the next three years, Gow repeatedly wrote to the SWAA
and the Director of Education to assure them that the conditions set forth in the August 1951
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meeting were met.140 In May and June 1955 the SWAA received applications for recognition
from AME representatives at Keetmanshoop, Aus, Maltahöhe, Mariental, and Windhoek.141 The
SWAA cautiously reviewed the applications for the establishment and construction of AME
churches and schools and were initially slow to approve the necessary permits. In several
government documents, this delay in approval was directly linked to the 1953 South African
General Elections and the possibility that approval for the construction of “Coloured” or
“Native” churches and schools could impact the NP’s electoral prospects in the territory and
further weaken the NPSWA in the 1955 elections.142 Despite the slow process, it is clear that
government officials believed that little harm would come to the territory through the state’s
recognition of the AME schools and that, in many cases, administrators wanted more time to
assess the long-term viability and ambitions of the AME Church in South West Africa.143 Some
concerns existed over internal political strife in Omaruru in 1953 and the aforementioned
“irresponsible members” spreading communist and anti-white propaganda. Although the Nama
used the AME Church as an anticolonial resistance institution to advocate for better educational
standards, most SWAA officials pointed to the lack of tensions and problems the church caused
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in the Union in the previous half-century and believed that the AME would cause few problems
in South West Africa outside of limited conflicts with the RMS for congregants and influence.144
As the Van Zyl Commission contemplated non-European education in South West Africa
in 1958, Gow and the AME secured recognition of two AME schools at Duwisib and
Keetmanshoop, but experienced great difficulty elsewhere as the commission recommended the
entrenchment of apartheid-style education in the territory.145 Gow described these difficulties in
a letter to the Director of Education in 1958:
Once again I am making an urgent earnest appeal for the registration of our schools. In a
number of cases we have gone to considerable expense, and even sacrifice to meet the
requirements as suggested to us by your office in the expectation that our petition might
commend itself to your favorable consideration. I need to point out of what tremendous
help it would be to our missionary efforts if we could be accorded the same or similar
benefits granted to like bodies in South West Africa. If we are still lacking in essential
requirements please point them out to us and we will seek further avenues through which
to meet your wishes.146
The acceptance and implementation of the suggestions contained in the Van Zyl Commission
report made the state recognition of additional AME schools unlikely and constructed barriers to
the Nama quest for socioeconomic inclusion within the restrictive colonial state.147
Regardless of the failures faced in achieving state-sponsored funding and recognition, the
AME Church received several permits in the 1950s that secured sites for the construction of
churches and school buildings. AME leaders at Hoachanas received a permit to construct a
church in 1952 and requested the expansion of their school building in 1953.148 Markus Witbooi
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secured a permit for a church site in Gibeon in 1951 and expanded the AME school there in 1953
as well. Additional AME Churches and schools emerged in Keetmanshoop, Rehoboth, Lüderitz,
Maltahöhe, Mariental, and Windhoek throughout the late 1940s and 1950s.149
The increase in the number of available AME schools led to a growth in enrollment
despite the lack of state support and funding. Between 1948 and 1950, Keetmanshoop’s AME
Church saw school enrollment rise from 260 pupils to 286, while Maltahöhe’s school enrollment
increased from approximately 140 pupils to 170 over the same period. Hoachanas and Gibeon
likewise saw increased involvement in the AME schools with their enrollment number moving
from 90 to 165 and 50 to 92, respectively, between 1949 and 1951. Similar trends of increased
school enrollments continued in Lüderitz, Rehoboth, and Mariental during the same time.150 The
statistics suggest that the AME’s Black liberation theology appealed to Namibian parents and
that Black-led education possessed a particular value as an anticolonial strategy to resist the
extension of Bantu Education in the early years of apartheid in South West Africa.
The increased level and quality of education provided by the AME schools also
facilitated its growth in the late-1940s and 1950s. As the previous pages argued, one of the
primary reasons that the AME Church’s schools appealed to Namibians was that it promised to
provide education above a Standard II level. The desire for education up to the level of Standard
VI became a central rallying cry for the AME leadership throughout South West Africa, and they
quickly achieved this goal. In March 1952, Joseph Kahuika argued that the AME possessed a
teacher capable of offering education to Standard V, and he placed pressure on the SWAA at the
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Berseba Reserve to make that a reality.151 By 1958, AME Church schools began to offer English
as a second language.152 The most successful of the AME schools proved to be the school at
Keetmanshoop which, by January of 1959, enrolled students from Sub-Standard A through
Standard VI.153 Over time, most of the AME schools in the territory achieved similar levels of
educational quality.
The early successes of the AME Church and its schools in the Police Zone served as a
means of resistance to the increasingly segregated and deteriorating level of education provided
to Namibians by the SWAA and the missionaries. The RMS and other Lutheran-based mission
schools provided low-level education with a limited curriculum designed to create a cheap and
immobile labor force to be used by white farmers, businesses, and the state in its economic
endeavors in the Police Zone. The AME Church schools offered a less vocational and more
traditional Western-style education that, by the 1960s, extended from Sub-Standard A to
Standard VI. AME congregants pulled their children out of the RMS schools and enrolled their
children in the AME schools in droves to obtain the type of education that provided Namibians
with the education, spiritual freedom, and limited socioeconomic opportunities that the RMS
schools could not provide.

Conclusion
The AME Church became an invaluable resistance institution against the extension of the
SWAA’s apartheid policies in the 1950s and 1960s because the AME’s Black liberation
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theology responded to the socioeconomic and political conditions faced by Namibians of the
period. The colonial state’s policies effectively worked to create a minimally-educated and
stagnant Black labor pool that existed to meet the economic needs of white society. The SWAA
limited Namibians’ mobility through the implementation of pass laws and vagrancy laws,
preventing them from freely seeking employment in the territory’s industrial centers. Instead,
through the use of systemic educational underdevelopment and the territory’s apartheid legal
apparatus, the colonial state funneled Blacks into the wage-based economy either as poorlycompensated migrant laborers or agricultural workers on white-owned farms.
The lack of economic opportunities for Namibians was inextricably linked by Nama leaders
to the failed educational system facilitated by the missionaries and SWAA. State- and
missionary-led education provided Namibians with basic technical skills necessary to fulfill
menial-labor jobs that were of value to the territory’s white population. However, this type of
education was limited to the level of Standard II in order to prevent competition between the
territory’s white and Black populations that might result in incidents similar to the Rand
Rebellion of 1922. The limits placed on education by the colonial government also served the
purpose of preventing the rise of a Namibian intelligentsia that could challenge white hegemony
and colonial dominance in the future. In both cases, Namibians faced poor socioeconomic
prospects as a result of educational underdevelopment.
In contrast to white-led schools and churches, the AME Church, from its inception in
Philadelphia in the 1810s, believed that education was the key to racial uplift and self-sufficiency
and served as a means to change white opinions of the Black race. The Nama leaders’ desires for
subnational concession like improved education and the historical linkages created between
Hendrik Witbooi and the Ethiopianist evangelist Stuurman in the early twentieth century
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generated a channel through which Francis H. Gow and the AME Church established a foothold
in the Police Zone in the 1940s and 1950s. Gow worked tirelessly in the 1940s and 1950s to
obtain state recognition for the AME Church and its schools, which would result in increased
state-sponsored funding and the issuance of permits for the construction of durable AME school
sites. Through these state channels, Gow ensured that Black educators filled positions at the
AME schools, even if it meant that they had to operate under white government supervision.
This ultimately fulfilled Nama parents’ desires for Black-led education and reduced student
interactions with white teachers who parents deemed condescending and oppressive.
Thus, education was viewed as a way for the Nama to seek inclusion in the colonial
economy, decision-making process, and social sphere. AME leaders recognized that the SWAA
placed barriers in the way of African-led institutions in order to maintain strict control over
Namibian economic, social, and political mobility. The AME schools represented a chance to
break through these barriers and increase the standard-of-living for the Nama congregants and
families. The quest for state recognition was aimed at pacifying the concerns of the SWAA and
gaining access to state funds to feed, house, and educate students, in exchange for the acceptance
of white oversight. AME congregants accepted this fact to receive higher standards of education
that could potentially lead to inclusion in the colonial economy and access to occupations of
higher prestige and wages in the Police Zone, like teachers or pastors.
The AME Church proved to be one of the most successful transnational resistance
institutions in South West Africa between 1946 and the 1960s, as it was able to achieve a number
of its stated goals. The AME Church increased the number of Black teachers and schools in the
Police Zone and gave previously marginalized Black clergymen and mission-educated teachers
an opportunity to receive decent wages for their work. New courses were also introduced to class

277

schedules, and Namibian school children were able to take some classes that did not directly
contribute to their ability to perform technical or menial labor jobs. Likewise, the AME Church
was able to increase the standard of learning in the territory by providing students with an
education that ranged from Sub-Standard A to Standard VI. Finally, in spiritual matters, the
church also achieved its goal of ordaining Black pastors in the territory. This allowed Namibians
to reassert some level of autonomy and control over their congregations’ spiritual and financial
lives and reduced their interactions with sermons and services that the Namibian congregations
deemed dehumanizing and oppressive.
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Chapter 6—Forced Land Removals and International Pressure Campaigns: Namibians’
Petitions to the United Nations, 1945-1959
The 1950s and 1960s in South West Africa were characterized by the rapid expansion of
the apartheid system and the systemic social, political, and economic underdevelopment of
Namibian communities. Transnational institutions provided opportunities for Namibians to work
outside of official government channels and leverage the influence of these international
organizations against the Union government and the SWAA to limit the continued abuse of
vulnerable Namibians. As chapter 5 showed, the AME Church proved to be a viable
transnational institution for Nama communities to make subnational claims of the SWAA for
improved educational standards and newly-constructed schools. However, as the mid 1950s
approached, the issue of land expropriation and forced removals came to the fore in South West
African politics. The Union government’s refusal to place South West Africa under the UN’s
trusteeship system effectively placed Namibians at the mercy of the exploitative colonial state.
Prior to the emergence of SWAPO in 1960 and the creation of a more unified nationalist
front, Namibians looked outside territorial boundaries and engaged with sympathetic
transnational actors to place international pressure on the Union government and combat the
government’s aggressive land expropriation schemes. While the Katutura Massacre in Windhoek
in December 1959 became the central thrust of the nationalist petitions at the UN in the early
1960s, the attempted removals at Aminuis and Hoachanas between 1956 and 1959 dominated the
early meetings of the Committee on South West Africa. In these small rural reserves, Namibian
community leaders called upon historical networks and relationships to make the international
community more aware of the Union government’s violation of the principles of its mandate.
Through a lengthy petition-writing campaign, Chief Hosea Kutako and Reverend Markus
Kooper called upon the UN to intervene in South West African affairs and fulfill its international
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duty to provide for the development and progress of the indigenous people in the mandatory and
trusteeship territories.
The historiography surrounding Namibians’ petitions to the UN in the post-World War II
period focused extensively on the nationalist petitions submitted by SWAPO and SWANU
representatives as part of a larger strategy to achieve national independence for the South West
Africa territory.1 In this process the petitions submitted throughout the 1950s, a decade prior to
the emergence of the nationalist movements, have gone largely unexamined and the historical
importance of their content not analyzed. This chapter argues that before the emergence of
SWAPO and a united nationalist front, the UN petitions from Namibians in the Police Zone were
subnational in nature and mostly concerned with halting the SWAA’s land expropriation
schemes in the 1950s. Although each petition was subnational and geopolitically exclusive in its
formulation, they occurred nearly simultaneously and drew upon one another’s experiences to
make their case. As a result of these resistance strategies and their access to politically influential
transnational networks, the Nama and Herero leadership in the Police Zone were able to wage a
public opinion campaign against the SWAA that led to UN resolutions which halted Namibians’
removal from socioeconomically important lands. Through this campaign, Nama and Herero
leaders sought further inclusion in the colonial decision-making process and a halt to those
exclusionary policies and actions which sought to further segregate and marginalize Namibians
in the Police Zone.

See Udogu, Liberating Namibia as a prime example of the works examining SWAPO’s role at the United Nations
between the 1960s and 1980s.
1
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The Transition from the League to the United Nations: A Change
in South West Africa’s International Status
The earliest origins of Namibians’ UN petition-writing campaign can be traced to the
establishment of the UN in 1945 and the re-ordering of international politics after World War II.
The commencement of World War II in 1939 made clear that the ambitious League of Nations
concept had failed. Criticism against the idealism of the League’s covenant and its inability to
fulfill its stated mission emerged as early as the 1920s and mounted with each of the
organization’s missteps. Despite the international community’s criticisms of the League, a
dialogue in support of a supranational successor organization emerged by the middle of the
Second World War. Cooperation among the world’s political powers was believed to be a
necessary endeavor to prevent future wars and the development of a more peaceable global
political order.
Scholars and politicians of the period considered the League of Nations a failure because
of the stark contrast between its idyllic and utopian message of democratic idealism and its
inability to fulfill its central political goal of collective security that was outlined in Articles 10,
11 and 16 of the League’s Covenant.2 The organization failed to maintain order within the
international community and proved incapable of protecting the rights of people and property
from aggression and abuse. M. Patrick Cottrell argued that the events of the late 1930s and early
1940s only further highlighted the limits of the League’s “naïve utopianism” and delegitimated it
in a multitude of ways.3 Chief among these was the lack of support from the Great Powers, the
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League’s inability to check German aggression in central Europe, and the ineffectiveness of
economic sanctions levied by the League as a result of the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis in 1935.4
From its inception, the League faced challenges to its legitimacy and struggled to attract
the dominant political powers of the period to its side. Although American President Woodrow
Wilson played a fundamental role in conceptualizing the League and its purpose, he failed to
convince Congress that the United States should join the League. The Japanese government
withdrew from the League of Nations in February 1933 when the League’s assembly adopted the
Lytton Report that accused the Japanese government of violating Chinese sovereignty and called
for the immediate withdrawal of Japanese forces from Manchuria.5 The German government
withdrew that same year and the USSR was expelled from the League in 1939. Without
resounding support among global political power brokers, the provision of adequate collective
security appeared unlikely. The defection of smaller nations like Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Hungary, and Spain in the 1930s only further weakened the League’s ability to fulfill
its charter.6
The German governments’ withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 proved
crucial in the delegitimization of the League. Germany’s increased aggression toward the
League’s member states provided direct evidence that the League possessed no coercive
mechanism to ensure collective security. In 1936, Hitler’s Germany reoccupied and remilitarized
the Rhineland and then, in 1938, he imposed the Anschluss in Austria and occupied the
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Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia.7 Each of these matters was vigorously debated in the League’s
assembly, but no resolution was achieved and no preventative actions taken. These failures only
contributed to the League’s negative post-war reputation and presented Hitler’s government with
no consequences to dissuade it from its future aggressive actions against Poland in 1939.
The League’s inability to successfully prevent, and later punish, the Italian government’s
aggressive actions in Ethiopia in 1935 solidified the image of the League as a failure. To redress
the failures of Italian forces in 1896 and recreate the glories of its Roman past, dictator Benito
Mussolini sent Italian forces to invade Ethiopia in October 1935.8 Ethiopian Emperor Haile
Selassie initially turned to the League for aid in enforcing its doctrine of collective security. The
League implemented economic sanctions against the Italian government and implored its
member states to refrain from selling arms to warring nations. However, the League failed to
institute an embargo on oil to Italy and the Italian military was able to continue its assault on
Ethiopia largely unimpeded.9 The ineffectiveness of the League was viewed as a significant
failure in the international community and eventually led Mussolini to withdraw from the League
in 1937.
Hitler’s invasion of Poland in 1939 represented a physical manifestation of the League’s
failure and, by 1941, discussion commenced on the termination of the League and its
replacement by a more effective successor organization. The Declaration of St. James’ Palace
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was signed in 1941 and advocated for “the willing cooperation of free peoples in a world in
which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security” as a
means to develop “enduring peace.”10 The Atlantic Charter was issued two months later and set
the foundation for the cooperative principles that guided post-war international relations.11 By
January 1942, representatives of the 26 countries fighting the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis signed
the Declaration of the United Nations and committed to the “maximum war effort” against the
Axis Powers and agreed to make a singular peace supported by each signatory power.12 The need
for a cooperative successor organization was again affirmed in November 1943 when paragraph
four of the Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security recognized “the necessity of
establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such
states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.”13
While the concept of a successor organization remained in the abstract during the early
years of the war, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 produced some of the earliest
concrete proposals for the League’s successor, the UN. On 7 October 1944, representatives from
the United States, USSR, Great Britain, and China met at a private mansion in Washington, DC
to create proposals for the organizational structure of the UN. The conference proposed that the
UN would consist of four bodies: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the International
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Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. The General Assembly consisted of representatives from all
member states and was tasked with the promotion of international cooperation through research
and recommendations for action. The Security Council, perhaps the most important new
innovation of the UN, consisted of 11 members, with five permanent members and six rotating
members from the General Assembly. The Security Council was tasked with the prevention of
future wars and granted the power to demand armed forces from member states to fulfill this
duty. Such capabilities sought to redress the League’s lack of a coercive mechanism for the
enforcement of its decisions.14
These proposals were debated at the San Francisco Conference of 1945, where
representatives of 50 nations met to establish a charter for the UN based on the work completed
at Dumbarton Oaks.15 On 24 October 1945 the five permanent members of the Security Council
ratified the charter and brought the UN into existence. The following April, the League’s
assembly voted to take the necessary steps to terminate its existence and transfer its properties
and assets to the newly-created UN. On 1 August 1946, this transfer was carried out during a
small ceremony in Geneva.16
In its early years, one of the key questions that the UN was forced to consider was the
status of the mandate territories created under the League of Nations. This issue arose at the San
Francisco Conference since such concerns were not addressed at the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference. At the center of the debate over the mandate territories was whether the UN should
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promote outright independence among the mandates, or whether it would be better suited to
pursue a policy of self-determination in these territories.17 After much debate, the San Francisco
Conference settled on the promotion of “the progressive development” of the people of these
territories and their direction toward either independence or self-government.18 The mandate
territories would be reclassified under this new system as “Trusteeships” and placed under the
purview and collective administration of the UN.
Chapter twelve of the UN charter provided for the establishment of a Trusteeship Council
that consisted of representatives from the five permanent members of the Security Council and
both administering and non-administering member states.19 The primary role of the Trusteeship
Council was to oversee the administration of these new “trust territories” and ensure that each
territory was administered in a manner consistent with the promotion of the best interests of the
indigenous people in each territory. Political scientist Huntington Gilchrist argued that the
Trusteeship Council’s established standards for the treatment of non-self-governing peoples
provided a “yardstick throughout the entire colonial world” for how indigenous inhabitants
should be treated under the new global political order.20
It was clear that a new system of administration was needed as the mandate system
possessed inherent weaknesses that led to its failure. The mandate territories that existed under
the League were primarily viewed in negative terms by those who supported the shift to the
trusteeship system. Under the League, the mandate system merely “sought to protect the peoples
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under its charge…from abuses which had arisen in dependent territories in the past.”21 Prolonged
enquiries on abuses committed by mandatory powers frequently took years to produce and often
relied on information provided by the abusive state itself. The PMC provided little protection
against these abuses and few consequences existed for the responsible party. Coupled with its
lack of concrete plans for the economic and social development of the people under its charge,
the mandate system was fraught with incoherency and contradiction.22
Conversely, the trusteeship system was viewed primarily in positive and proactive terms.
Social and economic development of the indigenous people entrusted to the UN became the
driving impetus of the Trusteeship Council. The “trust territories,” unlike their predecessors, also
had a “constitutional status recognized under international law” which permitted the Trusteeship
Council to send representatives to trust territories instead of relying on the reports of the
administering powers when claims of abuse arose.23 This theoretically allowed for quicker
resolution of disputes and limited the ability of the administering power to hide such abuses.
Likewise, the protective measure provided for under the mandate system would be enforced in
the new trust territories to ensure the promotion of “progressive development” of the indigenous
people in a territory.
Despite the more positive conception of the trusteeship system, however, one clear
weakness emerged that directly impacted the international status of South West Africa in the
post-war period. In order for a territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, the mandatory
power had to willingly place the territory under the purview of the Trusteeship Council and the
UN. Gilchrist described the process, stating “All former Mandatories which are now members of
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the United Nations…have drawn up Trust Agreements in consultation with other interested states
and these agreements are now receiving attention at Lake Success in the Trusteeship Committee
of the General Assembly.”24 The only exception to this process was the Union government,
which actively sought to retain its exclusive control over South West Africa and incorporate it
into the Union.
As chapter 4 discussed in detail, Smuts and the South African government still possessed
plans of outright annexation for South West Africa and desired to incorporate it as a fifth
province into the Union. Attempts were initially made to convince the General Assembly that
annexation was a more productive path forward rather than placing South West Africa under the
trusteeship system. Smuts held a referendum in 1946 asking the indigenous people of South
West Africa whether they wanted to be ruled by the South African government or “any other
Government or people.”25 Despite the referendum returning resoundingly in favor of
incorporation, reports emerged that brought the method of the referendum’s administration into
question. The UN subsequently rejected Smuts’ plan of incorporation and demanded that South
West Africa be placed in trust of the UN.26 Smuts and the South African government rejected the
demands of the UN and proceeded with their plan of de facto incorporation of South West Africa
as a fifth province. The rapid expansion of the apartheid apparatus and the continued social,
economic, and political underdevelopment of Namibians in South West Africa would continue,
despite the changing position of all other mandate territories within the international political
order.
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The refusal of the South African government to willingly place South West Africa in trust
of the UN caused international tensions between the two. Legally, the UN could not force the
South African government to place South West Africa under the trusteeship system and its
primary legal recourse was to demand the enforcement of the League’s earlier mandate, which
was deemed to still be in effect. Although the UN considered South West Africa still under its
purview and believed that it still had monitoring responsibilities over the indigenous Namibian
population, the South African government ruled the territory as a fifth province and continued
the extension of the apartheid apparatus relatively unimpeded. Thus, while 10 other territories
were under the administration of the UN Trusteeship Council, the South African government
maintained largely unfettered access to South West Africa as a colonial possession. This placed
Namibia in a precarious international legal situation, whereby the UN and South African
government were vying for control in the territory. Although the South African government
would not assent to placing South West Africa under the trusteeship system, UN efforts to push
for trust status spread knowledge and information about the organization among Namibians in
the territory. Whereas the Basters relied on Dewdney Drew to gather information about the
League of Nations for their petition-writing campaign, the Nama and Herero instead relied on
transnational actors from Britain and the United States to formulate their resistance campaigns.

The UN Comes to South West Africa: Rev. Michael Scott and
the Origins of the Namibian Petition-Writing Campaigns
While the South African government hoped to limit the impact of the UN in South West
Africa by refusing to place the territory in its trust and instead incorporate it as a fifth province,
the contest between the two for influence introduced many Namibians to the true power and
influence of the organization. In the administration of its controversial referendum, the South
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African government failed to adequately explain the role of the UN in international politics and
its potential role in the administration of South West Africa. Discussions about the trusteeship
system were avoided altogether in consultations with Namibian leaders. The concept of the UN
as an institution of resistance to fight against the Union government’s implementation of its
apartheid policies did not emerge until 1947. In 1947, Chief Frederick Maharero, upon the
urging of the Tswana chiefs, established contact with the Reverend Michael Scott.27 It was
through this contact with Reverend Scott that knowledge of the UN and its purpose grew among
Namibians during the 1940s and 1950s. By the middle of the 1950s, Scott petitioned the UN on
behalf of Namibians as their representative.
To understand Scott’s role in the formulation of the Namibian petition-writing campaigns
to the UN, it is first necessary to look at his early activism and the role he played in southern
African protest movements. Following his ordination as an Anglican priest in 1930, Scott spent
his first years at a parish in Sussex and then moved to a parish in West London. He lasted only a
year in West London, which he believed was too removed from the real struggles of the world
experienced by the everyday man. Scott moved to another parish in East London the next year
where he believed “the evils of the world were being fought or endured.”28 In East London, he
came to view religion as a “divine instrument of change rather than a divine sanction of the
status quo.”29 During this time he became sympathetic to communism and had dealings with the
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hunger marchers from Tyneside and Scotland.30 Through these experiences, Scott reconciled his
religious beliefs to follow a more humanitarian and activist ethos.
Scott took a post as the chaplain at St. Joseph’s Orphanage in South Africa in 1943 and
also served at the St. Alban’s Coloured Mission.31 While in South Africa, he likewise
participated in the Campaign for Right and Justice. The campaign was an extra-parliamentary
movement focused on seeking out both racial and class injustices in South Africa. Scott recalled
that “[The campaign’s] aim was to form a vigorous and realistic movement in opposition to the
growth of Dr. Malan’s form of Afrikaner Nationalism and ‘apartheid’ and to uncover the
menacing ramifications of the Afrikaner Broederbond, which was stretching its tentacles into all
forms of economic, social, and political life, and was becoming so powerful as to be almost a
state within a state.”32 The campaign was active in its messaging and called for the “provision of
social services for all races,” as well as “full and direct representation for all sections of society,”
the “abolition of all legislation discriminatory on grounds of colour, race, or sex,” and “the
provision of land for the landless people of South Africa.”33 By 1946, Scott’s activities were
well-known, and he was approached by the Council for Human Rights and asked to travel to
Durban to observe the violence meted out against the Passive Resistance Movement.34 Scott
witnessed immense violence against members of the movement following the passage of the
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Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, and his own participation in the resistance
only further solidified his desire to incorporate social activism into his personal life.35
In 1946, Tshekedi Khama invited Scott to the Bechuanaland Protectorate to meet with
Frederick Maharero and discuss his anxiety over the 1946 referendum and the Union’s desire to
incorporate South West Africa.36 When he met with Maharero, Maharero told Scott about the
numerous “letters of distress” he had received from the Herero in South West Africa over the
issue of land expropriation.37 Maharero asked Scott to travel to Windhoek to meet with some
Herero and question them about the issues afflicting his followers in the territory. During this
discussion, the young Herero determined that Scott should meet with the Herero headmen in
Windhoek and took him to the Aminuis Reserve to meet with Chief Hosea Kutako.38
Kutako called a number of his councilors to meet with Scott that night and discuss
Maharero’s concerns about incorporation and the treatment of the Herero in the territory. During
these discussions, information about the newly-formed UN was disseminated and its potential
role in South West Africa detailed. Scott recalled that there was a “curious tenseness about these
Africans hearing of the UN,” but by the end of the conversation the UN was regarded as “the
answer to their prayers” and “God’s instrument of justice and freedom for their people.”39 Molly
McCullers affirmed that the Herero readily embraced the vision of the UN described by Scott,
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writing, “Rural Herero conceived of the UN in terms of leadership, loyalty, and
deliverance….Rural Herero placed considerable, almost religious, hope in the UN and
overestimated the degree, speed, and kind of assistance it might provide…..[N]o one knew the
exact parameters of the UN’s jurisdiction or how much power it would wield.”40
During Scott’s visit with Kutako, the two constructed a petition to be submitted through
the Union government to the UN. In the petition, Kutako called for the “return of [Herero] lands
in South West Africa, and for the return from exile in Bechuanaland of our Paramount Chief
Frederick Maharero together with the Herero people at present living in Bechuanaland.”41 The
issue of Herero representation at the UN also permeated this first petition. Kutako asserted:
So long as the League of Nations existed [the Herero] retained the right to petition the
League, and, as has been pointed out…the Native inhabitants of South West Africa did
not become Union Nationals when the Union assumed the mandate of South West
Africa….Also we must beg to call your attention to the fact that despite the assurance of
the representatives of the Union government that our case would be fully represented by
the Union government’s spokesmen at the United Nations’ Assembly, we do not feel
confident that this was adequately done. It is our opinion that the Union government by
reason of its treatment of the African people, both in the Union and in South West Africa,
has now forfeited all moral right and claim to continue exercising the mandate over South
West Africa.42
He then requested the Union government’s support to send Herero representatives to the UN to
state their case in person. Kutako’s petition represented one of the early attempts by Namibians
to demand the placement of South West Africa under the trusteeship system and purview of the
UN.
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At the conclusion of this meeting with Kutako, Scott returned to Bechuanaland to discuss
the future of South West Africa with Maharero and Khama to write another petition to the UN.
The petition, in Maharero’s name, made similar demands of the Union government. He, too,
requested the return of his followers from exile in Bechuanaland. Maharero asserted that he
wanted to return to productive and healthy lands and that, upon agreement with Tshekedi
Khama, he would bring his cattle with him from the protectorate.43 At the conclusion of the
meetings with Maharero and Kutako, Scott was asked to serve as the Herero’s representative at
the UN. In 1949, he was granted a hearing before the Fourth Committee and presented testimony
on behalf of the Herero.44
Scott continued to present and submit petitions from the Herero as their official
representative into the 1950s.45 The petitions frequently demanded that South West Africa be
placed under the trusteeship system and reiterated that the South African government repeatedly
and flagrantly violated the principles and integrity of the mandate system established by the
League of Nations. In most cases, the petitions detailed the horrid living conditions in the
reserves and the socioeconomic hardships that Namibians faced in the wake of the extension of
South African apartheid policies.46 Over time, these early petitions had the cumulative effect of
keeping the South West Africa question at the fore of the General Assembly’s proceedings and
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forced the General Assembly to find more effective methods for checking the Union
government’s attempts to incorporate the territory into the Union.
Scott’s testimony and activity also proved instrumental in popularizing the South West
Africa question and bringing the weight of international political pressure on the South African
government. Stories about Scott’s testimonies in front of the UN appeared frequently in the press
in the United States and were particularly popular among the African American press. Reports of
his role as the representative of the Herero, and the conditions that the Herero faced under the
South African government, appeared in the Philadelphia Tribune in November 1947.47 In
December 1951 the New Journal and Guide published a story about Scott and Kutako,
emphasizing Kutako’s deteriorating health and his desire to testify in front of the UN in Paris on
the state of the Herero and other Namibians in South West Africa.48 Likewise, a similar story ran
that month in the Philadelphia Tribune of Kutako’s desire to testify as a “last service…to his
people.”49 More general appeals about the UN constructively intervening in Africa appeared in
the New York Amsterdam News in 1952 and reference was once again made to Kutako and his
desire to testify in person at the UN.50 The continuous circulation of reports about Kutako and
the Herero in South West Africa kept the issue in front of sections of the American public and
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placed pressure on diplomats, activists, and government officials to find a resolution to this
issue.51
The stories pertaining to South West Africa in the Black press coincided with an uptick in
African American anticolonial activity in the 1940s and late 1950s. Ebere Nwaubani contended
“American Black leaders from 1943 to 1947 raised a vigorous protest against European
colonialism and against the American foreign policy which they found in support of that
colonialism.”52 Although some negative images of Africa persisted among the African American
community in the United States, many saw their own destinies deeply intertwined with those
facing colonial oppression on the continent. Thus, African American intellectuals worked to
actively shape American foreign policy and, as a result of the Cold War, found some success.
For example, between 1957 and 1960 many of these intellectuals were enlisted by the State
Department to attend African independence celebrations and show support for new governments
that American foreign policy hoped to win to the causes of democracy and capitalism.53 Given
the African American role in this decolonization process, the circulation of these stories likely
had some impact on American political decision-makers and, consequently, the UN.
In light of this international pressure in 1950, substantial progress was made at the UN in
its attempt to check the Union government’s exploitation and abuse of Africans in the territory.
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On 11 July 1950, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion that
attempted to resolve the tensions between the UN and the Union on the issues of incorporation
and the international status of South West Africa. In its advisory opinion, the ICJ ruled that
neither the court nor the UN could compel the Union to place the territory under a trusteeship
agreement since the term “agreement” implied the consent of both parties involved. However,
the ICJ did rule that despite the termination of the League of Nations, the principles of the
mandates issued during its existence must continue to be enforced.54 Additionally, the ICJ
determined that the Union was obligated to continue to transmit Namibians’ petitions to the
General Assembly, as this right was granted by the Council of the League under the mandate and
maintained by Article 80, paragraph 1 of the charter of the United Nations.55 Thus, the General
Assembly maintained an important and influential role in monitoring the abuses meted out by the
South African government and SWAA. Over the next three years, the General Assembly worked
to find a solution to the international status of South West Africa and develop a method for
dealing with South African abuses in the territory.
On 28 November 1953 the General Assembly passed Resolution 749(VIII)/A, which
“Establish[ed] until such time as an agreement is reached between the United Nations and the

The Advisory Opinion further argued that “The obligations of the first group represent the very essence of the
sacred trust of civilization. Their raison d’etre and original object remain. Since their fulfillment did not depend on
the existence of the League of Nations, they could not be brought to an end merely because this supervisory organ
ceased to exist. This view is confirmed by Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Charter, maintaining the rights of States
and peoples and the terms in question are placed under the trusteeship system. Moreover, the resolution of the
League of Nations of April 18, 1946, said that the League’s functions with respect to mandated territories would
come to an end; it did not say that the mandates themselves came to an end….Therefore, South West Africa is still
to be considered a territory held under the mandate of December 17 th, 1920.”
55
Article 80, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter reads, “Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship
agreements, made under Articles, 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such
agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the
rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members
of the United Nations may respectively be parties.”
54

297

Union of South Africa, A Committee on South West Africa, consisting of seven members.”56
The Committee on South West Africa’s primary role was the analysis of “such information and
documentation as may be available in respect to the Territory of South West Africa” and to
“Examine, as far as possible, in accordance with the procedure of the former mandate system,
reports and petitions which may be submitted to the Committee or to the Secretary-General.”57
The General Assembly also tasked the Committee with the transmission of reports on the
conditions in the territory. Although Namibians submitted petitions to the General Assembly, the
creation of the Committee provided them with a direct liaison at the UN tasked specifically with
evaluating and resolving Namibians’ complaints against the Union government. In the coming
years, the Committee on South West Africa faced an influx of petitions as the South African
government more aggressively entrenched its apartheid system and more firmly instituted its
reserve policy.
The committee proved crucial to Namibians’ attempts to resist the extension of apartheid
while the UN attempted to find a resolution to the South West Africa question. As stated above,
the Committee on South West Africa wrote and distributed reports to the General Assembly on
the conditions faced by Namibians in the territory and also received and considered petitions
from Namibians. On several occasions, plans were made by the Committee to send an envoy to
South West Africa to examine the conditions firsthand, but the South African government
frequently rebuffed these attempts. Perhaps the most important success for the committee, and
boon to Namibian resistance efforts against the SWAA, occurred with the ICJ’s issuance of the
Advisory Opinion of 1 June 1956. This advisory opinion provided the Committee with the ability
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to grant oral hearings to petitioners on matters concerning South West Africa.58 Although the
SWAA and Union government actively tried to prevent Namibians from testifying at the UN, the
prospect of having their case heard in front of the General Assembly led many Namibians to flee
into exile and make their way to the United States.
Namibians in the territory faced an increasingly harsh socioeconomic reality at the hands
of the SWAA while the UN attempted to more fully bring South West Africa under its
trusteeship system and the Committee on South West Africa kept the General Assembly
informed of the situation in South West Africa. The issue of land came to define the tense
relationship that developed between the SWAA and Namibians in the Police Zone during the
1950s. The early-to-mid 1950s were characterized by a drought that placed strain on Namibians’
abilities to securely live in the environmentally-challenging Police Zone. Similarly, white
farmers in the Police Zone became increasingly frustrated with some Namibians’ continued
residence on agriculturally valuable land and land near water sources that could be used to
maintain herds of cattle. These white farmers placed immense amounts of pressure on the
SWAA to remove Namibians and place them in reserves.59
In response to white farmers pressure, the SWAA implemented a series of forced land
removals in the early 1950s and tried to free up this desired land. In 1954, the government
removed roughly 200 Hai||om from the Etosha Game Reserve and plans were developed to
remove Namibians from the Old Location in Windhoek. The following year, the Department of
Native Affairs brought the territory’s reserve strategy under its direction and started to turn the
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reserves into “homelands.”60 Between 1952 and 1959, two of these attempted forced removals
defined the petition-writing campaigns of Namibians to the UN: Aminuis (1952-1958) and
Hoachanas (1956-1959). Through these petition-writing campaigns, Namibian leaders sought to
employ the newly-empowered Committee on South West Africa and the General Assembly to
express Namibian agency and exert pressure on the Union government to halt their proposed
removals. The petition-writing campaign that ensued represented perhaps the largest network of
transnational actors and institutions employed by Namibians as a means of anticolonial
resistance. These campaigns focused on utilizing transnational resources to stake subnational
socioeconomic claims of the SWAA, halt the SWAA’s implementation of harsh spatial and
economic segregation, and seek inclusion and an influential voice in the colonial decisionmaking process.

The Aminuis Corridor Affair: Hosea Kutako’s Petition-Writing
Campaign to the United Nations
The first post-war petition-writing campaign to be examined involved Hosea Kutako and
the Herero at the Aminuis Reserve. They undertook one of the early petition-writing campaigns
to the UN in an attempt to resist the annexation of parts of the Aminuis Reserve for white
farmers and prevent a proposed land swap involving Kuridora.61 In 1923, the South African
Native Reserves Commission established the Aminuis Reserve to further control the mobility of
Namibians and reduce the spread of livestock disease into the Bechuanaland Protectorate.
Throughout the territory, over 2 million hectares were set aside for the further creation of
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reserves.62 The Herero were first forcibly moved to reserves in the Police Zone following their
role in the Rehoboth Affair in 1925.63 The conditions in the reserves were burdensome and
unsustainable for settlement, with Kutako remarking “[I]t is a desert where no human being ever
lived before. It is a country only good for wild beasts. On top of that it is not healthy for the
people or the cattle…You should rather bring the Europeans here and let us stay where we
are.”64

Gertrud Boden, “Mapping Culture, Representing Boundaries and Politicizing Difference: Reflection on two San
Cases in Namibia,” in Atlas of Cultural and Environmental Change in Arid Africa, eds. Olaf Bubenzer, et al. (Koln:
Heinrich-Barth-Institut, 2007), 112-113.
63
See Chapter 2, pages 101 and 102 for a full discussion on the Rehoboth Affair.
64
Wolfgang Werner, “No One Will Become Rich”: Economy and Society in the Herero Reserves in Namibia, 19151946 (Basel: P. Schlettwein Publishing, 1998), 105.
62

301

Map 5: Aminuis Reserve, ca. 1950

Source: Molly McCullers, “Lines in the Sand: The Global Politics of Local Development in
Apartheid-Era Namibia, 1950-1980,” (PhD diss., Emory University, 2012), 6.
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Nevertheless, the SWAA forced Kutako and his followers to Aminuis in 1925, where
they experienced the ecological hardships of the reserves. Aminuis, in particular, possessed a
severely compromised water supply, that veterinary reports described as “poisonous.”65 One of
the superintendents at Aminuis went as far as to lament the situation at the reserve, writing
“Grazing is poor. The oxen that were in fair condition when I was last there [have] fallen
considerably in condition and are quite unfit for market. How the women and children exist is
beyond my poor comprehension. At all events they are all thin and appear to be half starved.”66
Although the conditions in the reserve could not support an increase in population, plans still
existed to send more Namibians to Aminuis.
Historically, the Herero at Aminuis believed that a solution to improving their
socioeconomic position at the reserve resided in the opening up of Kuridora for Herero use and
settlement. In 1928, the Herero petitioned the SWAA to add Kuridora to the Aminuis Reserve,
but Kuridora was instead turned into a quarantine zone to protect against the spread of livestock
diseases from Bechuanaland. Another failed attempt was made in 1939 to see Kuridora attached
to Aminuis.67 The debate over Kuridora subsided until 1952 and 1953, when white farmers
placed increased pressure on the SWAA to open Kuridora to alleviate the hardships created by
the drought in the territory.
In 1952 the Herero at Aminuis, as a result, petitioned Chief Native Commissioner, H.J.
Allen, to add Kuridora to the Aminuis Reserve. However, the SWAA’s Executive Committee
rejected Allen’s request and instead placed Kuridora under the control of the Department of
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Native Affairs for the purpose of “emergency grazing.”68 When the Executive Committee faced
similar requests from the white farmers for access to Kuridora, the Executive Committee
commenced borehole projects and developed a plan to alleviate the effects of the drought in the
area.69 The Executive Committee proposed the settlement of white farmers in Kuridora and
promptly drilled more boreholes. Allen was highly critical of the Executive Committee’s
decision, and in 1955, he proposed a new plan that sought to annex the northern and western
parts of the Aminuis Reserve for white farmers, while granting the Herero access to part of
Kuridora for farming and grazing.70 Allen believed that such a plan would appease white
farmers, assent to Herero demands for the extension of the reserve and prevent the emergence of
a “Black island.”71
Despite Allen’s assurances, the Executive Committee failed to follow his suggestion that
the approval of the Herero must be obtained if such a proposal were to go forward.72
Unsurprisingly, Kutako and the Herero at Aminuis rejected the proposed land exchange when the
Executive Committee announced the plan. Kutako possessed few legitimate paths of recourse
with the SWAA to prevent the plan from moving forward and, instead, utilized his familiar
transnational network to petition the proposed removal of the Herero from Aminuis. On 30
October 1956, Kutako petitioned the UN and detailed Allen’s proposed exchange. Kutako wrote,
“We also wish to inform you that the Chief Native Commissioner of South West Africa, Mr. H.J.
Allen held a meeting with the Herero Chief and Headmen in September 1956 in the Aminuis
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Native Reserve…he informed us that a portion of the Aminuis Reserve was to be given to the
European farmers and that a small part of land called Kuridora to the southeast of Aminuis
Native Reserve was to be given to the Herero in exchange for their land.”73 Kutako proceeded to
“object” to the removal of the Herero to the southeastern portion of Kuridora and informed the
chairman that “We concluded our meeting with the Chief Native Commissioner by saying to him
that the government should keep Kuridora for European farmers and we would keep our reserve
and would not exchange one for the other.”74
Kutako elaborated on his reasoning for rejecting the proposed move in a second petition
to the Secretary General at the UN the following year. He highlighted the point that the proposed
exchange of land was uneven, arguing “That part of Aminuis Reserve which the government
proposed to give to the white farmers is the best grazing area in that Native Reserve and there are
five boreholes with strong water, and they are 500 feet and 700 feet deep. In Kuridora which the
government proposed to give to us in exchange for our land…a kind of grass called suurgras
grows in the largest area, but only during the rainy season and lasts…from January to June, while
Kuridora itself is in the Kalahari Desert and is therefore subject to scanty rainfall…the result [is]
unsuitable for grazing.”75 Thus, the proposed exchange threatened to place the already strained
Herero population in an even more untenable situation. The exchange would siphon off the best
parts of the Aminuis Reserve for the use of white farmers, while providing the Herero with an
inconsistent supply of grass for grazing and limited boreholes with faulty engines and equipment.
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Union Minister of Native Affairs H.F. Verwoerd and the SWAA attempted throughout
late 1956 and early 1957 to persuade Kutako to assent to the land exchange.76 A series of failed
meetings and negotiations during this period were only compounded by an environmental crisis
in Kuridora during March 1957 that was characterized by an influx of Bovine Malignant
Catarrhal Fever and inconsistent rainfall that had devastating consequences for both agriculture
and cattle herding. The only portion of land that remained viable for both agriculture and herding
was the northern part of the Aminuis Reserve; the portion of the reserve intended to be
expropriated as part of the proposed land exchange.77 The combination of these factors only
strengthened the resolve of Kutako and the Herero at Aminuis to reject any loss of their lands.
The petitions submitted by Kutako exhibited a tangible effect on the decision-making
process of the SWAA and concerned Verwoerd. Verwoerd questioned the viability of the land
exchange at Aminuis as early as August 1956, as Kutako became increasingly vocal and defiant
in his resistance to the plan. Verwoerd wanted to prevent the “unpleasantness and foreign noise”
that might accompany Kutako’s petitions to the UN, as his close relationship with influential
international actors was well known to Verwoerd and the SWAA.78 As was previously
mentioned, African American newspapers continued to publish stories about Kutako’s desire to
testify in person at the UN as early as 1950 and several of Reverend Scott’s speaking
engagements in the United Kingdom, South Africa, and the United States kept Kutako’s case in
the minds of transnational activists.
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In an attempt to halt Kutako’s petitions to the UN and alleviate the international pressure
and scrutiny directed at the Union government, the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs wrote to
Kutako on 31 August 1957 to clarify perceived points of confusion about the exchange. The
Secretary framed his argument in quantifiable terms and focused on the monetary value of the
land involved, as well its development potential. He reiterated the SWAA’s position that “the
land to be added to the reserve is both larger and better prepared for development than the land to
be excised therefrom,” and that there was “no less than 15 successful boreholes and the carrying
capacity of the area is in the vicinity of 10,000 cattle units as compared with about 3,000 units in
the area to be excised, which has only 3 satisfactory boreholes.”79 He valuated the proposed land
of Kuridora at £312,440, whereas the land to be excised at Aminuis was valued at £155,100.80
In that same letter, the Acting Secretary informed Kutako that “Minister [Verwoerd] does
not wish to force any exchange upon you and the [Herero], although he and the department are
still convinced that you and the [Herero] are extremely foolish and shortsighted in rejecting the
offer….The possibility of any exchange and any acquisition of part of the ‘corridor’ is therefore
now for all time at an end.”81 Though Kutako had temporarily prevented the expropriation of
land in the Aminuis Reserve, the Secretary informed him that Kuridora would not be added to
the Aminuis Reserve for Herero use. The SWAA rejected Kutako’s claim that Kuridora was
already part of the Aminuis Reserve and the property of the Herero.82 Instead, he wrote that “The
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[SWAA] is at liberty to allot the ‘Corridor’ to European farmers and will immediately proceed to
do so.”83
Kutako proved that the specter of foreign interference by the UN was enough to
undoubtedly change the behavior and decision-making process of the Union government and the
SWAA. Kutako’s petitions successfully resisted the expropriation of economically important
portions of the Aminuis Reserve and thwarted the aforementioned land exchange proposal.
However, as the Acting Secretary’s letter suggests, the reach of the UN and the ability of
Namibians to leverage the UN’s power was limited. The SWAA still proceeded to shirk its
responsibility to develop and protect the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa and, rather
than add Kuridora to the Aminuis Reserve as a means of alleviating economic and
environmental pressure mounting on the Herero settled at the reserve, the SWAA instead
attended to the needs of white farmers first.84 Despite the desire to work within the existent
colonial framework and be included in the decision-making process, the SWAA unwillingness to
acquiesce to Kutako’s demands forced him to seek alternative means to protect Herero interests
in South West Africa.
Kutako’s petition-writing campaign epitomized the subnational focus of many of the
transnational resistance strategies employed by Namibians in the Police Zone. Rather than focus
on complete territorial independence, Kutako attempted to obtain concessions from the SWAA
on matters of great subnational importance. Preserving control of the land at Aminuis was of
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paramount importance for the continued survival of the Herero under his leadership and, as such,
he focused many of his petitions on this attempted removal. Despite simultaneous forced land
removals elsewhere, Kutako’s primary obligation remained to the Herero at Aminuis and their
socioeconomic interests. It is clear that Kutako’s initial resistance strategies pursued Herero
inclusion in the economic and political decision-making process with regard to issues of land
settlement and forced removals. Kutako did not want to be further marginalized in this process
through the implementation of evermore restrictive apartheid policies and schemes. Once it was
apparent that this approach would not work, he instead turned to more exclusionary means of
resistance that called on the international community to safeguard and consider the economic
needs of the Herero under the repressive SWAA policies.

Imaginary Pelt-Thefts and Arbitrary Police Brutality: The Attempted
Forced Removal at Hoachanas, 1956-1959
As the Herero faced the full weight of the SWAA’s apartheid policies at Aminuis,
similar forced removal plans proceeded elsewhere in the Police Zone. Beginning in 1956, the
SWAA initiated a forced removal at Hoachanas to appease white farmers seeking more fertile
lands and more reliable sources of water in the southern part of the territory. Whereas the Herero
at Aminuis relied on the relationship developed between Michael Scott and Hosea Kutako to
fight the expropriation of land, the Nama residents at Hoachanas turned first to the familiar AME
Church to stake a claim to their land and then, in subsequent years, also developed an extensive
petition-writing campaign to the UN to express their agency and resist the SWAA. The SWAA’s
attempted removal of the AME pastor Markus Kooper and his congregation from Hoachanas
between 1956 and 1959 served as the basis of the Nama petitions that were submitted to the
Committee on South West Africa.
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An examination of the case study at Hoachanas provides a clear example of how the
support provided by two transnational institutions, the AME Church and the UN, dovetailed
together and formed the foundation of a successful resistance strategy against land expropriation
in the Police Zone. Over the course of 10 years, the Nama congregation at Hoachanas secured an
application for a church, constructed said church, and prevented their forced removal from the
land at the hands of the SWAA. Throughout the process, Nama leadership at Hoachanas
submitted petitions to the UN detailing the arbitrary arrest of Markus Kooper and the SWAA’s
attempts to move his congregation to a less hospitable reserve at Itsawisis. As a result, the UN
exerted international pressure on the SWAA to mitigate its aggressive behavior toward the
Hoachanites and prevent the removal of the AME congregation at the reserve. The following
pages examine these developments and the resistance strategies employed at Hoachanas as part
of a larger Nama strategy to win subnational concessions from the SWAA.
In response to land expropriation and increased forced removals in the Police Zone,
Namibians looked for any possible means to establish legal claims to their land and thwart the
government’s actions in court. The construction of AME churches in rural Nama communities
were viewed as a means to resist this process and affirm Namibian ownership of the land. It is
clear that the AME congregations understood the construction and presence of a church on the
land provided the community with a strong claim to possession of, and continued residence on,
the land.85 Many of the Nama communities had also provided labor, funds, and materials for the
construction of the RMS churches and schools. When the Nama Secession occurred in 1946,
AME leaders repeatedly petitioned the SWAA and made claims that their students, teachers, and
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congregants had a right to use the buildings and repurpose them for the AME’s functions.
Through the series of accepted permits and applications for AME schools and churches in the
1950s, these congregations believed that they had staked a legal claim to their continued
residence in their communities.86
The Khaiǁkhaun initially staked their claim at Hoachanas when they settled near the
freshwater springs in the area in 1695.87 The missionary enterprise arrived there in 1853, and the
Khaiǁkhaun continuously resided at Hoachanas until 1904. At the conclusion of the Herero and
Nama genocide, Governor Leutwein guaranteed the Khaiǁkhaun 50,000 hectares of land at
Hoachanas for their permanent residence.88 The South African government honored this
agreement between 1921 and 1956. However, the implementation of apartheid policies starting
in the late 1940s led to a lengthy legal battle between the Khaiǁkhaun and SWAA to resist their
forced removal from Hoachanas. While the Nama Secession in 1946 laid the foundation for this
legal conflict, tensions between the Nama and white residents of Hoachanas increased
significantly, beginning in 1952.
The AME’s rapid expansion in the Police Zone and the desire of its congregants to
remain on the land close to their church sites, frequently fertile agricultural lands, alarmed the
whites in the area. The congregations and communities in the AME strongholds fully embraced
the Black liberation theology advocated by the church and lived its message of racial uplift,
industriousness, and racial self-sufficiency.89 Adherents viewed white farmers and missionaries
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as an extension of the SWAA and, consequently, as oppressors. AME preachers demanded that
their congregations focus on maintaining their own flocks and small agricultural plots and
limiting their employment on white farms. Namibians’ control over fertile lands and some
freshwater springs, as well as their increasing refusal to participate in farm labor, significantly
increased tensions between rural Namibians and the adjacent white farmers. The forced land
removals served as a means to reduce and eliminate these tensions, but many AME
congregations grew entrenched and refused to willingly abandon their lands and churches.
In February 1952, AME officials began construction of a church at Hoachanas and
established a permanent AME presence at the reserve. That month, Reverend Markus Kooper
submitted an application for temporary residence at Hoachanas and permission to construct an
AME Church. On 31 July 1952, Welfare Officer Balt travelled to Hoachanas to examine the site
for the church and issue a construction permit to the Khaiǁkhaun.90 To complete construction of
the church, Kooper and his congregation navigated the restrictive apartheid apparatus and tapped
into local business networks to secure supplies. The only business owners who possessed the
supplies and materials to facilitate the church’s construction were white businessmen. After an
exhaustive search, Kooper found a white general store owner in Lidfontein, referred to in the
documents as Mr. Frank. Frank provided cement, building lime, roofing materials, doors and
windows for the construction of the church. Additionally, he granted the congregation access to
his lorry for the transport of these materials from Lidfontein to Hoachanas. Over the next four
years, Kooper and his congregation built the Emmanuel AME Church.91 During this process,
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Kooper was ordained as a deacon of the AME Church in 1954 and began preaching to the
congregation.92
The construction of the Emmanuel AME Church occurred in the midst of the aggressive
extension of apartheid in South West Africa. The aforementioned removal of the Hai||om at
Etosha occurred the same year that Kooper began preaching and, as tensions increased, the
SWAA undertook removals at Aukeigas Reserve in 1958. The Khaiǁkhaun found themselves the
target of forced removal in 1956. The white farmers in South West Africa desired the
agriculturally-conducive land and springs at Hoachanas. However, the Black liberation theology
preached at Emmanuel AME Church proved ill-suited for the SWAA’s goal of creating stagnant
labor reserves.93 To avoid further confrontations and inquires by the UN into the forced removals
in the territory, the SWAA sought legal justification for the removal of the Khaiǁkhaun.
Ultimately, the government decided to remove Kooper from Hoachanas in hopes that his loyal
congregation would follow.94
Later petitions and interviews with the Namibian residents of Hoachanas claimed that the
SWAA conspired with the police at Derm and white Hoachanites to provide false legal grounds
for the eviction of Kooper. In 1956, these parties manufactured what Kooper and Johannes
Dausab referred to as a “fake karakul-pelt theft” to justify the removal.95 The karakul-pelt-theft
plot alleged that AME congregants at Hoachanas illegally obtained and sold karakul pelts to
accumulate money for the construction of the Emmanuel Church.96 The Derm police travelled to
farms near Hoachanas to coerce falsified statements implicating African members of the AME
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and NGK churches. Kooper and his congregation recounted these attempts in petitions and audio
recordings obtained by activist Allard Lowenstein, stating “When the church building was about
to be completed in February 1956 they manufactured a make-believe karakul-pelt theftplan….The state-police [were] the executives of the horrible, barbaric, and unchristian devil’s
business. The members of the [NGK were] their tools. They were beaten by the police, tortured,
and strangled and dictate[d] to say what is not true….They were instructed by the police to say
that they have stolen karakul-pelts of their respective farm-masters and sold the same [pelts] to
us the members of the persecuted [AME Church].”97
Hoachanites victimized by the Derm police refused to affirm the SWAA’s manufactured
narrative, and the police could not secure the necessary witnesses to evict Kooper. The police
subsequently raided the houses of the AME congregants at Hoachanas to find evidence
supporting this false narrative. One witness recalled, “[The police searched] the house of the
[Rev. Kooper], the resident elder of the [AME Church] at Hoachanas…a man whose career and
record is clean as far as court cases and any other kind of irregularities are concerned….”98 The
Derm police were unable to recover any sheep pelts and the “make-believe” plot appeared
doomed.
The SWAA made one final attempt to find legal justification for the eviction of the
Khaiǁkhaun. On 7 February 1956, the police arrested Mr. Frank of Lidfontein and accused him of
purchasing stolen karakul pelts from the Khaiǁkhaun. Frank procured the representation of the
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law firm of Harry Bloch & Co. and brought a case of slander against the SWAA. The magistrate
ruled in Frank’s favor and found the accusations to be unsubstantiated.99 The judge awarded
Frank £3,000 to repay the damages made to his reputation and dealt another blow to the
SWAA’s pelt-theft narrative.100 Despite the collapse of the plot and a lack of legally-sound
evidence for removal, the SWAA issued a notice of eviction for the Khaiǁkhaun on 3 December
1956. The SWAA planned to remove the Khaiǁkhaun to the inhospitable reserves at Berseba,
Aminuis, and Tses. The Khaiǁkhaun believed the eviction order violated their legal ownership of
the land and refused to willingly leave Hoachanas.101
On 12 October 1957, Johannes Dausab petitioned the members of the Committee on
South West Africa to place South West Africa under the trusteeship system to resist these forced
removals and abuses meted out by the SWAA. He meticulously detailed the developments at
Hoachanas that placed the Khaiǁkhaun’s continued residence in the reserve in jeopardy.
Furthermore, Dausab reiterated that, “In case the United Nations learned that we the inhabitants
of Hoachanas are no [longer] at Hoachanas, the United Nations Organization are already told
that [this] will happen only by force, because we are totally [determined not] to go away from
Hoachanas, our inheritance. Nobody should have the right to assert that we have moved
voluntarily and on our consent. Hoachanas is [a] fertile agricultural place, if only we [were]
helped to improve our irrigation.”102 Dausab ensured that the SWAA’s continued attempts to
forcibly remove the Khaiǁkhaun would be understood as an act against the will of the residents at
Hoachanas and tried to leverage this information to increase international pressure from the UN.
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The eviction notice for the entire AME congregation at Hoachanas failed in December
1956 as the AME congregants refused to heed the government order. Throughout the 1950s,
Francis Gow and AME officials from South Africa and the United States continued to work with
the government to receive approval and recognition for the construction of AME churches and
schools in the Police Zone, a move that was viewed by congregants as a way to further entrench
the AME Church and its followers on the land. As a result, the SWAA created a new plan that
focused solely on the eviction of Markus Kooper as a way to get the congregation to follow. In
1958, Administrator D.T. du Plessis Viljoen brought an eviction case against Kooper that
claimed he was an illegal resident at Hoachanas. Kooper knew that the trial lacked integrity and
believed he would not receive a fair trial in the High Court of Windhoek. He refused to appear
before the High Court, and the case against him proceeded in his absence, concluding with the
High Court finding in favor of the SWAA. In July 1958, Kooper received his notice of eviction
but refused to relocate to Itsawisis.103 This final refusal to relocate set the stage for the events of
29 January 1959, when an armed police detachment committed acts of violence against the
resisting Khaiǁkhaun to forcibly remove Kooper.
A series of petitions submitted by Dausab and Kooper to the UN in 1960 detail the events
that unfolded at Hoachanas. Kooper and his congregation’s refusal to leave Hoachanas
necessitated action by Viljoen to appease the white Hoachanites and open up arable land. Viljoen
deployed a division of the South African police force to Hoachanas to ensure the removal of
Kooper. The Magistrate of Rehoboth, A.C. Chatwind, District Commander of Police Major
Lombard, Adjunct Commissioner of the South West Africa Police, Colonel N.J. Dorfling, and

“Ejection Order Against Natives in [Hoachanas] Reserve: Alternate Ground Offered,” Windhoek Advertiser, 22
July 1958.
103

316

Derm policeman Oliver accompanied the detachment deployed to Hoachanas.104 The detachment
arrived at Hoachanas in the early morning hours of 29 January 1959. The sun had not yet risen,
but AME member Jonas Nakom recalled, “[On 29 January 1959] these officials [came] in seven
motor cars under the leadership of [Chatwind and Dorfling] with 15 Europeans and 12 Native
African policemen.”105 Oliver led the police into Hoachanas from the east and halted before
reaching the congregants’ houses.106Accounts suggest that the police force was heavily armed
and militarized. Many petitioners claimed that the police brought a machine gun with them and
that they carried “guns on points of which bayonets were fixed.”107 In addition to substantial
firepower, police carried an array of handheld weapons, including assegais, kieries, police
batons, and knives.108
Kooper awoke as the police detachment entered Hoachanas and went to speak to
Chatwind. He recalled that the magistrate, who introduced Colonel Dorfling, said that as a result
of the so-called High Court decision the previous year, they came to eject him from
Hoachanas.109 Kooper’s primary concern was whether the police came to remove only him, or all
Khaiǁkhaun residents from Hoachanas. These concerns were rooted in the spread of recent
rumors that claimed the white residents near Hoachanas held a meeting in conjunction with the
police to conspire about land removals. Kooper feared that the removal of his congregation to
inhospitable lands would force the Khaiǁkhaun to participate in the migrant labor system or work
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on white-owned farms. When Kooper asked Dorfling who they planned to evict, Dorfling
responded, “[T]oday [we are] removing only [Reverend Kooper], but [you can] tell the others
that they will be ejected one day.”110 Upon learning his fate, Kooper requested the opportunity to
return to his home and change clothing and Dorfling assented. Dorfling’s own account suggests
that Kooper appeared ready to peaceably leave Hoachanas.111
Khaiǁkhaun and SWAA sources corroborate that Kooper returned to his house to change
and that a number of the residents at Hoachanas emerged from their homes. However, the
Khaiǁkhaun and SWAA narratives surrounding the subsequent events of 29 January 1959
contradict one another. Khaiǁkhaun accounts claim that they presented no threat to the police.
One UN petitioner wrote that they shouted at the police that Reverend Kooper was a minister and
“[he is] in no way responsible for [our] refusal to move from Hoachanas!”112 Colonel Dorfling’s
account contradicted Khaiǁkhaun sources. His account stated that between 150 and 200 people,
including school children, purposefully marched up from the school, “jeered” at police and
demanded they leave. Dorfling further contended that the actions of the residents of Hoachanas
moved beyond shouting, with some residents hurling rocks at the police and, in one instance, a
resident was seen carrying “a bicycle chain fastened to a piece of wood.”113
Tensions continued to mount while Kooper changed, and the situation outside
deteriorated. Local leader Matheus Kooper asked Dorfling the purpose of the police presence and
Dorfling replied that the police came “in peace” to carry out the eviction notice. Matheus Kooper
and the Khaiǁkhaun residents knew, based on previous experiences with police brutality, that the
claim was disingenuous. The crowd’s shouts that “[the police] have come to attack us” belied the
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strained nature of this precarious relationship.114 Dorfling recognized that the situation had
become increasingly dangerous and that the Khaiǁkhaun would not allow the police to remove
Kooper. During these conversations, a small group of residents entered Kooper’s home and
managed to barricade the door in an attempt to thwart the police’s attempt to evict the
reverend.115 In response to this “subversive” act, Dorfling instructed his policemen to fix their
bayonets to their rifles and ordered his white policemen to form a protective ring around the lorry
designated to transport Kooper to Itsawisis. He further commanded his African policemen to use
their batons and weaponry to disperse the crowd and gain entry to Kooper’s home.116
When the crowd refused to disperse, Dorfling ordered his policemen to charge the people
with their bayonets and batons. A bloody confrontation ensued, resulting in the injury of 18 men.
Policemen beat several residents so badly with their batons that during an interview with Allard
Lowenstein nearly five months later, a man presented his injured leg and still-bandaged arm. He
described the events of 29 January 1959, recounting that “[the residents] were made to see our
blood run down on the ground.”117 Another interviewee echoed this sentiment and stated, “the
police [fought] the people so that the blood was running down the bodies of the people.”118
The policemen inflicted severe injury on an additional seven women during their attack at
Hoachanas. One resident provided an account of the injuries his pregnant wife sustained. He
recalled that the policemen under Dorfling’s command “bodily assaulted” his wife and caused
her to have a miscarriage.119 UN petitioners noted that police attacked more than one pregnant
woman and, in some cases, “the police stabbed people, including women, on their stomachs with
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bayonets.”120 Additionally, some of the policemen were even accused of using their knives to
threaten the children who marched up from the AME school.121 One petitioner even went as far
as to beg the UN to intervene on their behalf and stop the violence, crying out “I am praying that
the United Nations will dry my tears for me.”122
Kooper provided the most vivid accounts of his removal, telling Lowenstein, “From my
house I was guided by three policemen…. When I was brought to the lorry, I was taken by my
right hand by a Coloured policeman [and an] Ovambo policeman took my left hand….I was in
my full [clerical] uniform.”123 After the policemen successfully removed Kooper from his home,
two African policemen threw Kooper into an old road construction lorry originally designed to
transport livestock.124 Petitioner Jonas Nakom recalled the unbearable sight, “We saw our poor
minister being thrown on one of the government’s lorries like a thief…without food and without
water.”125 Policemen then proceeded to throw his wife, teenage daughter, and four sons, all under
the age of 10, into the same lorry.126
On the morning of 29 January 1959, police successfully removed Kooper from
Hoachanas. After stops at Tses and Derm, the SWAA dumped Kooper at barren Itsawisis. There,
Kooper joined the Khaiǁkhaun NGK congregants who evacuated Hoachanas in 1956 in
compliance with the first eviction order. The environment at Itsawisis proved difficult for
Kooper and his family. He described the lack of food in a petition sent to the United Nations,
writing, “Sirs, while I do not know the present situation of my people at Hoachanas whom I have
been serving and from whom I was depending for my meals and salary. I, together with my wife
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and children are in a miserable situation of hunger….I fed my children on gum since we have
been [thrown] away in these lifeless stones….I am closing the petition so far for today because I
am going to fetch gum…our only diet to quiet my children crying for food.”127 Despite Kooper’s
removal and his family’s suffering, he still demanded that the congregation remain at Hoachanas
and continue to resist the SWAA’s eviction order. Kooper attempted to keep the spirits and
morale of the congregation high by stealthily returning to preach to them at Hoachanas each
month.
During Kooper’s time at Itsawisis he came into contact with sympathetic transnational
actors interested in exposing the oppressive nature of South African rule in the territory. Kooper
resolved to expose the abuses and injustices the Khaiǁkhaun faced at the hands of the SWAA and
utilized these transnational networks to send petitions and accounts to the United Nations.
Reverend Scott learned of Kooper’s resistance campaign through his communications with Chief
Kutako and AME leaders in the Union. Through information garnered from meeting Scott,
Allard Lowenstein proceeded to travel to South West Africa and secure testimony from Kooper
about the eviction attempts. Kooper provided an oral account of the violence at Hoachanas while
Lowenstein ferried him from Itsawisis to Hoachanas to preach.128
Upon Lowenstein’s return to the United States, the oral accounts provided by Kooper and
his congregants were transcribed, and plans were made to enter the accounts into evidence
against the South African government. When Lowenstein and two of his companions provided
oral testimony before the UN in late 1959, copies of the tapes were distributed to members of the
General Assembly and entered into the record. The compelling testimony provided by
Lowenstein and the taped petitions of Kooper and his followers resulted in the passage of a series

127
128

Ibid.
Lowenstein, Brutal Mandate, 95-100.

321

of resolutions by the General Assembly. The General Assembly referred to the Union
government’s actions as a “violation of fundamental human rights and the sacred trust assumed
by the government” and as “not in conformity with the mandate or the Charter of the United
Nations…[and] contrary to the obligation undertaken by the mandatory power to promote to the
utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the ‘Native’ inhabitants of
the Territory.”129 The resolution then “Urge[d] the Government of the Union of South Africa to
desist from carrying out the removal of other residents of the Hoachanas Reserve and to arrange
for the return of the Reverend Markus Kooper and his family to that reserve.”130
The petitions presented by Lowenstein and his companions in 1959 and 1960 received
the most attention by the press, as his influential network of activist supporters promoted his
testimony and subsequent book in the newspapers. Once again, the Black press in the United
States most actively carried stories about the testimony provided at the UN. In October 1959, the
Afro-American ran a brief story about the various petitioners that were heard by the General
Assembly and quoted activist teacher Emory Bundy as describing the conditions in South West
Africa as “near-slavery.”131 A much lengthier story ran the subsequent week in the New York
Amsterdam News that provided significantly more detail about the living conditions faced by
Namibians in the territory and included numerous quotes from the testimony of Namibians who
previously fled South Africa and South West Africa to come to the United States.132 Hans
Beukes, a Namibian student bound to study in Oslo who had his passport revoked by the South
African government, also received significant press coverage in the United States and in Cape
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Town.133 Newspapers would continue to cite Lowenstein’s and Scott’s testimony in the United
States press in the coming years, keeping discussions on the South West Africa question in the
public sphere and continuing to influence public opinion against the South African state.134
Lowenstein actively worked to secure funds from sympathetic actors in the United States.
Meanwhile, Kooper wrote to the UN from exile in Bechuanaland and requested an oral hearing
to provide his own testimony before the General Assembly. Kooper received a cable from the
UN on 3 June 1960 that granted him an oral hearing on 5 July 1960.135 He faced great difficulty
in securing a passport to travel to the UN to provide his testimony and, as a result, his oral
hearing was pushed back to the Fall of 1960. When Kooper finally arrived at the UN, he
provided compelling testimony in his own words to alert the General Assembly that the Union
government was still engaged in efforts to remove his congregation from Hoachanas and
reaffirm that the congregation was still unwilling to go to Itsawisis. Although the SWAA
continued in its attempts to remove the Khaiǁkhaun, the recognition of their right to reside at
Hoachanas by the UN only bolstered their resolve to remain at the reserve, and they successfully
resisted these future removal attempts. Whereas the Herero’s petitions ultimately forced the
SWAA to make the internal decision to halt its forced land expropriation schemes at Aminuis,
the Khaiǁkhaun resistance campaign held even more international significance. Their successful
use of the UN’s transnational networks and infrastructure forced the UN General Assembly to
issue resolutions condemning the South African government’s activities. This signified the
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sweeping reach and success that resistance campaigns waged by small groups, for subnational
concessions, could succeed in the larger international political order.

Conclusion
The petitions submitted between 1947 and 1959 brought intense international scrutiny on
the Union government for its treatment of Namibians in the Police Zone. Namibian leaders like
Chief Hosea Kutako and Reverend Markus Kooper recognized that any attempt to halt the forced
land removals and seek recourse through the apartheid state would prove futile. What initially
began as a process of seeking inclusion in the colonial decision-making process necessarily
evolved into a resistance campaign demanding exclusion from the SWAA’s repressive apartheid
policies. The Union government’s refusal to willingly place South West Africa under the control
of the UN Trusteeship Council limited the ability of the UN to stop abusive and oppressive
practices aimed at Namibians. South West Africa remained directly under the control of the
SWAA and was governed as a de facto fifth province of the Union. This resulted in the
continued, and often unimpeded, expansion of apartheid state in South West Africa and
reinforced the importance of looking outside of South West Africa’s territorial boundaries in
order to resist the colonial state.
As a result, Namibians accessed long-standing transnational networks sympathetic to the
demands of the indigenous people of South West Africa. Supportive transnational actors like the
Reverend Michael Scott and Allard Lowenstein aided in the transmission of these petitions to the
United Nations. There, the petitions were analyzed by state actors and representatives who could
exert external pressure on the apartheid state. The numerous and continued reports coming out
of South West Africa resulted in tangible victories for Namibians, like the creation of the
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Committee on South West Africa in 1953 in order to handle the growing volume of petitions
coming from the territory. This Committee, the result of the intense petition-writing campaign
waged by Namibians, wrote and distributed reports on the worsening situation in the territory for
Namibians. By 1956, the Committee, via the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, secured a ruling that
permitted oral hearings for South West African petitioners at the UN.
Most of these petitions dealt with subnational socioeconomic issues prominent in the
1950s Police Zone and concerns over the treatment of Namibians in the reserves. Kutako
petitioned the United Nations to make them aware of a proposed land exchange scheme at the
Aminuis Reserve that sought to take away the reserve’s most valuable land for white farmers and
give Namibians undesirable lands. Further south in Hoachanas, similar pressures from white
farmers during a time of drought and agricultural hardship led the SWAA to develop plans for
the removal of the AME congregation at that reserve. In each case, Namibian leaders drew on
their historical linkages to the reserves and claimed the right to legal and continued residence at
these locations to resist the SWAA plans. Both campaigns pursued inclusion in the face of
exclusionary policies that attempted to further marginalize the territory’s African populations.
This resistance strategy and use of the United Nations as a mechanism for recourse
against the apartheid state clearly had an impact on the state’s decision-making process and their
ability to arbitrarily carry out forced removals. Letters between Verwoerd and the administrator
in South West Africa reveal a minister astutely aware of the problems increased scrutiny at the
UN could cause in the territory. He feared that Kutako’s petitions could cause just such a
disturbance and thus, he reluctantly abandoned the plan to siphon off part of the Aminuis
Reserve in 1958. At Hoachanas, Kooper’s resistance activities and subsequent international
pressure also proved successful in dissuading the SWAA from removing the AME congregation.
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His petitions and audio recordings provided enough evidence of the Union government’s
wrongdoing that, in November of 1959, the General Assembly passed a resolution demanding
the actions of the Union government be investigated and that the Khaiǁkhaun be permitted to
remain at Hoachanas. In each case Namibian leaders were successful, even if only temporarily,
in preventing the arbitrary removal of their followers.
Discussions of subnational issues like forced removals and land expropriation dominated
the petitions of leaders in other parts of the territory as well. For example, Johanne Beukes
continually submitted petitions to the UN to resolve disputes over land in Rehoboth in the postWorld War II period. Likewise, petitions from outside of the Police Zone in Ovamboland also
complained about environmental crisis, land issues, and the abusive migratory labor system. The
Damara also submitted petitions over their concerns about their increasingly burdensome
situation. In each case, leaders sought to resolve their subnational issues and mitigate the abuses
committed by the SWAA against Namibians through the use of transnational actors and
institutions, rather than pursue outright territorial independence for South West Africa.
More violent forced removals also occurred in the urban areas, with the attempted
removal of Namibians from the Old Location in Windhoek being the most problematic. Protests
and women’s marches erupted in Windhoek as the SWAA attempted a forced removal of
Namibian residents of the Old Location to the newly-created township in Katutura. Among these
protests and marches, unrest outside of a beer hall in Windhoek resulted in the police opening
fire and killing 12 people.136 Whereas the UN was swift to action in the cases above, their
unwillingness and inability to reprimand the Union government following the Windhoek
Massacre led to a prolonged and voluminous petition-writing campaign from Namibians,
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particularly during SWAPO’s and SWANU’s infancy. However, that petition-writing campaign
took on a more nationalist tone, something largely missing in the earlier petitions of Kutako and
the congregants at Hoachanas.
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Chapter 7—International Student Politics and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1950-1962
The transnational resistance strategies implemented by Namibians in the Police Zone
between 1919 and the late 1950s developed largely along subnational ethnopolitical lines, which
at times became ethnically exclusive or developed specific characteristics depending on where
the strategy was employed in the territory. For example, the Rehoboth Basters’ use of
transnational networks and supranational political institutions during their petition-writing
campaign in the 1920s and 1930s pertained specifically to the Basters’ desire to re-establish
political autonomy in the Gebiet. Similarly, Namibians’ embrace of the UNIA as a means to
resist the SWAA’s implementation of segregationist policies in the 1920s illuminated
subnational fissures when the Herero seizure of power in the Windhoek branch led the Nama
members of the UNIA at Rehoboth to pursue their own sociopolitical ends through the
association’s framework. In the post-World War II period, the use of the AME Church as a
transnational resistance mechanism was likewise defined by its ethnic exclusivity, with the Nama
most vigorously incorporating the church into its strategies in the 1940s and 1950s.
As the 1950s unfolded, however, a new generation of social and political leaders from the
Police Zone emerged and sought new strategies to resist the apartheid state. These new leaders
were younger and more radical than their predecessors. Previous generations lacked many of the
educational opportunities that emerged during the 1950s, with Namibian students having new
opportunities to attend high schools and universities in South Africa and beyond. As this new
youthful intelligentsia developed and moved between South West Africa and South Africa for
their education, their approach to resistance took on a more nationalistic nature than its earlier
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iterations as they demanded not only educational reforms, but also complete territorial
independence.1
This new generation of Namibian leaders’ educational experiences in South Africa were
key to the formulation of new nationalist resistance strategies that sprung up at the end of the
1950s. In South Africa, a select number of Namibian students at the University of Fort Hare and
the University of Cape Town (UCT) were introduced to the ANC’s Youth League, with Fort
Hare serving as one of the Youth League’s main branches from 1948 onward. Here, Namibian
students were re-introduced to concepts of Black nationalism that had faded in popularity in
South West Africa after the collapse of the UNIA in 1924. At South Africa’s open universities
and pre-dominantly Black institutions like Fort Hare, Namibian students also engaged with
sympathetic transnational actors, student organizations, and university faculty with access to
extensive resource networks that possessed in-depth knowledge of the apartheid state.2
Namibian students’ use of these networks as a means of resistance to the apartheid state
centered on tapping into global resources to facilitate the creation of a Namibian intelligentsia in
exile that could wage a campaign of resistance against the South African government with
limited fear of the recursive power of the state. Essential to this approach at the end of the 1950s
was the desire of these Namibian students to present a political front that was united in its desire
to secure the territory’s independence from South Africa and seize control of the mechanisms of
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state. Over the course of the 1950s, students like Jariretundu Fanuel Kozonguizi, Mburumba
Kerina, and Hans Beukes found themselves at the center of this new nationalist strategy when
they used student organizations and universities across the globe, like the United States National
Student Association (NSA), the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), the
Norwegian National Union of Students (NSU), and the Swedish National Union of Students
(SFS) to escape South Africa in pursuit of more expansive educational opportunities abroad.
During this flight and formation of a Namibian intelligentsia in exile, Namibian students
embraced the suggestion by the leadership of the aforementioned student organizations to appear
in person before the UN and provide testimony on the abuses meted out by the South African
state. The following pages examine the role that these networks and student organizations played
in facilitating the appearance of Kozonguizi, Kerina, and Beukes before the UN in October 1959
and how these students attempted to sway public and international political opinion against the
apartheid state to frustrate and temper the extension of apartheid policies over Namibians in
South West Africa.
This chapter argues that there was no clean break between the subnational resistance
strategies of the past four decades and the new nationalistic resistance strategies that emerged in
the 1960s and advocated for national independence. The use of student organizations and
universities across the globe was initially intended to address subnational concerns of
educational and economic underdevelopment in South West Africa. However, over time,
Namibian students’ interactions with Pan-Africanist and nationalist organizations across the
globe introduced Namibians to new unified nationalistic means of resistance. While these
students still pursued their education for individual socioeconomic reasons, they used these
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experiences with Western-styled education and transnational organizations to open a new phase
in Namibians’ fight against the South African colonial regime.

The Development and Foundation of the Global Anti-Apartheid
Movement in the 1950s
Many of the educational opportunities secured by Namibian students that ultimately led
to their testimony at the UN in October 1959 were made possible by the rising tide of antiapartheid sentiment in parts of the Western world in the 1950s. The global anti-apartheid
movement began in earnest in the 1950s among a small, educated intelligentsia, but rapidly
expanded as more people became aware of the South African government’s policies towards
Africans and had direct interactions with those who experienced the brunt of these policies.
Mobility undoubtedly played an essential role in the spread and growth of the movement.
International student conferences and meetings of political institutions created the necessary
space for the liberal elements of Western society to network, debate, and coordinate both
national and transnational campaigns of resistance against the South African government. South
Africans in exile frequently attended these meetings, gave speeches, and provided a necessary
“face” that humanized the abstract “other” that often seemed so distant to Europeans and
Americans. Through these interactions with South Africans and by hearing their personal stories,
sympathetic actors and activists created an emotional connection to the anti-apartheid movement
that hardened their commitment to the eradication of these oppressive policies in southern
Africa.3
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The transnational anti-apartheid networks that developed between the 1950s and 1994
effectively connected thousands of disparate groups that spanned cross-sections of society,
including solidarity organizations, churches, labor unions, youth organizations, and student
organizations in over 100 countries. In this way, the global and transnational anti-apartheid
movement truly was a “New Social Movement (NSM).”4 The movement transcended the
boundaries of economic class, social status, or organizational affiliation and represented the
emergence of a new “transnational political culture.”5 Driven heavily by the production and
dissemination of knowledge to the masses, public opinion became a key ideological battleground
of the anti-apartheid movement and played a key role in reaffirming the solidarity and goals of
the movement as a whole.6 While in 1956 the international attitude and opposition to apartheid
could best be described as a “diffuse moral condemnation of [the South African government],”
the nearly 100 arrests and subsequent Treason Trial served to “[accelerate] the growth of
international campaigns against apartheid.”7
Although the anti-apartheid movement began in South Africa, the movement quickly
spread in the 1950s and developed epicenters of activity in Britain, Scandinavia, and the United
States. At the heart of the early anti-apartheid movements were the student organizations that
possessed a fairly liberal sociopolitical ideology and a vast network of connections across the
globe. Although the involvement of student organizations in the 1950s varied by country, by the
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1960s the aforementioned countries possessed numerous student organizations that took a highly
active role in coordinating and participating in the global anti-apartheid movement. In order to
understand how exactly these student organizations played a role in aiding the transnational
resistance strategies of Namibians in the Police Zone, one must first examine how the antiapartheid movement developed in South Africa and then spread to student organizations in
countries far outside of the recursive reach of the South African government.
As the third chapter detailed, the NP came to power in South Africa through the 1948
South African General Elections and implemented their apartheid policies to segregate South
African society in all spheres of life. The African intelligentsia in South Africa quickly
developed resistance strategies meant to frustrate the South African state and slow the
implementation of apartheid. In the 1940s, South Africa saw a rise in instances of grassroots
urban protest against the government’s restrictive policies. Political Scientist Brendan D. Works
contended that roughly 300 workers’ strikes occurred between 1939 and 1945. While more
militant resistance became popular during this period, moderate tactics of petition-writing and
public organizing were frequently used to place pressure on the government to secure
concessions that resolved minor local problems. Frequently, the division between these two
approaches in South Africa broke along class lines. Elite Africans and those in charge of the
ANC tended to embrace the more moderate approach to anti-apartheid protest, while the masses
embraced the more militant organizing that flourished among the trade and workers’ unions.8
The divergent approaches of these two groups were primarily reconciled when the ANC
Youth League organized in 1944 and a “new generation of more assertive leaders” encouraged a
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more militant shift within the ANC that led to “elite-led mass action.”9 This change in approach
came to a climax in 1949 when the ANC adopted its “Programme of Action,” which advocated
for the more militant approach embraced by the masses. Key to this strategy were campaigns of
civil disobedience, worker strikes, economic boycotts, and other acts of non-violent resistance.
This ultimately marked the beginning of “mass-based opposition” toward the South African
government that came to define the resistance campaigns of the 1950s.10
Throughout the 1950s, the ANC’s strategy also focused on undermining white support,
both domestically and internationally, for the South African apartheid regime by “revealing its
anti-democratic charter.”11 Works described the ANC’s approach as a “war of position” that
sought to undermine the NP’s “moral legitimacy” and “engage the state almost exclusively on an
ideological level.”12 ANC leadership believed that the most effective way to splinter white
support for the NP-led government was to embrace non-violent forms of mass protest in the early
1950s. Following the violence meted out during the May Day protests on 1 May 1950, the ANC
called for a National Day of Protest and Mourning on 26 June 1950 to protest the issuance of a
series of six unjust laws that Black South Africans viewed as further entrenching the apartheid
system.13 ANC leadership believed that African workers formed the backbone of the South
African economy and issued a “nationwide stay-at-home” on the Day of Protest as an act of civil
disobedience and economic resistance.14 Two years later, the ANC proceeded to launch their
Campaign of Defiance of Unjust Laws where volunteers “violate[d] petty apartheid laws, [got]
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arrested, and fill[ed] the prisons” in an attempt to overturn apartheid laws and overwhelm the
South African prison system.15 The Campaign of Defiance commenced on 26 June 1952 and
resulted in the arrest of nearly 8,000 South Africans; though it did not overturn the apartheid
system, the campaign received recognition by the UN and a commission was started to
investigate the matter.16
While the ANC waged its campaign of political and economic resistance against the
apartheid state, student organizations in South Africa fought against the extension of these
policies into the academic sphere. NUSAS played an instrumental role in coordinating antiapartheid resistance among the South African open universities and, perhaps more
consequentially, spread the anti-apartheid movement to sympathetic student organizations across
the globe that would play an influential role in aiding Namibian resistance to the South African
government’s colonial rule. NUSAS was founded in 1924 with the intent to “represent all
students at white and open universities in South Africa.”17 Yet, NUSAS failed to uphold this
lofty ideal until 1945 when Black African students from the University of Fort Hare and the
Hewat Training College were admitted to the organization.18 At this time, NUSAS amended its
constitution and included the defense of democracy and the “[encouragement and promotion] of
educational and economic opportunity to all South Africa with special attention to the
underprivileged.”19 However, until the mid 1950s, NUSAS focused primarily on issues of
apartheid that directly impacted student life and the halls of academia.
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Beginning in 1953, the ever-increasing encroachment of the government into academia
accelerated NUSAS’s anti-apartheid activism and resistance. In 1953, the Bantu Education Act
was instituted and the government’s intention to introduce apartheid to South African
universities was apparent.20 In March 1956, NUSAS and the faculty at UCT and the University
of Witwatersrand (Wits) became aware of the early manifestations of the future Extension of
University Education Act that would formally introduce apartheid in the university.21
Throughout 1956 and 1957, the faculty and student body at these universities passed a number of
resolutions and statements that opposed academic segregation and led protest marches against
the implementation of the act.22 While NUSAS’s activities were initially viewed as a minor
threat in the early-to-mid 1950s, their participation in protests alongside alternative, more
militant white liberal opposition groups like the Black Sash and the Torch Commando in the late
1950s and early 1960s soon drew the ire of the apartheid government.23
While NUSAS and white liberal student groups played an important role in the South
African anti-apartheid movement of the 1950s, the anti-apartheid movement in 1950s Britain
consisted of little involvement from student organizations and universities. Although the
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involvement of student organizations featured more prominently in the 1960s and 1970s, liberal
white intellectuals and activist priests defined the direction of Britain’s early anti-apartheid
movement. Initially, this movement was confined to small white elite circles in Britain.
However, the activities of the Reverend Michael Scott and his address to the UN in November
1949 served as a catalyst for the growth of British anti-apartheid activism and resulted in
increased media coverage for the already-existent movements occurring in South Africa.24 In
between his appearances at the UN as a representative on behalf of the Herero Chiefs’ Council
(HCC) and Chief Hosea Kutako, Scott worked tirelessly to promote the anti-apartheid cause in
Britain and bring it to the masses. Scott attended a number of public meetings across Britain
throughout the 1950s to speak on his experiences in South Africa with the apartheid regime and,
more importantly, appealed to political organizations like the Union of Democratic Control
(UDC) and the National Peace Committee that more directly pressured the government on issues
of foreign policy.25
Despite Scott’s best efforts, British public opinion against the South African apartheid
regime was slow to turn. In 1952, Scott and his associates founded the Africa Bureau to create an
organization that disseminated information about the African political situation and the struggles
for independence to the British public. The founding of the Africa Bureau and subsequent
organizations like the Movement for Colonial Freedom “helped stimulate public interest in
African affairs during the early 1950s.”26 This, much like earlier attempts to generate anti-
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apartheid sentiment among the British public, was confined primarily to “establishment circles”
that served as important voices of dissent and laid the foundation for the anti-apartheid
movement that flourished in the late 1950s and 1960s.27
In addition to Scott’s activities, other Christian activists became involved in antiapartheid protest in the 1950s out of a fear that remaining silent on the issue of apartheid
“fatally undermine[d] Christianity within Africa.”28 Historian Robert Skinner described the
problem faced by these British church activists: “For church and missionary circles, apartheid
raised an acute dilemma: on the one hand, very few argued that South African government policy
was reasonable (and it was unlikely that British clergy would run the risk of perceived
association with the state as they were elsewhere in Africa), while on the other, any criticism
risked undermining church activities.”29 To distinguish themselves from those who remained
silent on the issue of apartheid, activist priests like Bishop Trevor Huddleston published works
and treatises that invoked theological arguments to condemn the immorality of the apartheid
system and highlight the danger that silence on the issue presented to society. Works like
Huddleston’s Naught For Your Comfort publicized the anti-apartheid cause in 1950s Britain and
brought the issue to a much wider audience.30
These early efforts to grow the British anti-apartheid movement in the 1950s provided
tangible results when new institutions and strategies were established to place pressure on the
South African government. In 1956, the same year the Treason Trials in South Africa began,
Anglican priest John Collins established the International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF) to
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provide legal and financial support to those in South Africa accused of violating apartheid laws.
Subsequently, in June 1959 the Committee of African Organizations (CAO) formed a Boycott
Committee at a meeting in London. This movement evolved over time into the Independent
Boycott Movement, the forerunner to the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) created in Britain
by South African exiles.31
While the British anti-apartheid movements of the 1950s were largely devoid of
substantial influence from student organizations, elsewhere in Europe, particularly in
Scandinavia, student organizations formed the backbone of the early anti-apartheid movement.
The two Scandinavian countries most active in the anti-apartheid movement of the 1950s were
Norway and Sweden. Norwegian Historian Tore Linné Eriksen described the Norwegian
government and public as “silent through most of the 1950s,” contending that there was a limited
public interest in the issue of South African apartheid.32 Similarly, despite Norway having a
permanent mission to the UN, the government was hesitant to openly criticize the South African
government and the permanent mission frequently avoided the denouncement of the South
African government with the belief that they would be more open to listening to a “friendly”
voice.33
Eriksen credits the “internationally-inclined student organizations” for increasing the
Norwegian public’s attention to the South African apartheid regime in the late 1950s.34 After
Bantu Education passed in South Africa in 1953 and threatened the academic integrity of the
English-speaking open universities in South Africa, the NSU created a scholarship fund as an act
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of resistance against the apartheid regime.35 The scholarship fund was used to sponsor the study
of African students at the University of Oslo for a period of three months. The scholarship
program experienced limited success until it expanded the length of the scholarship to three years
in 1959 to allow students to complete their education at a Norwegian institution. Beginning in
1959 with the “Beukes Affair,” the scholarship fund experienced more success.36
In 1959, as a result of the Norwegian students’ efforts to bring more attention to the
abuses committed by the South African government, other elements of Norwegian society joined
the anti-apartheid movement. In October 1959, the Norwegian South Africa Committee formed
with the explicit purpose to internationally oppose the South African government, continue to
fund scholarships for African students to attend Norwegian universities, and explore the idea of a
consumer boycott on South African goods.37 Likewise, in 1959 Norwegian trade unionists and
students organized the aforementioned consumer boycott to directly impact the South African
economy and pressure the South African government to change its apartheid policies.38
Swedish society was similarly slow to grapple with South Africa’s apartheid regime.
Anti-apartheid activist Tor Sellström belied this point, writing “As Swedish society in general,
students at the universities of Gothenburg, Lund, Stockholm, and Uppsala were largely isolated
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from the colonized world until after the Second World War.”39 However, in the 1950s, with
increasing interaction between the SFS, South African students, and NUSAS, the Swedish
student unions became more involved in anti-apartheid activities. In the early 1950s the SFS
started a scholarship fund for international students geared toward bringing African students to
Swedish universities. This continued until 1955 when the South African government informed
the SFS that only white South African students could participate in the program. Despite this
setback and the SFS sending a delegation to South Africa to ascertain why this restriction was
placed on the program, it only steeled their resolve to provide scholarships for students who were
“working for freedom from colonialism and segregation.”40
In 1958 and 1959, with the impending implementation of the Extension of University
Education Act in South Africa, the SFS responded to NUSAS’s call for increased scholarship
funds for African students. Between 1950 and 1958, the SFS raised nearly 25,000 SEK to fund
the study of African students at Swedish universities. In 1958, the SFS attempted to further
increase its scholarship fund by appealing to the Swedish universities to fully finance a six-year
scholarship for a Black student. The cost of such a scholarship was roughly 30,000 SEK.
Students embraced this challenge and raised money through blood donations, successfully
raising approximately 7500 SEK annually from 1958 to 1964. In 1959, the SFS attempted to
influence Swedish politics by convincing the Swedish foreign minister to raise the issue of the
worsening situation for African students in South Africa at the UN General Assembly. The SFS
succeeded in having their request conveyed to the General Assembly and this represented the
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first time the Swedish government brought a matter pertaining to apartheid to the attention of the
UN.41
Although the global anti-apartheid movement developed more robustly as a NSM in the
1960s and 1970s, transcending class and social divisions, the origins of this transnational
movement emerged in the 1950s and was spurred forward by the collaborative efforts of student
organizations, universities, religious activists, and government officials. In South Africa,
NUSAS spearheaded white liberals’ and students’ anti-apartheid activities and served as an
important link between non-white South Africans and sympathetic actors in Scandinavia, Britain,
and the United States. While activist priests and government officials led the movement in
Britain, student organizations in Norway and Sweden established scholarship funds as an act of
open resistance against the introduction of anti-liberal apartheid policies, like the Bantu
Education Act and the Extension of University Education Act, in South African higher
education. Similarly, NUSAS acted as intermediaries to engage with the NSA and other
American student organizations, who were comparatively late to the anti-apartheid movement,
to secure crucial funding and diplomatic support to facilitate the movement of African students
across borders. These collaborative efforts in the early-to-mid 1950s created the foundation for a
sprawling transnational network that was essential to the creation of a Namibian intelligentsia in
exile. These efforts provided students with the resources and means to flee southern Africa to
pursue a liberal Western-style education and, perhaps more importantly, testify in person before
the UN as part of a more united nationalist resistance strategy.
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Black Nationalist Politics at the University: Kozonguizi, Fort Hare,
and the Emergence of Namibian Student Activism
While white liberal student organizations across the globe solidified collaborative
resistance networks to openly contest South Africa’s apartheid policies in the 1950s, Namibian
students took advantage of a limited number of opportunities to pursue higher education in South
Africa. A select few places existed at predominantly-white open universities like UCT in South
Africa for Namibian students. However, the predominantly-Black Fort Hare University became a
breeding ground for a more militant Black student activism in the 1940s and 1950s and served as
a training ground for Namibian students to organize and network among their peers. Namibian
student Jariretundu Fanuel Kozonguizi, a Herero from Windhoek, was essential to Namibian
students’ organizing activities and played a crucial role in the establishment of formal Namibian
student organizations like the South West Africa Student Body (SWASB) and South West Africa
Progressive Association (SWAPA), which sought to connect the Namibian intelligentsia at
universities across southern Africa. These formal student bodies constituted the backbone of the
Namibian intelligentsia’s anti-apartheid resistance strategies in the 1950s and facilitated the
emergence of more nationalist political organizations in the 1960s.
Any examination of the impact that international universities and transnational student
organizations had on both Namibians’ subnational and national resistance campaigns against the
South African government must start at Fort Hare University and explore how this university
developed and awakened the political consciousness of the select few Namibian students who
gained admission to a university outside of South West Africa. Prior to the late 1950s, tertiary
education for non-white Namibians in South West Africa consisted merely of four teacher
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training colleges.42 Therefore, it was necessary for those Namibians who had exceeded the
limitations of the mission schools, teacher training schools, and government-run secondary
schools to leave the territory in order to advance their education. This primarily meant that
Namibians had to seek out educational opportunities in South Africa since the government
desired to maintain relative control over the education of its African populations. Fort Hare
University maintained a significant amount of autonomy from the government prior to the late
1950s and, as a result, became an intellectual training ground for many future African nationalist
leaders across southern, eastern, and central Africa. Among its most distinguished alumni were
Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Robert Mugabe, Seretse Khama, and Robert Sobukwe.43 The
same was true of Fort Hare’s impact on Namibia’s earliest nationalists, with the university
having a particularly powerful influence on the political thought and activities of Jariretundu
Fanuel Kozonguizi, one of the founders SWASB, SWAPA, and the political party SWANU.
The first institutions of higher learning appeared in South Africa in the early nineteenth
century with the founding of the South African College in Cape Town in 1829, the Dutch
Reformed Church theological seminary in 1859, and University of the Cape of Good Hope in
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1873.44 These institutions catered to the needs of their white students, and opportunities for
Black South Africans to receive a secondary or tertiary education centered almost entirely on the
efforts of transnational African American actors who were able to connect Africans to
educational opportunities and available funding in the United States. Mission educated Africans
frequently attended Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) or predominately
Black religiously-affiliated institutions in the United States during this period. Institutions like
Lincoln College, Wilberforce College, and the Tuskegee Institute were active in this student
exchange. Other colleges, like the Hampton Institute and Fisk University, had historical links to
South Africa that dated to the late nineteenth century.45
The education that Black South Africans received at these foreign institutions was often
incompatible with the segregationist policies of the nineteenth and twentieth century South
African government, as these institutions frequently advocated for an educational ethos steeped
in race pride and racial self-sufficiency. This produced the necessary seeds for an African
intelligentsia with hopes of substantial sociopolitical and economic change in South Africa.
There was fear among South African leadership that these ideas of social, racial, and economic
equality would filter down from this educated elite as they returned from their studies abroad and
potentially spread among the masses, causing large-scale unrest among Black South Africans.46
In order to prevent this from happening, proposals emerged at the beginning of the twentieth
century for the establishment of an African university with a curriculum under the purview of the
South African government.
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Two proposals for an African university emerged in the first decade of the twentieth
century with competing ideas of how much control whites should have in running such an
institution. In 1901, Mfengu leader and South African Native Congress (SANC) member Horatio
Isaiah Bud-Mbelle began a fundraising campaign to establish an African university. His proposal
was taken up at the SANC Annual Conference in September 1902, and the Queen Victoria
Memorial Fund was established to raise the necessary funds. The SANC’s ultimate ambition was
the establishment of an African university in the Eastern Cape that was largely devoid of white
control.47 Unsurprisingly, this proposal failed to generate sufficient support among South African
authorities.
Conversely, the South African Native Affairs Commission’s proposal for an African
university in 1905 garnered more support from missionaries and government officials in the
Cape. Following a “native convention” held at Lovedale in 1905, where the Cape government
was encouraged to accept the newly-named Inter-State Native College scheme, the SANC was
implored to merge their Queen Victoria Memorial Fund with the Inter-State Native College
scheme to fund a new university. The SANC refused out of a fear that this new scheme injected
an element of white control into the African university that they so desperately wanted to avoid.
The mission-sponsored Inter-State Native College scheme continued to grow in popularity as
influential Africans, like John Tengo Jabavu, threw their support behind the scheme and more
African organizations embraced the concept at the Inter-State Native College convention in July
1908.48
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Following the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the government embraced
the Inter-State scheme and the South African Native College at Fort Hare was established on 8
February 1916. Although no official religious affiliation existed, Fort Hare maintained a close
relationship with the Methodist and Presbyterian missionaries who originally supported the plan
and required their staff to “be professing Christians and of missionary sympathies.”49 In its
attachment to the University of South Africa (UNISA), Fort Hare served as a college preparatory
institution that prepared students for matriculation exams and university entrance until it was
incorporated under the Higher Education Act in 1923. Upon its incorporation in 1923, Fort Hare
students took UNISA’s examinations “for degree purposes and for diplomas in the Arts,
Agriculture, and Commerce.”50 This affiliation with UNISA continued until 1951, at which time
the re-named University of Fort Hare severed ties and affiliated instead with Rhodes University
by way of the Rhodes University (Private) Act of 1949.51
As the student body grew during these years, so too did the political consciousness and
activism of the student population at Fort Hare. The 1930s are generally referred to as a “period
of calm” at the university, with the university’s principal submitting a report on student activity
from 1916 to 1935 that described students as commendable for their discipline and educational
progress.52 However, beginning with the enrollment of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo at the
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university in 1939, there was a marked and clear shift in student political activity and the
emergence of a new, more radical political consciousness.53 The first iterations of this new more
militant student ideology emerged in 1941 and 1942 when the students at Fort Hare organized to
protest against the deteriorating quality of food offered by the university. Yet, it was the
establishment of the ANC Youth League in September 1944 that “[brought] in fresh blood and a
new radicalism within the ANC” and among the students at the University of Fort Hare.54 By
1948, the main branch of the ANC Youth League was established at Fort Hare by Robert
Sobukwe, Joe Matthews, Ntsu Mokhehle, and Godfrey Pitje, further increasing the political
activities and radicalization of the student body.55
The emergence of the ANC Youth League was significant for Black student politics in
South Africa and African politics at-large because it represented a clear shift away from more
conservative and traditional old-guard politics to a more confrontational and radical style of
organizing. The leaders of the ANC Youth League criticized the ANC’s leadership for using
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conservative resistance strategies like petitions and complaints. Instead, the Youth League
embraced more visible and direct strategies that centered on civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts,
and stay-at-homes. Additionally, the ANC Youth League was much more vocal in its weariness
of white liberal institutions and those Africans that collaborated with them, instead preferring a
resistance strategy for, and controlled by, Blacks. These strategies flourished at the universities
where the ANC Youth League had a strong foothold, but also emerged in national politics in the
early 1950s with the Day of Protest in 1951 and the Defiance Campaign in 1952.56
The radical student politics that developed at Fort Hare during the 1940s profoundly
impacted and shaped Namibians’ approaches to challenging the South African government
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with Jariretundu Kozonguizi emerging as one of the leading
Namibian student intellectuals studying in the Cape. At Fort Hare, Kozonguizi immersed himself
in African nationalism and came into contact with influential actors, groups, and resistance
campaigns that he and his fellow Namibians re-purposed and retooled for the Namibian context.
Kozonguizi was born in South West Africa in 1932 and attended primary school in Windhoek
before being sent by his family to South Africa where he worked for the Department of Native
Affairs. In South Africa, he matriculated at Fort Hare in the early 1950s, at which time he
became highly active in campus political organizing.57
At the University of Fort Hare, Kozonguizi and fellow Namibian student Zedekia
Ngavirue were active in the ANC Youth League in the 1950s and, in 1952, endeavored to
establish a similar organization that represented the interests of Namibian students at universities
in South Africa. In 1952, with the help of fellow Namibian students Ottilie Schimming, Kenneth
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Abrahams, Emil Appolus, and Lincoln University student Mburumba Kerina, Kozonguizi and
Ngavirue established SWASB.58 SWASB was an experimental organization that served as “one
of the first major organizational expressions of political opposition to colonial domination in
[South West Africa].”59 The membership of the organization consisted only of those students
studying abroad in South Africa and, as such, the organization concerned itself primarily with
promoting and protecting the interests of Namibian students.60 Since so few Namibian students
studied in South Africa at this time, SWASB was unable to grow and extend beyond its student
base like the ANC Youth League.61
To rectify SWASB’s shortcomings and expand into a more nationalist cultural
organization with a wider support base, Kozonguizi, Uatja Kaukuetu, and other students
returning from their studies in South Africa formed SWAPA in Windhoek in late 1955.62 The
support base for SWAPA was slightly larger than SWASB, yet SWAPA was still geared
primarily toward teachers, clerical workers, and educated Namibians. SWAPA initially
concerned itself mostly with issues of African education and providing guidance for Namibian
students looking to leave South West Africa and study at universities in South Africa. Unlike
SWASB, SWAPA was concerned with founding a more nationalistic movement and believed
that it was necessary to aid in the creation of a Namibian intelligentsia that could wage a
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resistance campaign against the South African government and run a nation once independence
was achieved.63
While in South Africa as a student, Kozonguizi was heavily involved in not only student
politics, but also in broader political movements in both South Africa and South West Africa.
Shortly after founding SWASB with other Namibian students attending high school and
university in South Africa, Kozonguizi joined the HCC in 1954 as an advisor to Chief Kutako.64
As a student, Kozonguizi submitted his first petition to the UN on 5 August 1954 lamenting the
inadequate state of education in South West Africa. He argued that the introduction of the Bantu
Education Act “would virtually eliminate African education in [South West Africa]” and that
“no more than six non-Europeans [had] progressed beyond high school standard.”65 Kozonguizi
detailed the obstacles put in place by the SWAA to prevent the establishment of student
organizations like SWASB.66 This, and subsequent petitions to the UN caused issues for
Kozonguizi during his studies, with his scholarship eventually pulled because of his engagement
with the international body.67
Kozonguizi completed the first phase of his studies at Fort Hare in 1956 when he became
the first Namibian to graduate from the institution with a bachelor’s degree. In 1957, he enrolled
at UCT where he studied law for a brief time.68 However, he returned to Fort Hare in 1958 to
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secure his Diploma in Education. At this time, Chief Kutako made contact with Kozonguizi and
asked him to go into exile in order to testify in person before the UN. Kutako believed that
sending a Herero like Kozonguizi to the UN to provide eyewitness accounts of his experiences
with the apartheid government in southern Africa would revive the interest of the UN and the
international public in the South West Africa question. Thus, Kozonguizi was appointed the
official representative of the HCC and was set to join Reverend Scott at the UN the following
year.69
Therefore, in 1959 Kozonguizi abandoned his studies and fled from South Africa without
the permission of the South African government. His route into exile first began in the
Bechuanaland Protectorate, a territory placed under the protection of the United Kingdom in
1885 with an extensive network of resources that earned it the nickname the “Pipeline into
Exile.”70 From Bechuanaland, Kozonguizi continued his journey through Northern Rhodesia,
eventually arriving in Tanganyika where he was able to secure the necessary funding to fly to the
UN in New York in 1959.71
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Map 6: The Route of SWAPO Commander Helao Shityuwete into Exile in 1964 as an
Example of the “Inevitable Pipeline into Exile”

Source: Johann Alexander Müller, “The Inevitable Pipeline Into Exile:” Botswana’s Role in
Namibia’s Liberation Struggle (Oxford: African Books Collective, 2012), 103.

Once in New York, Kozonguizi became part of a small group of Namibian students set to testify
before the UN at the end of the year. Fellow student and co-founder of SWASB, Mburumba
Kerina, had already petitioned the UN in the early 1950s while a student at the Pennsylvaniabased HBCU Lincoln University. Although the two later became rivals jockeying for power
among the Namibian intelligentsia in exile, in 1959 they had the common goal of waging an
intense pressure campaign against the South African government for control over South West
Africa and its people. In the months that followed, another student from South West Africa’s
Police Zone used similar transnational networks, universities, student organizations, and
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sympathetic actors to flee southern Africa and provided eyewitness testimony at the UN. These
three students formed the heart of a public pressure campaign that continued into the 1960s and
caused the South African government legal difficulties and embarrassments on the international
stage.

The “Hans Beukes Case” and Covert Student Resistance
in 1950s Southern Africa
Kozonguizi’s flight into exile and subsequent political activity was the result of years of
higher education and complete immersion into the radical Black politics at Fort Hare practiced
by the ANC Youth League, SWASB, and SWAPA. However, his exile and appearance at the
UN in 1959 was principally undertaken of his own volition to represent the HCC and Namibians
before the international community to openly challenge the South African regime. Conversely, in
1959, following the seizure of his passport and the blockade placed on his study abroad in
Norway by the South African government, Hans Beukes was forced into exile so that he could
continue his legal studies and fulfill the scholarship granted to him by the University of Oslo.
Educated at the predominantly-white UCT, Beukes was largely viewed as apolitical and the
seizure of his passport reverberated among the liberal white elements of Cape society and the
Norwegian press. Beukes’ subsequent flight into exile introduced him to the more radical student
politics and anti-apartheid views present at Fort Hare and espoused by the NSA in the United
States.
The Hans Beukes case is perhaps one of the best examples of how universities and
student organizations worked collaboratively across national borders with national governments,
supranational governmental institutions, and sympathetic transnational actors to challenge the
South African apartheid regime’s claims over South West Africa. Beukes’ lengthy education,
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subsequent flight into exile, and testimony before the UN’s General Assembly in 1959 was made
possible by an extensive transnational network comprised of the University of Oslo, NUSAS,
American political activist Allard Lowenstein, Seretse Khama, and the NSA. These actors and
institutions provided the necessary resources, funds, and information to successfully smuggle
Beukes, a Namibian student, out of South Africa to pursue his degree at the University of Oslo
and provide in person testimony at the UN. Once outside of the recursive reach of the South
African government, Beukes and his fellow Namibians waged a public opinion campaign against
the apartheid regime and increased international pressure and scrutiny on the way that the South
African government exerted its control over the South West Africa territory.
Hans Beukes was the son of influential Baster political leader Hermanus Christoffel
Beukes and grandson of Johannes Timotheus Beukes.72 Although the family possessed modest
financial means, education was of paramount importance and Hans was educated from an early
age. His first experiences with the education system in South West Africa began when he
enrolled at a newly-created school in Tsumis Park. However, during his second year at Tsumis
Park, and at the urging of his grandfather, Hans was sent to a school in Rehoboth that was
created for the education of the children of the Methodist congregations. The school was run
primarily by South Africans and had a reputation for being much stricter and academically
rigorous than either of the neighboring Catholic or Lutheran schools.73
Upon graduating from the Methodist primary school, Beukes attended the Dr. Lemmer
Secondary School in Rehoboth, the first middle school in South West Africa that catered to the
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“mixed-race population” in the territory.74 Beukes proved a successful student and passed his
final examinations at the school, but he faced the harsh reality that the lack of traditional
institutions of higher education for Namibians presented a significant obstacle for his continued
education. At the urging of his grandfather, Beukes applied for admission to the Wesley
Teachers’ Training School in Cape Town, an institution geared toward Coloured students from
the Cape and South West Africa that provided students with a teaching certification.75 After two
years at the Wesley Teachers’ Training School, Beukes returned to South West Africa and reenrolled at Dr. Lemmer Secondary School which, during his absence in South Africa, was
elevated to the status of a high school. Following a year at the school, Beukes proceeded to
enroll at the William Pescod High School in Kimberley where most of the students were
Coloured and a large majority of the teachers were educated at the University of Fort Hare.
Beukes successfully graduated from William Pescod at the top of his class.76
Despite his academic success in South Africa, Beukes still faced financial impediments
that prevented him from immediately enrolling at a South African university upon his
graduation. He returned to Rehoboth where the SWAA’s Department of Education assigned him
a position as both a teacher and principal at a new school in Karasburg created for the education
of the Baster children of the Dutch Reformed Church congregation. Beukes intended to save
enough money while teaching that he could apply and attend an open university in South
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Africa.77 However, the specter of the implementation of legislation intended to entrench
apartheid at South African universities expedited this process. To secure the necessary funding
to pursue a law degree at UCT, Beukes drove to his grandfather’s house in Narabes and asked
him to “support an application for a loan to the Rehoboth community chest.”78 Given that Hans
had completed teacher training school and wanted to pursue a legal degree to “be able to defend
the interests of [his] less fortunate countrymen,” his grandfather supported the application. Hans
was accepted to UCT and, upon this acceptance, the loan from the Rehoboth community chest
was granted with minor stipulations.79
Beukes began his studies at UCT and enrolled in a number of law courses that would lead
to the conferment of a Bachelor of Arts and of Laws (BA-LLB), a degree that would allow him
to practice law as an advocate. At UCT, Beukes came into contact with a number of students
who became influential members in South African politics and society and was acutely aware of
the effects of apartheid even at open universities where the student body was generally opposed
to the extension of apartheid in the country. It was not lost upon him that, despite this opposition
to apartheid, only five percent of the student body was African, and he was only aware of
approximately two Black teachers at the university. In any case, Beukes successfully navigated
his first year of enrollment at the university.80
In April 1959, a seemingly innocuous event outside of the student cafeteria on campus
changed the trajectory of Beukes’ life and thrust him into the middle of the ongoing struggle
between the South African government, the international community, and Namibians over

77

Ibid., 37.
Ibid., 39.
79
Ibid. Beukes recalled that the loan was obtained “on the condition that it be secured with a third of Grandfather’s
farm as surety. In addition, should I happen to fail any subject at the end of the year, the loan would immediately
become repayable.”
80
Ibid., 39-45.
78

357

control of South West Africa. On his way from the library to the student cafeteria, Beukes was
handed a flyer by a member of the Student Representative Council (SRC).81 The flyer was posted
on campus by NUSAS and it implored African students at the South African open universities to
apply for a three-year scholarship at the University of Oslo to study in any academic field,
excluding medicine.82 The scholarship was issued as part of a student exchange program
established by the NSU following the introduction of the Bantu Education Act in 1953. The
program was partly established as an act of protest against the South African apartheid regime
and its attempts to segregate institutions of higher education. Initially the NSU scholarships were
only for a period of three months, but in 1959 the length of the scholarship was extended to three
years in order for students to complete their education in its entirety in Oslo. Prior to 1959, only
two students were invited to participate in the exchange program, but with increased funding
from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the University of Oslo, and student societies in
Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim, the exchange program expanded.83
Beukes submitted an application for the scholarship with the backing of some law faculty
and, within a month, he was awarded the bursary scholarship to attend the University of Oslo to
study law. Per the terms of the scholarship, Beukes was set to begin his study in August of that
year. Although Beukes was frequently described in the historiography as apolitical during his
early academic career, in the months before leaving for Oslo he participated in a number of
meetings with influential political leaders and activists in southern Africa who anticipated that
Beukes’ position as an international student would allow him to amplify an anti-apartheid
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message to a global audience.84 Beukes recalled that on a car ride from the train station back to
his home, his father remarked “It’s a good thing you will be going abroad. You should be using
the opportunity to make [the South West Africa] case known.”85 Once in Rehoboth, Beukes
traveled to Windhoek where a meeting was arranged with Clemens Kapuuo and Chief Hosea
Kutako to further avail Hans of the circumstances in South West Africa and provide him with
their viewpoints on the situation, so that he could credibly speak on their behalf if the
opportunity arose abroad. A subsequent meeting with Albert Luthuli following his press
conference at the Parade Grounds in front of the City Hall in Pretoria in 1959 only further
encouraged Beukes’ budding political activism and reified the importance of his future position
outside of the reach of South African government.86
With the help of South African senator Leslie Rubin, the father of NUSAS president
Neville Rubin, Beukes secured the necessary passport to study abroad in Oslo. He was to depart
from Port Elizabeth aboard a Norwegian ship that would take him to Oslo. After arriving by train
from Cape Town, the Port Elizabeth police and Major Heiberg of the Special Branch stopped
Beukes and commenced a search of his luggage and papers. An immigration officer
accompanying the police seized Beukes’ passport and the subsequent discovery of a copy of
Ronald Segal’s journal Africa South and Adlai Stevenson’s Call to Greatness among Beukes’
belongings gave the South African police the desired justification to withhold Beukes’ passport
and prevent him from travelling to Norway.87 Although the government claimed that Beukes
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participated in “subversive activities” and possessed communist propaganda, it was posited that
the South African government became aware of his meetings with Namibian and ANC activists
prior to his departure for Port Elizabeth and that the government was concerned that he may try
to testify before the UN on behalf of the Rehoboth Basters.88 The seizure of his passport forced
Beukes to return to Cape Town, where he was greeted by a public outpouring of anger at the
government and a series of publications and student marches that sought the return of his
passport.89
Not only did the seizure of Beukes’ passport stir the liberal parts of Cape society to
action, it also drew the attention of a vast network of transnational actors that viewed Beukes’
case as an opportunity to strike a blow at the heart of the South African apartheid regime by
showing the international community the human side impacted by repressive apartheid policies.
Few transnational actors played a more important role in the Beukes case than the American
Allard Lowenstein. Lowenstein was heavily involved in student politics throughout his early
career and, while an undergraduate at the University of North Carolina, he served as the
president of the NSA. In this role he focused on “winning over developing nations to Westernstyle democracy and the cause of anti-communism.”90 Lowenstein continued to focus on student
politics throughout his academic career and after he received his law degree from Yale in 1954.
Between 1956 and 1957 Lowenstein spent time organizing campuses for the College Association
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of the UN and then returned to the University of North Carolina for a subsequent year of
graduate study.91
In the summer of 1958, Allard Lowenstein embarked on a trip at the request of the NSA’s
international vice president to obtain answers to a series of questions about student life in Africa
and Asia. The journey spanned roughly 20 different cities across 17 countries and led
Lowenstein to spend a significant amount of time in Rhodesia and South Africa. During this trip,
Lowenstein stopped at the University of Fort Hare and gave an impassioned speech that
defended American ignorance to South Africa’s apartheid policies and attempted to absolve the
American public of responsibility for the South African government’s actions. It was during this
heavily-criticized speech and subsequent discussion that night, that Lowenstein became familiar
with the extent to which the apartheid government exerted control over the political, social, and
economic lives of Namibians in South West Africa. The aforementioned Kozonguizi attended
Lowenstein’s speech and called out from the back of the room, “You say your people do not see
that they are responsible for the things that are done to the Black man in South Africa. Well, I
come from a place for which your country and the UN are directly responsible, and there things
are so much worse that I must come here to get a breath of fresh air.”92 Initially stunned by the
story, Lowenstein spoke with Kozonguizi through the night about “the anomaly of a nation being
protected by a world organization dedicated to human rights, but exemplifying in the most
glaring ways the suppression of all those rights.”93
At the conclusion of their conversation, Kozonguizi encouraged Lowenstein to seek out
Reverend Michael Scott upon his return to the United States to further discuss the issue of South
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West Africa. During this meeting, Reverend Scott impressed upon Lowenstein the importance of
having a fresh set of eyes report on the conditions in South West Africa, and he detailed a plan
that saw Lowenstein travel to South West Africa to undertake a clandestine fact-gathering
mission that would result in his own in person testimony before the UN’s General Assembly.
Lowenstein used his connections from his time in national student politics to find reliable
companions who accompanied him on this mission. He chose Emory Bundy, a student at the
University of Washington who was the student body president when Lowenstein spoke at the
university in 1957, and Sherman Bull, a Yale graduate and Columbia medical student with a
scientific background that made his cover story about studying the various forms of wildlife in
South West Africa more plausible.94
In the summer of 1959, the three Americans travelled to South Africa under the auspices
of attending the annual NUSAS Congress at Wits in Johannesburg, where Lowenstein would
deliver the meeting’s greeting. While Lowenstein and his companions were in South Africa
preparing to undertake their fact-finding mission, Beukes’ passport was seized.95 Lowenstein’s
attendance at the NUSAS Congress and Beukes’ close relationship with NUSAS members at
UCT, combined with NUSAS awarding the Norwegian scholarship to Beukes, made a meeting
between Lowenstein and Beukes highly likely. Upon Beukes’ return to Cape Town via plane, he
was picked up by NUSAS president Neville Rubin and Adrian Leftwich and whisked away to an
impromptu meeting with Lowenstein.96 At this meeting, Lowenstein impressed upon Beukes the
importance of sending a cable to the UN detailing the nature of his passport seizure and he
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suggested that Beukes should request a hearing before the UN on the matter. In concert with
Beukes’ cable, Lowenstein also instructed Rubin to send a cable on behalf of NUSAS covering
similar subject matter.
Following this initial meeting in Cape Town, Beukes and Lowenstein both attended the
annual NUSAS Congress in Johannesburg where Lowenstein provided a brief greeting to the
crowd and Beukes gave a much longer speech detailing the seizure of his passport and the
conditions faced by Namibians in South West Africa. After these speeches, Beukes asked
Lowenstein to talk in a more private setting and, once the two were alone, he asked Lowenstein
to help him escape South Africa so that he could present his testimony at the UN in person.
Lowenstein and his two companions mulled over the request for nearly two days because helping
Beukes jeopardized the time-scale they established for their clandestine trip to South West Africa
at the conclusion of the NUSAS Congress. However, Beukes’ persistence won the day and the
three Americans agreed to smuggle him into the Bechuanaland Protectorate where they could
more freely find a way to get Beukes to New York to testify.97
This unexpected addition to their trip undoubtedly required more resources and
Lowenstein looked for sympathetic actors in South Africa to help smuggle Beukes out of the
country. Lowenstein first turned to the ANC which, as the chapter previously discussed, was the
most active anti-apartheid political organization in South Africa. Lowenstein and Beukes
travelled to the law offices of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo to attend a meeting and ask for
their help in this endeavor. However, Tambo informed Lowenstein that the ANC possessed a
limited infrastructure to help political dissidents escape the country. Lowenstein left the offices
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in disbelief that the ANC was not more prepared in this regard and, in his indignant outrage,
agreed to personally smuggle Beukes out of the country.98
Beukes’ escape from South Africa began in Johannesburg following the NUSAS
Congress, where Bundy and Bull had secured a Volkswagen Beetle for the journey. Despite a
series of miscues and miscommunication about where to meet one another, Beukes and the three
Americans began their journey to the Bechuanaland Protectorate by traveling through the
Northern Transvaal and heading north of Pretoria.99 The group made it within 30 miles of the
Bechuanaland Protectorate border before experiencing car trouble when an accelerator cable was
damaged. During the brief time in which Bull successfully fixed the car, Beukes and Lowenstein
debated the best way to cross the border since it was highly likely that the bridges that crossed
the Limpopo River were well-guarded by the South African police.100 It was during this
conversation that the Americans recalled a part of Rudyard Kipling’s poem “The Elephant’s
Child” that detailed the Limpopo’s crocodile-infested waters.101 As this conversation unfolded,
and before the Volkswagen was fixed, another car approached on the road and the Americans
hurriedly hid Beukes in the space between the back seat of the car and its rear window and
covered him with suitcases and documents to hide him from sight. Although this encounter came
to nothing, it did provide them with a method for hiding Beukes as they crossed into the
Bechuanaland Protectorate.102
Their crossing into the protectorate succeeded with little trouble and the foursome
continued onward until they arrived at a hotel near the Palapye, a small town roughly 30 miles
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outside of Serowe. The hotel in Palapye served as a makeshift base for Lowenstein and his
friends as they shuttled Beukes back and forth to the house of Seretse and Ruth Khama in
Serowe where plans were made for Beukes’ immediate future. Except for a small incident in
which the manager of the hotel stormed into Lowenstein’s room in the middle of the night with a
spotlight looking for Beukes, this process went smoothly, and it was eventually agreed that
Beukes would stay with the Khamas while Lowenstein, Bundy, and Bull completed their trip to
South West Africa to collect audio-recordings of Namibians’ testimonies on their treatment
under the apartheid regime.103
Beukes stayed with the Khamas in Serowe for approximately one month while
transnational actors worked to secure his safe passage to New York to testify. Kozonguizi and
Kerina worked tirelessly to secure a US visa for Beukes and obtain the necessary clearances that
allowed him to travel through countries that had their own restrictive racial policies. In one letter
to Beukes, Kerina claimed that he had called upon Kwame Nkrumah to write to the Prime
Minister of the Central African Federation (CAF) to clear Beukes’ path to Salisbury.104
Kozonguizi and Kerina eventually succeeded in securing a US visa and received clearance for
Beukes to travel through the CAF. Beukes embarked on a train that took him to Salisbury where
he received notification from Seretse Khama that Lowenstein had secured funding of $750 to
cover the cost of his airfare to the UN.105 Beukes eventually flew from Nairobi to London where
he was met at the airport by Reverend Scott’s secretary, Doris, who took him to meet Kozonguizi
and Scott in London. Beukes subsequently participated in a brief tour across Norway that was
followed closely by the press. This publicity tour was intended to draw the attention of the
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Scandinavian people, and more broadly the global public, to Beukes’ experiences with the
apartheid regime and increase public attention for the future hearing before the UN. At the
conclusion of this brief tour, Beukes flew to New York in preparation for his in person testimony
alongside Lowenstein, Kozonguizi, and Kerina.106
Beukes’ arrival in New York in 1959 was a result of the collective collaborative power of
student organizations in the United States, Norway, and South Africa and embodied the
transnational nature of anti-apartheid activism in the 1950s. The initial scholarship provided by
the NSU was advertised on the UCT campus by NUSAS and presented Beukes with an
opportunity to escape the South African government’s control over his education and study at the
University of Oslo so that he could potentially return to South West Africa and defend the legal
interests of the Rehoboth Basters. The seizure of his passport by the South African government
in 1959 resulted in further student collaboration that saw NUSAS call upon its relationship with
former NSA leaders who now adorned positions of political repute in the United States. From
these positions of power, Beukes was able to access the necessary resources and funding to flee
to Bechuanaland in 1959 and fly to New York to testify in person at the UN in an act of open
resistance toward the apartheid state.

Eyewitnesses to Apartheid: Namibian Students’ Testimony
Before the UNGA in October 1959
The tireless work of Namibian students to collaborate with foreign universities, student
organizations, government agencies, and networks of sympathetic transnational activists resulted
in the first testimonies of what developed into a lengthy and sustained legal campaign waged by
the international community at the UN against the apartheid government. In October 1959, some
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of the first Namibian students appeared before the UN to give in person testimony on the
conditions in South West Africa in an attempt to sway public opinion, give the South African
government’s occupation of South West Africa a human face, and secure concrete legal action
and resolutions to temper or dissuade the South African government’s oppressive policies.
Lowenstein, Bull, and Bundy returned to the United States from their trip to South West Africa
in the summer of 1959 and prepared their testimony for the UN, while also soliciting funds to
ensure that Beukes made it to New York later that year. Kerina, who already attended university
in the United States, similarly faced limited obstacles in his preparation to travel to New York.
Meanwhile, Beukes had successfully navigated the early stages of his exile in the Bechuanaland
Protectorate and Southern Rhodesia and used funds secured by Lowenstein through the NSA to
fly to London, Oslo, and then New York.107
Over a 10-day period in the middle of September 1959, Kerina, Kozonguizi, Beukes,
Lowenstein, and Bundy officially requested oral hearings at the Fourteenth Session of the Fourth
Committee of the UN General Assembly.108 Hearings were granted to these petitioners and
scheduled for the second week of October 1959.109 The testimonies between the aforementioned
parties were well-coordinated and each touched on a different aspect of life in South West Africa
and the impact that the South African government’s policies had on Namibians across the globe.
To avoid overlapping testimonies, Kozonguizi and Kerina focused on broader issues outside of
Namibia’s Police Zone. Kerina provided a lengthy statement that detailed the several legal
failings of the South African government to uphold the terms of its mandate over the territory.
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He focused extensively on the South African government’s unwillingness to negotiate with the
South West Africa Committee, restrictions placed on petitioners who wished to appear before the
UN, the apartheid government’s disregard for the ICJ’s advisory opinions, and their failure to
place South West Africa under a trusteeship agreement with the UN.110 Conversely,
Kozonguizi’s testimony covered the poor conditions and circumstances faced by the territory’s
Ovambo populations to the north of the Police Zone. He contended that the SWAA intentionally
underdeveloped the educational infrastructure in Ovamboland to provide a consistent stagnant
pool of labor necessary to maintain the Ovambo migrant labor system that was essential to the
southern African mining sectors.111
Beukes and Lowenstein, unlike their fellow petitioners, testified specifically about the
conditions that they personally witnessed in the Police Zone and in South Africa. Beukes
discussed the appalling state of the educational infrastructure in the Police Zone and larger
territory by relaying his own experiences looking outside of South West Africa to pursue a
college degree. He lamented the South African government’s implementation of apartheid at
South Africa’s open universities and the South African government’s great efforts to maintain
control over Black education, as evidenced by the confiscation of his passport and the prevention
of his continued legal studies in Norway.112 Beukes concluded with an appeal to the UN and
general public to halt the apartheid regime’s oppressive policies:
Sir, we have too much faith in the sincerity of the countries who have an anti-slavery
history and the establishment of human rights to their credit to believe that you are
acquiescing in the outrages against human beings in South West Africa out of
cynicism…. Can we hope, Sir, that the nations of the world will feel free to undertake
their obligations in regard to the people of our country, by removing us from the bondage
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of South Africa and granting us the opportunities denied us for so long, to live and
develop in dignity, as human beings, in our country of birth?113
Beukes’ appeal to the inhumanity and immorality of apartheid in South West Africa echoed
much of the language that came to dominate the anti-apartheid movement in Britain, which was
led by activist Christian priests and pastors like Scott and Huddleston.
Finally, Lowenstein’s testimony and the recounting of his journey to South West Africa
served not only to present the UN with a detailed summary of the audiotapes and statements he
secured that summer, but his popularity among American liberals, student activists across the
globe, and within government circles served to grab the attention of member states’
representatives and the wider American and European public. South Africa’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs Eric Louw was acutely aware of the potential legitimacy that the testimony of a white
man could give to the claims and demands of the other Namibian witnesses and worked to
undermine Lowenstein with questions of his credibility and his motivations for his visit to South
West Africa.114 Anticipating such a tactic, Lowenstein provided the UN General Assembly with
written letters from Eleanor Roosevelt, Frank Porter Graham, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, and
Adlai Stevenson that attested to his high moral character and credibility as a witness.115
Lowenstein’s subsequent testimony directly targeted the legitimacy of South Africa’s mandatory
rule over South West Africa and outlined the impact of their oppressive policies on Namibians.
Lowenstein denounced the conditions in South West Africa, arguing:
We have concluded that the Government of South Africa is unfit to continue as the
Trustee for the conscience of the world and should be stripped of its rights as a Mandatory
Power.…It is hard to find any evidence that, despite the clear injunctions of the Mandate,
the Mandatory Power in thirty-nine years has done anything significant to help the
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indigenous population of South West Africa to develop towards self-government or to
improve its living conditions.116
It was not lost on Lowenstein that the general global public knew very little about the situation in
South West Africa. In an apparent attempt to grab the attention of the public and ensure that parts
of his testimony received attention in the press, Lowenstein made a direct comparison between
the South African apartheid government and Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Lowenstein
proceeded to describe the unacceptable behavior of the South Africa government, writing “The
simple, unavoidable fact is that a sacred trust of all of us now rests in the hands of the only
government on earth that dares to exalt the same types of laws that united humanity against
Hitler, and that have been repudiated alike by science and by all religions, by the spokesmen of
democracy, of communism, and of all gradations and styles of government between.”117
Although the similarities between the two regimes may have been overstated by Lowenstein, the
intention of his statement to highlight how out of line South Africa’s policies were with the
mainstream international community proved effective.
While Kerina, Kozonguizi, and Beukes were some of the first Namibians to testify in
person before the UN, they were not the last. Kozonguizi and Kerina, alongside Allard
Lowenstein and Reverend Scott, continued to submit petitions and appear before the General
Assembly throughout the 1960s and highlighted the increasingly worse conditions experienced
by Namibians in the territory. Other Namibians fled the territory in the coming years, often in an
attempt to provide in person testimony at the UN of horrible atrocities that occurred in South
West Africa at the hands of the SWAA. In 1960, Reverend Markus Kooper appeared before the
UN to detail his forcible removal from Hoachanas and the bodily injury meted out against his
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AME congregation by the territory’s police force.118 Sam Nujoma, one of the leading members
of SWAPO, similarly testified before the UN’s Committee on South West Africa on 5 July 1960
and admonished the SWAA for the use of violent and deadly police tactics that resulted in the
Windhoek Massacre on 10 December 1959.119
Undoubtedly, the testimony provided by Namibians at the UN in 1959 and 1960
tempered and frustrated the attempts of the South African government to administer and control
South West Africa and its Namibian population. The testimonies of Lowenstein and Beukes in
particular were popular in the world press at the time and, for many in the general public, served
as an early introduction to the activities of the South African government in the territory.120
Likewise, following the testimony of so many Namibian students and those that aided their flight
into exile, the UN General Assembly passed a series of resolutions in November 1959 that
rebuked the South African government. Resolution 1358 stated that the General Assembly
viewed the withdrawal of Beukes’ passport “to be an act of administration contrary to the
mandate for South West Africa” and called upon the South African government to reconsider
their decision so that Beukes could “take advantage of the scholarship offered him to study at the
University of Oslo in circumstances permitting him to maintain normal relations with his family
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and his country.”121 In the subsequent Resolutions 1359 and 1360, the assembly continued to
exert pressure on the South African government to place South West Africa under the
Trusteeship Council’s supervision to ensure the economic and political development of the
Namibian people.122 In Resolution 1360, the assembly even made specific reference to
Namibians’ petitions and in person testimony on the “concerning political, social, economic, and
educational conditions prevailing in the territory” as a contributing factor to the their
recommendation that the South African government begin negotiations with the appropriate
committees to ensure that the South African government “administer the mandate territory in
accordance with the principles and purposes of the mandate.”123 Despite the flurry of resolutions,
little changed legally in the territory as the South African government continued to expand its
apartheid policies into South West Africa.
The largest impact that the testimony of these students had on pressuring the South
African government to temper its activities in the territory was in the awareness that their actions
raised across most of the Western world about the conditions in the territory. The circulation in
the press about the testimony of these students and their better-known white counterparts served
as a spark for a more global and transnational anti-apartheid movement between the 1960s and
1994. Hans Beukes’ case before the UN and the deep involvement of the Nordic student
associations led to a flurry of anti-apartheid activity in Norway, Sweden, and Finland.124
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Similarly, Britain saw the rise of the AAM in 1960, although the impact of the Namibian
students and Reverend Scott were much less influential in this instance. In the United States, the
Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960 served as a moment of awakening for many American
student organizations. However, for the NSA, some of their earliest involvements in antiapartheid activities came through their close relationship with Allard Lowenstein and the
provision of funds to ensure that Beukes could fly from Nairobi to New York to appear before
the General Assembly. These actions by student organizations and sympathetic transnational
actors across the globe ultimately culminated in a sustained effort to boycott South African
goods in the 1970s and led to a Student Divestment Movement against the South African
government in the 1980s.125
Namibian students’ testimony in 1959 was merely the beginning of the Namibian
intelligentsia’s engagement with student politics and the start of a protracted resistance campaign
from exile. Namibian students in exile continued to wage a number of different resistance
campaigns against the South African government that did not include the UN and transcended
national boundaries. In August 1959, two months before testifying in person at the UN,
Kozonguizi played an influential role in the establishment of one of the first truly nationalist
political parties in South West Africa. Kozonguizi, who was both a founding member of
SWAPA and acting as a representative of the HCC at the UN, successfully aided in the
negotiation of a merger between the two organizations and the creation of SWANU. The
formation of SWANU was seen as an attempt to bring together the traditional Herero authority
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with the more radical activist youth and intelligentsia that constituted SWAPA’s membership.
These youths wanted to find a less sectional approach to resisting the SWAA and viewed
SWANU as the bridge between these two groups and a move to cultivate a broader base of
support that transcended ethnopolitical boundaries.126 Kozonguizi worked effectively to include
many of the Herero students who received scholarships to Nordic universities in the hierarchy of
SWANU and, more importantly, included leading members of other South West African political
organizations, like the OPO’s Sam Nujoma, in the organization’s leadership.127 Despite
Kozonguizi’s efforts to create a nationalist organization while in exile, he was unable to maintain
unity between the diverse groups under the organization’s purview.
In April 1960, SWANU experienced its first major setback when the HCC withdrew from
the organization over disagreements about the diminished role of traditional ethnic authorities
that was espoused in SWANU’s radical post-independence vision.128 Similarly, a personal
rivalry between Kozonguizi and Kerina handicapped the organization’s appeal. SWANU was
largely founded without input from Kerina, and he feared that his influence as a significant
political force in post-independence Namibia would be diminished under Kozonguizi’s
SWANU. Therefore, in 1959 and 1960, Kerina advocated with Sam Nujoma to focus the OPO’s
efforts on expanding beyond their large Ovambo base and to actively recruit leaders throughout
South West Africa, regardless of their political or ethnic affiliations.129 In April 1960, Nujoma
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founded SWAPO, the political party recognized by the UN General Assembly in 1972 as the
“sole legitimate representative” of the Namibian people in their liberation struggle.130
Beukes, on the other hand, confined his political activities largely to student politics
while he studied law in Oslo. In 1966, in an attempt to mend the rift that had emerged between
SWAPO and SWANU, student representatives from each group met in Uppsala under the
auspices of an SFS conference to craft the constitution for a National Union of South West
African Students (NUSWAS). Beukes, then considered a political independent, was chosen to
chair the meeting that included influential figures like Zedekia Ngavirue, Sam Nujoma, Andreas
Shipanga, and Solomon Mifima.131 NUSWAS was founded at this meeting to create an
organization that could coordinate the education of Namibian students in exile, so that they
received the necessary training and degrees to run an independent nation. Beukes tried to create a
database of NUSWAS membership that tracked each member’s specific field of study so that
they could identify and fill the academic voids necessary for an independent nation to run
effectively. Unfortunately for Beukes and NUSWAS, the task proved too great and few students
responded to the requests for information sent out by NUSWAS. Additionally, concerns over
NUSWAS’s political orientation put off students from both SWAPO and SWANU, leading to
the organization’s quick collapse.
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The actions of Namibian students during their early resistance campaigns in the late
1950s represented their most complete transnational resistance strategies in the years prior to the
formation and expression of a solidified nationalist movement in the 1960s. For these
Namibians, international student organizations and foreign universities represented an entry
point into a larger transnational network that possessed the financial and infrastructural
resources, mobility, and necessary distance from the recursive power of the South African state
to facilitate an effective resistance campaign. Unlike previous resistance campaigns between
1919 and 1960 that mostly required Namibians to work with transnational institutions and actors
that were able to penetrate into South West Africa’s borders, the student-led campaign of 1959
saw Namibian activists traverse national boundaries and move beyond the punitive reach of the
state. Once in exile, Namibian students were more able to directly and openly challenge the
South African government on its policies.
These students successfully navigated emergent channels of communication that
provided them with the resources necessary to improve their own educations and form the
beginnings of an intelligentsia in exile that could effectively make the case for independence to
the international community. The foundations for their access to higher education were built by
South African activists in the early 20th century with the creation of the University of Fort Hare,
a university for the education of non-Europeans across southern, eastern, and central Africa.
Here, Namibian students were re-introduced to the concepts of Black nationalism and radical
mass protests espoused by the ANC Youth League that had waned in South West Africa after the
fall of the UNIA in the 1920s. This immersion in Black nationalist resistance strategies and
rhetoric provided Namibian students like Kozonguizi with the requisite experiences to form
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Namibian student organizations like SWASB and SWAPA in the 1950s, organizations of
paramount importance in the creation of the nationalist movements of the 1960s.
Namibians worked strategically and collaboratively within the context of 1950s southern
Africa, harnessing the rising tide of white liberalism in the Cape and using their disgust at
government interference in South Africa’s open universities to advance their own agenda.
NUSAS in particular became an important tool for Namibian students seeking educational
opportunities outside of South Africa, where scholarships and bursaries could be rescinded for
“subversive” political activities. NUSAS’s links to other student organizations in the Western
world presented Namibians with new opportunities to obtain scholarships and funding to pursue
college degrees in the United States, Britain, and Scandinavia. Hans Beukes was one of the
earliest students to take advantage of the scholarships offered by Scandinavian universities via
NUSAS. However, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, other influential Namibians who played
important roles in SWANU, SWAPO, and SWAPO-Democrats, like Uatja Kaukuetu, Charles
Kauraisa, Ottilie Schimming, Kenneth Abrahams, and Zedekia Ngavirue, similarly took
advantage of scholarships and academic opportunities outside of southern Africa.
In exile and outside of the reach of the South African state, educated Namibians could
openly debate issues of national independence and subnational resistance within colonial
boundaries. Student-based organization emerged throughout the 1960s as the Namibian
intelligentsia prepared for the territory’s future independence. In addition to numerous student
testimonies at the UN and the submission of petitions on behalf of those Namibians still in South
West Africa, Beukes created an organized network of student information intended to facilitate a
quick and effective transition to independence. These exiled students and political activists
ultimately came to populate the highest ranks of the Namibian government in the post-
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independence period. The opportunities created by these students, in conjunction with the
resources provided by transnational actors and institutions, proved instrumental in the transition
from one phase of resistance in South West Africa and began a new phase of armed resistance by
a relatively united nationalist front.
As the argument set forth at the beginning of the chapter states, this campaign should not
be seen as a clean or distinct break from the subnational resistance strategies that characterized
most of the pre-SWAPO period, but more of a slow evolution that portended the nationalist
campaigns that emerged in the 1960s. The actors discussed in this chapter initially went into
exile to pursue their own personal and subnational goals. For example, Kozonguizi initially went
into exile at the request of the HCC to provide personal testimony about the conditions facing the
Herero under the SWAA. Similarly, Beukes initially wanted to pursue his education at UCT and
in Norway to secure a law degree so that he could protect the rights and interests of the Baster
community at Rehoboth. In both cases, these actors pursued paths aimed at improving the
standard-of-living and conditions in specific localities where they had a vested interest.
However, over time and through interactions with other activists free of the recursive
powers of the South African government, the aforementioned Namibians developed campaigns
that simultaneously pursued subnational goals and complete territorial liberation for South West
Africa. It was clear to these savvy political operators that national independence meant an
improved standard-of-living in each locality and the dissolution of the apartheid apparatus that
so gravely underdeveloped and repressed Namibian communities. Kerina, Kozonguizi, Nujoma,
and to a lesser degree Beukes, were all involved in the nationalist politics that emerged in exile
in the 1960s as a result of the transnational resistance strategies discussed in this chapter. The
1960s, again, represented an evolution in Namibian resistance strategies that remained
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transnational in nature, but instead shifted their attention toward national liberation instead of
subnational concessions within the colonial framework.
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Chapter 8—Transnational Strategies and Subnational Concessions in the Pre-SWAPO
Period: A Conclusion
In September 1959, Jariretundu Kozonguiz founded the political party SWANU. In April
1960, Sam Nujoma and Andimba Toivo ya Toivo founded SWAPO. The establishment of these
two national political parties represented a shift in Namibians’ resistance strategies against the
colonial state and opened a new chapter in Namibians’ anticolonial activities. Although
continuity existed between the pre- and post-SWAPO periods, Namibians turned their focus
from securing subnational concessions from the colonial state to the complete eradication of
white rule in the territory and an end to white hegemony.1 In this new nationalist approach, the
inclusion of all Namibians and overcoming subnational segmentation was of critical importance.
That temporary unity was then leveraged as an instrument of resistance itself. National liberation
was the main aim of the nationalist movement and merely carving out spheres of influence
within the colonial structure was no longer acceptable. In 1966, as part of this larger national
liberation struggle, SWAPO began an armed liberation struggle against the South African state
that resulted in national independence in 1991.2
Despite the clear successes of the armed liberation struggle and SWAPO’s larger
nationalist movement, Namibians’ transnational resistance strategies in the pre-SWAPO period
also proved remarkably effective at winning Namibians concessions from the colonial state.
Throughout these resistance campaigns Namibians expressed their agency, frustrated the colonial
state, and won important subnational concessions that improved the standard of living for many
Namibians in the Police Zone and relieved some of the abuses meted out by the colonial regime.
This chapter serves as a conclusion for this work and analyzes the overall effectiveness of
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Namibians’ transnational resistance strategies. Of paramount importance here is an examination
of how and why these transnational networks were developed and maintained, how Namibians
utilized these networks to resist the colonial state, and in what ways these strategies succeeded or
failed in their stated aims. This analysis will concisely answer the crucial questions set forth in
the dissertation’s introduction on page 9.

Embracing Transnational Resistance: Namibians’ Motivations and Reasoning
Between 1921 and 1962, transnational resistance strategies flourished in the Police Zone
and became one of the primary modes of anticolonial resistance to the extension, intensification,
and entrenchment of South African rule in the territory. Other approaches to resistance existed
elsewhere in the territory. North of the Police Zone, the repressive migratory labor system was
an ever-present fact of life for the Ovambo and, as such, they adopted labor-centric resistance
strategies that centered on work stoppages, strikes, and smaller exclusionary acts of resistance
like refusing to participate in the system.3 Elsewhere, even in the Police Zone, it is clear that
alternative strategies existed. The Bondelswarts Affair of 1922 and the Rehoboth Rebellion of
1925 showed that many Namibians still embraced the idea of physical confrontation with the
colonial state as a mechanism to alter the behavior of the South African regime. However,
despite these diverse approaches to resistance, the Nama, Baster, and Herero embrace of
transnational institutions and organizations as vehicles for change in South West Africa
dominated the anticolonial activities of the period.
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Three of the central questions posited in this dissertation were why Namibians embraced
transnationalism as a means of resistance, how and to what extent did they develop transnational
networks across time and space, and was this part of a larger coordinated effort in the Police
Zone? A primary reason that Namibians readily embraced transnational institutions and
organizations as a means of resistance to the colonial state was that Namibians and the larger
South West Africa territory developed extensive networks in the Americas and Europe through
historical processes and relationships developed over the course of nearly 200 years. One of the
more influential circuits that developed linked South West Africa with the United States, the
Caribbean, and Black American seamen. As a result of the poverty and economic exclusion that
Black Americans faced after emancipation, many turned to commercial maritime industries as a
way to adapt to their circumstances. As chapter 3 illuminated, by 1850 Black Americans
accounted for nearly 50 percent of all American seamen travelling this developing circuit.4 As
these seamen traversed the Atlantic seaboard, they established Afro-Caribbean and West Indian
communities with some emerging in South West Africa’s industrial port towns. Combined with
South African experiences with singing groups from American HBCUs and the larger historical
process of post-emancipation Black migration, a circuitous network was created between the
Americas and southern Africa that allowed people, resources, and information to be circulated
multi-directionally across the Atlantic.
This transnational network was further developed and maintained throughout the
twentieth century by Namibians and Black Americans and was essential to Namibian resistance
efforts during the period. The earliest example of this network’s success at introducing
sympathetic transnational actors and institutions to Namibians occurred in the early 1900s as
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Garveyite agents came to South Africa and developed practical relationships with Black protest
nationalist organizations in South Africa like the ICU. The UNIA established its own branches in
South Africa during this period and shared some of its leadership and members in South Africa
with the ICU. The subsequent movement of ICU and UNIA agents from South African industrial
centers to those in South West Africa brought this transnational organization to urban Namibians
in the early twentieth century. Namibians developed their own relationships with these agents,
opened and maintained channels for information and resources to travel across national
boundaries, and ultimately repurposed the infrastructure of the UNIA in the territory to resist the
colonial state and achieve their own subnational goals.5
Much like the UNIA, the rise of the AME Church as a transnational resistance institution
in South West Africa was linked to a historical process that created a Black Atlantic circuit that
introduced Namibians to Black Americans with a keen interest in the African continent. 6 Often,
American interest in the continent was for a particular actor’s or organization’s own ambitions
and interests. The rise of the ACS in the nineteenth century and the increased salience of the
“Back-to-Africa” movement under Garvey in the early twentieth century saw Black American
actors travel to places like Liberia and South Africa to escape white hegemony or act as
civilizing agents seeking to redeem the African continent. The AME Church, much like it had in
Liberia, emerged in South West Africa as a result of this trans-Atlantic process and its links to
Pan-Africanist and evangelical movements in the Americas.
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Another global historical process that dramatically impacted Namibians’ embrace of, and
introduction to, transnational resistance institutions was the period of warfare and political reordering that occurred in Europe between 1915 and 1945. The European powers, which actively
worked to subjugate, exploit, and control African populations through colonial administrations
and enterprises since the nineteenth century, went through their own period of warfare and
turmoil during World War I and World War II. These wars ultimately brought many of their
colonial populations into the war. During the Interwar Years and after World War II, the global
powers set about re-ordering and re-organizing European political institutions and structures to
prevent these conflicts from enveloping the world again. Necessarily, this meant that a similar
restructuring took place in the colonial sphere and reshaped the relationship between the colony
and the metropole.
As this historical process of global political re-organization played out it had a direct
impact on Namibians and the South West Africa territory, which became a proverbial political
football whose international legal status was hotly contested by several states and supranational
institutions. The League of Nations was established in 1919 as an organization to prevent future
wars and oversee the modernization and development of the territories and colonies divided up
through the Treaty of Versailles. South Africa, because of its wartime service during the First
World War on behalf of the victors, received the mandate to rule over South West Africa and
quickly began the de facto incorporation of South West Africa as a fifth province.7 This entailed
the extension of South Africa’s segregationist policies to the territory, policies that were in direct
contradiction to the League of Nations mandate granted to the South African government and ran
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counter to the Wilsonian language and spirit that characterized international politics in the
immediate aftermath of the war.
The anger and contempt felt by more liberal transnational actors toward the South
African government’s disregard for the League’s mandate focused attention on South West
Africa and, in some instances, even brought sympathetic transnational actors to the territory to
impede this de facto incorporation of the territory. In the early years of mandatory rule, South
African parliamentarian Dewdney Drew, who had travelled to Rehoboth in 1917 to speak to the
Basters about the issue of post-war self-determination, continued to communicate with the
Basters on the role of the newly-created League and PMC. This information, which came to the
Basters as part of this larger global political re-organization, served as their first introduction to
the League of Nations and created deeper understanding of its function in global politics and its
ability to alter the behavior of an oppressive colonial state.8 As a result of this process and
transnational actors’ responses to violations of this political reconfiguration, the Basters
developed their petition-writing campaign to fight for subnational self-determination and the
return of political autonomy in the Gebiet.
A similar process occurred at the conclusion of World War II after the League of Nations
failed and another round of global political re-ordering commenced. The UN was established in
1945 to provide for the collective security and colonial modernization and development that the
League failed to produce. The South African government once again attempted to incorporate
South West Africa as a fifth province and came into direct conflict with the UN over placing the
territory in the trust of the UN. Given the rising tide of anticolonialism, nationalism, and human
rights across the globe in the 1940s and 1950s, it is unsurprising that sympathetic transnational
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agents who embraced more liberal sociopolitical positions, like anti-apartheid or
humanitarianism, turned their attention to South West Africa and worked to frustrate the South
African colonial regime. For example, this second round of global political reconfiguration led
the Reverend Michael Scott, who abhorred the South African government’s racial policies
because of his experiences with the Campaign for Right and Justice in 1943, to travel to South
West Africa and discuss the role of the UN in global politics with Herero chief Hosea Kutako.9
Similarly, American political activist Allard Lowenstein travelled to South West Africa in 1959,
in part at the behest of Reverend Scott and in part because of his student political activism across
the globe in the 1950s, to secretly record Namibians’ testimonies about the abuses perpetrated by
the SWAA and distribute them to a wider public audience.10 In each of these cases, historical
processes played an important role in the development and creation of the transnational networks
that Namibians maintained and used to wage their resistance campaigns against the SWAA.
While Namibians readily embraced transnational institutions for their resistance
campaigns because of the historical linkages that existed between Namibians, Americans, and
Europeans, Namibians also pursued this specific style of resistance because transnational agents
and institutions could more easily traverse national borders and evade the recursive power of the
South African state. Whereas the South African state controlled the movement of Namibians
through a series of segregationist pass laws and vagrancy proclamations, more limited
mechanisms of control existed for transnational actors who visited the territory. While outright
refusal of entry was a possibility for the South African government, language in South Africa’s
mandate for the territory allowed for observers and external agents to visit South West Africa.
Thus, refusal of entry often led to increased problems for the South African state that resulted in
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the government facing increased pressure from the League, UN, or general public over why they
prevented these seemingly innocuous actors from entering the territory.
Namibians recognized the problems that transnational agents caused for the South
African government with the international community and sought out sympathetic actors to serve
as vehicles and conduits through which they could express their agency and resist the colonial
regime. Namibians were acutely aware that some international figures received deference
because of their occupation or position. For example, the Reverend Michael Scott and Francis H.
Gow were able to cross the South West African border largely because of their positions as
Christian pastors and priests. Despite their activist inclinations and activities in resistance
movements elsewhere, the South African government was slow to limit their access to
Namibians because of the close ties the two had with influential religious and political
communities in Europe and the United States. In other instances, one’s occupation or position
made them less noticeable to the SWAA. Although Allard Lowenstein was monitored and
known to have embraced anticolonial causes during his time in global student politics, he and his
companions’ stated goal of speaking to student groups at South African universities only
moderately drew the interest of the South African state in 1959 and likely aided in his ability to
evade detection and arrest in South West Africa during his fact-finding mission.11
Namibians also recognized that transnational actors and institutions could more easily
enter and leave South West Africa. Rather than fully take on the colonial state and experience the
full weight of its recursive powers, Namibians instead turned to transnational agents as vehicles
of resistance because those actors could leave the territory and evade harsh punishment from the
colonial regime. The inability of the South African state to take action against these figures once
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they left the territory made them particularly difficult to monitor and control. If there was no
recourse once one left the territory, these actors could help facilitate Namibian resistance to the
South African state more vociferously and without the concern of punitive action. Likewise, any
attempts to punish these actors would further draw the attention of the international community
to the government’s segregationist and apartheid policies, a problem that the colonial
government surely wanted to avoid.
To further answer the second question posited at the outset of this dissertation,
transnational resistance appealed to Namibians for the several reasons above, but most
importantly, Namibians turned to this resistance strategy because it was one of the most effective
ways to frustrate the colonial state and slow the implementation of its segregationist and later
apartheid policies. Chief among the reasons that Namibians turned to transnational resistance
was that these networks and actors proved most effective at amplifying their voices, expressing
their agency, and getting their demands to the widest possible audience. While writing to a
newspaper or challenging South African segregationist policies in a South African court may
have wielded small successes, more well-known American and European activists and
institutions had a much wider reach and following. Namibians understood the importance of
amplifying their message and garnering as much global support as possible to influence the
colonial state. This made the colonial regime deliberate potential policies more extensively and
sometimes alter decisions based on the perceived optics of a policy. In a number of cases cited in
this dissertation, this pressure helped mitigate or halt the negative impacts that accompanied such
policies and their implementation. This amplification is perhaps best embodied by the activities
of the Reverend Michael Scott, Allard Lowenstein, and those Namibians who travelled to the UN
in 1959 and 1960 to state their case before the UN General Assembly. The popularity of these
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actors led to several media stories that were read and digested by intellectual elites and
influential politicians across the globe.12
Similarly, Namibians embraced these types of institutions because they understood that
organizations like the UN and League of Nations could leverage their international political
standing and resources to alter or temper the behavior of the colonial state. Namibians knew that
the colonial state possessed disproportionately more power than themselves and that by utilizing
transnational institutions and actors as conduits for their own agency and resistance, Namibians
could alter the power dynamics of their relationship with the colonial state to their benefit. The
Basters had minimal success with this approach during their petition-writing campaign in the
Interwar Years, but the use of international pressure as an instrument of resistance proved more
successful in the 1950s and 1960s as Namibians accessed the power and influence of the UN
through their petitions and testimonies. Following a petition-writing campaign to the UN, the
General Assembly issued a series of UN resolutions in the 1950s that halted forced land
expropriations at Hoachanas and Aminuis and condemned the South African government’s
pursuit of these apartheid-based removals.13 Combined with the Namibian students’ testimonies
at the UN and another series of UN resolutions, the use of international political pressure as
leverage against the colonial regime belied why Namibians turned to transnational institutions
during this period.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Namibians also embraced transnational resistance
for the access that this strategy provided to immense international pools of resources. After
experiencing nearly four decades of socioeconomic and political underdevelopment at the hands
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of the German government, Namibians faced similar underdevelopment by the South African
colonial regime that was made more salient by the state’s hardline segregationist and apartheid
policies. As a result, Namibians possessed a limited number of resources in South West Africa
that could be used to resist the colonial state. Thus, access to the resources possessed by
transnational actors and institutions were crucial to Namibians’ ability to effectively resist the
state’s policy of underdevelopment and oppression. The UNIA and AME Church presented
Namibians with access to important actors and institutions that provided economic and political
support that resulted in the construction of numerous school buildings intended to fight economic
underdevelopment, and the creation of a social welfare program meant to limit the devastating
impacts of socioeconomic disaster. Likewise, the League and the UN provided Namibians with
access to extensive networks connecting students, priests, politicians, and others, for the purpose
of fighting the South African government’s legal claims to the territory. Scholarships served as
an important form of aid to facilitate the development of a Namibian intelligentsia in exile and
brought the South West Africa case to the international forefront. In each of these instances,
transnational institutions and actors presented Namibians with access to resources, people, and
networks that were used to challenge the colonial state more effectively.
One question posed in the introduction was whether these transnational resistance
campaigns were part of some larger preconceived resistance strategy in the Police Zone between
1919 and 1962. It is clear that there was never an explicit agreement by the actors referenced in
this work to coordinate and embrace transnational institutions as a way to resist the colonial
state’s oppressive policies. Rather, Namibians turned to transnational forms of resistance when
the opportunity presented itself and made logical sense in the achievement of Namibians’
broader subnational sociopolitical and economic goals. While some of the resistance campaigns
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overlapped on subject matter, shared historical actors, and at times coordinated on specific issues
like the forced land removals of the 1950s, there was no territory-wide effort to simultaneously
or exclusively pursue transnational institutions to frustrate the colonial state. In most instances,
transnational resistance strategies were used alongside more territorially-bounded campaigns that
involved labor strikes, work stoppages, or boycotts.

Finding the Subnational in the Transnational: Subnational Concessions
and the Success of Transnational Resistance Strategies in the Police Zone
While the creation and nature of the transnational networks and strategies employed by
Namibians in the Police Zone make up a bulk of this work, questions were also posed in the first
chapter about the way that Namibian sociopolitical systems impacted the resistance campaigns
and what types of subnational concessions and reforms were demanded. The aims of these
transnational resistance strategies and the concessions they sought to win from the South African
state were mostly subnational in nature, despite the networks spanning continents, oceans, and
national boundaries. Historically, the scholarship on this time period focused on tracing the roots
of nationalism and connecting these resistance campaigns to the activities of the national
political parties and armed liberation struggle of the 1960s and 1970s.14 This dissertation,
conversely, contends that most of the resistance strategies and actions taken by Namibians were
not part of some long linear progression toward nationalism and national independence, but
instead formulated as a response to particular subnational, regional, and local everyday concerns
in the Police Zone.

See Emmett, Popular Resistance and Pirio, “The Role of Garveyism” for examples of works that aim to uncover
the roots of nationalism in Namibia.
14
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The subnational concerns of Namibians’ transnational resistance campaigns, and the very
way that specific campaigns developed and grew, often broke along existing ethnopolitical and
geopolitical lines, all with the express purposes of carving out spheres of influence, challenging
the colonial state, and improving Namibians’ quality of life in the territory. One of the key
subnational concerns that Namibians addressed through the use of transnational actors and
institutions was the re-establishment of subnational political autonomy in the Police Zone. At
times, Namibians’ political ambitions during this period are portrayed as seeking the complete
overthrow of the colonial state and the removal of white hegemony over the entire South West
Africa territory. Despite this depiction, most resistance campaigns in the Police Zone during this
time centered on achieving subnational political autonomy or concessions for one’s own group,
since modern forms of African nationalism were still in their infancy in the territory.
In the 1920s, these subnational desires were most apparent with the Rehoboth Basters
and their petition-writing campaign to the League of Nations. Rather than call for complete
territorial independence for all Namibians, they instead focused their energies and resistance on
re-establishing the political autonomy in the Gebiet that they secured under German colonial
rule. The Basters worked through the transnational League of Nations and used its vast
international resources and legal mechanisms to challenge the control that the SWAA exerted
over Rehoboth, but their claims centered almost exclusively on the Gebiet and mentioned only
other “small nations” in Europe receiving independence as a result of their participation in World
War I instead of other groups in Namibia’s Police Zone. The Nama at Rehoboth also sought the
re-establishment of their subnational political autonomy through the UNIA in the 1920s and laid
claim to the formerly Nama areas surrounding Rehoboth. Although their claims failed, it
highlights the role those transnational institutions played in Namibians’ attempts to resist the
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colonial state and win subnational concessions around political autonomy and exclusion from the
colonial state.
The campaigns surrounding the Basters and Nama in 1920’s South West Africa represent
the clearest examples of transnational resistance campaigns that were exclusionary in their
political goals. Ethnically, these approaches were exclusive to the Basters and Nama and sought
localized concessions and reforms. Whereas later strategies sought to be more involved in the
colonial political process, these two campaigns instead demanded exclusion from colonial rule
and policies and the return of political autonomy in the decision-making process. The Basters,
specifically, frequently differentiated themselves from other Namibians in the territory and
contended that they should not be subjected to German or South African colonial rule because of
the various treaties they constructed and their military service during World War I. Likewise, the
Nama members of the UNIA did not demand concessions within the colonial framework, but
instead demanded the complete return of ancestral lands and exclusion from the colonial
government’s repressive policies.
In addition to subnational concerns on the restoration of political autonomy, other
resistance strategies focused on the socioeconomic instability of the time and the improvement of
living conditions in one’s particular region or town. In the 1920s, the UNIA emerged in South
West Africa espousing its Pan-African message and calls for national independence for the
territory. This message proliferated in the Police Zone during the association’s early years, but as
Namibians became more familiar with its structure and machinations, they repurposed the
infrastructure and resources of the UNIA to achieve their own subnational goals. Following the
Herero’s rise to power within the South West African UNIA, the association’s messaging and
activities shifted from one of Pan-African unity and national independence and focused more on
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improving the economic conditions for Namibians in the Police Zone. In those areas where the
Herero controlled the UNIA branch, the association called for the re-establishment of herds, the
return of Herero lands, and use of the “sick fund” to alleviate the economic pain and burden felt
by those who became ill or faced an unexpected death in the family.15 In those areas where the
Nama controlled the UNIA branch, like Rehoboth for example, the association was used to press
Nama claims on expropriated lands. While the association did not succeed in achieving many of
these economic claims, through the Herero’s interactions with this transnational association, a
new masculine Herero cultural identity formed, became more salient, and impacted the Herero’s
resistance strategies between the 1930s and 1950s.
The example of the UNIA in the 1920s provides another fine example of how subnational
strategies differed and changed over time. While non-indigenous Namibians maintained control
over the UNIA in 1921, the association demanded exclusion from the colonial state’s repressive
policies and relied on claims of territorial liberation as a recruitment technique. Yet, when it was
clear that territorial liberation would not be achieved by the UNIA, Namibians quickly changed
their strategies and, instead, sought inclusion in the colonial decision-making process. The
Herero used the UNIA and its international audience as a way to demand the restoration of social
programs and herds that would improve their standard-of-living in the territory. The Herero
viewed inclusion and a seat at the table as a more practical way to carve out a sphere of influence
within the colonial superstructure.
This concern with winning subnational socioeconomic concessions continued after World
War II and was a prominent feature of Namibians’ transnational resistance strategies during the
extension of apartheid to the territory in the 1940s and 1950s. Although the petition-writing
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R.S. Cope to J.F. Herbst, 21 December 1921, NAN: SWAA/A50/32.
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campaigns to the UN took on a more nationalistic nature in the 1960s, during the 1950s
Namibians used the UN and the international political pressure it wielded as a way to stop the
forced land expropriations that became commonplace in the 1940s and 1950s. In the early 1950s,
rather than focus on national liberation, Herero chief Hosea Kutako wrote to the UN on behalf of
his followers to prevent the expropriation of valuable arable lands at Aminuis. The Reverend
Markus Kooper undertook a similar campaign in 1959 when the SWAA attempted to remove the
AME congregation at Hoachanas. The nature of the petitions submitted by Kooper and his
followers explicitly asked for the UN to halt their removal from lands that were held by their
ancestors for nearly two centuries. Unlike the UNIA’s failure to dramatically impact
socioeconomic change on the subnational level, the UN issued a series of resolutions that
effectively halted the forced removals at Hoachanas and Aminuis and allowed Namibians to
remain on comparatively more arable land than the SWAA intended.16
Although these two petition-writing campaigns were ethnically exclusive and demanded
concessions that were localized at Aminuis and Hoachanas, their ultimate goal was inclusion in
the colonial decision-making process and to have a larger influence and voice in their
socioeconomic affairs. Kutako, for example, initially attempted to go through official
government channels to explain to the SWAA why their resettlement scheme at Aminuis was
flawed. Markus Kooper and the AME congregation at Hoachanas similarly navigated the state
apparatus to apply for permits to construct a church and school at Hoachanas with state
recognition. When they did finally petition the UN in the 1950s, they still attempted to carve out
their own spheres of influence within the colonial structure by demanding that the UN force the
SWAA to consider their objections to the forced removals and follow established international
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General Assembly Resolution 1357(XIV), The Hoachanas Native Reserve: Resolution, A/RES/1357(XIV) (17
November 1959).
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legal precedents set forth by the transnational bodies. It was only after the SWAA refused to
heed these demands that both men demanded national liberation in their petitions and sought
exclusion from colonial rule and policies.
Lastly, the transnational resistance strategies of Namibians during this period also aimed
to win concession from the colonial state on the matter of improved educational standards.
Namibians turned to the AME Church and its extensive network of activist pastors across the
globe to win subnational concession on this matter. The Nama benefitted substantially from the
relationship that they cultivated with the AME Church agents from South Africa and used the
church’s good standing in the Union to construct churches and school buildings in central South
West Africa. Through transnational agents like Francis H. Gow, the Nama worked through the
AME Church and colonial state to raise the level of education in the Nama areas from Standard
II to Standard VI. This provided Nama schoolchildren with a more advanced education and
served as a mechanism through which the Nama directly resisted the colonial regime’s systemic
underdevelopment of the Namibian population.
The Nama’s use of the AME Church, although mostly ethnically-exclusive, sought
further inclusion in colonial life. Nama parents desired to have the same opportunities and
educational standards that were compulsory and guaranteed to the territory’s white populations.
They viewed improved educational standards as a way to combat educational and economic
underdevelopment. If Nama schoolchildren received improved standards of education, many
believed that this would lead to better and more prestigious jobs, like clergymen, clerical
workers, or schoolteachers, and improve the socioeconomic standing and standard-of-living for
one’s family or community. In a more long-term view, this would also provide a basis for a
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Namibian intelligentsia that could more aptly carve out spheres of subnational influence within
the colonial structure and, at a later date, help lead the nationalist movement.
All of these transnational resistance strategies were developed with the express goal of
achieving subnational concessions to improve the standard-of-living for Namibians in the Police
Zone, carving out new spheres of influence for Namibians, and frustrating the colonial state’s
extension of South African apartheid policies. Some of these resistance strategies were
ethnically-exclusive in nature. The Rehoboth Basters’ petition-writing campaign is perhaps the
best example of an exclusive transnational resistance strategy because it was only the Basters
themselves who submitted petitions and made official subnational claims of political autonomy
from the League of Nations. Other strategies, like Namibians’ use of international student
organizations and foreign universities in the 1950s, were more inclusive and involved Namibian
students of various ethnic and class backgrounds. This more inclusive movement was led by
Basters, Nama, and Herero alike.
Most of the transnational resistance strategies during this period, however, fell
somewhere between completely ethnically inclusive or exclusive. The UNIA for example was
embraced by both the Nama and Herero in the 1920s and was ethnically-inclusive in nature.
However, by 1922 it was apparent that the Herero held the most power within the territory’s
association and exerted a significant amount of influence over the resistance strategies
surrounding the UNIA. The AME Church’s role in Namibians’ resistance strategies followed a
similar path. When it first emerged in South West Africa, the AME Church was an inclusive
organization that served Nama and Herero congregants alike. Yet, when the Oruuano Church
appeared and siphoned off Herero support from the AME Church, it became almost exclusively a
Nama institution and served the Nama as a mechanism for resistance to the colonial state. A
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similarly blurred line between ethnically exclusive and inclusive also appeared in the UN
petition-writing campaigns of the 1950s. Both the Nama and Herero participated in this form of
resistance, but there was limited coordination between the two and each set of petitions sought to
secure its own subnational concessions from the colonial state.17 Although there was no clear
pattern on the inclusivity or exclusivity of Namibians’ transnational resistance campaigns, they
all shared a similar goal: secure subnational concessions from the colonial state to improve
Namibians’ standard of living in the Police Zone and alter the behavior of the oppressive
colonial state.
While ethnic exclusivity was common to many of these transnational resistance
strategies, most of the campaigns deployed by Namibians sought some form of inclusion in the
colonial sphere or the colonial decision-making process. The Herero used the UNIA to demand
concessions from the SWAA that brought them more fully into the colonial economy and
provided them with access to land and herds that could improve their standard-of-living. The
Nama undertook a similar quest with the establishment of AME schools in the Police Zone. They
believed that the provision of compulsory and high-level education represented the best path
toward greater inclusion in the colonial economy, improved occupational opportunities, and an
increased standard-of-living. Similar arguments could be made about Kutako’s and Kooper’s
petitions to the UN and their demands to halt forced land removals that would further weaken
their voice in the colonial decision-making process and socio-economically marginalize their
communities. Perhaps the only resistance strategy covered in this dissertation that was truly
exclusionary in its subnational goals was the petition-writing campaign of the Rehoboth Basters.
They demanded exclusion from oppressive colonial policies and the return of their complete
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See pages 300 through 324 of this dissertation for more on the UN petition-writing campaigns of Hosea Kutako
and Markus Kooper.
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political autonomy in the Gebiet. The Nama made similar territorial demands through the
Rehoboth branch of the UNIA and likewise sought exclusion from the colonial sphere.

Conclusion
Despite their variety of forms and manifestations, transnational resistance campaigns
became the primary way of frustrating the colonial state in South West Africa prior to the
emergence of the national political parties and the commencement of the armed liberation
struggle in the 1960s. Rather than looking at these resistance campaigns as part of some longer
linear trajectory toward nationalism, they should be viewed as characteristically distinct
strategies that were developed for a particular colonial circumstance and, in most cases,
obtaining some level of concessions within the colonial framework for the improvement of their
standard-of-living. The South African colonial administration worked tirelessly to expand its
segregationist policies and apartheid apparatus in South West Africa between 1921 and 1962
and attempted to actively monitor and control Namibians’ movements and activities in the
territory. Under the watchful eye of the state, Namibians developed effective resistance strategies
that frustrated this state apparatus, slowed the extension of these detrimental policies, and carved
out spaces of influence on the subnational level where subnational political and socioeconomic
concessions were won.
The employment of transnational resistance strategies and the use of transnational actors
and institutions to wage these campaigns was a calculated decision by Namibians that shielded
them from the recursive power of the SWAA. Transnational actors could cross national
boundaries more freely, escape the jurisdiction of the South African state, and bring more
attention to the claims and complaints of Namibians stuck within the colony’s borders. The
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power dynamics in these relationships were fluid, with transnational actors and Namibians both
having different motivations for participating in these networks. However, both worked
effectively together between 1921 and 1962 to leverage international pressure against the
colonial state that ultimately tempered and altered its behavior toward Namibians in the territory.
Through these campaigns, Namibians won numerous concessions including improved
educational quality and standards, the halt of forced removals at Aminuis and Hoachanas, the
slower implementation of apartheid policies, more tempered and less violent responses from the
SWAA to perceived acts of resistance, and a few instances of local political autonomy.
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